A HISTORY OF VIGILANTISM AND THE INSECURITY SITUATION IN KISUMU CITY SINCE 1986

BY

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DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to everyone who contributed to and made this work a success.

ABSTRACT

Urban security remains a perennial problem globally. Kenya in particular has faced the challenge of inadequate security in its towns. Quite often, neighborhood groups have emerged to take advantage of these security lapses through vigilantism. Ordinarily, vigilante activities border on criminality despite the acceptability they sometimes enjoy from the locals they purport to protect. The Government of Kenya enacted the Prevention of Organized Crime Act of 2010 and 2012 that proscribes vigilante groups. The prohibition, however, has not deterred these groups. Consequently, Kisumu City has over the years witnessed high levels of insecurity occasioned by the emergence and entrenchment of vigilante groups. According to Crime Statistics Economic Survey report of 2015, the City has continued to experience heightened insecurity instigated by vigilante groups. This study, therefore, purposed to investigate the activities of vigilante groups since 1986 and to elucidate how these groups have affected security in Kisumu City. Specifically, the study sought to: establish the historical background of vigilantism in Kisumu City since 1986; describe the activities of the vigilante groups in Kisumu City; and to explain the inter-connections between state and non-state actors in providing security in Kisumu. The study adopted Bjorn Moller's (2003) interpretation and perspective on Conflict Theory, by which he asserts that conflict occurs at various levels based on social, economic and political structures in a society. The major tenets of the theory are marginalization, poverty, and inequality. The study made use of historical descriptive design to investigate and analyze the phenomenon under study. Purposive and snowballing sampling techniques were used to identify Key Informants for the study. The study area was Kisumu City, with a total population of 285,412. The target population was 55 respondents. Primary data was collected through Key Informant Interview Guide (11), In-Depth-Interview Guide (11) and Focus Group Discussion (33). Secondary data was collected from library research and archival reports. Data analysis involved both document and content analysis. The findings revealed that vigilante groups in Kisumu City specifically the *Baghdad Boys* emerged in 1986 as a result of state security failure, unemployment, ethnic animosity, economic hardships and political marginalization. Consequently, the period in the late 1980s, leading to the repeal of section 2A of the Kenyan constitution in order to allow multipartism explains the resurgence of vigilante groups and vigilantism in Kisumu. Particularly, this study deduced that KANU's struggle to retain power and its several years of establishing a repressive system of governance left Kisumu politicians with no option but to co-opt vigilante groups into their political mobilization and other activities as they faced state sponsored violence and police brutality in what was publicly considered as a melting pot for opposition politics. The study further established that vigilante groups evolved from neighborhood groups to political movements and, eventually, to criminal gangs. It ascertained that vigilante groups in Kisumu City depicted organized recruitment procedures and hierarchical structures, and engaged in various political, social and economic activities. In retrospect, this study pointed to a symbiotic relationship between the police and vigilante groups, confirming the general public perception by majority of Kisumu residents that vigilante groups thrived and continued to perpetuate their criminal activities by conspiring with a number of rogue police officers of all ranks. The study concluded that failure by State agencies to address security concerns and the socio-economic needs of City residents contributed to the formation and development of vigilante groups. The study recommended police reforms and an integrated approach to security in Kisumu City. It also advocated for the enactment of legislations to curb insecurity in Kisumu City and other urban areas as a way of minimizing or completely eliminating vigilantism that continues to endanger the security of citizens and leads to repression of democratic idreals within the locality. A reflection on the findings and analysis from this study signals to an enrichment of knowledge that is available on urban security from the angle of the emergence and growth of vigilantism and the intricacies of urban (in) security as a key governance issue.

TABLE OF CONTENT

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

FGD	:	Focus Group Discussions
IRIN	:	Integrated Regional Information Networking
KANU	:	Kenya African National Unity
KHRC	:	Kenya Human Rights Commission
KHRW	:	Kenya Human Rights Watch
Kicomi	:	Kicomi Cotton Millss
KII	:	Key Informant Interview
KNA	**:**	Kenya Natinal Archives
KNDR	:	Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation
KPU	:	Kenya People's Party
KYW	:	KANU Youth Wingers
LRA	:	Lord's Resistance Army
MRC	:	Mombasa Republican Council
NARC	:	National Alliance Rainbow Coalition
O.I	:	Oral Interview
ODM	:	Orange Democratic Movement.
PDM	:	Pwani Democratic Movement
SAPPS	:	Structural Adjustment Programme
SLDF	:	Sabaot Land Defense Forces
TRAC	:	Terror Research and Analysis Consortium

DEFINATION OF TERMS

OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF TERMS

Crime   -   The act of violation of law from which formal penalties are applied by some government authority or engaging in prohibited acts whether violent or otherwise.

Security   -   Freedom from danger and anxiety, freedom of individual to enjoy rights; the act of feeling safe, free and assured.

Vigilante groups   -   An organized group of people, with or without support from the state who undertake security related activities and at times engage in criminal activities and subsequently undermining national security.

State   -   A nation or territory considered as organized political community under one government.

Non-state   -   Used to describe something that does not belong to or is not controlled by a government.

Vigilantism   -   Law enforcement undertaken by a self-appointed group of people without legal authority/security related activities organized and run covertly or overtly by a group of civilians outside the legally recognized frameworks

Gang/Militia   -   This refers to an illicitly organized group of persons, with plainly defined, set and radical rules whose violation can lead to severe punishment including death. It can also be defined as group of people organized in a paramilitary formation characteristically regarding themselves as defenders of individual rights against the supposed intrusion of the government. However, at times they can be state owned depending on their primary objective.

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF PLATES

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Security remains a serious challenge to many urban centers and cities in the world. In most polities, security is a key function of either national or federal governments. These institutions secure citizens as provided for in their laws or by laws (Okoth 2010). However, due to population explosion in urban areas and strained budgets for security provision, the state agencies entrusted with the provision of security in cities have often found themselves overwhelmed (Kenya's Crime Statistics Economic Survey, 2018). As such, security gaps and vacuums characterized by ineptness of those directly charged with the responsibility are created. It is this ineffectiveness that has been exploited by such neighborhood groups like vigilantes through their organized activities that have in turn ended up being a threat to many urban inhabitants (Asyraf, 2016).

Scholars have advanced varied interpretations of vigilantism. For instance, Doomsday (2009), Johnston (1996) and Shortland (1984) perceive vigilantism as a planned act whose engagements are more often than not set-up beforehand by people having a common interest. Similarly, Johnston (1996), Sheffield (1983) and Abraham (1987) perceive a vigilante as a private security group. Such vigilante groups include Ku Klux Klan, an outfit constantly used against blacks in the United States of America, and which led to the formation of Black Panthers as a means of retaliation (Shortland 1984). In addition, the US witnessed other forms of vigilantism namely, the Battalion of Lights Fart, Spokane, Zetas, Tijuana Liudad and Juaraz, Montana Vigilantes and Patriots (Johnston, 1996). A study by Pokot (2012) reveals that social, political and economic reasons fuel the emergence of these groups in America and other parts of the world. Vigilantes have been employed by the locals for protection against their perceived foes. Politicians use them during political rallies and campaigns for security purposes.

Doomsday (2009) and Huggins, (1991) further envisage a vigilante as a group of self-styled militias who execute their activities outside the parameters of law and order. These scholars contend that vigilantism is characterized by the use of violence and force, an aspect that makes vigilantes a threat to security. Huggins, (1991) explains that such vigilante groups include *Latin Kings, the Jamaican Pose, Azaka Boys, Primero Commando da Capita (PPC)* and *Mexican Mafias* in Central America, *Inkatha* in South Africa and *Mungiki* in Kenya. On the other hand, Ayyildz (1995) perceives a vigilante as a group that is illegally used to bring to end unpleasant situations. According to him, most of the groups owe their origins to the social-economic decadence of their set-ups, which differ from one region to another.

In addition, Jennifer *et al.* (2014) views vigilante groups in India, Brazil and Britain as "gangs" often associated with brutality and senseless and destructive violence. According to her, early studies of these "gangs" depicted them as alternative sources of order in urban slums experiencing security lapses. In spite of their proliferation there is little consensus regarding what constitutes a 'gang'. The term is used to denote phenomena ranging from organized crime syndicates to groups of youths who gather spontaneously on street corners to engage in their criminal activities.

The varied scholarly interpretations of vigilantism notwithstanding, most scholars perceive the phenomenon as characterized by the use of violence and force, rendering the actions of vigilantes a threat to security. Despite this defining characteristic, some vigilante groups also include non-violent roles such as neighborhood guard (Hine 1998). Hine argues that vigilante groups protect their communities and people against external or internal attacks. Such groups include Anti-theft organizations in Bugisu District in Uganda and Sungusungu in Kisii and Tanzania. Bachman and Alvarez (2007) observe the importance of vigilante groups in enforcing security in areas that experience security slip-ups. For instance, white farmers in the Orange Free State in South Africa in the 1910's and 1920's used vigilante groups for their

security since the colonial government was busy with administrative duties (Murray 2013). It is clear that vigilantism is reactionary and emerges in response to prevailing socio-economic or political circumstances, real or imagined. Thus, scholarship around vigilantism and urban security studies need to push further beyond the prism of the criminality narrative that characterizes knowledge around such groups.

This study adopts Bachman and Alvarez's (2007) definition of vigilantism as law enforcement undertaken by a self-appointed group of people without legal authority. Accordingly, vigilante groups enforce security in areas that experience security lapses. However, the groups may later morph into criminal gangs that engage in unlawful acts such as rape, theft, destruction of property, murder and drug trafficking.

The history of vigilante groups in Kenya predates independence. Hyde (2002) opines that during the colonial era in the late 1940's and early 1950s, there were vigilante groups operating in Kenya. For example, *Anake a Forti* vigilante group was mainly formed to hasten Kenya's quest for independence and to fight for the return of African land that had been taken by the colonialists. Oloo (2010) perceives the *KANU Youth Wing* of 1960 as a vigilante group used to silence politicians in the opposition party KADU. Later in the 1980s and 1990s more vigilante groups emerged (Anderson, 2002). According to the Kenya Human Rights Commission (2008), there are over 45 vigilante groups in Kenya. These include *Sungusungu, Sirilanka, Kuzasha Boys, Chinkororo, Amachuma, Mungiki, Jeshi la Embakasi, Sabaot Land Defense Forces (SLDF)* and *Taliban*. The rise of these vigilante groups has been triggered by security and governance vulnerabilities in Kenya (Hyde, 2002). While this historiographical background is relevant in highlighting the origin and nature of vigilantism in Kenya, it also clearly indicates the ethnic orientation of such groupings.

It is clear that vigilantism has been rampant in Kenya over the years (Ngunyi and Katumanga, 2012). According to Anderson (2002), in 1990s and 2000s, Mungiki has been the most

prominent vigilante group in Kenya. The group operated in Central Kenya, Nakuru and Nairobi's informal settlements, especially in Eastland. Anderson further explains that due to the activities of Mungiki and their threat to National Security, the Government of Kenya enacted the Prevention of Organized Crime Act in 2010 and 2012. The act criminalized all non-registered groups involved in illegal activities. It further gave the Kenya Police force the authority to suppress and eliminate all groups believed to engage in criminality (Okoth 2010). Despite the enactment of this Act, the country has not witnessed any successful suppression of vigilante groups.

President Daniel Moi took over power in 1978. To consolidate his powers, he initiated a 1982 amendment of the constitution that made Kenya a one–party state. In the absence of an opposition, Moi used violence, harassment, and intimidation to maintain a firm grip on power. Faced with this suppression, economic hardships, political exclusion and insecurity, the pro-democracy movements in the opposition strongholds of Nyanza, Western and Central provinces began to agitate for mulitpartyism. In response, the government backed the 1992 ethnic clashes in the Rift Valley, Western and Coast provinces to put in check communities deemed hostile to the government (Throup and Hornsby 1998).

Many vigilante groups emerged between 1982 and 1990 as ethnic based militias formed to secure their ethnic communities and the political elite. This was at the height of single party dictatorship in Kenya. According to Crime Statistics Economic Survey (2015), the emergence of vigilante groups in Kisumu can be traced back to around this time then *Baghdad Boys,* a neighbourhood group organized around vigilantism, started its operations. The group aimed at addresing insecurity and political exclusion experienced in Kisumu. Even with the return of multiparty politics in 1992, socio-economic deprivation of the majority of Kenyans, the collapse of social infrastructure, ethnic violence and the uninhibited accumulation of power persisted. This explains the proliferation and increased activities of the vigilante groups in

Kisumu City in the years that followed the onset of multi party politics. The city has lately witnessed rampant criminal activities associated with the emergence of vigilante groups. These groups comprise *Baghdad Boys, Darfur Boys, Nyalenda Hood Boys, Ghetto People, Kosovo, Small Base, Taliban, Langata Barracks, Vuvuzelas, China Squad, Taliban,* and the *American Marines* (Okoth 2010, Masese and Mwenzwa 2012).

Goodstein (1984) argues that vigilante activities are not always planned. He reiterates that although vigilante groups are formed to help in handling high cases of theft, robbery, rape and other immoral behaviors in the society, their activities are usually characterized by the use of violence and force. Hence, while vigilante groups are believed to provide security to people within their neighborhood, they also pose a threat to security. This is the case with *Soldiers of Odin* and *Predator Exposure* in England, *Battalion of Lights Fart, Ku Klux Klan* and *Sungusungu* in Tanzania (Madison, 1975).

A scrutiny of security situation in Kisumu City and its environs shows a steady rise in insecurity and the frequency of criminal activities (Reported Crime Statistics, 2015). According to Kenya's Crime Statistics Economic Survey of 2018, Kisumu is one of the most insecure urban centers with an average crime rate of 4%. In the same year, the City recorded 747 crime reports, including 400 instances of lawbreaking instigated by vigilante groups, 182 burglaries, 98 homicides, 61 assaults and 77 cases involving possession and trafficking of illicit drugs. Kondele and Manyatta estates recorded the highest number of reported criminal cases followed by Migosi and Nyalenda and Kolwa (Crime Statistics Economic Survey, 2015). Vigilantism, therefore, has majorly instigated the widespread insecurity in Kisumu City. This heightened crime has affected negatively the right to life and created limited space for private initiatives and entrepreneurship (Crime Statistics Economic Survey, 2015). The study intended to establish the extent to which these criminal activities and practices are associated with organized vigilante groups in Kisumu City, and how the community exploits

vigilantism either to bolster or to undermine security in the City. The study delved into the the organizational structure of the vigilante groups, members' recruitment pocedures and training, and how these contribute to the groups' involvement in incsecurity.

Vigilantism involves convoluted operations in which several players are involved. These players include state actors like the police and other security agents on the one hand, and non-state security actors such as militias and vigilantes on the other (Pratten 2008). Most studies argue that the emergence of vigilant groups is fuelled by a deep-rooted distrust of the police and the state to provide basic human and economic security (Dixon and Johns 2001). When people perceive the police as illegitimate, they establish an alternate response to maintain social control. However, according to some studies, the police are also known to train vigilantes on some instances, especially when there is shortage of police personnel. Furthermore, high crime rates contribute to the growth of private security firms (Krahmann, 2002 and Singer, 2008) and other community policing strategies such as the Nyumba Kumi Initiative. Sometimes these non-state actors become overbearing just like the police they intend to supplant, thus tainting their relationship with the community. Few studies have ventured into the intricate inter-relationship between these players in Kisumu City. There was need, therefore, to interrogate the interconnection between state and non-state actors in the provision of security in Kisumu City.

Many studies have been conducted on various aspects of vigilantism in many parts of the world. However, no study has specifically sought to unravel the history of the emergence and development of vigilantism in Kisumu City especially since the city remains as one of the most prone areas to insecurity in the country. Consequently, the present inquiry enderavored to trace the history and contexts of the formation and growth of vigilant groups in Kisumu City. It also aimed at determinining how the knowledge of such groups impacts on sustainable security in urban areas like Kisumu.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Urban security remains a serious challenge to many cities and towns in the World. In many instances, the state security agencies are overwhelmed by population burst creating loopholes and lapses that neighbourhood and underground groups exploit. While it is true that these neighbourhood groups, organized around vigilantism, emerge to address real social problems occasioned by weak governance structures, they quite repeatedly metamorphose into criminal gangs. Despite the original acceptability amongst members of the community where they operate, and which offers them a pseudo-legitimate status, the groups slowly degenerate into a security threat to members they ought to protect. In such situations, many governments respond reactively rather than proactively. For instance, though the government of Kenya enacted Prevention of Organized Crime Act in 2010 and 2012, which banned all illegal groupings in Kenya, these groups have continued to operate, posing security threat to the urban dwellers in Kisumu. It was important to uncover why these groups still operate and cause security challenges in Kisumu City despite the Acts. The study, therefore, endeavored to investigate the history, activities and the extent to which state security agents and vigilante groups engage, either to mitigate or to escalate insecurity in Kisumu. The researcher employed a bottom-up approach: drawing from the understanding and everyday experiences of people residing in Kisumu City.

1.3 Research Questions

This research endeavored to answer the following specific questions:

i. What is the historical background of vigilantism in Kisumu city since 1986?

ii. What are the activities of the vigilante groups in Kisumu city?

iii. What are the convergence and divergence points in security in Kisumu between state and non-state actors?

1.4 Objectives of the Study

The objectives of this study were to:

i.   Establish the historical background of vigilantism in Kisumu City since 1986

ii. Describe the activities of the vigilante groups in Kisumu city.

iii. Explain the inter-connections between state and non-state actors in providing security in Kisumu City.

1.5 Justification and Significance of the Study

Wachenje (2015), Kegoro (2009), Maribe (2014), Oyagi (2016), and Akinyi (2014) have conducted several studies around the question of urban governance, urban security, and the emergence of vigilante groups. Most of these studies have approached urban security from the top by focusing mostly on state or formal actors that include the National Police and private security companies. However, the study perceives security as an everyday practice. As a result, the researcher employed a bottom-up approach. The method helped the researcher to focus on the local people and how they strive to meet their security needs. The approach helped in providing a comprehensive narrative on urban security through the prism of Kisumu as a city. The suitability of Kisumu City as a study area emanates from its high level of insecurity that is associated with gang violence and vigilantism. This violence is heightened by brutal police crackdowns on residents in the City, as part of a pattern of repression in opposition strongholds. This brutality triggers more violent reactions from the vigilante groups, according to Crime Statistics Economic Survey (2015). The area also exhibits high fluidity in the nature and operations of these vigilante groups based on how they either metamorphose or reconstitute themselves into splinter rival gangs. Apart from enriching the existing literature on vigilante groups, the study attempted to plug the scholarly gap created by previous studies that have approached urban security from the top. Furthermore, the study findings help to inform the development and formulation of policies

8

on urban security especially the integrated approach, which involves both state and non-state actors.

1.6 Scope and Delimitations of the Study

This study confined itself within the geographical area of Kisumu City in Kisumu County and data collected between January and December 2021. The study focused on the Kisumu-based vigilante groups. Any mention of groups outside the city was for illustration or comparison purposes. This study was limited to the history of vigilante groups, the impact of the groups' activities on insecurity, the inter-connection between state and non-state actors in providing urban security, and how the interconnection was manifested since 1986, through vigilantism in Kisumu city. The year 1986 was the point of departure of the study because studies cited it as the commencement year for these vigilante groups (Crime Statistics Economic Survey, 2015). This study period stretched upto 2023 since urban security is an ongoing concern and most cities have not achieved zero tolerance to insecurity.

1.7 Theoretical Framework

This study used Conflict Theory by Moller (2003). It is an extension of Marxist analyization of conflict and Johan Galtung's explanatory approach to conflict in what he referred to as the conflict theory triangle. Bjorn Moller's (2003) analytical typology of Conflict Theory mainly addresses conflicts that arise from security issues hence its adoption for this study. His exploration of the typology conflicts offers great insights into the concept of conflict and its manifestations from the various theoretical viewpoints as noted.

According to Moller (2003), conflicts at various levels of the society are based on social, economic and political structures. Conflicts range from violent to non-violent or global to inter-personal and marital disputes. According to the theory, groups of people with different concerns make up a society. The groups may be based on social class, gender, and ethnicity. Social problems emerge from the differences and the continuing conflict between these

groups. Conflict Theory is premised on the role of individuals as the agents of change in their surroundings. This theoretical perspective recognizes the individual as the main actor in a group. The individual is inherently self-centered and prone to either peaceful or violent acts. The self-centeredness emanates from the individual's desire to fulfill his self-belief within the perspective of "one person's gain is another person's loss." The common denominators in this theoretical perspective are basic human needs, personal security, and political and economic satisfactions. Proponents of the theory posit that people's actions are always based on rational cost-effective analysis of their environment, and how best they can use either coercive power or diplomatic means to gain from the environment. The theory was critical to this work because it presented a framework for the observation of the behavior of vigilante groups within the area of study. It also helped this study to discern how members of these groups exploit their surroundings for their selfish ends.

Conflict Theory based on Moller's (2003) theoretical analysis postulates that political or vigilante groups actively engage in socio-economic and political competition against each other. This competition defines the political orientation and inclination of various political camps during general elections. The ability of the leaders of political factions to identify opportunities, real or imagined, determines the viability of vigilante activities. The theory postulates that vigilante groups are in constant socio-economic and political competition against each other. This competition defines the political orientation and inclination of varying political camps during general elections. In this state of competition, the politicians and the vigilantes can command cooperation from their subjects. Bjorn Moller's view of conflict, therefore, was crucial in explaining the history, the roles and the impact of vigilante groups in Kisumu City.

By analyzing Marxist theory of conflict, Norwegian peace researcher, Johan Galtung's (1996) conflict theory triangle and John Burton's (1990) Human Needs Thory of Conflict,

Bjorn Moller (2003), that while all three theories posit an objective antagonism between the "haves" and the "have-nots", it is important to stress that it is not absolute (material and other) poverty, which causes conflict behaviour. He further argues that there is no strong correlation, if any, between violent behaviour and living standards. Accordingly, it is relative poverty or deprivation that causes grievances and conflict behaviour, i.e. a standard of living which is seen as unsatisfactory in comparison with something else—either with that which others (are seen to) enjoy, or with what the individual or group in question used to enjoy, or what s/he expected to enjoy in the future. Hence, deteriorating living conditions may cause conflicts, as may even a declining rate of growth, because it may frustrate overly optimistic expectations, thereby producing aggression and a propensity for direct violence, as implied by the famous "frustration-aggression hypothesis" (Moller 2003).

Other proponents of this theoretical perspective are Fisher *et al* (2000); Reuchler (2001) and Paffenholz and Cheru (2002). These scholars locate conflict by vigilante groups to the individual or collective agency acting on behalf of their leaders. They highlight perceptions and misperceptions as the causes for violence. As a result of social, economic or political reasons, and often orchestrated by their aggressive behavior, vigilantes tend to make a differentiation between "self" and "others". As such, this theory perceives the fundamental actors in groups as individuals and privately constituted vigilante groups seeking to promote their independent interests. The society comprises individual human agents who form private groups or organizations to advance their political, economic and social interests using vigilante groups.

Another tenet the theory propagates is inequality, which is realized through class exploitation of unequal economic structures of the society. Accordingly, unequal access to resources for different groups is the tool that operationalizes or patterns vigilantism. The theory states that people can feel marginalized and underrated by the state in terms of economic development

and political inclusion. Marginalization can lead to unequal development because some areas will enjoy a bigger share of resources while others will be denied basic amenities such as clean water, better roads, affordable housing and adequate security. In such cases, the marginalized group will form vigilante groups to fight for economic equality. The groups may also fight for political inclusion to ensure fair political representation of their people.

According to the theory, social ills, poverty, perennial losses in elections, persistent rigging during party primaries and sectional political enclaves have all led to the formation of vigilante groups either to guard the community's votes or to champion the interests of the community. Politicians can also work with vigilante groups to carry out rigging during elections. The theory explains how groups form and evolve along social, economic and political lines. The current study purposed to establish the historical background of vigilantism in Kisumu city since 1986. The study traced the social, economic and political formation and evolution of such groups. Conflict Theory as propounded by Moller (2003) provided a clear framework within which to understand, interpret and analyze the emergence of vigilantism in Kisumu City. The theory helped the researcher to interpret data on the operations of vigilante groups in Kisumu within the wider scholarship on conflict and security. The study traced the origin of vigilantism to the marginalization of certain social groups within the context of the urban-underclass. The study interrogated factors that contributed to the entrenchment of vigilantism in Kisumu City. The researcher also used the tenets of this theory to determine whether the emergence of vigilante groups can be attributed to social, economic and political inadequacies and security lapses. Thus, the theory provided an ideal benchmark of understanding the current study.

Most importantly, not all conflicting sides to all conflicts behave in the same way. Behaviour differs not merely because of different objectives, but also as a function of the means at the disposal of each side (Moller 2003). Therefore, this study sought to understand vigilantism in

Kisumu by acknowledging the socio-cultural, political, economic and geographical particularities.Conflict and its causal agents is not universalistic. Rather, it is unique based on context. This fact therefore helped not only validate this study but also provided the researcher with the impetus to avoid generalization and pay attention to the forces explaining the history of vigilantism in Kisumu, their activities and the interconnection between state and non-state actors involved in security/insecurity in Kisumu.

CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

The researcher reviewed selected literature according to the objectives of the study. This section delved into the existing literature on the history of vigilante groups. It also examined the role played by vigilante groups and the impact of such groups on the security of urban residents. The section attempted to explain the inter-connections between state and non-state actors in providing urban security with an emphasis to vigilantism in Kisumu city since 1986. The discussion opened up the scholarly gap that the current study sought to fill.

2.2 Origins of Vigilante Groups

Jennifer *et al.* (2014) discusses the origin, growth and nature of vigilantes in India, Brazil and Britain. She asserts that "gangs," though often associated with brutality and senseless destructive violence, are not inherently antagonistic. Initial studies on "gangs" portray them as alternative sources of order in urban slums where state authority is lacking. The term "vigilantism" denotes phenomena ranging from organized crime syndicates to groups of youths who gather spontaneously on street corners**.** Some societies depict these groups as important elements in youth life cycles. In spite of their proliferation, the literature reviewed shows little consensus regarding what constitutes a 'gang.' As a result, the current study endeavored to determine the nature and the modus operandi of the various groups operating in Kisumu City.

According to Pratten (2018), vigilantism has become an endemic problem in Nigeria's social and political landscape. This situation is occasioned by rampant cases of theft and robbery. Vigilante groups are also organized at various levels, ranging from lineage to ethnic groups and from location to ward. At all these levels, vigilantes assist in fighting crime and in political lobbying. Similarly, Fourchard (2008) explores the origin of vigilantism in South – West Nigeria. He asserts that vigilantes began to thrive in this area in response to the illegal

14

acquisition of oil wealth by politicians. The aggrieved citizens responded by forming vigilantes. For instance, a group called Sode was formed in Ibadan Town in early 1930's to assist in community policing in towns.

Elrena and Rontsch (2008) examine how ineptness of state in offering adequate security to its citizens encouraged citizens to form self-help groups and vigilantes. In Nigeria, for instance, people called on their members of parliament to institutionalize the role of vigilantes to beef up security. Pratten, Fourchard and Elrena (2008) have established the origins and the essence of these vigilante groups. Their scholarly work, therefore, was quite significant to this study since it helped in unraveling the reasons for the emergence of vigilante groups in Kisumu City.

The long history of apartheid, which alienated most youths, is central to gang movements in South Africa. In the early 1980s, the Apartheid regime formed vigilante groups to dismantle or weaken the opposition (Mzala, 1988). Most of the vigilantes comprised unemployed youths and ex-prisoners. Mzala notes that Inkatha and Ama-Africa Pogo were the most lethal of these groups. He explains how the groups were embroiled in the harassment and elimination of political opponents. Even though Kisumu City offers a different case scenario, Mzala's work was significant to this study as it shed light on the involvement of the youths in vigilante movements.

Furthermore, insecurity in South Africa made the white farmers to form vigilante groups (Murray, 2013). The white vigilantes did not fear prosecution since they knew local authorities were pre-occupied with administrative rather than farming issues. According to Murray, white vigilante groups offered security to white farmers. Murray points towards state sponsored vigilantism in a highly divided and racist society that apartheid South Africa was. This study explored vigilantism in an expectedly inclusive urban environment.

Scholars have cited state oppression as one of the main reasons for the emergence of vigilante groups across the World. Ikelegbe (2005) examines factors that enabled vigilante groups to emerge and thrive in the Niger Delta of Nigeria. He sees state oppression as a cause of lawlessness, criminal violence and insecurity, hence the formation of vigilante groups. His study examines what he terms as "the economy of conflict." This comprises intensive and violent inter and intra communal or ethnic conflicts over resources, plunder of oil revenue and environmental degradation. He further explains that Nigerian government agencies had symbiotic relations with the vigilantes especially in oil exploration and extraction. Ikelegbe's work was significant to the current study as it gave insight into the history of vigilante groups. However, it did not delve deeply into the historicity, roles and the impact of the vigilante groups on the insecurity situation in urban areas such as Kisumu.

Vigilantes have often divided Kenyans along 'tribal' lines (Wafula, 2008). In the early 1980's, many vigilante groups were formed to protect the interests of different ethnic communities. For instance, a section of the Kikuyu in Central Kenya formed the Mungiki to enforce the community's cultural practices. The group later spread to Nairobi and parts of the Rift Valley to protect Kikuyu kinsmen in the diaspora. The Sungusungu among the Kisii, the Sabaot Land Defense Force, the KAMATUSA and the Taliban were all formed to secure ethnic interests. Wafula's work was relevant to this study since it enhanced the researcher's understanding of the causes of vigilante groups. The current study focused on Kisumu's cosmopolitan nature and the extent to which multi-ethnicity played into the formation of vigilante groups and their operations in relation to security.

According to the Kenya Human Rights Commission (2008), there are several vigilante groups in different parts of the country - all formed and organized along tribal lines. Oloo (2010) and Olang and Okoth (2010) made similar observations. According to them, the rise of vigilante groups can be viewed from an ethnic and political perspective. The above works

were relevant to this study since they place emphasis on the political role played by vigilante groups. However, the studies fall short in their analysis of the history and operations of vigilantism in relation to insecurity in Kisumu City. The current study sought to address this scholarly deficit.

Further studies that focused on the activities of vigilante groups in rural set-ups were undertaken by Maribe (2014), who examined Rural Militia Groups in Kenya, Bosibori (2014) who focused on the Transformation of Chinkororo Vigilante Group among the Abagusii, and Wachenje (2015) who ventured into Militia and National Security in Kenya. The current study deviated from these earlier studies by adopting a general approach to the history and activities of organized groups in urban areas using Kisumu City as a case study.

Ogot (1995) examines the extent to which Colonialism fostered the rise of ethnicity. According to him, the British colonial government in Kenya did not allow Kenyans of various communities to interact, fearing that the unity of the ruled would pose a threat to the colonial administration. The colonial government was not only brutal but it also marginalized Africans. The racist and oppressive policies of the government led to the formation of ethno-regional militias and other ethnic organizations to protect the Africans' rights. Ogot's ideas were relevant to this study since they present the ethnic regional origins of vigilante groups. This study borrowed considerably from Ogot's work as it traced the emergence of Vigilantism in Kisumu City.

Various factors led to the emergence and the boom of vigilante groups in Kenya. Mkutu (2014) says lack of development in the North Rift region gave way to ungoverned spaces. The locals created vigilante groups to fill these spaces. These groups seized the opportunity to arm themselves in order to provide security to the locals. In the Northern parts of Kenya, vigilante groups were used to raid their neighboring communities for cattle. Mkutu's study

focused on rural vigilante groups unlike this study, which paid attention to the history of vigilante group in an urban set-up.

Hope (2014) and Keriga (2009) explain how corruption in government institutions led to the emergence of vigilante groups in Kenya. They state that vigilantes arose out of the people's mistrust of corrupt government institutions, which could not provide adequate security. The works cite corruption and weak government institutions as the factors that led to an explosion of vigilante groups. Mutahi (1997) expresses similar sentiments, asserting that having weak and corrupt government security agencies such as the police results in high crime rates. According to him, whenever the police fail to combat crime, civilians turn against them since they see them as a source of insecurity. Therefore, in an attempt to beef up security on their own, people mobilize themselves into vigilante groups. However, the works did not make any case studies. This study explored the history and activities of specific Kisumu-based vigilante groups such as the *Baghdad Boys, China Squad, the American Marines, Darfur Boys, Nyalenda Hood Boys, Ghetto People, Kosovo, Small Base, Taliban, Langata Barracks, Vuvuzelas, China Squad* and *Nyalenda Base*.

Ngunyi and Katumanga (2012) observe Kenya's incapacity to provide security to all her citizens, thus leading to the formation of vigilante groups. Kenya is a heterogeneous state, and the mistrust of state institutions by some groups and citizens has led to the formation of various tribal vigilante groups that provide security at village and community levels. Kisumu is the bedrock of opposition politics, and the current study aimed at explaining how the politics of opposition, marginalization and police brutality play into the emergence and endorsement of vigilantism in the city. The constant political rivalries in Kenya prompt politicians to use vigilantes to eliminate or suppress their political opponents and to protect themselves. According to Oyugi (2003), this has led to the emergence of vigilante groups such as the Taliban, Chinkororo and Mungiki. Katumanga (2012) cites power struggle, failed

state security and poverty as the key reasons for the formation of Mungiki, the Taliban and Mombasa Republican Movement (MRC). His work, however, does not examine the formation of Kisumu-based vigilante groups, a variance the current study paying attention.

The current study attempted to establish whether the factors cited in Katumanga's work could have led to the emergence of other vigilante groups in Kisumu City. Oyugi's study shows how politicians successfully use vigilante groups to obstruct law enforcement agencies from putting them to account for wrongdoing. This state of affairs furthers the formation and growth of these groups. Oyugi's work shed light on how political rivalry led to the formation of vigilante groups. The work assisted the researcher in interrogating the role political rivalry plays in fueling the emergence of vigilante groups in Kisumu City.

Okeke (2013); Akinyi (2014); Masese and Mwenzwa (2012) cite unemployment, poverty, insecurity, weak state institutions and poor community policing as key factors that have led to the emergence and growth of vigilante groups in Kenya. Similarly, a report by the National Crime Research Center, NCRC (2012) explains how politicians capitalize on unemployment to recruit idle youths for their personal security. The report further indicates that impunity and an incompetent legal justice system have contributed to the success of these groups. The report concludes that vigilante groups create fear to the citizens and even to the police. These works were relevant to this study because they address factors that have made vigilante groups to thrive. The current study interrogated these factors vis-à-vis the general government attitude towards security in opposition zones such as Kisumu City.

A report by the World Bank (2010) examined features that enable vigilantes to emerge and prosper in cities. The report states that economic, social and political motivations drive vigilantes to use all available means to achieve their goals. The pursuit of these intended

objectives often lead to insecurity and constant threats to the city dwellers. The report was significant to this work since it highlights some of the factors that add impetus to vigilantism.

Ngunyi and Katumanga (2012) explore the emergence of vigilante groups in slums in Kenya. According to them, slums provide space and opportunities that constantly attract crime. For example, lack of adequate security compels the locals to form joint security groups to protect themselves. Thus, there is a symbiotic relationship between citizens' welfare and the existence of vigilante groups. Ngunyi and Katumanga blame the withdrawal of the police from certain areas for the rise of these vigilante groups. They also blame the politicization of the security sector, which drives ethnic groups that mistrust government security to seek alternative security arrangements. These scholars explain the factors that facilitate the easy formation of vigilantes in slum areas. However, their study does not address the history of these groups and their operations. The current study purposed to examine the history of these groups and their mode of operation in Kisumu City.

Kilonzo (2012) pinpoints social-economic hardships, unemployment and low literacy levels as some of the challenges facing the youths in developing nations. These challenges have pushed the youths to join vigilante groups for survival. To achieve their survival goals, the concerned youths become causes of crime and constant security threats in both urban and rural areas. Kilonzo's study was significant to this work since it highlights the factors that led to the emergence of vigilantism and how vigilante activities lead to insecurity especially in urban areas.

Mueller (2011) and Hope (2014) explore how rampant corruption has led to inequalities, underdevelopment, unemployment and economic and political challenges. According to them, vigilante groups serve political elites. Hope states that rampant corruption provides fertile ground for the operations of vigilantes. The two studies were significant since they

20

address the reasons for the emergence of vigilante groups. This study borrowed from Mueller and Hope as it sought to establish the history of vigilantism in Kisumu City.

A Report on Multi-city study by the World Bank (2010) has described various characteristics of urban areas that easily give rise to vigilante and militia groups. The report notes that communities are easily provoked into violence and insecurity by social, political and economic power struggles. The growth of urban centers may lead to unemployment and idleness among the youths if the government does not create jobs. Jobless youths will resort to illegal activities to acquire an income. Thus, some youths will end up joining militias or vigilante groups. The World Bank Report was relevant to this study since it gives reasons for the emergence of the vigilante groups. However, the report fell short in the elaboration of the history of these groups and in the presentation of case studies. This study purposed to fill this void.

2.3 The Organization, Activities and the Impact of Vigilante Groups

In their study on the organization of vigilante groups in South America, Anderson and Bourne (2013) conclude that these groups have a hierarchical structure of leadership, with a kingpin and other leaders who implement and execute duties as stipulated by the group's leadership. Bruneau (2005) analyzed vigilante groups in the same geographical area. According to him, vigilante groups in South America pose different security challenges. He asserts that these groups operate at different operational levels. For instance, they control economic sectors using violence to dominate market. Bruneau states that, at times, these groups overwhelm the police, challenge State legitimacy and act as government in ungoverned states. These works focus on the existence and operations of vigilante groups in ungoverned spaces. The current work borrowed from the studies as it delved into the operations of the vigilante groups under study. Administratively, Kisumu cannot be

characterized as an ungoverned space, a fact that renders the current study different from the previous ones.

Susanne (2011) groups vigilante organizations into five different categories. According to her, the first category entails ethnic vigilante groups organized along tribal lines such as Mungiki, Chinkororo and Sungusungu. The second category comprises vigilante groups that engage in extortion as they purport to provide the populace with security and other services. The third is composed of vigilante groups that offer their security services to political players. The fourth category includes vigilante groups that disappear or go underground a few months into their formation. The last category of vigilantes comprises groups that purport to provide or augment security in conjunction with the police or other government security agencies.

In their study, Skaperdas and Connotations (1998) show the organization of vigilante groups into a leadership structure with a set of rules and regulations and a judicial system. Bisimba, (2002); Nyamu-Musembi (2003) hold a similar opinion. In their view, vigilantes usurp the roles of a judge to deal with wrong doers in their areas of jurisdiction. The verdicts are usually unfair and lead to the victimization of the innocent. Much of these works concentrated on vigilantism and the justice system. The current work went beyond the justice system to concern itself with the history of the vigilante groups and their impact on the society. Other studies only classified the different categories of vigilante groups. However, the studies are silent on the structure of organization and activities of these groups. This study, therefore, endeavored to fill this gap. Okumu and Ikelegbe (2010) examined various vigilante groups based in Kenya. Their study examined rural based vigilante groups including Mungiki in Central Kenya and the Sabaot Land Defense Force (SLDF) in the Rift Valley. Even though the study delved into the operations of these vigilante groups, it is not specific to the operations of vigilantes in an urban set up, a gap that this study endeavored to address.

Le Sage (2010) studied the organization of vigilantism in Africa. According to him, both the Government and the citizens embrace vigilante groups depending on the interests of each side. In this case, these groups are useful to both the state and the public. This work is informative, and it enabled us to determine the extent to which state actors embrace vigilantism in Kisumu City. Pratten (2008) discusses the organization of vigilante groups into regional and ethnic levels. Pratten's work was important as it helped us understand the operations of vigilantes in mono-ethnic and cosmopolitan settings.

Research by the Human Rights Watch (2002) examines how Kenyan politicians take advantage of joblessness and poverty in slum areas to persuade the youth to join vigilante groups. Subsequently, these groups instigate havoc, murder, intimidation and destruction of property. The Report by Human Rights Watch was relevant to this study because it pinpoints the structure of vigilante groups and their activities and highlights the factors responsible for the formation of these groups.

Manwaring (2007) carried out a study on the history, activities and the impact of vigilantes in a given geographical enclave. According to him, vigilantes can easily take control of the state and its institutions especially in the face of rampant corruption and support from a section of the political class. This observation was important to the current study because it puts emphasis on the effects of vigilantism. The study borrowed from Manwaring's work. However, it went further and scrutinized the history of vigilantes, their operations and their impacts in Kisumu City. Studies by Kamara (2000) and Miklaucic (2010) on various vigilante and militia groups across the world expose the negative effects of these groups. For instance, these groups unleash mayhem and violence to the populace. The studies reveal that some politicians use vigilantes to suppress their political rivals and hence gain political mileage during elections. The researcher made use of these works to gain insight into the

history of vigilantes, modes of operation and the effects of their activities in Kisumu City since 1986.

Research work by Omboto (2013) examines the effects of Sungusungu in Kisii. He states that the group has been involved in punishing criminals in this region. Omboto asserts that in as much as a vigilante group may provide security, it can also become a source of insecurity when group members start collecting taxes and demanding pay from the households for their services. Omboto's work explores how vigilantism negatively affects both interpersonal and societal relationships. The study presented the intersection and the departure points for examining vigilante groups operating in homogenous surroundings and those in heterogeneous setups like Kisumu City.

Bartolucci and Kanneworff (2012) observe that in most parts of Africa where vigilante groups exist, people live in the shadow of violence and threats to their livelihood. There are numerous cases of rape, robbery, murder, extortion and carjacking. In Nigeria, Ghana and Cameroon, for example, these groups transform themselves into highway robbers, criminal networks and extortionists. A report by the Kenya Human Rights Commission (2011) explores the negative effects of vigilantes. The report indicates how Kenyan politicians employ vigilante groups to terrify citizens during elections. In some cases, the groups arrest and detain "suspects" within their own cells and prosecute them in 'Kangaroo' courts. The findings of these works have a bearing on the current study because they depict the activities of vigilante groups. However, much of the works focus only on the negative effects of the activities of vigilante groups. Therefore, the current study endeavored to conduct comprehensive research that addresses the twofold nature of urban vigilante groups in Kisumu City.

2.4 The Inter-Connections Between State and Non-State Actors

In the analysis of India's national security, Prabhakaran (2008) states that a comprehensive understanding of national security should integrate the security of the state and that of the citizens since each is dependent on the other. According to this study, non-state security actors, such as militias, vigilantes and gangsters, are on the rise. Prabhakaran recommended the integration of state and non-state actors in the security system. Thus, this inter-connection between state and non-state actors in the security system in an urban environment like Kisumu became a focus of this study. Moreover, it was of great interest to see the manifestation of the inter-connection between state and non-state actors in urban security matters on vigilantism.

Baker (2002) carried a study on vigilante groups in South Africa. He states that these groups operated independently of the state machinery. He gave an example of Mapogo Matemaga, which was the largest vigilante group in South Africa. The group provided security, in conjunction with the state police, to citizens in areas where the government had failed to provide adequate protection. The current study borrowed from Baker's work, which concentrates on vigilantes in a South African environment under repressive laws. The study also helped the researcher to examine whether the same collaboration between vigilantism and the security agents is evident in Kisumu City. The current study focused on Kisumu in Kenya, where such repressive laws do not exist.

In his analysis of the effects of vigilante groups in Nigeria, Higazi (2008) asserts that the groups created a positive impact on the security situation in the country. According to him, the ratio of police officers to citizens is a paltry 1:1500. Thus, across the country various vigilante groups assist the police in fighting crime. It is clear from Higazi's study that the police and the army train the vigilantes in Nigerian. The main aim of incorporating vigilantes into the security system is to combat crimes that are rampant in Nigeria. Higazi's study

focuses on how vigilantes and the police work jointly to fight crime in the society. The study was significant to this work because it underscores the symbiotic relationship between the state police and vigilante groups. Thus, the current study endeavored to find out whether there is a mutual relationship between the police and vigilantes in Kisumu City.

Smooha and Hanf (1992) underscore the importance of co-operation between the police and the public in the provision of security. According to them, the public should volunteer information to the police. The public, however, requires the legitimacy of the police in order to give this information. With the proliferation of alternative forms of policing, Smooha and Hanf advocated for more accountability from state actors to avoid legitimacy disputes between the police, vigilantes, and private and community policing agents. Hence this study sought to determine the interconnection between the police, the vigilantes and other security agents and suggest ways of harnessing this interconnection in the effective provision of security to urban dwellers.

De Waal (1993) points out at the collapse of the state actors responsible for conflict resolution in the Sudan, thus heightening the activities of non-state actors. This has led to increased access to guns and ammunitions. The availability of firearms has triggered inter-ethnic violence. De Wall's study dwells more on armament, especially the proliferation of small arms and its impact on security. The current study analyzed the participation of state and non-state actors, acting either in competition or in collaboration to achieve the goal of securing cities.

Fleisher (2000) states that Provincial Administrations in Tanzania and Kenya aided in the formation Sungusungu vigilante group to help in fighting crime. The Administration introduced the Sungusungu to the Kuria ethnic group to help stamp out criminal activities. In the 1990s, the Abagusii people of Western Kenya adopted the outfit to control the spiraling crime rate. However, the group soon became a menace to the residents. According to a report

26

by the National Task Force on Police Reforms (2009), for effective security, the police service needs to be representative and professional. Police officers should create a mutual relationship with the public. In most cases, however, members of the public usually recoil from the police for fear of the officers' lack of confidentiality. The reports conclude that the Kenya Police should abide by the motto 'Utumishi Kwa Wote' (Service to all). This study attempted to interrogate the applicability of this motto in the face of vigilantism in Kisumu City.

Ngunyi (2014) points out to the complex relationship between vigilantes, the communities they operate in and security agencies in Kenya. He blames communities for providing healthy and safe grounds for vigilantes to operate in. The tolerance of the communities, especially in urban slums, is alarming. Despite the mutual exchange, the vigilante groups tend to extort, intimidate and rob the same community of their property. The vigilante groups have an ambiguous relationship with security agencies. At times, they work hand in hand with security agents in their criminality. Sometimes, the police employ them as informers. Occasionally, the security agents brutalize them through mass arrests or extra-judicial execution. Ngunyi's study, however, focused on Kenya in general. This study, therefore, sought to investigate the interrelationship between the police and vigilante groups specifically in Kisumu City.

In most cases, both state and non-state actors have social, economic and political motivations and are willing to use violence to achieve their objectives. Militias act as ready tools for helping people meet their various economic, social and economic demands. Likewise, the State may also apply force or violence to achieve economic, social and economic prosperity. The outcome is a blurring of motivations and objectives of both state and non-state actors that may lead to a complex security environment. Balancing these social, economic and political motivations is essential. Security in urban centers or communities would require mutual

effort from the communities and the police. The state and non-state actors should come together to help establish a state of peaceful co-existence. Unfortunately, there is a widening gap between the police, non-state security agents and the communities. This study, therefore, endeavored to interrogate this disparity and suggest ways of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the State in curbing insecurity in urban centers.

On the whole, the literature reviewed shows a variety of circustances that inspire the vigilante groups from one geographical area to another. The studies also reveal that these groups carry out different types of social and economic activities some of which border on criminality. The literature indicates that the relationship between state-actors and non-state actors varies from one study to another depending on the area of study. It was, therefore, necessary to studythe emergence, activities of vigilantism in Kisumu City, and how vigilante groups relate to other security operators in the City.

CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter covered research design, study area, study population, sample size, sampling procedure, data collection methods, validity of research instruments, reliability of research instruments, data collection procedures, data analysis and ethical issues.

3.2 Research Design

The study used historical descriptive research design to investigate the history of vigilantism and the security situation in Kisumu city since 1986. Historical descriptive research design enabled the researcher to gather information pertaining to vigilante groups in Kiusmu City using questionnaires, interview guide and Key informant guide. Orodho (2002) asserts that descriptive design is a method of collecting information by interviewing or administering an interview guide to a sample of individuals. The design was necessary for the study because historical evidence was obtained through scrutiny of archival, secondary and oral sources to ascertain their authenticity and validity. Historical descriptive design enabled the researcher to study the history and the activities of the vigilante groups and the relationship between these groups and other security operators in Kisumu, report the findings and formulate important principles of knowledge and solutions to significant problems to the research area.

3.3 Area of Study

The researcher conducted this study in Kisumu city. Kisumu city occupies an area of 13450 km^2 with a population of 285,412 and a density of 460 people per km^2 (Kisumu County Integrated Development Plan, 2013-2017). The City is located in Western Kenya and lies within Longitude 34 '0' W and Latitudes 0 '15' S. The City is sub-divided into ten administrative wards: Mlimani/Market, Kaloleni, Railways, Migosi, Nyalenda A, Nyalenda B, Kolwa East, Kolwa Central and Manyatta B. Although majority of the inhabitants are Luo, the city is cosmopolitan, inhabited also by members of Kisii, Luhya, Kalenjin, Kikuyu

and Asian communities. The activities undertaken by various households to generate income include fishing, salaried jobs, jua kali sector, small scale businesses, crop farming, livestock keeping and tourism.

Source: Maseno University Cartographer

Figure 3.1: Map of Kisumu City

3.4 Study Population

According to Mugenda and Mugenda (2003), study population is the universal or absolute population from which the researcher wants to generalize the results of a study. Accessible population is the reachable or available number. This study purposively targeted members of the society who have lived in Kisumu from 1986 and have adequate knowledge on the subject under study. The study also targeted both retired and serving county administrators and security officers, retired and civil society members who work around security issues. These individuals possess vital information on the history and activities of vigilante groups in Kisumu City. Other groups such as hawkers, businesspersons, traders and turn boys within Kisumu City provided further information on the operations and impact of vigilante groups. Additionally, the study targeted members and ex-members of vigilante groups in Kisumu because they possessed vital information on the internal organization of the groups, the activities and the inter-connections between them and the state security actors.

3.4.1 Sampling Techniques

This study employed purposive and snowballing sampling techniques. This meant counting on the purposively sampled informants to identify others who qualify for inclusion in the sample. The identified people helped in identifying others until the saturation level was attained. Purposive technique was used to identify initial key informants from records available at Central Police Station in Kisumu and information gathered from community members who were aware of the existence of the vigilante groups. Through snowballing the researcher was able to access more informants. These informants include current and former members of the vigilante groups in Kisumu. Purposive sampling was also used to select members of the National Government Administration (DCC, SCCIO), Nyumba Kumi representatives, chiefs, county administrators, security officers and civil society members. Snowballing sampling was used to trace respondents such as tauts, hawkers, residents and

traders. The study had a sample size of 55 informants, distributed as follows: FGDs 33, KII 11 and Indepth interview 11.

3.5 Data Collection Methods

This section discussed the methods and respective instruments utilized to collect data. The method used depended on sources of data. Data was collected from primary and secondary sources.

3.5.1 Primary Source
3.5.1.1Methods of Data Collection

Primary data for this study was collected from purposively sampled Key Informants using in-depth interviews. To collect diverse oral data, the researcher reconstituted the Informants into Focus Group Discussions of between six and eight members from the various neighborhoods of Kisumu City. With the help of a moderator, members of the constituted focus groups were allowed to openly discuss and explore the key issues in the formation of vigilante groups in Kisumu, the operations of these groups and the general societal outlook on their existence. The moderator and the researcher asked open-ended questions, probed for more detail and made sure that participants did not digress. The researcher also constituted focus group discussions with members of different interest groups involved in security matters such as NGOs and City residents. Other sources of oral historical data like legends, songs, and recorded media interviews were also relied on to provide primary data.

3.5.1.2 Instruments for Data Collection

Key informant Interview (appendix II) was employed to gather data from administrators, security officers, civil society members, traders, residents, politicians, hawkers, touts, and members of the vigilante groups purposively selected to give the desired information about the vigilante groups.

In-depth interview guide (appendix IV) was employed to gather data from administrators, security officers, civil society members, traders, residents, politicians, hawkers, touts, and members of the vigilante groups purposively selected to give information on the history of vigilante groups and the interconnection between the state and the non-state actors in security.

Both the Key Informant Interview and the In-depth interview guide were appropriate in interviewing informants who possessed vast knowledge about the history of vigilante groups and the interconnection between the state and the non-state actors in security. For each tool, the study used eleven informants (five from urban and six from peri urban wards). All the traits were evenly distributed to a void picking from one gender or group. Inclusion was based on security knowledge depth, gender and position held. This helped in covering crossectional diversities in key security areas.

Focus Group Discussions (appendix III) were conducted in eleven wards to ten people comprising a chief, assistant chief, traders, residents, politicians, hawkers, numba kumi reperesentative, touts, and current and ex-member of vigilante groups. The study used thirty-three FGDs, with each ward having three sessions. The discussions highlighted vigilante activities in Kisumu, City residents' the perceptions and attitudes towards groups, the incorporation of vigilante members into the City politics and the intricate connection between state and non-state security apparatus. Dholuo and kiswahili were used as the medium of communication in the discussions to accommodate informants who could not understand English. Non-structured and open-ended questions were asked to provide qualitative data for the study. The diverse responses from the broad representation of FGDs enabled triangulation of the findings. While conducting interviews and FGDs, data was recorded using note-taking and an electronic tape recorder. The tape recorder was used to store information that was later transcribed

3.5.2 Secondary Sources

Secondary sources of data were vital to the researcher. Data from secondary sources saved effort, expenses and time. Secondary data collection helped to improve the understanding of the research problem and provide basis for comparison with data collected from primary sources (Kothari, 2004). Secondary sources helped the researcher to get information about the history of vigilantism and insecurity in Kisumu City since 1986. Secondary data constituted information from articles, books, published and unpublished theses and dissertations, pamphlets, newspapers, journals and periodicals, desktop documentation from the archives and government documents (Dawson, 2007; Yogesh, 2006). To obtain the data, the researcher utilized various libraries notably, Maseno University School of Graduate Studies Library, Kenyatta University Post Modern Library, Jomo Kenyatta Memorial Library and Margaret Thatcher Library of Moi University, the archives and institutional/regional libraries in Kisumu.

3.5.3 Archives

Regional archives and the National Archives in Nairobi were also instrumental in providing both primary and secondary data. Primary data from the archives included minutes of security meetings, unpublished reports, and letters and correspondences. The archives were also important in providing secondary data in the form of books, journals and published reports. Archival data were subjected to interanal scrutiny for authentication and validation. Archival information proved to be important during the oral discussions with the repondents in providing the chronology of events.

3.6 Reliability and Validity of Research Instruments

The researcher conducted a reconnaissance study to get familiar with the area of study and to establish the reliability of research instruments. To validate the research instruments and test their reliability, the researcher closely worked with experts in the field who included the supervisors and other members of the Department of History and Archaeology, Maseno

University. The research instruments were tested for appropriateness of content, quality and consistency of the question guides, clarity, and objectivity to cover the scope of the study exhaustively.

3.7 Data Analysis

The field data was analyzed using content and document analysis. The recorded information was transcribed verbatim. The transcribed data was classified into themes based on the objectives of the study. Cumulative data from the primary and secondary sources was synthesized and the resultant data categorized into themes in accordance to the objectives of the study. Theoretical probing was observed when analyzing data to reach a logical descriptive analysis. Archival data was analyzed using document analysis. This was taken for internal scrutiny of the documents to establish their validity. To authenticate the data collected, corroboration of both primary and secondary data was carried out.

3.8 Ethical Considerations

The researcher discussed with the participants the purpose of the study before the commencement of the data collection exercise. The researcher kept the identity of the informants confidential by the use of pseudonyms (K-001 to K-055). The Informants' signed consent forms (Appendix I) alongside the researcher and were allowed to keep copies of the forms. The informants gave the information voluntarily. The researcher upheld confidentiality and did not adversely divulge information gathered from the respondents. Data collected was stored on computer and protected using a password to safeguard it from unauthorized access. The researcher assured the participants that data gathered from the study will be used for academic purposes only. Before proceeding for the fieldwork, the researcher acquired permission from Maseno University Post Graduate Ethical Review Committee and the National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI) to carry out research.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF VIGILANTISM IN KISUMU CITY SINCE 1986

4.1 Introduction

This chapter interrogates the evolution of vigilante groups in Kisumu since 1986. Kisumu City is a microcosm of the entire country, and so the chapter begins by examining the factors that informed the rise and the vivacity of these groups in Kenya. Thus, the section looks at the earlier vigilante groups that emerged in Kenya from the early 1940's; and which set the pace for subsequent groups in Kenya in general, and in Kisumu City in particular. The chapter determines that decline in employment opportunities, political instability, and excessive poverty levels have all contributed to the proliferation of neighborhood vigilante groups in Kenya. The section further demonstrates that unequal distribution of resources, the emergence of multiparty politics, political violence, the mushrooming of political parties along ethnic lines and the need to finance drug addiction have aided the formation of vigilante groups in Kisumu. The chapter concludes that the failure by State agencies to address security concerns and the socio-economic needs of City residents has greatly contributed to the formation and recruitment of the youth into the vigilante.

4.2 The Evolution of Vigilante Groups in Kenya

The history of vigilante groups in Kenya is traced back to early 1940's (Kaso, 2012). Ogot (1995), states that the racist and oppressive acts of the British colonialists in Kenya marginalized Africans and led to the formation of ethno-regional militias meant to safeguard the rights of the Africans. *Anake a Forti*, the first vigilante group formed, challenged the British colonial government (Kahiga, 1990). It comprised World War II veterans who had helped the British during the war against the Japanese in Burma. Being a militia, the group used force and violence to speed up Kenya's quest for independence (ibid). By 1950s, the group had evolved into the Mau Mau, a predominantly Kikuyu armed group which protested against white domination in Kenya and agitated for independence (Hyde, 2002). Other

grievances that led to the formation of the Mau Mau included land alienation, forced labor and low wages. To defuse this increasingly lethal uprising, the colonial rulers declared a state of emergency in 1952 (Elkins, 2000). Even though the revolt was eventually subdued, it had immensely accelerated Kenya's struggle for independence, which was achieved in 1964 (ibid). Vigilante groups started as underground security movements within their neighborhoods where they operated as neighborhood groups to ensure security and protection for people and property. The colonial government and the three post-independence regimes of Kenyatta, Moi and Kibaki neither accepted nor recognized vigilante groups. After independence, Kenya was ruled by dictatorial regimes under a single party system that started unofficially during Kenyatta's reign in 1969 (Odinga, 2013). Ogot and Ochieng (1995) explain how Kenyatta banned the Kenya Peoples Union (KPU), the first official opposition party, and arrested its leaders for opposing the single party rule.

In post-independence Kenya, vigilante groups trace their origins to the creation of a youth wing of the ruling party, Kenya African National Union (KANU) led by Jomo Kenyatta and Oginga Odinga in the 1960s (Oloo 2010). According to Oloo, the youth wing was used as an instrument of terror against the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), the opposition party led by Ronald Ngala and Daniel Arap Moi. In retaliation, Ngala and Moi recruited their own youth wingers to fight and intimidate their political opponents (Willis, 2015). Both Ngala and Moi thought that having their own youth wing would counteract the KANU threat. Largely, the youth wingers were formed for political purposes, which served the interests of KANU and KADU stalwarts.

In 1961, the militia KANU youth wing started the agitation for the release of Jomo Kenyatta (Kariuki, 2001). During the 1963 political campaign rallies in Kenya, the rivalry between KANU and KADU wings escalated and members fought and attacked their opponents (ibid). This led to the arrest and conviction of KADU youth wingers and police raids in KADU

37

offices in Nairobi. In Nakuru, the police ran into an assortment of deadly arms and weapons that were being used by KADU youth wingers (Willis, 2015). The cache was enough evidence that the KADU youth wingers were in possession of lethal weapons, which they used in their operations. Kenya gained independence in 1963 and became a republic in 1964, and Jomo Kenyatta and Oginga Odinga worked together in the same government for a while before ideological differences made them part ways. Both leaders were the de facto leaders of the two most dominant ethnic groups in Kenya, the Kikuyu and the Luo. According to K-004, KII, 19/3/2021. Odinga quit KANU and formed KPU in 1965 after ideological stalemate with President Jomo Kenyatta. On the other hand, Kenyatta's KANU was adamant to share or hand over power to any other political party in the country, as pointed out by K-004, KII, 1/3/2021. KANU youth wingers used violence and threats against the opponents who wanted a share of power and equal rights (Willis, 2015). In 1966, Parliament passed the Security Act that banned the activities of KPU. Members of the opposition were rounded up, arrested and detained without trial. However, these operations did not deter the opposition from fighting for social, political and economic freedom in Kenya.

On various occasions, KANU would deploy its youth wing members to wage war against the opposition KPU party supporters. In 1966, for instance, KANU deployed its youth wingers to pelt with stones members of KPU during their political rallies (Willis, 2015). The State used the police and KANU youth wing members to violently disrupt KPU meetings, torment their officials, and execute KPU protesters. During the 1966 elections, the government used public resources to finance vigilante groups to silence members of the opposition both within and without the government itself (Okombo, 2010).

President Jomo Kenyatta received a hostile reception when he visited Kisumu in 1969 on official duty. The residents felt that the KANU government had politically sidelined their political kingpin, Oginga Odinga. According to them, the same government had also

assassinated Tom Mboya, one of their leading politicians. As per K003, KII, 21/3/2021, Kenyatta's visit turned violent and the police used excessive force against the rowdy crowd. In the aftermath of the hostile reception, Kenyatta proscribed KPU (Okombo, 2010). Odinga (2013) states that during the opening of the New Nyanza Referral Hospital the police unleashed violence against the innocent people of Kisumu for being members of KPU. During the 1969 political rallies, former Vice President Oginga Odinga stated the following regarding the youth wingers:

> *"The youth wingers have a free will to campaign for the person or candidate of their choice without force, coercion or violence."* (Odinga, 2013).

According to Oginga, the youths were at liberty to join any political formation of their choice. After Kenyatta and Oginga fell out, Oginga's men were constantly brutalized by the KANU youth wingers. This prompted Oginga and his group to look for ways of shielding members of KPU against KANU youth wingers.

Nevertheless, KANU youth wingers intensified their activities, participating in political rallies and campaigns and supporting candidates of their choice. An interview with a former politician in Kisumu indicated that the wingers bullied opposition politicians. They also extorted money from people, as stated by K-004, KII, 22/3/2021. Okoth and Olang (2010 and 2015) state that the activities of KANU youth wingers put the outfit in the category of the earliest state sponsored vigilante groups.

In many instances, whenever a vigilante or security related group is formed, another group is always founded to counter the operations and activities of the former (Katumanga and Ngunyi, 2014). The increased violence by the provincial administrators, the police and KANU youth wingers, therefore, prompted opposition politicians to organize their own ethnic based regional vigilante groups to counter the rampant state sponsored violent activities (Olang & Okoth, 2010). As such, the formation of these groups in different regions

was informed by the increased demand for their services. These groups were viewed as security wings in their ethnic groups and could be used in subduing the enemy. Consequently, the groups started filling the security lapses within their regions thus helping in the provision of security to the public.

In more recent years, the political elite has been hiring the services of vigilante groups to assist in their pursuit of political and economic power, and for the protection of their ethnic groups. Most of these groups are ethnically conscious and mixed, amorphous and money driven. For instance, a group could easily mobilize 80 youths from different ethnic groups within minutes to instigate violence against opponents if the terms of agreement are acceptable. The recruiting agent would give a down payment to the group leaders before assigning them duties and paying the balance on the accomplishment of the mission (Okombo, 2010). As Oloo (2010) explains, various security related movements emerged in different parts of Kenya.

In 1987, Ndura Waruinge and six others, in consultation with Mau Mau veterans, formed the Mungiki, a group that was widely used by the political elite. The rapid rise of the Mungiki was attributed to political and economic tensions (Kagwanja, 2002). The founders expected Mungiki to complete the unaccomplished mission of the Mau Mau key of which was the land question. According to Kagwanja (2002), the inability of the state to resolve long-standing land issues instigated the proliferation of the group. The Mungiki became more vibrant in 1992 in its efforts of protecting the Kikuyu displaced from their lands in the Rift Valley by the Maasai and Kalenjin warriors (Wamue, 2001). This was on the backdrop of the push for multipartism in 1991 and the subsequent ethnic cleansing in the Rift Valley as a way of consolidating KANU's support in the region through eviction of considered opposition supporters or sympathizers. The state of disenfranchisement and marginality that created a precarious existence for the Kikuyu community within the Rift Valley, majority believed to

be descendants of the Mau Mau freedom fighters whose dream of freedom had been betrayed, retrospectively explains the genesis of Mungiki as a vigilante otherwise christened a militia cum terrorist group.

Another vigilante group that was vibrant at around the same time was the *Taliban,* a Luo vigilante group that emerged to counter the activities of the Mungiki. The Luo in Nairobi wanted to protect themselves against the threats and violence caused by the *Mungiki* (Olang & Okoth, 2010). *Taliban* was very active in Baba Dogo, Huruma, Mathare, Kariobangi and the Eastlands Districts of Nairobi.

On the other hand, *Jeshi la Mzee*, another outfit of the kind, operated mainly in Kangemi and Kawangware slums (Kabukuru, 2008). President Daniel Moi formed KANU youth wingers and the Jeshi la Mzee to suppress his political opponents (Human Right Watch, 2002). Kabukuru further explains that Fred Gumo, the former Westlands Member of Parliament was its leader. Gumo would use the group to instill fear on his political opponents during run-ups to general elections (Kabukuru, 2008). Similarly, the *40 Brothers* group carried out its criminal activities within Nairobi. The outfit would work effectively in groups of ten. It would rob pedestrians of their valuables and money (Ombati, 2013). Group members arrested for criminal activities would easily be bailed out, thus frustrating police efforts of dealing with crime (Ombati, 2013).

The formation of vigilante groups extended to the rural areas. For instance, villagers of Ng'enda ward, Gatundu South formed vigilante groups, which they used to protect themselves and their livestock against their perceived enemies (Thairu 2018). They claimed that the government did not provide them with adequate security for their livestock, and so they used the vigilante groups to stamp out livestock thefts.

The *Kalenjin Warriors* was a vigilante group based in the Rift Valley. The group was made up of young men who had undergone initiation at the same time (Report of the Judicial Commission Appointed to Inquire into Tribal Clashes in Kenya, 1999). The report further explains how young Kalenjin men developed cohesiveness among persons who were initiated together, making it easy to organize and mobilize them when need arose. The *Kalenjin Warriors* were assigned the responsibility of preserving the traditions of the communities based in the Rift Valley (ibid). The report states further that the group commonly used weapons such as spears, bows and poisoned arrows and machetes. The group was well organized and it received financial aid from members of the Kalenjin political elite.

The *Sabaot Land Defence Force (SLDF)* in the Rift Valley, a non-state group, possessed firearms and directly challenged state security agencies leading to deployment of Kenya Defence Forces in Mt. Elgon (Standard Digital Reporters, 2007). A section of members of the Sabaot community formed the group with the aim of fighting against unfair allocation of land in the Chebyuk Settlement Scheme (Oloo, 2010). Oloo notes that *SLDF* drew its members from the Ogiek, Bukusu, Teso and Sebei communities. This group emerged after the 2002 elections but remained inactive until 2006. *SLDF* operated around Mount Elgon region and the neighboring Trans Nzoia district that border Uganda. *SLDF* aimed at evicting people who did not belong to these communities from the region. It also endeavored to reallocate the fertile land of Mount Elgon from Western Province to the Rift Valley (Oloo, 2010). The Standard Digital Reporters (2007) reported how the *SLDF* group leaders would hide in caves and forested mountains of Mt. Elgon. The other members would live within the community. According to unverified information from security agencies and other organisations conducting research on the issue, *SLDF* had over 35 000 soldiers who carried out inhumane acts.

At the Kenyan Coast, *Mombasa Republican Council (MRC)* emerged among the Mijikenda in 1999 due to the economic and political marginalization of the coastal people (National Consortium for Study of Terror and Response to Terror, 2015). The group remained docile until 2008 when it started agitating for the secession of the Coast region from Kenya. The group had over one million members (Kamande, 2012). The State proscribed MRC in 2012 but the court reinstated it on condition that it registers as a political party and renounces the secession call (Reuters, 2012; Kamande, 2012). The group changed to Pwani Democratic Movement (PDM) in 2014 and commenced recruiting new followers (Terror Research Analysis Consortium, 2015). In Kwale, retired military officers founded the *National Republican Movement* in 2002 to use it to overthrow the Kenyan Government (Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) Monitoring, 2010). The group leader had been sacked from the army on disciplinary grounds and incarcerated for months. The Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) states that in June 2007, the police arrested all the members of PDM.

The *Chinkororo Movement* was formed in Kisii within the Nyanza region. The vigilante members were heavily armed and lived in the forest. Kegoro (2009) describes *Chinkororo* as a group of warriors deployed to defend territorial integrity and to protect the Gusii territory against cattle rustlers and the Kalenjin warriors and Maasai Morans. The group pursued and returned stolen cattle to their owners. (Angwenyi, 2011). Waki (2008) states that the group membership comprised the youths and the old, the educated and the uneducated. Another vigilante group within Kisii was the *Amachuma*. This group emerged from Nyaribari and was purposely formed and used by politicians to terrify their opponents (Ombour, 2010). As Masese & Mwenzwa (2012) argue, *Amachuma* became a political terror faction of politicians battling their political rivals.

The *Sungusungu* emerged from Kisii in the early 1990s (Akinyi, 2014). The group arose as a result of the state security failure in the face of political, social and economic challenges the community experienced since the colonial period (Masese & Mwenzwa, 2012). Members of *Sungusungu* were mostly unemployed and poorly educated youths. They penalized social ills like witchcraft and adultery, and attacked the political and business competitors of their benefactors (Akinyi, 2014). Sungusungu got its finances from the extortion of members of the society in the name of providing them with security (Kenya Human Rights Commission, 2010).

4.3 Multi-Party Politics in Kenya and the Typology of Vigilante Groups

Before the 1990s, Kenya was a one-party state, and there was rampant oppression of the political rivals of KANU. Some of the vigilantes and other security related groups emerged in the 1970s and 1980s. In 1992, Kenya repealed Section 2A of the Kenyan Constitution to allow for multiparty democracy. There was a strong wave of democratization sweeping across the African continent and Kenya was no exception. The opening up of political space in Kenya augmented electoral competition. This paved way for the formation of more political parties and hence more political competition (Nasong'o, 2007). There was increased demand for vigilante groups among key politicians who contested for various positions, and so jobless slum youths found a ready source of income (Wamwere, 2008). The 1988 General elections, for instance, were marred with violence from youth wingers hired by prominent politicians to disrupt their rival's rallies (Wamwere, 2008). Jeshi la Embakasi, for example, emerged during this period to strengthen the opposition.

KANU deployed youth wingers within its political structure as a single party governing the country, thus establishing a binary axis between political competition and violence. In retrospect, the emergence of multipartism within an environment of KANU's desperate act to remain in power and monopolize leadership of the day opened up the country to more

44

aggressive vigilante activity. The vigilante's raison d'être, seen from the vantage point of the political climate of the late 1980s and early 1990's, was fundamentally the protecton of political leaders facing state sponsored violence and brutality, intimidation and state intereference with their freedom to politically organize. The clamour for multipartism in Kenya in the last quarter of the 20th century therefore provided a perfect opportunity for the growth and expansion of vigilantism in Kenya in general and in Kisumu City in particular. K-004, OI, 4/4/2021 stated that from the *Baghdad Boys* of the late 1980s to the *American Marines*, *China Squad* and 42 Brothers amongst others of present day Kisumu, the city has undergone several phases of emergence and re-emergence of vigilante groups, both in form and function. This happened(s) in a rather ambivalent nature that has seen them operate sometimes as the law itself.

4.4 Evolution of Vigilante groups in Kisumu City from 1986

Most of the vigilante groups in Kisumu city surfaced in 1986 as security outfits, as stated by informant, K-003 (O. I 4/4/2021). Later, the groups transformed themselves into political support groups before metamorphosing into criminal militias. A report by Mars Group (2012) indicated that factors such as unemployment among the youths and political and ethnic rivalry led to the early emergence of these groups in Kisumu (ibid). The report revealed how politicians supported the formation of vigilante groups so that they could use them to push for their political agenda. The same groups were used during the one-party era to put pressure on President Moi to allow for multiparty politics in Kenya (Taifa Leo 27, October 2012). The groups were fragmented, and were only used to fill the security lapse that existed in the Kisumu City (ibid).

Being an opposition zone, Kisumu City was discriminated against and neglected by the regimes of Presidents Kenyatta and Moi. According to this informant, President Moi had banned political parties and there was bad blood between him and Mr. Oginga Odinga. K-

004, OI, 4/4/2021 told us how the residents of Kisumu wanted Odinga to form his own party and vie for the presidency. The emergence of *Baghdad Boys*, the earliest vigilante group in Kisumu, is associated with this political animosity. The *"42" Brothers* was another dreaded vigilante group that emerged in 2015. Members of the group were young people recruited from the neighborhoods of Nyamasaria, Manyatta B and Nyalenda A. The group used extremely brutal tactics to attack unsuspecting residents and rob them of money and electronic gadgets. Victims said that the gang operated within the Central Business District of Kisumu and along the Kisumu-Nairobi Highway and the surrounding estates. Group members hunted down their victims and dragged them to particular locations where they would rob and rape them and leave them for dead (*Standard Newspaper* 2/8/2015).

Key informants and focus group discussions conducted revealed that the major vigilante groups in Kisumu City were prevalent in both formal and informal settlements. There were other smaller groups scattered across the town. These included *Angola Musumbiji*, *Somalia, Kisoko Base, Western Base, Kilo Base, Kondele Base, Car Wash Base, Corner Mbuta Base*, *Bus Pak Base, Central Business Base (CBD), Container Base* and *Nyamasaria Base*. In most instances, according to Nyalenda B residents (FGD, 2/042021) these smaller groups preferred to take a low profile

4.5 Agitation for Economic and Political Equality

In the 1980s and 1990s, there was increased agitation for political democracy in Kenya. The political scene was unpredictable and chaos and violence were the order of the day (Kagwanja, 2002). Youthful politicians and students abroad and in local institutions were at the forefront in demanding for equality in the political and economic spheres. This period also witnessed the introduction of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). Consequently, the government could not offer employment to thousands of educated young people in the face of rampant retrenchment by both public and private sectors. SAPs were also

characterized by the closing up of businesses and industries. For instance, Kisumu Cotton Mills (Kicomi), which employed thousands of Kisumu residents, closed down its doors in the early 1990s due to the realities of the implementation of SAPs. K-003, (O.I, 1/3/2021) affirmed that market for local produce shrunk and there was lack of government incentives Accordingly, families lost sources of income and, as stated by K-017 (KII, 4/01/2021), jobless and marginalized youths residing in Kisumu city were easily lured into joining and forming vigilante groups

The *Baghdad Boys* emerged as a group of energetic and enthusiastic young men keen on joining political campaigns and changing Kenya. They were also keen on offering "security" to Jaramogi Oginga Odinga and his team at a time when they were subjected to harassment by state agents who were bent to frustrate the reforms advocated especially by persons from opposition strongholds. Informant K-004 (KII, 4/4/202) affirmed that Kisumu was a melting pot for opposition politics since the 1960s According to Okoth (2010), the *Baghdad Boys* emerged because of insecurity in Kisumu. The group underwent several changes depending on the prevailing interests and objectives.

The findings revealed that the group adopted the name 'Baghdad Boys" out of admiration for the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and his soldiers who were defending Baghdad from a determined onslaught of American soldiers in 1991-1992. According to K-005 (KII, 5/03/2021), one of the co-founders of *Baghdad Boys,* the group perceived their fight as similar since they were presumably fighting the entire KANU government. President Sadam Hussein, an anti-American Iraqi nationalist, emerged in the face of these youngmen as a hero and a symbol of defiance. In such circumstances, as per Nyalenda B, (FGD, 2/04/2021), the group found traction to Iraq's political and economic capital of Baghdad The group became an unofficial security wing formed to offer protection to the Luo based in Kisumu. According to the interview with one of the key informant K-017 (KII, 4/4/2021), the

founding group members were majorly men aged between 25 and 45 years old. Regardless of the members' ages, they were all referred to as youths. The group had a core leader and eight others who also participated in its formation;

> *"We were a group of brave young people, keen to join the fight to remove Moi (the retired president) from power by forcing change in the constitution as Kenya was a one-party state with only the ruling part KANU."(* K-017, KII, 4/4/2021)

According to an ex-member of a vigilante group, one of the key reason for the formation and vibrancy of the *Baghdad Boys* was their agitation for the repeal of section 2A of the Constitution (K-005, KII, 4/4/2021). The neglect of opposition areas such as Kisumu in terms of security and development, and the political harassment encountered by politicians from the region contributed to the formation. Thus, the founders of the group purposed to help push for Constitutional amendments that would make Kenya a democratic state. One of the Ex-members, K-005 (KII, 4/4/2021), recounts how Prof Joseph Ouma Muga, a key anti-KANU and multiparty democracy campaigner, would inspire them during meetings in Kisumu with powerful accounts of Kenya's history and the sufferings Kenyans went through in the hands of Presidents Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel Moi. According to a chief in Obunga, Prof Muga and other leaders such as Oginga Odinga gave the group backing. The leaders wanted to remove Moi from power and ensure political pluralism and democracy.

The group later attracted disgruntled officers of the defunct Kenya Air force dismissed from the force following the attempted coup in 1982. Many officers from the Luo community were either summarily dismissed or wrongfully arrested and court martialed. Senior soldiers such as Hezekiah Ochuka were executed even though they did not play any role in the coup (*Standard Newspaper* 2/10/1997). The ex-Air force men were believed to have trained the Baghdad youth, which gave the group more firepower and motivation. The experience of these ex-military men helped model the group into a dangerous armed gang with requisite expertise to repulse and counter state sponsored violence, majorly carried out by an

ethnicised police force or KANU supporters and sympathisers determined to deny opposition parties any chance at fair competition.

At the time, Oginga Odinga, one of the luminary political leaders from the larger Nyanza province, and his team of Young Turks had their movements restricted by the Moi regime. They could not address rallies or conduct any political activity. In early 1991, the *Baghdad Boys* in Kisumu and Nairobi started what they christened "*Operation Moi Out*" movement. They often engaged in confrontation with security officers who regularly erected roadblocks on their path. Group members felt it was time to force Moi out of power because he had denied politicians like Oginga Odinga, the leader of the Ford Kenya Party, the opportunity to campaign. Moi had drawn his lessons from the 1982 coup attempt and feared that the rallies might attract more resistance to his regime. As elaboratively stated by the informant K-005 (KII, 4/4/2021), security was key to the existence and operation of the youth groups:

> *"Our objective was to provide security to Jaramogi and his team,*
> *and we often physically remove police roadblocks when they did*
> *not allow the team to attend to schedule rallies."*

The death of Jaramogi Oginga Odinga on January 20, 1994 came slightly more than a year after the 1992 general elections, that saw him and his FORD Kenya party emerge position three with 944,197(17.48%) votes behind President Moi (36.35%) and Mwai Kibaki (19.45%). It exposed to the public domain the differences of ideology, style, personality and approach that he had tried to conceal in Ford Kenya. The schism in Ford Kenya party heralded the split of the *Baghdad Boys* with one wing being loyal to Odinga's son, Raila Odinga and the other gravitating towards the axis of James Orengo and Wamalwa Kijana. Ford Kenya did not have proper internal mechanisms for resolving the differences from the two factions and this ended up splitting the leadership of the party (*Standard Newspaper* 4/3/2015). A Key informant, K-005 (KII, 3/3/2021), who is a former member of Ford Kenya in Kisumu describes how power struggles in Ford Kenya between Raila and Wamalwa broke up the group as members aligned themselves with one faction or the other. After Oginga

Odinga's death, Wamalwa, the Deputy party leader, was elevated to act as the chairperson pending party elections.

As cited by one of the former members of Ford Kenya, divisions in Ford Kenya directly affected the succession of Jaramogi Odinga and the fight against corruption and the misappropriation of public resources. One of the things that brought division was the revelation that Oginga Odinga had received financial assistance on behalf of Ford Kenya from Kamlesh Patni, a businessperson who was at the epicenter of the Goldenberg scandal that rocked Kenya in the early 1990s and in which the Exchequer made export payment on fake gold exports. This was despite the fact that he was the leader of opposition in parliament and the chairperson of the Public Accounts Committee that was investigating the Goldenberg scandal. Informant K-004 (KII, 2/4/2021) told us that Oginga's critics in Ford Kenya felt that he was not suitable to chair the Public Accounts Committee.

These contesting views led to serious divisions in Ford Kenya, which inevitably split *Baghdad Boys* into two fiercely opposing sides. As observed by K-005 (KII, 3/4/2021), these groups often clashed violently as they supported different factions of Ford Kenya One of the Ex-members, in an oral interview, narrated how one of the group leaders of *Baghdad Boys* joined the Orengo-Wamalwa axis and mobilised members to support his preferred side. The other group of the Baghdad Boys had its base in the poor neighborhoods and was led by the Mayor of Kisumu, who had used his dalliance with Kanu to gain money and popularity.

The most memorable faceoff between the two factions occurred at the Thika Municipal Stadium in May 1995 during the hotly contested Ford Kenya party elections pitting Wamalwa against Raila factions. The winner would replace Jaramogi Oginga Odinga as the party's flag bearer in the 1997 presidential election (The *Standard newspaper* 2/4/1995).

Plate 1: Ford Kenya Party Elections in Thika Municipal Stadium

Raila Odinga hiding under the table during the 1995 Ford Kenya Party Elections that turned chaotic.
Source: Standardmedia.ac.ke Sep 22, 2019.

According to two former leaders of the *Baghdad Boys* group, chaos erupted when the two contestants differed over the delegates' list. An Ex-leader of *Baghdad Boys* further explains how Raila's supporters locked the gates and spent the entire night at the stadium. The rival faction, which was denied entry to the stadium, feared that Raila's supporters would kidnap Bishop Kuria, the presiding officer, and force him to declare Raila the winner. Consequently, they denied people entry into the stadium.

According to the Report by Election Violence Watch (1995), Wamalwa, Orengo, and their supporters broke into the stadium, which culminated into more conflict as both sides presented different delegates' lists. The Ex-member concurs with the Election Violence Watch (July-September, 1999) report that the different delegates' lists caused the faceoff. He explains how Contestant K-003 (KII, 3/4/2021) and the Mayor of Kisumu had facilitated the movement of the *Baghdad Boys* to Thika Stadium. Ford Kenya elections divided the party Informant K-017 (OI, 2/4/2021) affirmed that MPs such as Joab Omino, Orwa Ojode and

Otieno Kajwang were all Raila's lieutenants while James Orengo, Lawrence Oile and Orie Rogo Manduli supported Wamalwa. After the chaos, Wamalwa was declared the new chairperson of Ford Kenya. However, another election was held at the same venue and Raila was declared the party's chair.

In an interview, K-017 (OI, 2/4/2021), a key informant narrated how the Thika ordeal scared Raila. Soon afterwards, Raila resigned from Ford Kenya, broke ranks with Wamalwa and formed the National Development Party (NDP), which he used to win and retain his Langata parliamentary seat for two consecutive terms. He also used the party to run for presidency in 1997 (*Standard Newspaper* 2/6/1997).

After the shambolic elections, one Baghdad Boys ex-leader, K-005 (KII, 3/4/202), returned to Kisumu only to be interdicted by the Kisumu Municipal Council in a letter Ref. TC/PF/TT/2380/ (34) (see appendix). The letter referred to an occurrence reported in both *the Standard Newspaper* and the *Daily Nation* issues of June 9, 1995 in which the Ex-member was involved in a bloody physical confrontation with supporters of another political party in a Ford Kenya office in Nairobi. During the scuffle, the Ex-member sustained stab injuries as were evident in the pictures that appeared in the two press releases. The letter cited the law, which prohibits Civil Servants from participating in political parties' activities. He faced many tribulations and later differed with party officials over the sale of party cards:

> *"I was at one time stabbed on the head in the streets of Nairobi. I used to be arrested frequently and locked in several times at Kodiaga prison, often for months over capital offences. I was denied bail and generally considered a bad element. The newspaper headlines, pictures and stories, together with what people said back home stressed me. I did not know how I would cope with this or if I would survive now that this was no longer viewed as a party affair but as a betrayal of Raila and the Luo community".(K-005,KII, 3/4/202)*

The muddled Ford Kenya elections in Thika affected the lives of Baghdad Boys' ex-leaders. Members of the public perceived those who supported Wamalwa's faction as traitors and

instigators of the chaos and many lost their jobs. One *Baghdad Boys* ex-leader, K-005, KII, 4/4/2021, said he witnessed battles in Kisumu City between the followers of the mayor who backed Wamalwa and Raila's supporters. K-005 (KII, 4/4/202) informed us that the youths were also split into two factions, occasioning frequent running battles whenever they met or during rallies:

> *"1995 was an unforgettable year. It was a difficult period in Kisumu with youths fighting all the time on different sides of the political divide. Some of the battles went out of Kisumu to political rallies in other parts of Nyanza."*

The infighting within Ford Kenya, according to K-009 (KII, 4/4/2021), led to the expansion of vigilante groups' membership to recruit more youths.

Vigilante groups have also been able to participate in the political leadership of this country. In 1992, for instance, the leader of *Baghdad Boys* took over the leadership of Ford Kenya and his comrade became the mayor of Kisumu City for a term. They also participated in various leadership activities in the city, as stated by informant K-017 (KII, 4/4/2021). A Focus Group Discussion conducted revealed how politicians aspiring for various positions in Kisumu City constantly consulted the leaders of the vigilante groups.

Informant K-003(O.I, 4/4/2021), affirmed the key roles vigilante groups play in determining winners in elections held in Kisumu City. The nature of Kenyan politics embraces the culture of vigilantism since coercion is key to political activities at both party and national elections. A vigilante group member explained how they determine who wins and who loses in an election. They achieve this by causing pandemonium in the strongholds of the marked politician in the morning of Election Day. This may prevent many of his supporters from voting. Informant K-009 (KII, 4/4/2021) added that members of vigilante groups may participate in the rigging process and ensuring that the candidate who pays them well emerges victorious. This has raised the stakes for the services of the most lethal vigilante

groups in Kisumu. Politicians will pay dearly because they believe that with a strong and dangerous group on your side you are guaranteed victory.

During the reigns of Presidents Moi and Kibaki, vigilante groups continued to exist amidst the risk of serious government crackdowns. For instance, during Kibaki's regime the government enacted the Prevention of Organized Crime Act of 2010 and 2012, which banned all illegal groupings. This limited the vigilante groups' activities, hence forcing them to either go underground or carry out their operations in an extremely discreet manner. However, the impact of their activities is still being felt in different parts of the country including Kisumu. These groups have continued with their activities and recruitment of new members, posing security threat to the urban dwellers in Kisumu. This study reveals that the vigilante groups in Kisumu form part of those proscribed under the 2010 and 2012 legislation but still operate and recruit members.

4.6 Key Factors and Motives behind the Formation of Vigilante Groups in Kisumu City
Vigilante groups are formed for a given purpose. Abrahamsen (2013) notes that the need to survive drives the youth to join vigilantes. Sheriff (1952) states that the need to pursue shared goals and objectives brings many people together. This gives us a pointer on why vigilante groups are popular and vibrant in Kisumu. Toch (1965) explains that people join a vigilante group due to the existence of a vacuum. According to him, vigilante groups must be motivated by a specific discontent of specific people in specific situations. Vigilantes arise for the purposes of ameliorating collective difficulties or achieving shared goals. Vigilante groups are like social groups; they are formed because a group of people may need to pursue certain obligations or expectations towards one another (Blumer, 1952). The expectations usually base on economic, political, religious, ethical or moral considerations.

Informant K-009 (KII, 2/4/2021) ackowledged that the pursuit of political fulfillment has been a coherent factor in unifying people to form vigilante groups in Kisumu City. The

nature of politics in the country has resulted in various ethnic groups creating political parties led by one of their own in the hope that if they capture power, they will have unlimited access to state resources. Electoral politics in Kenya consists of highly cohesive bloc-voting ethnic groups. Kenyans generally vote for the same party as their ethnic kin, and particularly so if a contending party has a representative from their own community as a presidential candidate. Consequently, political parties were/are formed at the behest of a single leader who provides financial patronage and who draws a core of founders linked more by personal and ethnic ties than by ideological commitment. Even where coalitions emerge, they have been coalitions of ethnic groups rather than coalitions of parties that share the same ideological commitment.

Another key factor that contributed to the existence of vigilante groups is the normalization of political violence as a tool for political competition in Kenya (*Daily Nation* Friday 17, 2008). The Newspaper states that as early as 1990s, politicians formed vigilante groups to use them as instruments of protecting themselves from a despotic government and to overwhelming their political opponents. In early 1990s, violence became institutionalized during the clamor for democracy especially in parliamentary and presidential elections. Vigilante groups such as Mungiki, Jeshi la Mzee, the Taliban, Chinkororo and Baghdad Boys could operate without fear of state reprisal (*Daily Nation* Friday 17, 2008).

Violence became a means of winning elections and acquiring political power in the country. In Kenya, elections are characterized by the dread of the eruption of violence. Kioko (2017) observes that the institutionalization of widespread ethnic violence was witnessed during the 2007, 2013 and 2017 elections. As a result, a pattern was established of forming vigilante groups and using extra-state violence to secure political power. The existence of groups such as Baghdad Boys, China Squad, American Marines, Taliban, Chinkororo, Kamjesh and Mungiki has intensified the institutionalization of violence during and after elections. Many

politicians in Kisumu have come to perceive these vigilante groups as crucial to winning elections. Thus, the vigilantes have continued to sell their services of violence on a willing-buyer-willing-seller basis (Mwagiru, 2008). Mueller (2004) observes Numerous reports on elections show that some high-ranking politicians and civil servants used vigilante groups or youth wingers to intimidate people in areas believed to support the opposition, especially among the Luo, Kikuyu, Kamba and Luhya communities (Kenya Human Rights Commission Report, 1998. Youth wingers from the Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana and Samburu (KAMATUSA) communities were used to cause violence and to threaten opposition supporters during elections.

Marginalization and joblessness drove many youths in Kisumu to vigilantism. A clan elder interviewed further states that the feeling of being left out by the government and the effects of negative ethnicity led to the formation and escalation of Baghdad Boys. According to one of the key informants, marginalization is one of the features that easily give rise to vigilante groups. The marginalization of Kisumu City has been attributed to unequal distribution of resources by the national government. This state of affairs is worsened by discrimination in the application of the rule of law. Report on   Multi-city study by World Bank (2010) has described how social, economic and political marginalization has led to youths joining vigilante groups. Bjorn Moller theory of conflict explains how marginalization influences the youth to join vigilante groups if they are left out in social, political and economic endeavors. In Kisumu City, youths who have joined the vigilante groups are involved in crime and violence. Informant K-009, KII, 2/5/2021 told us that some politicians vigilante groups to frustrate development projects.

Plate 2: A Machete-Wielding Youth

Vigilante group members in action during an insurgency along Kondele -Mamboleo Road in Kondel.
Source: Saturday/Sunday, June 18/19, 2016

The opposition politics in Kisumu have often been attributed to marginalization, with funds purposed for development projects in Kisumu time and again channeled to other areas, thus retarding the development of Kisumu City. There are no new industries in the city, and the old ones have all collapsed, thus stagnating employment opportunities. There was also a feeling that government-sponsored groups such as KANU youth wingers were persecuting the political kingpins in Nyanza. To counter such treatment, the political class also began using their local vigilante groups. An ex-member of *Baghdad Boys* noted that with time, the group was able to attract very many youths who felt neglected by the State. According to *the Kenya Crime Statistics Economic Survey of 2018,* Kisumu, with its bulging population of jobless youths, has over 20 different vigilante groups operating from different "Bases" or "Barracks." The groups go by various names, some local and others imported identities.

Negative ethnicity has also compelled some people to embrace vigilantism. In an interview, a clan elder, K-004 (O.I, 4/04//2021), indicated that the effects of negative ethnicity contributed to the existence of Baghdad Boys. In Kenya, negative ethnicity escalated during the reign of

Moi, especially in 1980s and early 1990s when KANU youth wingers intensified their activities. Communities such as the Kikuyu and the Luo felt that Moi favored his ethnic community, the Kalenjin and only allowed his own party, KANU to operate (Anassi, 2004). Moi's actions prompted other communities to form their youth wings that could counter KANU youth wingers hence the emergence of *Baghdad Boys:*

> *"We did not have adequate security to protect us, Kisumu being an opposition zone, especially after the fallout between Kenyatta and Odinga in 1966. The subsequent harassment of leaders by the KANU youth wingers necessitated the formation of the group."(K-004, O.I, 4/04//2021).*

The founding of political parties along ethnic lines boosted the formation of militant groups that claimed to safeguard the interests of their specific communities (KNA/NBI/F1/3611 Crime and Stock Theft Report).

According to Olsten (1968), people may form vigilante groups for personal gratification. Davis (2011) argues that in some vigilante groups, the relationship is an end in itself, rather than being a means to an end. Members of these groups always want to feel like they own the world and everything. Peer pressure and idleness may create a void among the youths. As a result, the youths end up joining vigilante groups in order to avoid loneliness, gain acceptance by friends who are already in such groups and improve on their self-esteem. Oral interviews revealed that peer pressure and idleness pushed the youth in areas such as Kondele and Manyatta within Kisumu City to join vigilante groups. A report titled Multi-city study by the World Bank (2010) describes how idleness in urban areas has given rise to vigilante groups. The report notes that the growth of urban centers may lead to unemployment, hence idleness among the youths if the government does not create jobs. The jobless youths will resort to illegal activities such as joining vigilante groups to acquire a living. For instance, in some bus termini such as Kona Mbuta and Kondele fly-over the idle youths could be seen chatting, looking at passing vehicles or playing cards. Many others could be seen strolling

along the streets and market places. Most of these youths are likely to join vigilante groups, as stated by informant K-017, KII, 4/4/2021:

> *"I was introduced to this group in 15th April 1996 by a friend. He was my best friend and classmate. We used to play football together for our local team. When he joined, he convinced me to join him and so I followed him,"*.

Vigilantism has had a great effect on secondary school students in Kisumu City. Kisumu has witnessed school going youths joining the groups. Oral interviews conducted in Kisumu showed that young boys in primary and secondary schools joined vigilante groups to gain self-esteem and independence and instill fear to their peers and other community members. According to Informant K-017 (OI, 8/4/2021) belonging to a vigilante group like *Baghdad Boys* gave them a sense of prestige, self-esteem and independence. Due to economic hardships, many young people drop out of school or college. Interviews further revealed that many of these high school and college dropouts could not secure jobs; whether white collar or just manual jobs, and so these groups became their main source of livelihood. Students who are members of the vigilante groups lure others to join their bandwagon. An oral interview conducted at Manyatta, Kisumu with the area chief showed that some students form Kisumu Day High School were hard-core members of vigilante groups. Teachers refrain from punishing such students for fear of retaliations.

The study noted that in Kisumu, poverty and unemployment have forced many young people to join *vigilante groups* (KNA/NBI/F1/3611/ Crime and Stock Theft Report). The youths form the majority of the poor and the employed in Kisumu City. Kisumu residents depend largely on fishing, which keeps on fluctuating. The collapse of vital industries such as Kisumu Cotton Mills (KICOMI), Fish Net and various sugar industries, and lack of government employment initiatives led to serious economic challenges to Kisumu City residents (K-003, KII, 2/4/2021). The water hyacinth in the lake also diminished sources of income for many families. From an oral interview conducted, informant K-017(KII,

4/4/2021) commented that most families suffered from unemployment and inability to provide families with the basic needs:

> *"I came from a poor family; my parents could not even afford to buy us our basic necessities. I could not continue with such life, I dropped out of school. I joined Baghdad Boys; at least here, I could get food. We were paid after providing security to the politicians and the locals."*

Thus, the ensuing poverty attracted many youths to *Baghdad Boys*. This concurs with Bjorn Moller's explanation that poverty, unemployment and the need for economic satisfaction drive the youth into vigilante groups. With the high rate of unemployment, as per informant K-009 (KII, 2/4/2021), vigilante groups become vital sources of livelihood to the many unemployed youths in Kisumu.

Consequently, members of many vigilant groups such as *Baghdad Boys* used promises of economic prosperity to lure ignorant youths into joining the group. Informant K-017(OI, 3/4/202) indicated that such tractions of 'quick money' and a 'gate-pass out of poverty' and the trappings of power derived from the unholy unions with area and national political leaders become efficient recruitment and mobilization instruments for expanded gang membership. The ex-member dictates that youths were/are lured into joining *Baghdad Boys* after promises of financial benefits. Some youths even refused to progress with their education after KCPE or KCSE to join vigilante groups within Kisumu (Kondele, FGD, 5/4/2021). The prospect of a brighter and prosperous future has always been a motivation to the youths joining the groups. *Baghdad Boys* vigilante group, for instance, took advantage of young people's ignorance to entice them into becoming members. According to K-031(KII, 5/4/2021), these groups assured the youth of economic stability and a prosperous future

Corruption and fiscal mismanagement in Kenya have been big challenges to successive governments over the years. Key Informant interviews showed unsatisfactory service delivery to the citizens by the administration. An interview with K-009 (KII, 2/4/2021)

revealed how ministries, which are supposed to provide essential services to the citizens, are terribly mismanaged. This has resulted in coordination challenges, duplication of functions, decline in social services and security, underdevelopment and widespread poverty. The ineptitude has contributed to the emergence of vigilante groups in Kisumu under the pretext of self-help strategies and service provision to the people.

Hope (2014) and Keriga (2009) state that the effects of rampant corruption in government institutions and weak governance have not only led to the emergence of vigilante groups but they have also provided fertile ground for the youths to join the groups. Other studies attribute the deteriorating state of security within the city to corrupt, incompetent and politically biased to security agents. The Crime Statistics Economic Survey (2015) reveals that corruption by the state security operators has hindered efforts to provide adequate security to Kisumu residents and hence the rise of vigilante groups (Crime Statistics Economic Survey 2015). When people perceive the police as corrupt or ineffective, they are likely to consider vigilante violence as a possible alternative. In addition, corrupt individuals seek to use vigilante groups to silence whistle blowers or even to demonstrate that the accusations are politically motivated. Those interviewed singled out politicians as the major perpetrators of corruption because they give money to vigilante groups to cover their tracks. This has encouraged many youths to join vigilante groups, especially during electioneering periods. The report by the Crime Economic Statistics on security in various estates of Kisumu City indicates, with the police compromised, that local youths decide to join vigilante groups to ensure security in their neighborhoods and the protection of property. Katumanga (2005) terms the scenario the 'privatization of public violence.'

Oral interviews indicate that in some instances, vigilante group members recruited youths through threats, confinements, abductions and beatings. K-004 (KII, 8/4/202), stated that these youths would later be trained to extort money, and carry out other duties and at the end

61

of the day remit the day's collection to the *Baghdad Boys* leaders where they got their pay. Forceful recruitment has been common in many vigilante groups. For instance, Maribe (2010) gives insight on how the Mungiki employed force to recruit youths and forced them to take oaths as a means of pledging their loyalty. This may not apply fully to Kisumu although some forceful recruitment was noted.

As established by this study and corroborated with existing secondary literature, inequality was another reason behind the emergence of vigilante organizations in Kisumu. A study by Philips (2017) focused on the formation of *Autodefensas* group in Mexico. The group was formed based on the high inequality rates and the increasing unemployment among the youths. High inequality among the residents was associated with increased operations of the vigilantes to offer protection against exploitation by the wealthier neighbors. Smilarly, in Kisumu, economic inequality has created a conducive environment for vigilante groups to thrive. The poor citizens feel deprived of security by the authorities when compared to the wealthier neighbors who can hire both public and private security (Honorine, 2013). This creates the need to hire groups that can expedite protection of the civilians in areas experiencing increased incidents of insecurity. The operations of the vigilantes in such cases are based on the mutual understanding of the groups that form cells for self-protection (Bateson, 2013).

These groups fight for the equal distribution of economic resources. One interviewee, Nyalenda A (FGD, 22//2/2021), narrated how the opposition politicians have used the vigilante groups to fight for equal distribution of the available meagre resources that trickle down from the central government and also locally sourced. These politicians engage the vigilantes in demonstrations, insurgences and strikes meant to agitate for equitable distribution of resources. Their fearless character has made them emblematic of Kisumu's long struggle for fair resource distribution, fair governance and equal justice.

Some interviewees associated the youths joining vigilante groups in Kisumu City with the abuse of alcohol and other drugs. According to them, Kisumu is characterized by high rates of drug consumption, especially opium and illicit alcoholic drinks. Many interviewees stated that illegal trafficking of '*Simba Waragi*' spirits sachets from Uganda was rampant in Kisumu, occasionally with the involvement of the police. These sachets have high alcohol content (up to 90%), which makes them harmful to many young people in Kisumu. The high number of idle youths within the city has led to more consumption of alcohol and drugs. Wachenje (2015) states that drugs and alcohol abuse has forced many youths to join vigilante groups either as a means of getting money to buy drugs or as a way of securing police protection.

4.7 Conclusion

One of the key findings and discussion in this chapter is the fact that Kenya's long history of vigilante and vigilantism is intertwined with the politics of the day and ordinary people's everyday experience with governance, right from the colonial imperialist regime through the postcolonial governments. Consequently, Kisumu city's history of vigilantism operates hand in glove with the history of the region's marginalization and characterization as an opposition bedrock and a melting pot for anti-government sentiments, mobilization and agitation.

Further discussion establishes that the failure of the state to address insecurity and the socio-economic needs of the youths provoked the emergence and development of the vigilante in Kenya. The decline in employment opportunities caused by the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), rampant insecurity and political instability witnessed during the one-party era, and excessive poverty levels compelled many youths to search for alternative ways of social and economic survival. Consequently, the youths got involved in neighborhood vigilante groups. Others joined the groups as a means of getting money to finance their drug and alcohol addiction, or to secure police protection.

In Kisumu City, economic marginalization occasioned by unequal distribution of resources by the national government has given rise to vigilante groups. Political violence, widespread corruption, weak governance, and the founding of political parties along ethnic lines have aided the formation and proliferation of militant groups.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE STRUCTURE AND ACIVITIES OF THE VIGILANTE GROUPS IN KISUMU

5.1 Introduction

This section sought to investigate the leadership structures of vigilante groups in Kisumu City. It explored the operations of the vigilante and the numerous economic activities the groups undertake to finance their activities. The chapter also delved into the relationship between vigilantes and the police and other security agents, politicians, and community leaders. Also surveyed are the social and economic effects of the activities of vigilantes on the community. The study revealed that the vigilante groups in Kisumu have a recognized leadership structure. It contends that the formation of the vigils follows the identification of a gap in service provision. Further, the study revealed that vigilante groups in Kisumu engage in numerous economic activities for survival. Each vigilante group in Kisumu aligns itself to a political side. The chapter reinforces the notion that vigilante groups function outside the law. The section explained the roles of women in the vigilante groups, such as safe keeping of stolen wealth, traffic drugs and provision of sexual favors to the male members. The chapter concludes that vigilantism involves intricate operations that rope in the police and other security agents, politicians and other community leaders.

5.2 Leadership Structure of the Vigilantes Groups in Kisumu City

Various studies indicate that vigilante groups have a clear organizational structure. Although Kisumu City had a myriad of vigilante groups, their leadership structures were similar because they all had their roots in *Baghdad Boys*. Most of the groups copied Baghdad Boy's style of leadership. In Kisumu City, a characteristic vigilante group would be composed of between 30 and 100 members. According to Richard (2007), vigilante groups assume a pyramid structure of leadership. Richard (2007) notes that at the top of the hierarchy is a king or president and at the bottom are street soldiers. However, studies indicate that some organizations are autonomous with free charismatic leaders. Each vigilante group in Kisumu

has a recognized leadership consisting of office bearers: normally a chairperson, secretary, and treasurer. Informant K-005 (KII, 18/12/202), asserted that vigilante groups in Kisumu have a visible, well-developed chain of command with a distinct overall leader. Kegoro (2009) who notes that vigilante groups have specific leaders and office bearers.

Plate 3: Newspaper Headlines Featuring Baghdad Boys

Headlines from various newspapers portaying the activities of Baghdad Boys in Kisumu. Sources: Standard Newspaer, June 15, 1997 and Nation Newspaper, June 23, 2000

During the struggle for multi-party democracy in Kenya in 1991, *Baghdad Boys* had their supreme leaders (K-005) and (K-0032). Later, *China Squad* and American Marine also had their leaders that is (K-016) and (K-0018) respectively. These vigilante groups produced visible leaders who were recognized by the local citizens as well as the politicians in the area. The vigilante group leaders received more recognition than the basic unit did. At the beginning, (K-005) was the leader of vigilante groups in Kisumu before the other groups emerged. To ensure proper functioning of the group there was need for a defined structure of leadership which was also driven by the need to have a clear link between the political elites

and the vigilante groups in Kisumu (K-017, KII, 10/3/2021. The hierarchy of vigilante groups was pyramidal in nature with the chairperson at the peak followed by the commanders and finally members in their various sections.

5.3 The Organization of the Vigilante Groups

According to informant K-017 (KII, 4/4/2021), at the top of the hierarchy of a vigilante group was an overall chairperson of the vigilante groups. The chairperson was the leader of the vigilante group and among the longest serving members of the group. The chairperson was expected to possess some outstanding leadership characteristics, which included swiftness, wisdom, and charisma, ability to control members of the group, reliability and bravery. These characteristics conform to Davis's (2007) assertions that the vigilante group chairperson should be a member of the vigilante group. He should also be brave enough to ensure democracy of the group. In Kisumu, the leader had to be proficient in Dholuo and familiar with the city's topography.

Key informant K-017, (KII, 2/04/2021) stated that the chairperson's position in a vigilante group was given to the founder of the group unless there were other factors that would bar him from the role. This ensured that no fights and conflicts emerge in relation to that position. From the oral interviews, it was realized that the leader of the vigilante group assigned duties to the treasurer and secretary. The vigilante group officials delivered to other members any information from the chairperson. However, ex-member (K-017, KII, 5/4/2021) noted that sometimes a member could avail information on insecurity in case he or she got it ahead of the chairperson or secretary. The leader would give instructions on the next course of action. Davis (2011) states that overall, the leader of a vigilante group thought on behalf of others and made final decisions. The chairperson would always be at the forefront of all group activities. As a sign of authority, the leader would wear Russian uniform. This consisted of jacket and pants, jacket straight cut, the central fastener on

67

detachable zipper and loops for shoulder straps to demonstrate respect. Other members of the movement would stand up and salute him whenever he came around. They would remain standing until he ordered them to sit or after taking his instructions.

According to K-017 (KII, 6/4/2021), the secretary assisted the leader in executing his duties and could act on behalf of the leader in his absence. It was also his responsibility to train new recruits. The treasurer kept the money that the group collected from security services to the politicians, members of the public and the business community. For instance, this study noted that every household within Kisumu City where Baghdad Boys operated used to pay to the treasurer a monthly fee of sh. 200. Informant K-003 (KII, 4/04/2021) informed us that the money collected was to enable the vigilante to carry out their security activities such as night patrols. The vigilante groups would term the paid fee a voluntary contribution for the work they do although, as pointed out by K-003 (OI, 6/4/2021), some residents claimed that they were compelled to pay or face some sanctions. In order to curb the state of insecurity in Kisumu City, therefore, residents felt obliged to pay the monthly fee.

Below the treasurer, as indicated by informant K-009 (KII, 7/4/2021), were spies, messengers and weapon makers. The weapon makers specialized in the production of weapons used by the vigilante groups. The messengers were always sent by their leaders to collect money. The spies could be sent to gather information before executing an attack. The spies provided crucial and detailed information to the chairperson of the group on events in the city. Spies were well conversant with the enemy's lifestyle, territory and language, and would ordinarily work within the city. They were valiant people who could not betray the vigilante group members even under duress. Informant K-017 (KII, 7/4/2021), added that in most cases, the spies used women and children to gain access to the person of interest. They would study his character, interests and associates. For instance, if the group's motive was to steal from a given shop, they will use one of the shop attendants to study the events in the shop after

which they could hatch a plan on how to accomplish their mission. Other members were also crucial in the execution of the group's activities such as the collection of illegal levies at the bus termini.

Findings from the study revealed that vigilante groups in Kisumu City lacked a specific ideology or code of conduct. This was unlike other groups like the Mungiki and the Sungu Sungu who took an oath as a symbol of unity. However, their leader who acted as their symbol of unity ensured the unity and discipline among group members in the city. Nonetheless, leadership wrangles, lack of strong bonds, loose organizational structures and factions were major characteristics of the vigilante groups in the City. As clearly indicated, Baghdad Boy's and other Kisumu based vigilante groups' lacked an oathing element. Perhaps this could be because of their lack of a religious or indoctrinal ideology. Vigilante's in Kisumu have no specific dogmas or doctrines of any kind, a character that makes them reactionary outfits. Concomittantly, they have also operated openly with a certain form of arrogance and carefree attitude pointing either to their utter dieregard of the law or their forceful self-imposition on the people.

5.4 The Operations and Activities of the Vigilante Groups

Across the world, the quest to surmount a shortfall such as insecurity in the neighborhood, provide justice for the masses, and create awareness on particular issues fuels the existence of vigilantes. Vigilantes have relatively common process of formation, with members identifying a gap in service provision and coming up with a community solution to fix it. Many societies see the marginalization of their communities, increased social insecurities, and laxity in the provision of essential government services as major motivators for the existence of vigilantes. The nature of the problem identified, the outcomes of the vigilante activities towards the original goals, and the need to establish a long-running body to cater for the community's issues, together determines the success of the vigilante.

The activities of the vigilante groups in Kisumu city can be categorized into three dimensions: political, social and economic. In the group's activities in the city, these dimensions are exhibited. The involvement of the vigilante groups in political conflicts in Kisumu demonstrate how the political elite has manipulated the groups. To achieve economic prosperity, the groups resort to extortion. Some groups believe that extortion is a way of balancing the haves and the have-nots as well as a means of gaining earnings. In some cases, vigilante groups use blackmail to extort money from politicians.

The formation of vigilante groups seeks to quell social disturbances and to meet the community needs such as insecurity within a given neighborhood (KNA/NBI/F1/3611/ Crime and Stock Theft Report). In return, the vigilantes may rely on the community support and goodwill to execute their roles. The community may voluntarily or by coercion support the groups through donations such as monthly fee for the provision of supplies. For instance, *Baghdad Boys* was formed in order to protect the interests and property of the community and, ironically, maintain peace. An oral interview with K-003 (O.I, 2/4/2021), revealed that the vigilante group was meant to ensure the community enjoys normalcy by engaging youths in vigilantism. Members of a given estate may engage the vigilante group leader to help them curb insecurity in their estates after agreeing on terms of payment. Individuals who are reluctant to pay may be coerced to cooperate, according to informant K-026 (O.I, 4/4/2021). Trelles & Carreras (2012) describe the duties of these groups as always short term because they easily fall out with their bosses.

5.5 Involvement of the Vigilante Groups in Crime and Insecurity

Vigilante groups in Kisumu have been accused of engaging in various criminal activities. These include being in possession of illegal weapons and violence attacks to members of the public. One occurrence cited by interviewees is a football match between Gor Mahia and AFC Leopards at Kasarani Stadium in Nairobi on September 19, 2012. Among the Gor

Mahia fans were members of American Marine and China Squad. The two groups got involved in a fracas, which culminated in the shooting of K-017 (KII, 5/4/2021), an American Marine member. The attack was reported at Shauri Moyo Police Station and recorded in the Occurrence Book as OB No. 20/22/09 at 1220 hrs. After the attack, China Squad members met in Kisumu with two prominent businesspersons in Nyanza and resolved to subjugate the American Marines.

The Kisumu Crime and Violence (2019) report indicates that the rivalry between the two groups at the time had peaked to worrying levels. The rivalry is intensified by political influence, and a largely compromised police force, which has been accused of abetting crime. The transfer of some senior police officers and their replacement with more competent officers has brought some hope to the residents. The changes have gone a long way in taming crime in the city. Some of the criminals may have fled to Nairobi while those who remained in Kisumu have either gone underground or camouflaged their activities by operating small businesses during the day, although at night they may engage in criminal activities.

Plate 4: A Standard Newspaper Headline Featuring Activities of the China Squad

Vigilant groups in Kisumu City are portrayed as violent gangs linked with serious criminal activities.
Source: Standard Newspaper, March 25, 2015

A scrutiny of the security situation in Kisumu City and its environs shows clearly that there is an increase in insecurity and criminal activities (Reported Crime Statistics, 2015). According

to Kenya's Crime Statistics Economic Survey of 2018, Kisumu is one of the most insecure urban centers with an average crime rate of 4%. Remarkably, out of 747 crime cases reported, 400 were instances of crime by vigilante groups. 182 were burglary cases, 98 homicide cases, 61 cases of assaults and 77 cases of possession and trafficking of dangerous drugs. The estates affected are Milimani, Kaloleni, Railways, Migosi, Nyalenda, Kondele, Kolwa and Manyatta. Kondele and Manyatta estates recorded the highest number of reported criminal cases followed by Migosi and Nyalenda in that order (Crime Statistics Economic Survey, 2015). Thus, the rise of vigilante groups in Kisumu since 1986 has posed perturbing security challenges to the Kisumu city residents. It has caused a significant impediment to sustainable development.

5.6 The Involvement of Vigilante Groups in Economic Activities

As a means of survival, vigilante groups in Kisumu have been involved in numerous economic activities - some lawful and others illegitimate. For instance, the groups have taken control of the lucrative matatu industry. Key informant K-033 (O.I, 4/4/2021) told us that managing the matatu routes and termini has become the most important source of funding. Kagwanja (2002) states that apart from tips from some drivers who were members, the vigilante groups were also taking KSh 150 from all drivers. The vigilantes will point guns at drivers who would refuse to pay willingly. At the end of the month, the vigilante groups would have accumulated millions of shillings.

Informant K-017 (OI, 5/4/2021), pointed out that the American Marines members operated many businesses at the bus stage. They also controlled *matatu* operations on busy routes such as Busia, Siaya, Migori, Kakamega, Kisii and Nairobi (*Daily Nation*, 8th April, 2005; see plate 5).

72

Plate 5: An Aerial View of Kisumu Bus Park

BACKGROUND

Gangs had learnt to live with each other

China gang members are known to well-off with big businesses in Kisumu town and its environs.

They support Jubilee while their rivals, the American Marines, who control the main bus park are believed to be followers of ODM and Cord.

The two groups reconciled after a lot of interventions and the rivalry ended until two weeks ago when members believed to belong to the China squad stripped naked, tortured and whipped more than 10 youth they suspected of breaking into shops in Kisumu.

FILE | NATION

"We are law-abidi citizens whose policing initiativ

Kisumu bus park that is said to be controlled by the American Marines gang

Activities at the Kisumu Bus Park which is said to be controlled by American Marines.
Source: Standard Newspaper, March 28, 2015

Informant K-036 (KII, 4/4/2021), approximated that the *American Marines* collected at least KSh. 20 000 per day per route, amounting to nearly Sh. 500 000 per day from all routes under their control. The group collected KSh. 250 daily from each 14-seater *matatu*, KSh. 300 from 25-seater minibuses and Sh. 400 from 65-seater buses. The monies collected from the bus park were used to start car hire and car wash centers. Informant K-019 (KII, 5/4/2021) told us that any threat to the business would be met with vicious response American Marine members believe that all the termini and bus-parks within Kisumu city belong to them, and so prospective owners of businesses near the bus terminus must first seek their blessings.

Vigilante groups have also been involved in the collection of protection fee. Oral interviewee, K-003 (OI4/4/2021), noted that the vigilante groups collected protection fees to maintain security in the city. According to him, vigilantes forced households in Kondele, Kona Mbuta, Kona Mbaya, Nyalenda, and Fly Over to pay a monthly protection fee of between Sh. 30 and

Sh. 60. They demanded a monthly fee of Sh. 100 from kiosk owners and grocers, Sh. 250 from shopkeepers and Sh. 1000 from chang'aa brewers. Delivery vehicles paid Sh. 500 per delivery. This agrees with Baker's (2002) assertion that vigilante groups in South Africa were paid to provide protection to South African citizens in their residential and business premises and around mining areas especially during the apartheid regime. Our informant *K-003, OI 4/3/2021* told us that the groups were able to accumulate a lot of wealth through such activities, as stated below:

> *"From as early as 1988 we have been paying protection fees each month to the members of the vigilante groups. If I fail to give them the cash, my shop is usually at risk of burglary. I experienced such theft once a time we had quarrel with the boys who collect the cash. I refused to pay as there was peace with no recent history of theft. It did not pass two days; I lost almost all the stock in the shop. I complied immediately."*

The confession explained why Kisumu residents have continued to pay the fees even when there seemed to be stability in the area. The groups also instill fear to business owners, with threats of invasion to their premises if they do not comply. Owners of shops, supermarkets, apartments and other business facilities are the main targets of the extortion cartels. Confronted, vigilante members indicate that they need the funds to operate and execute community protection activities. With this defense, they continue operating, with the support of the business community and the political elite.

These groups have also set up a formidable matatu, motorcycle and taxi enterprises. Informant K-009 (O.I, 4/32021), noted that the groups use the proceeds from the enterprises to bankroll their unlawful activities. In an oral interview, a driver in Kisumu, K-033 and Market B (FGD, 2/2/2021), explained how vigilante groups have also formed Matatu Sacco's where thousands of vehicles are registered according to the new NTSA rules. Vehicle owners pay a monthly fee of Sh. 500 to the Saccos, which accumulates to millions of shillings. Thus, the vigilante groups in Kisumu have become well-moneyed outfit whose kitties run into millions of

shillings. The Matatu Saccos have bolstered the growth of these groups because they sometimes use the Saccos as a smokescreen to carry out illegal activities. The money raised from the Saccos is used to pay the salaries of members involved in full time activities of the group. However, some funds are used for to acquire guns for senior group members. Finally, some funds are used to bribe state agents like the police.

Historically, the political and business elite have supported vigilante groups financially from as early as 1986. Key informant K-034 (O.I, 4/4/2021) pointed out that in the 2008 and 2013 general elections, *China Squad* and *Baghdad Boys* leaders, who did not have any permanent source of income, suddenly started driving cars and owning plots and houses in up market areas. During these elections, leaders of the groups frequently met with ODM, KANU and Jubilee politicians and received money and other items in return for rallying members to vote for them, as stated by an informant, K-017 (KII, 4/4/2021). Likewise, in the 2005 referendum and 2007 elections, politicians paid the vigilante groups to advance their political agendas. *Baghdad Boys* and other vigilante groups were also aggressively involved in the 2008 post-election crisis (Kenya research by Human Rights Watch, 2002).

> *We are always ready to provide our services to the politicians provided they give a good offer. In some cases, we have many suitors who want our services; as such, we always go with the highest bidder. We provide security as well as mobilize and sell political parties manifestos,"(K-017, KII, 4/4/2021).*

The *China Squad* was mainly based in Kondele, the famous sub-urban area located 5 kilometers from the city Centre. The group was believed to enjoy police protection. Informant K-0051 (KII, 5/4/2021) stated that the group also found partnership with the "Wash-Wash," a group known for making fake currency. China Squad members would use their wealth to compromise the police and avoid arrests whenever they committed serious crimes. According to K-017 (KII, 4/4/2021), the *China Squad* and the *American Marines*

were at one time operating together in the collection of illegal fees at the Kisumu Bus Terminus:

> "The American Marine Squad was the first one to be and it was commanding all businesses within town. One could go to the gym then after gym they could go to the bus and matatu terminus for work where one could make a whooping cash of between (50,000 - 900,000 shillings) but by the end of the day you end up getting very little amount as American Marine squad took a lot as their share since they controlled all the business including the bus and matatu terminuses. We decided to form another group and called it China Squad which was to be used to control business within the Central Business District and other bus and matatu stages outside the town, this was a life changer to me."

In Kisumu, politicians enticed members of the vigilante groups to support them in the mobilization of the masses and to undertake improper activities especially in areas where the politicians are either unpopular or have economic interests, as stated by K-005:

> "In many cases, operations are ordered by the boss in either retaliation or possession of some new property, or to make statement. Once a raid is done, the loot goes to the boss who then divides the smaller parts to the gang members who were in the operations. In this case, the operations are depended on the needs of the patrons and the elite. We cannot go for operations when the boss has not commanded," (K-005, (KII, 4/3/2021).

Vigilante groups in the city have been able invade private and public land for their bosses' or their own gain. These land parcels include road reserves, bus termini and underdeveloped lands in areas like Kondele, Manyatta, Patel and areas around the Maseno University Town Campus. Through the oral interview with K-017 (KII, 5/4/2021) and FGD with Kisumu residents, it was indicated that politicians and ruthless land grabbers in Kisumu mainly hired vigilante groups such as *Baghdad Boys* and *China Squad* to invade private land, demolish property, displace people, fence off and guard the land with impunity. Our informant Kondele (FGD, 5/4/2021) revealed that *Baghdad Boys* and *China Squad* members commit these crimes so effortlessly because they work in collaboration with police officers. According to our informant K-017 (O.I., 5/4/2021), politicians fund these activities for their own personal gain and the gain of the vigilante groups. This concurs with Muriuki (2011)

who notes that police and politicians were accomplices in land invasions in Kenya. This also applies to Kisumu City:

> *"I bought a piece of land near Patel on your way to Kibuye for 0.5M in 2000, in 2017, a group of young men who were members of Baghdad Boys came and warned me and gave me a notice to leave that piece of land. I was hesitant that this was somehow a joke or a daydream. After two weeks, the group came, beat me up, and demolished my strictures. I reported the matter at Kondele police station, but the police did nothing. Going to the lands to check who the land belongs to; it was a road reserve. I gave up to avoid constant harassment from members of the vigilante. How many have lost their lands to these groups?"(K-017, KII, 5/4/2021).*

In most cases, the vigilante groups construct kiosks on the grabbed land and rent them out. These cases of injustice often go unpunished by the legal system. Vigilante groups have also been involved in drug trafficking (The Standard 2017). As indicated before, drugs influence young people's recruitment into vigilante groups in urban areas like Kisumu (The Standard 2017). In an oral interview, an informant, K-009 (KII, 6/4/2021) revealed that *Baghdad Boys* were involved in trafficking drugs within and outside Kisumu City. Schubert (2014) points out that *Baghdad Boys* were mainly hired to secure the transportation of cannabis and cocaine and provide security at the dens where the illicit goods were being consumed. *Baghdad Boys* also cooperated with the dealers of light drus such as cannabis and bhang especially in Kondele estate (Schubert, 2014). These observations were echoed in an oral interview with a Kondele tout, K-003 (O.I, 5/4/2021), who revealed how the drugs, mainly cocaine and bhang are pushed to drug addicts in Manyatta, Kondele and Railways. The vigilante members use the proceeds to provide for their families.

Njonjo (2011) points out the outright competition among vigilante groups in Kisumu to work for drug lords who pay them handsomely for their services. In an oral interview, one Kisumu resident pointed out that drug lords used women and children to traffic the drugs because they could not be easily suspected. Maribe (2014) is also in agreement that vigilante groups

used women and children in drug trafficking. Maribe further explains that children convey drugs to users, especially in areas where law enforcers are likely to suspect the adults. The same has also been echoed by Baraza (2017), who explains that vigilante groups in Kenya have resorted to using children and women in drug trafficking since they are the least suspected, making them elude arrest by the police and suspicion from members of the public. The lucrative drugs business has led to the mushrooming of vigilante groups whose membership comprises men, women and children.

Vigilantes have been turned into quasi-economic companies where members are organized into cells to protect and gain from the fees collected. Respondent, K-003 (OI, 20/4/2021), who operates a small business in the Manyatta slums, explains how the vigilante groups are organized into groups that man designated areas in exchange for weekly or monthly stipends. The competition for the control of the sources of income for the vigilante groups in Kisumu has often climaxed in bitter disputes and sometimes the fragmentation of the groups. Respondent K-0014 (OI, 2/4/2021), informed us that the need to control the matatu business in Kisumu led to the split between *China Squad* and the *American Marine Squad*. The latter had a monopoly of all activities of the booming matatu business. Some people could collect so much money from the matatus and buses and still go home with very little after remitting the rest to the *American Marine* leaders. This forced the disgruntled lot to even the score by forming *China Squad*.

A Key Informant and a former member of *China Squad* explained that members of his group and those of *American Marines* would also wrangle over fraudulent deals gone sour. He cited a case of a member of *China Squad* who convinced K-0014, a member of the *American Marine,* to give him KSh 400,000 to be doubled in a process called "wash wash." The 'washing' did not materialize and to recover his money, the *American Marine* mobilized other members of his group who accosted the culprit and badly injured him. The victim paid

back the money with contributions from other *China Squad* members, but the incident brought enmity and constant suspicions between the two groups

The second incident involved K-0015, an *American Marine* who bought two Toyota Premio vehicles from K-0016, a *China Squad* car dealer. The car dealer could not produce all the necessary documents to facilitate change of vehicle ownership. Consequently, K-0015 could not pay him all the money without all the documents, though he still used other means to acquire logbooks from Kenya Revenue Authority. According to K-0016, this was a breach of the agreement, which led to bad blood between the two groups.

A bitter row over spaces set aside at Nyamlori Market by the City Council for hawkers to construct stalls further aggaravated the antagonism between *American Marines* and the *China Squad*. All those who got the opportunity to construct stalls, it is believed, had bribed the local councilor with Ksh. 40 000 each. During the allocation of the stalls, K-0016 arrived with a contingent of *China Squad* members armed with machetes and other crude weapons and forcefully secured 106 stall plots for *China Squad.*

5.7 Political Involvement of Vigilante Groups in Kisumu City

The operations of vigilante groups have influenced the political arena in Kisumu. The essence of the groups has been economic and political empowerment. A Key Informant and a former member of *Baghdad Boys* indicates that the existence of vigilante groups was going to create fear to Kisumu residents, especially during the general elections, with youths easily lured by politicians with money. There are many youth groups in Kisumu operating in different estates and politicians misuse them (Human Rights Watch, 2002). During the interviews, it came out clearly that politicians use vigilante groups to accomplish their political ambitions, after which they abandon the groups. In some cases, the politicians use the vigilantes and renege on the payment agreements and other promises.

Bartolucci and Konnerworlft (2012) observe that during elections, vigilante groups can be used to organize rallies and crowds. With good monetary incentives, politicians can use the youth to cause havoc or to attack their competitors. This is the case in Kenya where politicians use the vigilante groups to reach and stamp their authority in areas they feel they are not welcome. In such cases, the politicians entice vigilante group members with goodies that are easily acceptable to them. These are the tactics used by *China Squad*. The group was part of TNA plot to paint ODM as a violent party and depict ODM strongholds such as Kisumu as prone to violence and interference with voter registration. TNA used the *China Squad* to penetrate the opposition zone, organize rallies and win them votes in exchange for goodies (K-003, O.I, 2/4/ 2021).

China Squad had connections with the State. For instance, in April 2011, Uhuru Kenyatta, accompanied by former TNA Secretary General Onyango Oloo and the POA Party Leader and Presidential Candidate Raphael Tuju, made an abrupt trip to Kisumu. A group calling itself Luo Nyanza Professional and Business Caucus hosted him (Kenya Human Rights Commission, 2011). The report further indicates that in another meeting at Sunset Hotel, Uhuru met *China Squad* members. All those in attendance blamed poor politics for lack of development in Nyanza. The relationship between Uhuru and *China Squad* began when Onyango Oloo invited him to Kisumu for a meeting with Kisumu residents to discuss how they could support TNA.

On September 9, 2012, Honorable Uhuru Kenyatta went back to Kisumu. Our respondent, K-004 (KII, 5/4/2021), told us that TNA Communications Director Munyori Buku and Nyanza TNA Coordinator Hezborne Omollo had announced the rallies Uhuru Kenyatta was going to address. He was scheduled to address a rally at Kondele, Kisumu and to campaign for TNA's candidate in Ndhiwa by-election, Rosemary Rumo. Organizers asked people to attend in large numbers and assured them of adequate security provided by the TNA Kisumu branch and

China Squad members. When Uhuru Kenyatta landed in Kisumu City, hired hawkers and boda boda operators clad in TNA t-shirts received him at the Kisumu International Airport. China *Squad* members, in a convoy of several top-of-the range vehicles, escorted him from the airport (https://deepcogitation.com). TNA members, boda boda operators and touts blew sirens and danced to TNA tunes. This made even more people to join them in praising the party (ibid).

However, Uhuru Kenyatta's presence in Kisumu did not augur well with the *American Marine,* who gave a stern warning to both K-005, the *China Squad* leader and Oyango Oloo that no rally was going to take place in Kondele. This was in contrast with earlier assurances by the *China Squad* leaders that the ground was secure for the TNA leadership. Interviews showed that this culminated in extreme political resentment and *China squad* vowed to "teach the *American Marines* a lesson" for having disrupted their planned rally in Kondele (Kisumu Crime and Violence Report, 2019).

As previously noted and reinforced by the interview with *Baghdad Boys'* former leader K-005 (KII, 3/4/2021), a revelation that the group was part of the security detail of Ford Kenya politicians leading the crusade for change in Kisumu in the early 1990s was made:

> *"In Kisumu it was the Baghdad Boys while in Nairobi, a similar group was called "Operation Moi out (OMO)" The two groups grew quickly in Numbers to provide security to Jaramogi and the Young Turks and to ensure they move freely from one part of the country to another without being stopped by the state security agents.").*

The operations of vigilante groups are at the peak during electioneering periods. Politicians hire them to provide security and to mobilize supporters during campaign rallies. They also organize the venues for meetings, distribute branded shirts of the politician, and deal with any unruly individual who might disrupt the rally. Similarly, a report by National Crime Research Center (NCRC) (2012) explains how politicians in Kisumu take advantage of the unemployed

youths and lure them to be employed as politicians' personal security during campaigns. And even after elections some are still retained as security or they may be given other duties in the county government.

Vigilante groups in Kisumu align themselves to a political side that can protect and foster their interests. An interview with K-003 (O.I., 4/4/2021), a *Baghdad Boys* member in Kondele revealed that politicians hire vigilante group members as bodyguards during campaigns and the election period. They also use the groups as a means of extending their political dominance. This also helps group members to gain some income. Murunga and Nasongo (2007) agree, noting that in 1992, the onset of multi-party politics led to the emergence of youth wings, which transformed themselves into vigilante groups that had political patronage and support to unleash violence to political opponents.

Okombo and along (2010) note that politicians have often used vigilante groups to disrupt political rallies organized by their opponents, burn or petrol bomb their opponents' homes, circulate leaflets threatening their opponents, and even kill their opponents to make sure they do not participate in elections. One respondent, K-033 (KIII, 4/4/2021), explained that politicians in Kisumu hire young, physically fit and daring vigilante members to inflict pain on opponents. In return, the politicians pay and provide them with the basic needs such as food, drugs, cigarettes and alcohol. Informant K-003 (O.I, 2/4/ 2021), indicated that some politicians even pay their rent for their 'good' work. Some vigilante group members were even promised jobs provided they did all it took to enable the politicians win elections The informant noted that vigilante group members acted as supporters, defenders and messengers of the politicians who had hired them during elections. This conforms to Gumbihi and Ombati (2013) who explained how various politicians hired vigilante groups as bodyguards during the National Rainbow Coalition – Kenya (NARC-K) regime. Thus, the involvement of vigilante groups in Kisumu politics is a give-and-take affair. The vigilantes only support

an individual politician or a political party with the aim of benefiting economically. In most cases, vigilante groups operate on the highest bidder takes it basis.

Murunga and Nasongo (2007) state that vigilante groups were associated with politicians. For instance, *Baghdad Boys* was linked to Ford Kenya leadership, as witnessed during the Ford Kenya elections in Thika. *China Squad* and *American Marines* were associated with Party of National Unity (TNA) and Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) politicians respectively. Politicians can also engage *Taliban* or Sungusungu when there is need for political protection or retaliation against other political camps. During party events like press conferences, demonstrations and parliament meetings, the vigilantes collaborate with the police to give security to the political figures they support. Ngunyi (2015). Wambilyanga (2009) explains that during the transition of power from KANU to NARC-K in 2002, politicians hired goons to offer services to the leaders. Mares & Queralt (2015) noted that in quest for political power, the vigilantes offer protection and the energy needed at the party level which is a characteristic of the vigilante groups in Kisumu city.

Kisumu has witnessed the mushrooming of vigilante groups because of the high demand for the work they do. During the electioneering period, the demand for services of the vigilante groups increases even more. This was witnessed in 2007 elections when *China Squad* and *Marine Squad* emerged to support different factions of politicians in Kisumu. Informant K-033 (O.I, 2/4/2021), affirmed that politicians could hire these vigilante groups at about KSh 300 per member with the aim of unleashing violence to their political rivals. Thus, during such periods, vigilante groups find a source of livelihood while the politicians get power and prestige. Vigilante groups have also been vital in the protection of party offices and homes of politicians in Kisumu City. Since the 2002 elections, vigilante groups have protected ODM, Jubilee and Ford Kenya party offices in the city from rivals, according to K-034(O.I, 4/4/2021).

Kisumu City has witnessed violent elections since 2007. During such periods, businesspersons hire the services of vigilante groups for about sh. 3000 to provide protection for their property. Informant K-003, O.I, 4/4/2021 confirmed that during election violence, vigilante youths are paid to guard business premises from acts of arson and looting Thus, vigilante groups have been crucial in protecting offices and businesses premises.

5.8 The Economic Effects of the Vigilante Groups in Kisumu

The main aim of incorporating vigilantes to the security system is to combat crimes. In Kisumu City, vigilante groups had a positive influence in their formative stages but later the groups turned into a nightmare to city residents because of their extortion acts. The groups force residents to pay '*protection fee*' for night patrols or risk losing money or valuables.

The activities of the vigilante groups have adversely affected the transport industry. Informant K-033 (KII, 4/3/2021) confirmed that group members extort money from bus, matatu and car hire vehicle operators. As a result, some operators have opted to give up the transport business that has been their source of livelihood for years. The extortion and interference from the vigilante groups has driven away potential investors from Kisumu City. Consequently, many city residents have been rendered poor and unemployed (KNA/NBI/F1/3611/ Crime and Stock Theft Report). Joblessness has complicated matters for idle city youths forcing some of them to join vigilante groups. In an interview, a former matatu owner re-counted that he vacated the transport industry after the vigilante groups increased renewal fee from KSh 20,000 to KSh 100,000, much more than what they get from the industry at the end of the year.

According to informant K-017 (KII, 5/4/2021), extortion by vigilante group adherents has led to the economic prosperity of certain individuals in the groups, particularly the group leaders. Vigilante groups have reserved some matatu routes within the city where they have placed their own matatus and those owned by operators who are ready to play by their rules. Private

vehicles using '*Baghdad Boys marked routes*' have not been spared from paying protection fee. Informant, K-033 (O.I, 4/4/2021), pointed out that in some areas of Kisumu City, private vehicles have also been forced to pay parking fee. The vigilante groups use the proceeds of extortion to buy guns and ammunition, bribe police officers for protection and pay court fines for arrested members. This is in agreement with Bruneau (2005) who explains how these vigilante groups pose different security challenges. Vigilante groups have been able to amass wealth. The transport industry has been their major source of income. The groups could collect as much as KSh. 500 000 in a day from bus, matatu and private car operators within their routes.

It was ascertained from informant K-009 (KII, 4/4/2021) how vigilante groups in Kisumu have established lucrative Kangaroo courts which help solve cases ranging from family feuds to theft. This agrees with Skaperdas and Connotations (1998) who explained how vigilante groups have a judicial structure, which they use to arbitrate disputes in the society and maintain law and order. In Kisumu city, for instance, such courts intervene in domestic squabbles. They also mete out various disciplinary measures on petty crimes and offences. On many occasions, they engage in activities such as settling land disputes mainly in favor of politicians. Informant K-003 (O.I, 2/4/ 2021) also narrated that politicians in Kisumu paid members of *Baghdad Boys* around sh. 300 000 to help them deal with land cases in the City. The interviewee further indicated that most of the land ownership disputes occurred in areas such Railways, Kondele, and Manyatta.

According to findings of this study, most residents still use vigilante groups at a fee to grab land or deal with land grabbers. As they help the politicians to grab pieces of land, members of vigilante groups have also benefited by acquiring their own pieces too. For instance, some of the stalls that were adjacent to Varsity Plaza in the City belonged to vigilante group members. *China Squad* members grabbed a piece of land opposite the Kibuye - Town Centre

junction and sold it as plots to businesspersons. All cases brought before the disciplinary committee must be paid for in one form or another. Thus, this judicial system is a source of income for the groups.

An interviews conducted with K-003 (O.I, 4/4/2021) revealed that vigilante groups extort money from politicians and wealthy people in Kisumu by sending threatening short messages. The panic created prompts the victims to buy their safety and the protection of their families. According to this informant, *Baghdad Boys* is one such outfit that has been extorting money from politicians in Kisumu. In the run-up to the 2013 elections, a Member of County Assembly (MCA) candidate in Kisumu was asked to pay Sh. 50000 or face death. With the help of Safaricom and the Provincial administration, the police arrested a member of the group (*Standard Newspaper*, 15th July, 2013). Thus, vigilante groups are not only a threat to the common citizens but also to the politicians and wealthy businesspersons. The groups have always demanded that politicians fulfill their financial obligations. The vigilantes deal with uncooperative politicians by disrupting their rallies. In some cases, the hoodlums blackmail the politician and tarnish their names.

The operations of vigilante groups have affected the economic situation of Kisumu City residents. The activities of the vigilante groups have terrified and driven away investors, hence the city's economy has considerably deteriorated. In an oral interview, a tout, K-033, O.I, 5/4/2021, explained how the vigilante group members force aspiring businesspersons to pay exorbitant levies before they set up new businesses.

5.9 The Social Effects of Vigilante Groups on the Residents of Kisumu

Plate 6: A Newspaper Coverage of Gangs terrorizing Kisumu's CBD.

A violent gang strip and torture youths who operatd a car wash business in Kisumu's CBD
Source: Standard Newspaper, September 16, 201.

The operations of the vigilante groups have caused fear to individuals, families and led to communal break ups, indiscipline among children, and the suppression of freedom of speech and religious activities. Vigilante activities have instigated the migration of people to safer neighborhoods. It was ascertained from informant K-003 (OI, 3/4/2021) that frustrated locals have been forced to migrate from the city to other areas such as Maseno, Siaya and Bondo Away from their ancestral lands, the migrants tend to find living in their new neighborhoods more expensive and so they are forced to live in hardships and depravity. A report by Kenya Human Rights Watch (2002) elucidates how the operations of vigilante groups in Kisumu City have caused mass migrations of people to other parts of the country because of the many cases of insecurity occasioned by these groups.

Vigilante activities have also interfered with the order and the normal running of school and the performance of students in Kisumu City. The dread of vigilante groups in Kisumu City has led to indiscipline in schools and colleges. K-003(OI, 3/4/2021) told us that some of the vigilante group members who are still at primary, secondary or college levels use their

group membership status to intimidate their teachers whenever they are to be punished Various schools within Kisumu City have reported experiencing many indiscipline cases due to the students' involvement with the vigilante groups.

Children between 13-14 years who are recruited into the vigilante groups become disrespectful to their parents. For instance, K-003, OI, 3/4/2021 expounded that a Kondele father who punished his son for indiscipline was given a ruthless battering after the boy reported him to the *Baghdad Boys.* The young vigilantes will sometimes carry drugs to school. Informant K-003 (KII, 3/4/202), cited an incident that occurred in Manyatta Primary School where a teacher confiscated tobacco from a pupil. The pupil reported the teacher to *Baghdad Boys* who threatened the teacher and demanded back the tobacco. For fear of these vigilante groups, some teachers have taken transfers to safer zones and others have quit the profession all together. This in turn has adversely affected learning in areas perceived to be controlled by vigilante groups.

The operations of the vigilante groups have negatively affected Church work in Kisumu City. According to K-003 (OI, 3/4/2021), vigilante groups clash with the Church for subjugating the traditions of the people and preaching against the operations of the groups. These vigilante groups also detest the Church because they feel it hinders their expansion. As a result, some Church leaders in Kisumu have been reprimanded. This has destabilized the work of the Church because the clergy cannot freely condemn the evils bedeviling the society. Informant K-003 (KII, 3/4/2021) noted that three pastors have fled the city owing to threats from the vigilante groups

According to Bruneau (2005), vigilante groups have posed various security challenges to Kisumu residents, including instilling fear on Church leaders opposed to their activities. A major cause of confrontation between the vigilante groups and the church leaders is the recruitment of children into these groups and the roles they play. Another contentious issue

is the piece of land on which Milimani ACK Church stands. Interviewee, (K-003, OI, 3/4/2021), disclosed that the disagreements and confrontations over the land forced some clergymen to flee for fear of attacks. Also terrified by these vigilante groups are whole congregations who shy away from pointing out the evils of the groups for fear of reprisals. However, the Church has tended to downplay such hostilities for the sake of a peaceful co-existence.

Plate 7: Newpaper Coverage of Women Demonstrating over Insecurity in Kisumu

Residents demonstrate a long the streets of Kisumu City over rising cases of insecurity. Below is a couple in hospital nursing injuries sustained from a gang attack. Source: Standard Newspaper, September 25, 2015

The adherents of the vigilante groups in Kisumu instilled fear on the residents through beatings and harassment of those who questioned their operations. The fear prompted by vigilantism has led to behavioral change amongst Kisumu City residents. One Migosi resident interviewed confirmed that vigilante groups have created fear and intimidation among the city residents. Many city residents keep silent about the activities of the groups or speak in low tones to avoid the repercussions. For instance, during the interviews, the resident was quite apprehensive when asked questions regarding the operations of vigilante

groups in Kisumu. Kenya's Crime Statistics Economic Survey, (2018), in their report regarding security in Kisumu, found out that most residents live in fear of attacks from the vigilante groups. The survey showed how most residents are psychologically tortured because of the ruthless nature and actions of these groups. The psychological fear and intimidation have created a negative impact on social life in the city.

The vigilante groups are dreaded to the extent that they have hampered people's freedom of speech. The uncertainty of who might be spying on who was clearly manifested in the behavior of the residents. Parents and clan elders have taught their families, especially the children, to avoid speaking to strangers for fear of being branded traitors, which may lead to serious repercussions from the vigilante groups. Thus, the residents of Kisumu have chosen silence to avoid reprisals from the vigilante groups, as stated by K-003,(OI, 4/3/2021). This silence has given the vigilante groups a conducive environment for carrying out extortions and terror:

> *"Being silent has negatively affected the youth's social skills as most of the communications were always aimed at the vigilante groups which they tended to avoid. Questions such as, how can you dialogue to a stranger? Are you exhausted of living? Do you know your mouth can cost you? It is better to stay quiet."*(K-003, OI, 4/3/2021)

The fear of the vigilante groups was not limited to the non-members. Many group members live in fear too. In an oral interview, one *Baghdad Boys* member stated that due to the fear of retaliations, vigilante groups are bonded together. For instance, one of the *Baghdad Boys* member, K-017 (KII, 3/4/2021), said that fear for his life prevented him from quitting the group. The study established that due to constant harassment from fellow vigilante group members and the police, some vigilante groups members have always thought twice about their membership to the groups. However, the fear of the consequences that they may face compel them to remain loyal to the group. Any form of betrayal will have serious repercussion on their families as well. The climate of trepidation and tension created by the

90

vigilante groups has denied the residents of Kisumu City happiness and the freedom of speech, movement and association.

The fear instilled by the vigilante groups in Kisumu city has affected communal ties and family unity. Some family members have opted to keep away from their relatives or the families they believe to have connections with the vigilante groups. Informant K-003 (OI, 4/4/2021) noted that most parents in the city fear such associations as they could lead their children into joining the groups. The informant cited a single father of two boys aged 14 and 12 in Kolwa East, K-003(OI, 3/4/2021), who terribly feared for his two sons' lives. Suspicions between family or clan members have been rampant in families that associate with the vigilante groups (Crime Statistics Economic Survey, 2015). The report states that from 1990, suspicion has led to stigmatization of some family members who are perceived to be members of the vigilante groups. In some cases, family and clan disagreements have spilled over to the vigilante groups. Family and communal ties are broken as some families are forced to migrate to other areas to avoid stigmatization.

Mistrust between families has made residents individualistic: no one is certain whether the next-door neighbor is a vigilante group member or not; hence they prefer not to associate themselves withneighbors in any way.   Informant K-003(OI, 3/4/2021), disclosed to us that the traditional practice of borrowing items from the neighbor has vanished thanks to suspicions between families. Residents operate as individuals rather than groups, thus killing the old communal ties. Cases of attacks in broad daylight without any intervention from neighbors have been rampant. This is caused by family differences and the individualistic nature of most of Kisumu City residents.

The fear of the presence and the activities of the vigilante groups has undermined the state security structures within the city. A police officer, K-019 (KII, 5/4/2021), noted that the National Government Administration has not been able to fight insecurity in the city due to

the presence of these groups. According to informant K-0038 (KII, 5/4/2021), the administration has been unable to wipe out the operations of vigilante groups because no one wants to volunteer information for fear of reprisals. Similarly, informant K-0019(KII, 6/4/2021), informed us that some elements in the administration are also terrified by these groups, and so the growth and operations of the groups continue unabated.

Worse still, members of the vigilante groups in Kisumu City have little regard for low cadre administration officers such as the chiefs. A vigilante group member, K-017(KII, 6/4/2021), cites the example the *Baghdad Boys* members who have been reported at Kondele Police Station many times but nothing ever comes out of it. These vigilante members went as far as threatening the assistant chief of Manyatta area. They told the chief to report to the government every word they uttered if he so wished because they feared no one. This clearly shows how the operations of the vigilante groups have created fear among the citizens and the police who are responsible for their protection. The insecurity in Kisumu City is a cause for grief and fear to residents (The Standard 2017). Interviewees stated that *China Squad* is responsible for the rise in insecurity and crime in Kisumu City. The group is involved in daily robberies and carjacking in the City Centre, Kakamega Rd, Kisian-Bondo Rd, Migosi, Kondele, Nyawita, Nyalenda, Tom Mboya, Robert Ouko, Mosque, Manyatta, Ogango and around Mamba Hotel.

Political campaigns since 1992 in Kisumu City have witnessed mass destruction of property and loss of lives. For instance, informant K-003 (O.I, 4/3/202), disclosed to us that the arrest of opposition leaders from Kisumu such as Oginga Odinga and James Orengo during the agitation for multi-party democracy in 1991 led to demonstrations in the city, which culminated in the destruction of property and maiming of thousands of people (KNA/NBI/F1/3611 Crime and stock theft report). The 2008, 2013 and 2017 political campaigns witnessed mass destruction of property and loss of lives. Die-hard vigilante

members considered supporters of the opposition party (ODM) in Kisumu led the demonstrations.

The operations of vigilante groups in Kisumu City have also affected education among the youths. Respondent K-003 (O.I, 5/4/2021) asserted in an interview that most of the recruits in the vigilante groups are young secondary school or college students who drop out of school to engage in vigilante activities. Young people are the most productive members of the society. Engaging in such operations makes them an economic burden to Kisumu City residents. Report on Multi-city study by World Bank (2010) concurs with this view, stating that vigilante groups have affected the youths and their education. The recruitment of these young people to the vigilante groups has led to mass school dropouts. Some of those who drop out are very bright students who had dreams but due to various factors such as peer pressure, they ended up joining these groups.

The operations of the vigilante groups have caused a myriad of deaths in Kisumu City, especially to those who oppose their operations. These deaths, orchestrated by the operations of the vigilante groups, greatly affect the bereaved families. Informant K-003 (O.I, 4/4/2021) told us that family members undergo sorrow, suffering and economic hardships, particularly if the deceased was the sole breadwinner. This is in agreement with a report by Kenya Human Rights Commission (2011) that evaluated the effects of vigilante groups on the economic status of the family where the breadwinner has been killed through the operations of these groups. This leads to economic hardships and insecurity since the family head who used to protect them is no more. The affected families will also live under the fear of more attacks especially if they are tempted to pursue the case.

The loss of energetic young people in Kisumu City leads to a shortage of labor and productive human resource, two crucial factors in the economy of a city (*Daily Nation*, Monday 08, 2015). A respondent in Kisumu, K-003 (O.I, 4/4/2021) revealed that majority

of the vigilante members gunned down by the police were productive members of the society. This is a big loss not only to the bereaved families but also to the public. Those who survive the police shootings flee their homes. This has affected the economic productivity of the city. When Kenya enacted the Prevention of Organized Crime Act in 2010 and 2012, many vigilante group members fled Kisumu. Some even reformed and started engaging in other activities after the government intensified the hunt for organized and illegal groupings in the country. This report further explains how some youths in Kisumu fled the City in fear of police arrest. Those who just abandoned their groups invited dire consequences to their family members. This has happened in places such as Kondele and Manyatta. When a vigilante group member quits, his family members are usually harassed and threatened with beatings and death so that they can disclose his whereabouts. According to key informant K-017 (KII, 4/4/2021), if the family is unable to produce the defector, they are compelled to make monthly remittances as compensation for the absence of a resourceful member.

5.10 Women and the Vigilante Groups

From an interview with one of the women in Kisumu city, it established that women started joining vigilante groups during the clamor for multi-party politics in Kenya in 1993. However, they were few and most of them worked underground. As the time went by more women, joined vigilante groups especially *Baghdad Boys* and *China Squad*. Informant K-003, OI, 1/4/2021 disclosed that women unwittingly joined vigilante groups in Kisumu through marriage to vigilante group members who would force them to join the groups with threats of physical assault, separation or divorce. Some women had no idea they were married to vigilante group members until they saw their husbands arrested or arraigned for a criminal offence. The husband's colleagues may bail out her husband on condition that she joined the group. These women had specific key roles such as preparing food and taking care of the family affairs as their husbands were busy in group matters. Another woman, K-003, (KII, 3/4/2021), examines the role of women in the groups, as reported below in verbatim:

> *"As women, we played a key role in cooking and taking care of the house when our men were busy in the streets or estates providing security to the city residents. We took care of what they will eat when they are back and also the family affairs."*

These sentiments from the Key Informant agree with Hakannson's (1996), who notes that traditionally, Luo women played a key role in food production and cooking while their husbands focused on herding and protecting the community against external attacks. Thus, the roles of these women in the vigilante groups were akin to the traditional roles of Luo women. In an oral interview with one of the women in Kisumu, K-036(OI, 3/4/2021), it was established that women kept safe stolen goods and transported drugs;

> *"We used to keep whatever our husbands had brought to us safely as they had worked hard to get whatever they brought. We transported drugs and satisfied our men sexually."*

Those remarks concur with Haledon's (2005) who observes that women were the "real store keepers" of their men's property. Women and children attract little suspicion, and so they acted as spies for the vigilante groups in Kisumu. Due to their small size, children were used for minor crimes such as breaking into people's premises to commit burglary, as stated by K-019 (KII, 3/4/2021). This is one of the emerging trends used by the vigilante groups since the early 1990s. The roles of women in vigilante groups were minimal but important. Lahey *et al* (1999) assert that vigilante groups were patriarchal in nature with few women involved in criminal operations. Informant K-036(OI, 3/4/2021) explained that some women would act as prostitutes with an aim of getting closer to the target in order to spy on them:

> *"We disguised ourselves as prostitutes in different areas of Kisumu City where we lured men whom we have been sent to spy on. This way we were able to get closer to the target and get information required by our members."*

These remarks are in agreement with Ombati's (2013) who pointed out that in the 21st century, vigilante groups have been using women and children to commit crimes such as espionage and drug trafficking. In the Luo culture, according to informant K-003(OI, 3/4/2021), women would provide crucial information to their husbands. Women would raise

95

alarm whenever there was security alert in the community to mobilize the community to respond to the impending danger. There were different kinds of alarm that could be raised by women, depending on the nature of danger Alarms were important in notifying the people the scene of danger or criminal activity.

Women have sometimes used vigilante groups to solve marital and domestic issues. An oral interviewee in Kolwa, K-003(OI, 3/4/2021), stated that some women hire vigilante groups to punish their husbands for getting involved in extra marital affairs or abandoning their domestic responsibilities. This is done through beatings or even death as noted below;

> *"Currently there is no need to worry about husbands who are stressful. You can have peace of mind by parting with some cash which you pay to these groups and they will deal with any situation that is troubling you. For instance, I had once sought the help of these groups when my husband was unfaithful and to stop him and the woman the group threatened him with death."*

Involving women in the vigilante operations has made it difficult to combat crime in Kisumu City. Police officers rarely suspect women and searching of handbags especially by male officers is discouraged. The People Daily Newspaper (2021) reported that girls have been joining vigilante groups in Kisumu City. Notorious groups such as *Baghdad Boys* and *China Squad* contain a sizable number of female members. The vigilantes use women to distract the police at crime scenes. Children work undercover, hide stolen loot, traffic guns, and provoke unsuspecting members of public into retaliation so that adult vigilante members can intervene and attack the victims. Informant K-003(OI, 3/4/2021) dislcosed to us that during demonstrations, women would also gather stones for their male counterparts to use against the police. This happened during the 2007-2008 post-election violence Women would also fetch water for the men to use to mitigate the effects of the tear-gas.

5.11 The Vibrancy of the vigilante groups in Kisumu City

Vigilante groups in Kisumu have been vibrant since 1986. In an interview with one of the residents of Kisumu, K-003(KII, 3/4/2021), it was noted that security lapse in most estates in

the city is the main reason behind the vibrancy of the vigilante groups. People in the estates cannot afford to live in an insecure environment and so they fill the security gap with vigilante groups. This concurs with Katumanga and Ngunyi (2014), who observe that a corrupt, ineffective, ill equipped and inadequate police force has seen the citizens turn to vigilante groups for security. This is similar to what the situation in South African was during the apartheid years when neighborhoods formed vigilante groups (Ama-Africa pogo). The groups were vibrant because the colonial government was so busy with administrative issues that they disregarded their role of providing security to their citizens (Murray, 2013). Vigilante groups in Kisumu have also sprouted and become effervescent because the locals need them. Security agencies in Kisumu do not provide adequate security, a vacuum that is occupied by vigilantes.

Powerful politicians and businessmen have been supporting the vigilante groups financially, especially during electioneering periods. The financial benefits that accompany membership to these groups motivate the recruitment of new members (Human Rights Watch, 2002). For instance, the *China Squad*, *American Marine* and *Baghdad Boys* were able to operate because of the financial assistance they got from politicians and the business owners in the city. A chief in Kondele, K-009(KII, 3/4/2021), revealed in an interview that business people rely on these groups for the continued existence of their businesses.

Plate 8: Newspaper Reports on Government Complacency

Governor, police accused of complacency amid rising insecurity

BY KEVINE OMOLLO, DENISH ONG'UDI AND OSCAR OUTA

At least 35 criminal gang attacks are reported in Kisumu every week with half of the incidents resulting into loss of lives and destruction of property.

And residents have accused Governor Jack Ranguma and area police of lethargy and complacency, which they said have provided a favourable environment for insecurity to thrive. Under the banner #KisumuLiveMatter, residents yesterday took to the streets demanding the resignation of Govenor Ranguma and transfer of long serving police officers.

The protesters who included Members of County Assembly and civil society groups claimed that some officers had developed a close relationship with gangs and were benefiting from the crime. They also blamed Ranguma for failure to constitute County Policing Authority to handle security. The residents who chant-

ed 'Ranguma must go!' paralysed business a Kisumu County Government offices for close to two hours demanding to be addressed by th governor. The public who went to seek service at the premises which hosts the county government offices, Huduma Centre and other Nation al Government departmental offices wer blocked from entry.

The governor was forced to come out of th office whereupon he was presented with a te point petition.

The petition read by Hesborn Omollo, d manded the transfer of notorious police officer formation of metropolis, regulation of bodab da, erection of streetlights and demolition of i complete and abandoned buildings which act hideouts for criminals.

"We are giving the Governor's office 14 da to act or else we will storm his office," said Omo lo. On his part, Ranguma promised to act. "I ha received the petition and I promise to work t gether with the relevant authorities." he said.

Kisumu Governor Jack Ranguama addressing residents who were demonstrating outside his office yesterday over insecurity. [PHOTO: COLLINS ODUOR/STANDARD]

Kisumu City residents demonstrating at the governor's office over insecurity attributed to vigilante groups suspected to be funded by politicians and businessmen.
Source: Standard Newspaper, August 22, 2015

A former Member of Parliament in one of the constituencies in Kisumu City, K-004(KII, 3/4/2021), explained that the ethnic nature of Kenyan politics has contributed to the vitality of many vigilante groups in Kisumu. According to him, almost every ethnic community in Kenya has its own vigilante group that is supposed to protect the community against external attacks. The Luo have come to embrace vigilante groups because of lack of trust among Kenyans during general elections. Oloo (2010), as well as Okoth and Olang (2012) state that vigilante groups have been vibrant because of the ethnic nature of Kenya as a state. Accordingly, Kisumu as a cosmopolitan region has not been spared of incidences of strained intra and inter ethnic relations.

In the same vein, Focus Group Discussion participants further echoed the above observation, stating that Kenyans do not believe in leaders from other ethnic groups and so they are always prepared for violence during elections. Vigilante groups in Kisumu, according to informants in Shauri Moyo, (FGD, 1/4/2021), vigilante groups remain vibrant in any form, whether they engage in criminal activities that lead to insecurity or defend their own people against attacks from other ethnic groups. From these statements, it can be deduced that

negative ethnicity in Kenyan politics is a key factor for the existence and vibrancy of vigilante groups in Kisumu. This concurs with Ajulu (2002) who observes that since 1992, political activities in Kenya have been ethnic in nature. According to him, political parties mobilize youth groups along ethnic lines and use them for political competition. One chief interviewed, K-009(KII, 3/4/2021), mentioned the ethnic nature of Kenyan politics as the reason why communities cannot denounce their own vigilante groups knowing well that they will need them for protection during elections. Thus, the ethnic considerations constantly displayed during elections are a motivation for the formation of more vigilante groups. Ethnicity also explains why many people have come to embrace the groups regardless of their negative impact on the society.

The presence of vigilante groups in other communities has also contributed to the vibrancy of vigilante groups in Kisumu. Informant K-009 (KII, 3/3/2021) observed that despite the ban on illegal groups, many vigilante groups are still alive and active in various areas. These groups include *Mungiki, Sungusungu, Amachuma* and *Chinkororo*. This has given *Baghdad Boys* and other vigilante groups in Kisumu hope for survival. Kegoro (2009) states that the presence of vigilante groups in many regions of Kenya illustrates how the culture of vigilantism is alive. These groups have devised various survival mechanisms such as the ability to transmute depending on the need.

Even though the Organized Crime Act 2010 and 2012 proscribed illegal groups, vigilante groups are still operational in most estates in Kisumu. A police officer, K-009(KII, 3/4/2021), remarked that it was not easy to crack down on members of vigilante groups because they keep metamorphosing into other groups when the mother group has been unearthed. This ability to metamorphose has allowed the vigilante groups to remain vibrant despite the ban. Kegoro (2009) echoed the same sentiments, explaining that the police are tactless and clueless when it comes to the handling of vigilante groups and their operations. The groups

still exist since not even the law enforcers have a clue on how they work. Cracking down on vigilante groups is not easy as they change according to the prevailing conditions or societal needs. For instance, they can be instrumental in providing security to the locals if adequately compensated. However, they can transform themselves into political hoodlums if politicians come along with a better offer.

In an interview with one of the chiefs in Kisumu, K-019(KII, 3/4/2021), it was established that the police in the City have been working with these vigilante groups. This explains why members of vigilante groups get away with crime so easily. The Institute of Security Studies (ISS) (2009) did a study on Kenya's security agents focusing on vigilante groups. The study established that the police colluded with criminals. Similarly, there has been an outcry among residents of Kisumu City about the police conspiring with vigilante groups. Residents wondered why members of vigilante groups are set free hurriedly after committing crimes and, worse still, how they acquire firearms. According to the ISS, the police were benefiting from the actions of these groups and so they could not fight the spiraling crime associated with vigilantes.

High unemployment and poverty rate among the Kenyan youth is another factor that drives the youths into the groups in Kisumu City. This youthful population ends up engaging in crime as a means of survival (Ogada, 2010). Kenyan Vision 2030 and Agenda IV of the National Accord warn that if we do not address the social, economic and political exclusion of the youths in Kisumu crime and violence will intensify. One of the pillars of Kenya Vision 2030 is to empower youths economically, and this happens through creating employment opportunities both in the informal and formal sectors. Lack of employment opportunities may compel the youth to engage in illegal activities to earn a living. Thus, unemployment and poverty are key factors in embracing these groups.

Corruption and institutional deficiencies in Kisumu have also informed the vibrancy of the vigilante groups. The discussion with informant Kaloleni (FGD, 26/4/2021), established that corruption has led to unemployment among many youths. Billions of shillings meant for the creation of jobs have been lost in corrupt scandals such as National Youth Service and the Goldenberg. This has led to unemployment among the youth in Kisumu City and other parts of Kenya. As a result, vigilante groups have employed these youths to provide security to politicians in political rallies. They have also engaged them in other economic activities, thus empowering them economically. This conforms to Keriga (2009) who says that corruption and institutional deficiencies have led to the rise of vigilante groups, who in turn have intensified crime and insecurity.

Easy accessibility to firearms has enabled the groups to remain vibrant. Chief interviewed from Manyatta pointed out that firearms were available in abundance for the vigilante groups. According to Kisumu County Crime and Violence Assessment Report (2019), the vigilante groups have used firearms, most of them unlicensed, either to provide security or cause mayhem. The report further indicated that the police and other law enforcers do not have correct records of authorized firearm owners and so they cannot apprehend those who possess firearms illegally. The fact that some of these vigilante groups work in collaboration with the police has compounded the problem.

5.12 Conclusion

The discussion above has shown that vigilante groups have been functional in Kisumu City since 1986. The groups have a recognized leadership structure with an overall chairperson at the top of the hierarchy. The formation of the vigilante groups follows the identification of a gap in service provision. Further, the study shows that vigilante groups in Kisumu engage in numerous economic activities, most of which are illegal, for survival. Each vigilante group in Kisumu aligns itself to a political side that protects its interests. Women's roles include safe

keeping of stolen goods, trafficking drugs and providing sexual pleasures to the male vigilante members. The chapter reinforces the widely held notion that vigilante groups operate above the law. Overall, vigilantism involves intricate operations, which rope in the police and other security agents, politicians and other community leaders. By aligning themselves with powerful politicians, engaging in covert and overt relationships with official security systems and raising revenue through either legally established businesses or extortion of members of the public, business operators or politicians, vigilantes ensure their sustainability and attractiveness to unsuspecting young men and women alike. By owning formal businesses, the vigilante groups are also able to 'clean' fake money and drug proceeds establishing an intricate web of money laundering, drug trafficking, extra-judicial legal system, 'kangaroo courts' and 'gangs for hire' for political expediency and debt recovery through intimidation.

CHAPTER SIX
THE INTER-CONNECTIONS BETWEEN STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS IN THE PROVISION OF SECURITY IN KISUMU CITY

6.1 Introduction

Security provision in Kenya involves a complex relationship between various institutions and actors. This chapter investigated the correlation between the police and non-state security operators. It also explores police reforms in Kenya and the impact the reforms have had on security in Kisumu City since 1986. State actors are security providers in the employment and control of a government of a given country or state. In Kenya, the police force is under the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Internal Security. The police work on behalf of the state to provide security and maintain law and order within their areas of jurisdiction in accordance with orders given to them by the state. Non-State actors include vigilante groups, neighborhood groups and the Nyumba Kumi outfits. This analysis holistically explores the place and role of vigilantes and how they navigate, circumvent or exploit the formal security structures. It starts by looking at the history of policing in Kenya to expose the loopholes exploited by vigilantism and gangrism. After extensively offering a critical examination of policing and the police service in general, the chapter re-examines the question of police reforms on the backdrop of Kisumu's security situation as reported in the status reports.

6.1.1 The Kenya Police

The history of the Kenya Police is closely intertwined with the country's colonial past and its constitutional and political development. The flawed colonial policing model and the politicization of the force have tarnished the reputation of Kenya's police force. The Imperial British East Africa Company formed the Kenya Police force in Mombasa between 1887-1902 to provide security for the company business interests at the Coast (Dwyer, 2020). In 1902 the police units expanded to Nairobi and Kisumu (KNA/NBI//1/2/1963). The main purpose of the units in Mombasa, Nairobi, and Kisumu was to safeguard the railways property and guard the work force engaged in the construction of the railway line. Although the officers

employed had little experience, they were mandated to maintain peace, law and order at all costs (KNA/NBI//1/2/ 1963).

Archival data revealed that the laws used in the force were adopted from India. These included the Indian Evidence Act, which incorporated both the Procedure Code and the Police Ordinance Act. India had become very important in providing valuable know how in the administration of the new British colonies in Africa. With time, the scope of police activities was expanded to include duties like vehicle parking in the city and controlling scenes of accidents in various places (Lid, & Okwany, 2020). In 1965, the State established the Anti-Stock Theft Police Unit to deal with cattle rustling and insecurity in parts of the country where the vices were rampant. However, concealed in this unit was actually a secret police unit christened the Ngoroko whose essence was to stop Mr. Daniel Moi from succeeding President Jomo Kenyatta (Morton 1998).

Prior to Kenya's independence, the police force was intensely involved in the maintenance of law and order during political meetings and at the height of the independence election period. Currently, the Kenya Police Service comprises the Traffic Laws Enforcement Unit, the Tourist Police Unit, the Railways Police Unit, the Presidential Police Unit, The Kenya Police Dog Unit and several other units. These police units have enhanced security at various levels in the society.

Police training began in 1907 with the establishment of a unit in the colonial government that enforced law and order and helped in the pacification of the "natives". Evidence shows that the training of the Kenyan Police Unit was organized along military lines, and it was geared towards instilling in the officer competence and integrity. Usually, training took six months in which recruits were taught loyalty and their responsibility of enforcing law and order. Informant K-025(OI, 2/4/2021) stated that police officers would often be required to maintain

a reasonable level of physical fitness to enable them perform physically demanding tasks and defend themselves against attacks if need be. K-025(OI, 2/4/2021), was in agreement, observing that prospective police recruits, just like serving police officers, were required to achieve some minimum standards of fitness to enable them perform their professional duties. The process of police recruitment and training put emphasis on physical strength at the expense of emotional and mental preparedness (Allen, 2020). The wearisome physical training and orientation turned members of the police force into an inhumane and ruthless paramilitary unit predisposed towards the use of terror and violence while dealing with conflict and disorder. This in turn has created a sour relationship between the police and the citizens. Police officers are expected to employ force only as a last resort and only as necessary under the circumstances. Use of unnecessary, unreasonable, or excessive force is considered quite serious, especially if it results in the injury or death of civilians (Fridell & Pate, 1997).

Police brutality is not a new in Kenya. The phenomenon can be traced back to the 1960s when the colonial Government used the Police to safeguard the interests of the administration. The police visited with viciousness freedom fighters and workers in farms owned by colonial farmers. The post-independence police force inherited from the British policies that have perpetuated the same callousness. Post-independence leaders have used the police units to safeguard their own interests. Mzee Jomo Kenyatta, for instance, used the police units to suppress dissenting voices. Informat K-005 (OI, 3/2/2021) indicated that the police instigated the 1969 Kisumu Massacre by firing at a crowd that was protesting the President's visit to Kisumu. The police fatally short at least eleven people and injured hundreds. President Daniel Moi used the police for the twenty-four years he was in power to repress, torture, detain and assassinate political opponents and detractors of his regime. In the 1980s, the KANU government banned all other political parties to make Kenya a one-party

state. Moi deployed the police to torture members of the proscribed parties. Consequently, citizens lost confidence in the police. Police slogans such as "Utumishi kwa Wote," which are meant to build trust with the locals have not born fruits and most people still view the police as brutal enemies. The use of brutality affects both the violent police officers and their nonviolent colleagues since they are all identified with brutality and inhumane acts. Civilians develop apprehension, hate and mistrust for the police, and may target them for resistance and retaliation (Kraska & Kappeler, 1988).

6.2 The Symbiotic Relationship between the Police force and Vigilante Groups

There is a close interconnection between state and non-state actors in the provision of security in Kisumu City. The two entities are like two sides of the same coin in the nature of their operations. In the mix of this complex nature of security set up, the different groups base their operations on the authority that is supreme, shared goals and communal needs. Police support and legitimization of acts of violence and brutality against suspected criminals portray vigilantism as a suitable course of action (Dixon and Johns 2001).

Vigilante groups in Kisumu have been involved in many instances of crime and insecurity. There is a widely held belief that the vigilante groups are above the law. Sometimes, the police provide cover to vigilantes as they engage in drug trafficking and other criminal activities. In turn, the police share money and other items wrested from community members. Thus, these groups have a symbiotic relationship with the police. In 2016, for instance, the police arrested a member of the *Baghdad Boys* for attacking a member of the rival *China Squad*. However, the suspect was released the next day to continue with his malevolent activities. A Key Informant, K-009(KII, 4/3/2021), told us how *China Squad* members attacked with a machete a leader of the American Marine, K-005, at Tuskys Mall car park after an argument. The area Chief stated that the police officers let the warring parties leave without preferring any charges. Angry members of the public wondered how the police

could let people who had committed a crime at a public place to leave scot-free. According to the informant, the officers feared that members of the *China Squad* may have carried dangerous weapons. This incident illustrates how vigilante groups have been able to work with the police.

In another instance, the *American Marines* lodged a complaint at the Kondele Police station on September 16, 2012 on the attack of their member, K-005. OCS K-024 ordered the immediate arrest of *China Squad* member, K-017, who had been seen in the complainant's compound. Instead, the arresting officer telephoned the suspect, chatted with him briefly and the matter was put to rest. OCS K-024 alleged that money must have changed hands. The manner in which the police officer was compromised angered members of the public, who swore to deal with the suspect since handing him over to the police would amount to nothing. They assembled the local vigilante group members and went to the suspect's house in Kondele. In the house they recovered crude weapons, TNA banners and t-shirts similar to the ones worn during the reception of Uhuru in Kisumu International Airport. Informant (K-026, KII, 4/3/2021) told us that the vigilantes demolished the suspect's butcheries, looted his shops, and burnt his vehicle. The suspect voluntarily presented himself at the police station where the police locked him up and later arraigned him at the Kisumu law courts. Surprisingly, the court released him on bond, according to informant K-017(KII, 5/4/2021). This occurrence concurs with Ngunyi's (2014) view that law enforcement agents release members of vigilante groups instead of punishing them after breaking the law. This shows how vigilante groups work with confidence since the police and the political elite are already on their side.

In addition, The Kenyan police force is perceived to be one of the country's most corrupt institutions. From 2007 to 2021, the corruption index has been on the rise with an index of 4.0 per year (National Task Force on Police Reform, 2009). The vice is widespread from the

junior ranked officers to the upper echelons of the force's hierarchy (*Standard newspaper*, 3/4/2016). The *Standard Newspaper* further reports that the police will often brutalize, maim, or even liquidate people who refuse to part with bribes. In an oral interview carried out in Kondele, informant K-017(KII, 3/4/2021), told us that the police are involved in many corrupt deals in the city. For instance, the police take bribes from the owners or drivers of public and private vehicle that contravene road safety regulations. Police make arrests but the culprits buy off their freedom to continue with acts of lawlessness. This concurs with Bjorn Moller (2003) theory of conflict which explains how corruption has led to the rise of vigilante groups.

The use of violence in tackling crime is a common practice among state and non-state actors in Kisumu City. From their inception, the efforts of the vigilante groups to combat crime in Kisumu have been riddled with violence. The group members resort to taking disproportionate measures to crimes committed, such as executing suspected criminals (Otiso, 2014). The actions of the vigilante groups are similar to the police use of excessive force on alleged offenders. On many occasions, the *Baghdad Boys* have been implicated in crime and insecurity (ibid). According to the Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence, the vigilante group perpetrated atrocities against city residents (Ibid) as members purported to combat crime.

State and non-state actors have been working together in night patrols of Kisumu highways. The vigilante groups and the police extort money from bus and truck operators and owners of private vehicles with threats of arrests. To carry out their operations without fear, according to informant K-00(OI, 2/12/20), the vigilante groups on highway patrol and roadblocks disguise themselves by donning police uniform. They also fake common police parlance (The *Standard Newspaper*, 2 May 2020). Through oral interview, one of the local chiefs within the city, K-005(KII, 4/01/2021), confirmed that vigilante group members disguise themselves as

police officers providing night patrols in the city. Residents have raised complaints concerning the confusion arising from the use of police uniform but no action has been taken so far. No one is ready to offer adequate information, though it is clear that the two groups work together. During the night patrols, the vigilantes still engage in other criminal activities such as burglary (*Standard Newspaper*, 19 July 2009). Whatever they get from the highways and roadblocks is shared with the police. In an oral interview, a Kisumu resident, K-003(KII 4/2/2021), explains how vigilante groups and the police in Kisumu City work in partnership:

> *"I have been working with police in Maseno and Kondele on Kisumu-Kakamega highway since 2015. We inspect vehicles and, collect bribes from traffic offenders. We dress just like the traffic police and use the same language they always use on lawbreakers. With guns we usually acquire from the police, we threaten those who refuse to part with money. If they respond positively by doing the needful, we allow them to work."*

The Institute for Security Studies (ISS), an African organization that aims to enhance security in Africa noted that during the 2007, 2013 and 2017 elections in Kenya, the police colluded with criminal groups such as the *Baghdad Boys*. The ISS reported that the Kenyan police was unable to fight spiraling crime or crack down on organized criminal groups (*Standard Newspaper*, 19 July 2009). Both the police and the group mutually benefitted from each other's activities and were usually aware of what the other was doing. The police gained by getting around the formal justice system (ibid). In the public domain, the police and the vigilante are enemies but privately, they dine and wine together. If the police can maintain the service code of ethics, such camaraderie with criminal groups would not be necessary.

In some instances, the police have engaged in vigilante-like activities within the city. Abrahams (1987) argues that off-duty police officers at times engage in vigilante activities as a way of demonstrating their dissatisfaction with the State's failure to provide law and order. For instance, informants from Manyatta (FGD, 2/2021), claimed that off-duty police officers patrolled estates such as Obunga and Manyatta and collected bribes from night drunks and

loafers. During these patrols and activities, the off-duty police link up with members of vigilante groups in their operations in the estates (ibid). The police and the vigilante are, therefore, comrades-in-arms although they pose to the public as sworn enemies. The following newspaper report confirms this assertion;

> *"The police are investigating the Quick Response Team and Cobra Squad officers over allegations of assault and harassment of Kisumu City residents. It was alleged that the officers raided Kaloleni Estate on Monday night and attacked residents before making away with their food and other household items (Standard Newspaper, 22/7/2016)."*

This newspaper report illustrates police involvement in vigilante-like activities in the city. The state has the vital role of upholding the safety of its citizens. The vigilantes undertake similar duties, either through lawful or unlawful means (Schuberth 2013). Schuberth (2013) further explains that the vigilante groups assume the roles of the police in various Kisumu City estates due to security lapses. From the State's point of view, however, as the vigilantes enforce a first-order legal rule, for example arresting a thief, they flout a second-order legal rule, for instance, enforcing the law without the legal mandate (Pratten, 2008).

The activities of these groups challenge the State's monopoly of the use of force, as well as the State's position as the custodian of the law. In an in-depth interview, a police officer, Kolwa East (FGD, 4/3/2021), stated that vigilante groups have assumed the duties of the police officers, which is against the law. On how these groups acquire the police uniform they wear to hoodwink people, the local police insist that they buy counterfeit uniform from the local second-hand clothes dealers. Apart from the uniform and the weapons, the vigilantes also cooperate with some police officers in their operations as indicated in the following statement:

> *"In Kisumu City, during wee hours of the night it's difficult to know who really is a genuine police officer. The police wear almost the same clothes as the vigilante groups and this is a problem to us, as they demand a lot of money when they find you walking at night. If you do not play along, they can as well take all*

*you have or even do away with you. In some cases, they even use
blackmail tactics to get more money from the city residents caught
in a situation."*

The police and the vigilantes play similar roles of providing protection to politicians. They ensure that the politician is safe and the rally goes on uninterrupted. The vigilantes may be in police outfit or in suits, in which case the public will take them for under cover political militia hired to protect particular political groups and enforce order during political rallies. This is in addition to the security measures put in place by the police. Informant K-017(KI, 2/2020), told us that during campaigns, the vigilante leaders will have a direct link to politicians. The politicians embrace the vigilante more than even State security. Similarly, informant K-017(KII, 2/2/2020), informed us that the State security agents will feel demeaned since they are relegated to the periphery of the venue as the vigilantes surround the politician. Informant K-004(O I, 2/2/2021) cited the FORD-Kenya elections of 1995 which witnessed vigilante groups aligning themselves to a candidate they wanted elected the party chairman regardless of his unpopularity. Elections held in 2007, 2013 and 2017 witnessed mass destruction of property and executions by the police and the vigilante groups. For instance, a police officer on duty shot and killed a baby named Baby Pendo. The police and the vigilante also killed several other people (*Standard Newspaper*, 4 March 2018).

In Kisumu City, State and non-state security agencies perform the same duties during campaigns and election periods. The duties include organizing venues for the rallies and offering protection and advice on security issues to the politicians during campaigns. It is clear, therefore, that the police recognize vigilante groups and the roles they play. Moreover, both State and Non-State actors play vital roles in the management of security in Kisumu City. Informant K-005(OI, 2/2021), told us that apart from protecting property, these actors also provide dispute resolution mechanisms to residents of Kisumu City). However, they also display serious deficiencies, which affect the security of the residents of Kisumu City. Since

the promulgation of the Kenya Constitution 2010 and the proscription of vigilante groups through the Prevention of Crime Act, a new trajectory of vigilantism and non-state policing in general has emerged. According to IPOA, the police provide solutions to various criminal and social issues. However, their sluggishness in reacting to crime allows criminal elements to evade justice. Consequently, city residents may resort to vigilante groups as an alternative means of curbing crime or addressing domestic conflicts as indicated by informant (K-005, OI, 2/4/2021:

> *"My husband used to beat me and my children. My family members could not help me in anyway. I reported him to the Kondele Police Station to no avail. My friend took me to a Baghdad Boys member who promised to intervene. Within days, the vigilante group attacked my husband and gave him serious beatings. When he went to report the matter to the police station he was arrested and threatened with dire consequences."*

This is just one example of a situation in which vigilante groups usurp the roles of the police to maintain law and order, including resolving domestic feuds. The police and the vigilante groups also join forces in the protection of business premises in Kisumu City. In return, the businesspeople pay protection fee to the two security providers. This point implies a clear link between the state and non-state security providers in Kisumu City.

6.3 Police Reforms in Kenya and their Impact on the Security of Kisumu City

Vigilantes have a tendency to become malevolent and harmful to the very community they claim to safeguard. The state can address the threat posed by vigilantes by replacing them with adequately trained, equipped and well remunerated police force. Since the promulgation of the Constitution of Kenya 2010, the State has made significant efforts towards police reforms (Njuguna *et al.,* 2013). Various bodies such as the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC), the Economics Crimes Act (2003) and the Public Procurement and Disposal Act (2005) have been formed to improve efficiency in the service (National Task Force on Police Reforms, 2009). A more efficient police force means greater safety and

service with dignity and respect to Kenyans. This can be achieved through improved welfare, better pay and housing and reasonable living standards.

Police welfare is an integral aspect of their profession. Welfare problems contribute greatly to the discontent and general lethargy in the police. The Kenyan Government has overseen massive change and reforms in the Police Service. The modifications range from introducing new police uniform, altering the command structure, introduction of the police service week, to affecting a significant salary hike for police officers. Despite the reforms and efforts made by different regimes, changes in the police welfare have not reached acceptable standards. Establishing Welfare Associations would be of great help to them and to their families. Welfare Associations will fight for improved working conditions, promote the general welfare of the police and provide members with legal representation.

As the most corrupt public institution in the country, the police have a great role to play in restoring the integrity of the national police service (Kivoi & Mbae, 2013). A report by the National Task Force on Police Reforms (2009) explains how corruption, compounded by bureaucratic bottlenecks in the procurement of construction materials and the awarding of tenders for the construction of police houses has caused major delays in completing the projects. This, according to K-017(OI, 2/4/2021), has led to a severe overcrowding and shortage of housing in the police quarters, sometimes forcing married police officers to share dilapidated single rooms with their unmarried colleagues, which is an infringement on the police officers' right to privacy. In some cases, the officers live in tents, wobbly timber structures, or temporary tin huts which are unnervingly hot during the day and quite chilly at night. In an interview, police officer K-017(KII, 2/2/2021), observed that lack of proper housing demoralizes officers. As a result, the officers may engage in other unlawful pursuits to better their lot. There is, therefore, need for the improvement and modernization of police housing as an incentive in their work. Besides police welfare, infrastructure and capacity

building are vital to the police and their ability to deliver service to the citizens. The National Police Service is usually underfunded, which dramatically hampers the efforts of the Service to modernize and match the sophisticated nature of criminals and crime. For instance, the Criminal Intelligence Department does not have a forensic laboratory for investigating complex crimes. Moreover, the Police Service lacks the personnel specialized in Information Communication Technology to handle cybercrime and other technology-based crimes. Vehicle responses and patrols are impaired by the use of decrepit patrol cars (Kivoi & Mbae, 2013). This has led to weak police management and coordination of responses to disaster and crime. The police officers also lack life insurance policies, yet they find themselves in life-threatening situations as they discharge their duties. Many uninsured police officers die in the line of duty leaving their families without any form of compensation.

Informant K-017(OI, 2/4/2021), disclosed that the remunerations for police officers are still low in relation to other civil servants, and yet their work requires dedication and risk taking According to a report by the National Task Force on Police reform (2009), police salaries and allowances are far below the wages paid to civil servants and employees of other sampled organizations. The police earn a risk allowance of a paltry Kshs 5000, which is not commensurate to the hazards involved (National Task Force on Police Reform, 2009). The miserable wages compel the police to abscond duty to engage in unlawful activities to improve their livelihoods. For instance, as stated by K-005(KII, 2/4/2021), some police officers may take bribes from motorists or collect illegal fines from "changaa brewers" in various estates of the city. Worse still, the police officers also engage with, and benefit from vigilante groups. These activities have hampered service delivery to the residents of Kisumu City. The Kenyan government has instituted many reforms in the Police Service under the Government, Justice Law and Order program (World Bank; 2009, Waller; 2010). The changes include the introduction of a code of conduct, increased service delivery efficiency,

114

and the provision of effective equipment for investigation (Ibid). The government has introduced other mechanisms geared towards improved accountability. It has also developed measures of reviewing police preparedness in dealing with security issues (World Bank, 2009). To promote good relations between the police and the public, the government initiated a public relations campaign aimed at improving interactions and communication, and changing the public's negative perceptions of the Police (World Bank 2009; KNCHR; 2008). The police have benefited from the reforms through community policing, improved welfare and salaries, enhanced mobility and upgraded housing facilities (World Bank 2009). These reforms have brought improvement and efficiency in police operations. They have also enabled the police to reduce the activities of the vigilante groups. For instance, the increase in the number of police vehicles has facilitated patrols and response to emergency cases and other operations in Kisumu City.

Under Kenya's new constitution, the name of Kenya's police force changed to The National Police Service. The change of name signaled a shift from the use of force to being a service provider. The Police strategic plan 2003-2007 identified increased security as a measure of performance. According to National Task Force on Police Reforms 2009 (NTFPK), more resources are needed to ensure long-term human, financial and technical support. It is also important to have clear reform goals, vision, and accountability on the use of resources (Kagari, 2003). Cases of torture and police brutality have drastically reduced and there is improvement in the relationship between the Police and the people.

However, reports by the KNCHR in 2008, especially on the post-election violence in Kisumu City indicated that senior police officers have not completely changed their old ways. This was witnessed during the 2017 elections when the police took extremely brutal and violent measures. Moreover, the overall performance of the police has stagnated (World Banks, 2009). This research has also shown that the reforms have not changed the perspective of the

public on Police (SRIC, 2009, World Bank, 2009). Various civil society organizations in Kenya have also pointed out cases of brutality. The high crime rates and violent conduct are likely to undermine the public's trust and confidence in the Police, which has led to reduced crime reporting (World Bank, 2009). Citizens still have to contend with corrupt police officers in their pursuit for police service and justice. Citizens, therefore, prefer to look for security from the vigilantes and other security providers (Ibid). Thus, the use of vigilante groups in Kisumu as an alternative to the police has persisted.

Many factors have conspired to hinder police reforms. One police officer identified one deterrent to police reforms as lack of trust and cooperation between the police and the public. Both parties can create trust if members of the community formulate their safety priorities and allow the police to handle them (Malet, 2015). This presents an open and accessible platform on which the police can directly engage with the community. As a result, the police will be acquainted with the community's concerns and can involve the public in police plans (UNODC, 2011). The approach has been of great help to the residents of Kisumu because they are able to discuss their security issues at various forums. For instance, there are public barazas at ward level on Wednesdays where members of the public present security matters and other issues affecting wards within Kisumu city to the area chiefs and the police.

Reforms in public institutions are not easily realized especially if they touch on the top echelons of management (Pierson, 2000). Therefore, the institutionalization of reforms requires the participation of everyone. The community sometimes demand instant results from the police in dealing with insecurity (Kimberly *et al.,* 1980). This may force the Police to use brutality to enforce the law, thus harming the community members. Such actions are a hindrance to reforms as has been the case with Kisumu City. They also lead to the escalation of the activities of the vigilante groups.

The effects of police reforms can be best understood when viewed within different contexts. For instance, there is a close bond between politics and the police, especially in Africa (Rauch and Elrena 2006). Police reforms in a number of African countries involve alterations in their structure, functions and sources of legitimacy. There are those that need a structural shift from being centralized to being decentralized. Some alterations require a functional shift from regime policing to citizen protection. Others are associated with legitimacy change from regime-based to people-driven. Police reforms are seen as a political endeavor, with political interests playing a leading role. For instance, while police reforms may be effected to benefit the residents of Kisumu City, they may be also aimed at influencing the next elections too.

In many African countries, Police have been able to achieve police reforms with the help of National governments, society organizations, and donor agencies (Marenin, 2009). It is yet to be known if Kenyan Police reforms can be achieved through introducing favorable political and economic factors, or if Kenya can learn from other countries that have implemented the reforms as part of their overall democratic reforms. What is clear, however, is that police reforms in Kenya will reduce the activities of vigilante groups.

6.3.1 The Love-Hate Relationship between the Non-State Actors and the Community

Non-state actors describe entities that exist outside the jurisdiction of the government. Vigilante groups, private security firms and the neighborhood groups are examples of non-state actors. These groups operate within their set guiding principles and administrative structures, and may or may not operate with the help of state actors. Non-state actors provide security and related services.

Many ordinary citizens consider vigilantes as necessary providers of security in the face of growing crime and police incapability to maintain law and order. The perception of the public towards the police creates an environment that condones and justifies vigilantism. People support vigilante violence when they perceive the police as illegitimate and corrupt (K-

009(OI, 20/2/2021). Thus, public support for vigilantism is often affected by trust in police (Goldstein 2003, Harnischfeger 2003). Citizens may take the law into their own hands in defiance of the police domination on the use of force. Vigilante patrols in the streets of Kisumu, therefore, are often seen as a legitimate response to insecurity. The local community tends to justify the violence committed by the vigilantes as a legitimate response of counter-violence. Numerous instances of public outrage have been cited over the arrest and prosecution of vigilantes who take the law into their own hands. In such situations, the public acclaims the vigilantes rather than the action of the police.

Nevertheless, the relationship between vigilantes and the community has never always been cordial. Vigilantes become besmirched and politicized just like the illegitimate police they purport to replace (Schuberth, 2014). Occasionally, the lines between vigilantes and those considered criminals is distorted. As the vigilantes offer their services, they also extort money from residents and businesses in their areas of operation. The use of violence by members of vigilante groups poses a strong challenge both to police legitimacy and to the rule of law that they claim to protect. The situation is exacerbated by police officers who close their eyes to acts of violence and use of force by vigilante groups.

Despite the misgivings of ordinary citizens about these groups, people often turn to them whenever there is a security threat such as a burglary or when a crime is in progress. Vigilantes, on the other hand, rely on the community for information. Thus, there is a symbiotic relationship between the community and the vigilantes.

6.4 An Integrated Approach to Urban Security: Citizen and Non-State Participation

Citizen participation means the involvement of the society in offering security against the threat of crime or violence in their neighborhoods. Non-state security providers have in modern times become key factors in security. The study focused on non-state actors such as security companies and the Nyumba Kumi Initiative.

6.4.1 Private Security

The private security industry comprises the actors who give security to individuals and property. The private security firms usually consider themselves as auxiliary to the police. These two security actors may patrol together, with the security firms providing the resources like vehicles, and the police officers providing the firearms. With this arrangement, information is shared and the police can patrol areas they might not have been able to. The private security firms pay the police officers assigned to them monthly allowances which are sometimes higher than their salaries. In Kenya, private security firms first emerged in the 1960s in industrial areas of Nairobi and Mombasa. Later, they spread to Kisumu, Eldoret and Nakuru. High crime rates and the failure of the state to provide adequate security contributed greatly to the expansion of private security firms (Krahmann, 2002 and Singer, 2008).

Several other factors drastically increased demand for security services. These include the fear of international terrorism following the attack on the US embassy in 1998, the Kikambala Hotel bombing, Arkia Airlines missile attack in 2002 and the Westgate Mall attack in September 2013. The outbreaks of post-election violence in 2008, 2013, and 2017 accompanied by ethnic massacre and police incapacity served as a reminder to security specialists and observers that Kenya's security sector was in crisis (Wycliffe Otiso and Ruth Kaguta, 2003).

The private security sector has witnessed a tremendous growth to become one of the biggest employers in Kenya. According to data from the Kenya Security Industry Association, there are about 500,000 security guards employed by 2,500 registered private security firms. However, only 600 companies are currently active, 150 of them being transnational firms. The transnational firms that dominate the market share include the Group 4 Securicor (G4S), K.K. Security, Wells Fargo, Bob Morgan (BM) Security, SGA Security Group, Ultimate Security, Pinkerton's Kenya and Radar Security. Informat K-005(OI, 2/2/2021), disclosed

that these firms compete in providing services to a wide range of sectors that cut across mining, oil and gas, retail, energy, agriculture, and finance.

The commercialization of security provision by collaborations with state security actors devalues the functioning of the police as a public protector. They also remove public resources, such as the police and firearms, from the public domain, where citizens have a right to access them at no cost. This increases the gap between the population's demand for security and the ability of the police, which in turn may foster the proliferation of vigilantes. These partnerships may also provide opportunities for corruption.

6.4.2 The Nyumba Kumi Initiative

The Nyumba Kumi Initiative is a community policing strategy in Kenya meant to address existential threats to communities and empower individuals at the local level to combat criminal activities, according to informants in Kondele 5 (FGD, 2/3/2021). The initiative clusters families living in the same area into groups of ten households with a view to knowing one another better and sharing information among themselves (Koome, 2021). It is structured as a link between the state and the community at the estate and village levels. The initiative is an adoption of Tanzanian Ujamaa Policy informed by the Ubuntu Philosophy, a hybrid philosophy which focuses on population mobility, crime prevention, access to basic human needs, social and spatial structure, and loyalty to the establishment (Were and Opondo, 2021). It was ascertained from the informants in Kolwa Central (FGD, 21/2/2021), that Nyumba Kumi brings together the police, the civil society and local communities to develop local solutions to safety and security concerns within various estates or villages.

The Nyumba Kumi initiative begins with the formation of neighborhood peace committees empowered by the State to apply customary laws in handling specific local conflicts. In the process, the State has decentralized community policing and delegated the responsibilities to the community level. Largely, the Nyumba Kumi Initiative purposes to provide institutional

support for peaceful conflict management and crime prevention with local involvement (Kioko, 2017). Each Nyumba Kumi unit consists of local leaders, residents and community-based organizations who meet to identify and solve problems in their area (The Kenya Police Service, 2018).

The State mandates the Nyumba Kumi Initiative with community policing at the household level, according to its 2015 Guidelines on Community Policing (Ibid). The approach is rooted on the premise that citizens know their areas well and are, therefore, able to spot any suspicious activities and inform the police. As stated by informant in Railways (FGD, 21/2/2021), people safeguard their own security by being involved with their neighbors. Effective peace building, enhanced surveillance, crime detection and security management entail involving all community members in surveillance. Bringing everyone on board creates accountability and a sense of belonging.

Informant K-004(KII, 23/3/2021), told us that the Nyumba Kumi Initiative remains tightly controlled by the state and is often characterized by human rights flaws The state believes that the initiative will create a rapport between citizens and law enforcers in fighting insecurity. The deduction from informant K-005(KII, 4/4/2021) that apart from community policing, the initiative is also expected to deal with non-security issues such as identifying the needs of communities, paying special attention to vulnerable groups, resolving intra and inter community conflicts through dialogue and enhancing peace and stability. Through the program, residents can identify particular security issues and report them to the police and the national administrators rather than reporting to the vigilantes. Community members are also able to ascertain other non-security matters and prioritize them accordingly. Youth involvement is a key aspect of the initiative; it empowers them to put their energy and resourcefulness to good use for the benefit of the community. Proper youth involvement in community policing allows them to play an active role in peace and development. It also

121

encourages responsible behavior, which inevitably decreases crime and early deaths caused by involvement in armed crime (Ndono, 2019). Youth involvement in vigilante activities, armed crimes and immoral activities undermine the activities of the Nyumba Kumi initiative, and so they need to be involved in peace building.

The Nyumba Kumi Initiative has emerged as an effective strategy in curbing crime and enhancing the security of residents in Kisumu neighborhoods. Kisumu County had 4,065 Nyumba Kumi clusters by 2016, which boosted the fight against crime, especially cattle rustling. It also dealt a blow to the appeal and activities of vigilante groups in the city. Empirical evidence shows that the police can only succeed in combating crime if they win community acceptance (Limo, 2017). Lack of public participation undermines police legitimacy and contributes to further public disorder and the use of vigilante groups instead of the police (Bayley, 1996). This has negatively affected cities like Kisumu especially during electioneering periods when lack of adequate security breed chaos and violence. According David (2011), collaboration between the public and the police helps in getting information about crimes, identifying suspects and highlighting the social conditions that promote crime. The police resolve crimes more efficiently when the public is willing to provide information (Limo, 2017).

6.4.2.1 Challenges Facing Nyumba Kumi Initiative

Many parts of the country continue to suffer incessant insecurity despite spirited efforts to actualize the Nyumba Kumi Initiative in the counties. Lack of awareness and preparedness by the authorities and the public have become a significant barrier. Lack of awareness about the initiative among the residents of Kisumu city poses a major challenge to the initiative. To overcome the obstacle, National and County Administrations, religious, political and other leaders have been training some individuals as agents of information concerning crime and security matters. Furthermore, as per K-017(KII, 4/4/2021), the misinformation by a section

of the political class that the initiative was a tool used by the government to create a police state has hampered the progress of the initiative in Kisumu City (Omollo, 2014). Low morale and corruption in the police, occasioned by poor remunerations may result in serious management problems, minimal cooperation from the community, and general lack of respect for community policing (Leting, 2017). Thus, for people to embrace the Nyumba Kumi Initiative, sensitization and improved public awareness are quite important (Muchangi, 2016).

Community policing has not done well in the communities where the public perceives it as a government plan to form illegal groups. This is common in areas where innocent people suspected of committing crimes lost their lives in the hands of vigilantes (Kivoi 2013). People withhold information from the police for fear of reprisal from criminal elements (Ruteere & Pommerolle, 2003). Members of the community who volunteer information are still skeptical due to lack of a policy governing community policing (World Bank, 2003). Misunderstandings between members of the public and the police must be addressed for effective community policing (Monjardet, 2000). In an oral interview, one Manyatta resident stated that there is need for the community to team up with the police in order to achieve the millennium goals of 2030 on security.

Political instability, reprisals by vigilante groups, inter-ethnic tensions, lack of accountability within the security systems and the absence of shared values usually affect the functioning and the effectiveness of the initiative in Kisumu City. Informant K-0052(KII, 3/3/20021), observed that there is need for the sensitization of the residents on policing strategies and communication. Secondly, a legal framework should be put in place to guide and inform decisions. Thirdly, police officers should undergo a specific training in line with the initiative. There is also need to improve crime detection techniques, employ more police officers, acquire state-of-the-art equipment, and integrate improved technology into policing.

6.5 Conclusion

This chapter provided a historical background of the police force in Kenya. It related the history of the Kenya Police to the country's colonial past and its political development. Police brutality originated from the recruitment and training processes, which placed emphasis on physical strength. The chapter showed that poor welfare hinders the activities of the police. The study also pinpointed the close interconnection between state and non-state actors in the provision of security in Kisumu City. Since the promulgation of the new constitution, Kenya has made significant efforts towards police reforms. These reforms, however, have not changed the perspective of the public on Police. Success in combating crime is realizable only if there is acceptance of the police by the community. In conclusion, emphasis is on ethical values, professionalism, compassion, and integrity in the police service. There should also be a close working relationship between the police, the non-state security players and the community.

CHAPTER SEVEN
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 Introduction

This study set out to investigate the history of vigilantism and the insecurity situation in Kisumu City since 1986. The study also sought to investigate the historical background of vigilantism in Kisumu City. In addition, the study investigated the activities of the vigilante groups in the city and the convergence and divergence points between state and non-state actors in Kisumu. The chapter made suggestions and recommendations on policy formulation and implementation of security related measures.

7.2 Summary of the Study

While the preliminary chapters laid the foundation for this study both conceptually and methodologically, *Chapter Four* probed the evolution of vigilante groups in Kisumu since 1986. The chapter traced the history of vigilante groups in Kenya to early 1940's when some people instigated protests against white domination, land alienation, forced labor and low wages. Vigilante groups started as underground security movements aimed at filling the security lapses within their neighborhoods. In post-independence Kenya, vigilante groups developed from state sponsored youth wingers formed to participate in political rallies and campaigns. The political elite would hire vigilante groups for economic empowerment and the protection of their ethnic groups. Vigilante groups emerged in Kisumu City in 1986 as security outfits and political support groups. Later, they metamorphosed into lawless militias. The early emergence was triggered by unemployment, political harassment and ethnic animosity. Kisumu attracted an influx of jobless and marginalized youths who were easily lured into joining the groups. The enactment of the Prevention of Organized Crime Act in 2010 and 2012 did not deter these groups from continuing with their activities in Kisumu.

The proliferation of vigilante groups in Kisumu City can be attributed to economic hardships, political marginalization and rampant unemployment. Moreover, the failure by the state to

provide adequate social services and security paved the way for the emergence of these groups. Negative ethnicity also drove many youths into vigilantism. The founding of political parties along ethnic lines boosted the formation of militant groups to safeguard the interests of the specific communities. Politicians used vigilante groups to protect themselves from a despotic government and political opponents. Corrupt government officials employed vigilante groups to silence whistle blowers. The desire to make their peers happy or to gain a sense of prestige, self-esteem and independence enticed some youths in Kisumu City to join vigilante groups. Some youths are, however, recruited through threats, abductions and beatings. Other youths join the groups to finance their drug and alcohol addiction or secure police protection.

Chapter Five analyses the recruitment procedures and the structure of the vigilante groups. While conscription was voluntary, at times cases of forced conscription would occur. Diehard group members would train the recruits on the use of weapons. The vigilante groups in Kisumu City had a distinct organizational structure comprising a chairperson, secretary and treasurer, weapon makers, messengers and spies. The chairperson was expected to possess charisma and the ability to control members. Each group was composed of between 30 and 100 members. Initially, the groups were male dominated, but women joined over time. The women played vital roles like snooping, providing food to their male counterparts and fending for the family while the husbands were away on vigilante activities.

The Government proscribed vigilante groups through the Prevention of Organized Crime Act of 2010 and 2012.This forced the groups to go underground. However, the groups continued to thrive in many parts of Kenya. Corruption and institutional deficiencies, marginalization and inequality, easy obtain ability of firearms, unemployment, political patronage, and security lapses all contributed to the vibrancy of vigilante groups in Kisumu City.

The activities of the vigilante groups can be categorized into political, social and economic dimensions. Politicians would hire vigilante groups to organize political rallies, carry out campaigns, act as bodyguards during political campaigns and even disrupt their opponents' rallies. To achieve economic prosperity, vigilante groups in Kisumu have set up a formidable matatu, motorcycle and taxi enterprise. They also engage in other criminal activities such as extortion, drug trafficking, abductions, assassinations and armed robbery. But their activities have also driven away investors. Socially, the groups have caused fear, despondency, family break ups, indiscipline in schools, the suppression of the freedom of speech and deaths. In Kisumu, vigilantism has remained vibrant because it involves intricate operations which rope in the police, politicians and other community leaders.

Chapter Six explores the relationship between the police, non-state security operators and the community. An appalling colonial policing model has tarnished the reputation of the Kenya's police force. The severity of training tends to make police officers inhumane and violent in their treatment of citizens. Post-independence leaders have used the police to torture, detain and assassinate political opponents. The study shows a symbiotic relationship between the police and vigilante groups in the provision of security in Kisumu City. The two entities patrol the streets of Kisumu together, with the vigilantes donning police uniform. The police support and legitimize acts of violence and brutality by vigilantes. This portrays vigilantism as a suitable course of action. Failure by the police to apprehend criminals drives city residents to vigilante groups. Vigilante groups in Kisumu have been involved in crime and insecurity. But the police have equally engaged in vigilante-like activities. Both the police and the vigilantes provide protection to politicians. The State can curb vigilantism by having an adequately trained, fully equipped and well-remunerated police force.

The study has also showed a symbiotic relationship between vigilante groups and the community. People support vigilantes when they perceive the police as illegitimate and

corrupt. The groups, however, become tarnished just like the police they intend to replace. Despite the misgivings, people often turn to them whenever there is a security threat, and the vigilantes rely on the community for information. Kenya has tried to reform the police through improved welfare, better pay and housing and reasonable living standards. However, the reforms have not changed people's perception of the police. The integrated approach to security in Kisumu City includes the use of private security firms and the Nyumba Kumi initiative. The police and the private security officers patrol together. However, the partnerships may breed corruption. The Nyumba Kumi initiative empowers individuals at the local level to combat crime. The initiative has enhanced security in Kisumu neighborhoods. It has also diminished the appeal of vigilante groups in Kisumu City.

7.3 Conclusions

This study aimed at establishing the historical background of vigilantism in Kisumu City since 1986. The discussion concluded that the failure by State agencies to address security concerns and the socio-economic needs of City residents contributed to the formation and development of vigilante groups in Kenya. The decline in employment opportunities caused by the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), rampant insecurity, political instability, and excessive poverty levels compelled many youths to search for alternative ways of social and economic survival. Consequently, the youths got involved in neighborhood vigilante groups. Others joined the groups as a means of getting money to finance their drug and alcohol addiction, or to secure police protection. In Kisumu City, economic marginalization occasioned by unequal distribution of resources by the national government has given rise to vigilante groups. Political violence, widespread corruption, weak governance, and the founding of political parties along ethnic lines aided the formation and proliferation of militant groups.

Vigilante groups engaged in social, political and economic activities. The activities had both positive and negative impacts to the Kisumu city residents. For instance, the groups positively affected the Kisumu city residents through provision of security through patrols, deterring and apprehending criminals, settling various disputes and providing security to politicians. On the other hand, their negative impacts included undermining national security through challenging the state monopoly of the use of force, intimidation and spread of fear, acting as incubators for the next vigilante groups, displacement of state and its functions and undermining both state and individual wellbeing

The study has shown that there is a symbiotic relationship between the police and other non-state security operators such as vigilante groups, private security firms and the Nyumba Kumi Initiative in Kisumu City. The police and the private security officers patrol the streets of Kisumu together. However, the commercialization of security provision in collaboration with the police removes public resources from the public domain and may even create opportunities for corruption. Both the the police and the vigilante groups are known to use excessive force on suspected offenders. The police also engage vigilante groups in their patrols, and at times support acts of violence and brutality carried out by vigilantes. The study established that the success in combating crime can only be realized if there is acceptance of the police by the community. However, members of the public are still skeptical about community policing. The Nyumba Kumi Initiative handles specific local conflicts. Essentially, the Nyumba Kumi Initiative provides support for peaceful conflict management and crime prevention. Overall, the Initiative has enhanced security in Kisumu neighborhoods. This chapter concludes by stating that effective peace building enhanced surveillance, crime detection and security management entails bringing on board the police, private security firms, the Nyumba Kumi and all community members in surveillance.

According to Human Development Report (1993), the concept security must change from an exclusive stress on national security to a much greater stress on people's security; from security through armament to security through human development; from territotial security to food, employment and environmental security. This is an acknowledegemt that security is a multi- faceted phenomenon that requires an all-inclusive approach. While this study was able to analyse how the Nyumba kumi approach to security impacted Kisumu city, it was clear that it was a haphazardly implemented programme. This study therefore, establishes that attaining full security through bottom up approaches and to be able to close the security gaps occasioned by top down approach, requires a clear policy structure anchored in law. This would be able to provide and define roles at every level of security governance. Retrospectively, power can be abused as is the case of the vigilante that come upto provide security but quickly metamorphosize into gangs that threaten the same security. The law is therefore critical in guiding both formal and informal mechanisms of attaing zero tolerance to insecurity.

7.4 Recommendations of the Study

The study has established that the failure by State to address security concerns and the socio-economic needs of City residents has contributed to the formation and growth of vigilante groups in Kisumu city. In order to curb the vigilante menace, there is need for the enhancement of urban security and policing not only in Kisumu City, but also in other major urban areas in Kenya where vigilantism and gangrism thrive. The study, therefore, recommends the enactment of legislations that will raise the police to citizen ratio to internationally acceptable standards. It also recommends the formulation of a policy framework that empowers the youth economically to reduce the high rates of unemployment and by extension the skyrocketing crime rates in cities such as Kisumu.

Vigilante groups engage in social, political and economic activities which have both positive and negative bearing the Kisumu City residents. Some of the more positive activities include the provision of security through patrols, deterring and apprehending criminals, and settling of certain disputes. Thus, the study recommends that, instead of focusing on eliminating vigilante activities, the State should devise strategies of equipping the groups with life skills and training to enable them provide security to the residents within the confines of the law. Moreover, the study recommends State regulation of vigilante activities to ensure members' engagement in pursuits that can spur social harmony, economic growth, fair political competition and crime management.

Finally, the study proved that security management requires the input of the police, private security firms, the Nyumba Kumi and members of the community. This study, therefore recommends a multisectoral and multifaceted perspective that integrates bottom-up and top-down (state run) modalities of policing and security management. This should take place in a well structured policy frame work. In addition, the State and NGOs should conduct regular briefings on the role of state and non-state security operators at the community level in order to transform public perception and win the community's support.

7.5 Suggestions for Further research

Vigilantism despite being organized around same principles across the world is also place specific and many times it is informed by the unique socio-cultural, economic and political realities that combine place and people. On this backdrop therefore, this study recommends a comparative approach between cities either in different or same countries to unravel the differences and similarities that can broaden the scope of knowledge within the area of community and urban security studies.

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APPENDICES

Appendix I: Consent Form

(To be filled in duplicate)

Title of Project: **A History of Vigilantism and the Insecurity Situation in Kisumu City since 1986**

Name of Researcher: ………………………………………

Supervisors: 1……………………………………………...

2……………………………………………………

I confirm that I have read and understood the Plain Language Statement/Participant Information Sheet for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions.

I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, without giving any reason.

I consent / do not consent (delete as applicable) to interviews being audio-recorded.

I acknowledge that participants will be referred to by pseudonym.

• All names and other material likely to identify individuals will be anonymised.

• The material will be treated as confidential and kept in secure storage at all times.

I agree / do not agree (delete as applicable) to take part in the above study.

I agree to take part in this research study ☐

I do not agree to take part in this research study ☐

Name of Researcher …………………… Signature………………. Date…………………..

Name of Researcher …………………… Signature………………. Date…………………..

In case of any follow up you may the researcher through the following address;

Dean, School of Graduate Studies

Maseno University

P. O. Box 333.

Maseno.

Tel: 254-057-351620, 351622

Kiambatanishi I: Fomu Ya Idhini

(kujazwa kuwili)

Mada ya Mradi historia ya uanamgambo na hali ya ukosefu wa Usalama jijini Kisumu tangu mwaka1986

Jina la Mtafiti　　　…………………………………………………………………….

Wasimamizi　　　**1**…………………………………………………………………….

　　　　　　　　　2…………………………………………………………………….

Nimedhibitisha kuwa nimesoma na kuelewa taarifa ya lugha wazi /karatasi ya taarifa ya mshirikishi kwa somo lililo hapo juu na nilikuwa fursa ya kuliza maswali. Ninafahamu Kuwa kushiriki kwenyu ni kwa kujitolea na kuwa niko huru kujitoa wakati wowote bila ya kutoa sababu.

Nimekubali/sijakubali (futa inayotakikana) mohojiano yanayonaswa kwa kanda za sauti na video.

Ninatambua kuwa washiriki watarejelewa kwa majina ya utani.

- Majina yote na vifa vingine ambavyo huenda vikawatambua watu vitawekwa siri/ vitafichwa.
- Kifaa hicho kitachukuliwa kama siri na kuhifadhiwa kisalama wakati wote.

Ninakubali/sikubali (futa inavyotakikana) kushiriki kwenye somo hili.

- Ninakubali kushiriki kwenye somo la utafiti [ ]
- Sijakubali kushiriki kwenye somo la utafiti [ ]

Jina la mshiriki……………………… Sahihi……………………. Tarehe…………………

Jina la mtafiti…………………………Sahihi……………………. Tarehe…………………

Okang I: Otas Mar Ayie

(NyakaOgol copies ariyo)

Nying nonro risach historia mar ang'enge gi arita marach e boma ma Kisumu chakre higa 1986

Nying jatim research   …………………………………..

Jotecho mag jatim research: 1…………………………….............

                                        2………………………………….

Ageno ni asesomo kendo awinjo gigo ma owacheyor ler gi jagol paro ewi risach ma ondik malokanyono kendo abedo gi nafas mar penjo penjo. Ang'eyo ni golona paro en eyomanono maokochun kendo anyalogolo rasaaasayamao kachiwo gimaomiyo.

Ayie/ok ayie (ruch kaka dwarore) gi dayodhok ma imako edwol kata picha mar video.

Alero ni jogol paro ibiroluongo gi nyinge mopogore.

Nyinge kod gigo duto manyalo miyo nyingjago/parong'ereibiropando.

Gimaolosni biro bedosiri kendo ibirokane e yomaber seche duto.

Ayie/ok ayie mondo abed achiel mar risach ni (   )

Ok ayie mondo abed achiel mar risach ni (   )

Nying ja risach…………………………. Sin …………………….   Tarik…………………

Nying ja duok penjo……………………Sin……………………   Tarik…………………

Erokamano kuom secheni kod paro michiwo

149

Appendix II: Key informant guide

Introduction

Hello, my name is Bernard Omondi Ouma. I am a Master of Arts student at Maseno University in the department of History and Archaeology. I am currently conducting a field research on the topic history of vigilantism and the insecurity situation in Kisumu city since 1986. I will be glad if you will spare your time to respond to the questions listed below:

Section A: Background information

1. Respondents name…………………………Mobile number…………
2. County
3. Sub- County
4. Division
5. Ward
6. Sex: Male   [ ]   Female [ ]
7. Age:
8. Occupation/job: ………………………………………
9. Ethnic group/tribe
10. For how long have you lived in your current residence?
    a. Between 5-10 years
11. Have you heard of vigilante groups in this area? Yes   [ ]   No   [ ]
    a) Give reasons for your answer.
12. When did you first hear about them?
13. How did the groups start?
14. What are the sources of finance of the groups?
15. What motivates people in Kisumu city to join the vigilante groups?
16. Why have the vigilante groups thrived in Kisumu city?
17. How are vigilante groups organized?
18. What activities does the groups do?
19. Are the Political leaders also involved in the vigilante groups activities?
20. How have the vigilante groups affected the following?
    a) Local people (male, female and children)?
    b) Business in the city?
    c) Elections in Kisumu city?
    d) Security in Kisumu city?
21. Is there a link between the state and non-state actors in Kisumu's Urban insecurity?

22. Are state and non-state actors   have conditions that mark their operations?

23. How are the police and the non-state actors related socially?

24. How do they always link up in terms of time, place and what transpires in their interactions?

Kiambatanisho II: Viambatanisho

Mwongozo maalum wa mhojiwa

Utangulizi

Hujambo, jina langu ni Bernard Omondi, mimi ni mwanafunzi wa shahada ya uzamili Katika chuo kikuu cha Maseno katika idara ya Historia na Akolojia. Kwa sasa ninafanyaUtafiti nyanjani kuhusu mada ya: historia ya uanamgambo na hali ya ukosefu waUsalama jijini Kisumu tangu mwaka1986. Nitashukuru ikiwa utatenga muda wako iliUjibu maswali yaliyo nakiliwa hapo chini:

Sehemu ya A:Taarifa ya kimsingi

1. Jina la mhojiwa: Nambari ya mhojiwa:
2. Kaunti:
3. Kauntindogo:
4. Tarafa:
5. Wodi:
6. Jinsia: Mume[ ]

    Mke[ ]
7. Umri:
8. Ajira/Kazi:
9. Kabila:
10. Umeishi kwenye maskani yako ya sasa muda gani?

    a) Kati ya muda 5-10

11. Umewai sikia kuhusu makundi ya wanamgambo katika eneo hili? Ndio[ ] La[ ] a)

    Toa sababu la jibu lako

12. Ulisikia kuwahusu lini kwa mara ya kwanza?

13. Makundi hayo yalianzaje?

14. Vyanzo vya kifedha vya makundi haya ni vipi?

15. Nini huwasukuma watu katika jiji la Kisumu kujiunga na makundi ya

    wanamgambo?

16. Ni kwanini makundi ya wanamgambo yananawiri jijini Kisumu?

152

17. Makundihayoyawanamgamboyamepagwaje?

18. Je, viongozi wa kisiasa pia wanajihusisha na makundi ya wanamgambo?

19. Makundi ya wanamgambo yameathiri yafuatayo kwa njia gani?

a) Wenyeji (waume, wanawake na watoto)

b) Biashara jijini

c) Uchaguzi jijini Kisumu

d) Usalama jijini Kisumu

20. Je, kuna uhusiano kati ya watendakazi wa serikali na watendakazi wasio wa

Kiserikali katika ukosefu wa usalama mjini Kisumu?

21. Je, kuna masharti ambayo yanaongoza utendakazi wa watendakazi wa serikali

na wasio wa serikali?

22. Je, polisi na watendakazi wasio wakiserikali wanahusiana vipi kijami?

23. Huwa wanaungana vipi kiwakati, mahali na yanayotokea katika mtagusano wao?

OKANG' II: OKENGE

Wechematayo ng'ano midayo dhoge (Key informant guide)

Chakrok

Amosi nyinga en Bernard Omondi Ouma, anjapuonjre mar mbalariany ma Maseno kama atiegra e digri mar Masters e mgao mar Histori kod Archeology. Gie sani atimo risach e wi historia mar ang'enge gi arita marach e boma ma Kisumu chakre higa 1986. Abiro bedo mamor kaponi ibiromiya sani mondo idwok penjo ma ondik piny kanyo.

Tielo mar A: Ler ma awiye.

1. Nying ng'ano midayo dhoge: Namba simo
2. County
3. Sub-County
4. Division
5. Ward
6. Sex   Dichuo(   )   Dhako(   )
7. Higa
8. Tich
9. Dhoot
10. Isedak e karjotni masani ndalo maromo nade?
11. Be isewinjo gimoro e wi riwruoge mag ang'enge e gwing' ka? Yes(   )   No(   )
    (chiw ler mari e wi dwokoni)
12. Ne iwinjo wachi makuongo karang'o?
13. Riwruogno nochakure nade?
14. Riwruogogi yudo pesa konyruok kowuok Kanye?
15. En ang'o madhiro jokisumo mondo odonje riwruoge mag ang'enge gi?
16. En ang'o momiyo riwruoge mag ang'enge ogurore motegno ei Kisumu?
17. Riwruoge mag ang'enge gi ochanore nade?
18. Bende jotend siasa dongore gi gigo ma riwruoge mag ang'enge timo?
19. Riwruoge mag ang'enge gi osekelo lokruoge machalonade e wi gik makamagi
    i.   Ne jogweng' mamon, chuo kod nyithindo.
    ii.   Ohala e boma
    iii. Yiero e boma ma Kisumo
    iv.   Arita kwe e boma ma Kisumo

20. Bende nitiere todruok e kind telo mar sirkal gi maok mag sirkal e wach koso aritakwe e boma ma Kisumu?

21. Bendo nitiere chike matayo tije mag telo mar sirkal kod maok mag sirkal?

22. Obila gi riwruok maok mag sirkal nigi tuderuok mane e ngima mapile?

23. Gitudore ga nade e yor seche, kar romo to kod gik matimore e todruoge mar gi?

Erokamano kuom secheni kod paro michiwo.

Appendix III: Focus groups discussion guide for Kisumu town residents: Government officers, businessmen, turn boys, drivers, traders and hawkers.

Introduction

I am a student of Maseno University, Kenya. I am carrying out a research on topic: history of vigilantism and the insecurity in Kisumu city since 1986. The study is purely academic, being undertaken in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of Master of Arts Degree in the Department of History and Archaeology. I humbly request you to provide the relevant information that would assist me in making this research a success. Confidentiality and/or absolute anonymity will be strictly ensured especially if requested by the informant(s). Thank you in advance.

PART A: PERSONAL INFRMATION.

Name………………………

……………………. Sub- location/Estate…………………………

Sex……………... Location………………………

Age: ....Ward…………………………...

Contact…………………... Sub- county (District)………………...

County…………………………...

PART B:

1 Has there been security problems in this area?

2 a). Are you aware of vigilante groups in this area?

b). If yes, what do they do and for how long have they been in existence?

3.   What constitutes the groups, in terms of membership?

4.   In your opinion, what caused the emergence of the vigilante groups in this area?

5.   How do they operate?

6.   Which activities do they involve in to achieve their objectives?

7. How do these activities affect the following?

-       The people of this area?

-       Government administration?

-        Politicians

-        Business in Kisumu

-        Peace and security in Kisumu

-       The group members

8. In your opinion has the relationship between the state and non-state enhanced insecurity? Justify your response.

9. In your view, who provides the connection between state and non-state actors and how is it always facilitated. Is the government security agency aware of this?

10. In your view, how do they always link up in terms of time, place and what transpires in their interactions?

Thank you for your cooperation

KIAMBATANISHO

Mwongozo wa majadiliano wa makundi lengwa kwa wakazi wa Kisumu: Maafisa wa serikali, wafanya biashara, utingo, madereva wauzaji na wachhuzi Utangulizi. Mimi ni mwanafunzi wa chuo kikuu cha Maseno. Ninafanya utafiti kuhusu madaya: Historia ya wanamgambo na ukosefu wa usalama jijini Kisumu tangu mwaka1986.

Mafunzo haya ni ya kielimu kwa minajili ya kuhitimu mahitaji ya kutuzwa shahada ya uzamili ya sanaa katika idara ya historia na Akiolojia. Ninaomba kwa unyenyekevu ili utoe taarifa muhimu itakayoniwezesha kufanya utafiti huu ufaulu. Usiri au ufichaji utahakikishwa hasa ukiombwa na mhojiwa/wahojiwa. Shukran.

SehemuyaA: Taarifa ya kibinafsi

Jina: Katandogo/Mtaa:

Umri: Kata:

Anwani: Wodi:

Kaunti:Kauntindogo/Wilaya

Sehemuya B

1. Kumetika tatizo la usalama katika eneo hili?
2. a) Una habari kuhusu makundi ya wanamgambo katika eneo hili?

   b) Kama ndio wanafanya nini na wamekuwepo kwa muda gani sasa?

3. Uanachama wa makundi unahusika nini?

4. Kwa maoni yako nini ilisababisha kwa makundi ya wanamgambo katika eneo hili*?*

5. Yanafanyaje kazi?

6. Yanajihusisha na shugli zipi ili kutimiza malengo yao?

7. Shuhli hizi zina athiri vipi yafuatayo?

   - Watu waeneo hili

   - Utawala wa serikal

158

- Wanasiasa

- Biashara ndani ya Kisumu

- Amani na usalama ndani ya Kisumu

- Wanachama wa kundi

8. Kwa maoni yako uhusiano wa watendakazi wa serikali na wasio wa serikali

Umeimarisha amani?

Thibitisha jibu lako.

9. Kwa matazamo wako, nani huleta uhusiano kati ya watendakazi wa serikali na

Wasio wa serikali na huwa wanawezeshwa vipi?

Je, idara za usalama za serikali zinafahamu haya?

10. Kwa mtazamo wako ,huwa wanaungana vipi kiwakati, mahali na yanayotokea

Wakati wamtagusano wao

Asante kwa ushirikiano wako.

OKENGE

OKANG'1

Weche matayo ng`ano midayo dhoge

Chakruok

Amosi, nyinga en Benard Omondi Ouma, an japuonjre mar mbalariany ma Maseno kama atiegra e digri mar masters e mgao mar History and Archeology. Gie sani atimo risach e wi historia mar ang'enge gi arita marach e boma Kisumu chakre higa1986. Abiro bedo mamor ka poni ibiro miya sani mondo idwok penjo ma ondik piny kanyo.

Tielo mar Ai Ler ma awiye

     Nying ng'ano midayo dhoge:
     County:
     Sub-county:
     Division:
     Ward:
     Sex: Dichuo[ ]   Dhako[ ]
     Higa
     Tich
     Dhoot

1. Isedak e kar jotni masani ndalo maromo nade?
2. Be isiwinjo gimoro e wi riwruoge mag ang'enge egwing'ka? Yes[ ] No[ ]
   a) Chiw ler e wi duoko ni
   b) Ne iwinjo wachi mokuongo karang'o?
3. Riwruogno nochakore nade?
4. En ang'o madhiro jokisumo mondo odonje riwruoge mag ang'engigi?
5. En ang'o momiyo riwruoge mag ang'enge ogurore motegno ei Kisumo
6. Riwruoge mag ang'enge gi ochomore nade?
7. Riwruoge gi timo gik mage?
8. Bende jotend siasa donkore gi gigo ma riwruong mag ang'enge timo
9. Riwruoge mag ang'enge gi osekelo lokruoge machalo nade ewi gik makamagi?
i. Nejogweng'mamon,chuokodnyitindo
ii. Ohala e boma ma Kisumo
iii. Yiero e boma ma Kisumo
iv. Arita kwe e boma ma Kisumo

10. Bende nitire todruok ekind telo mar sirkal gi maok mag sirka ewach koso arita kwe e boma ma Kisumu?

Erokamano kuom secheni kod paro michiwo.

Appendix IV: In- Depth Interview Guide for residents of Kisumu town: Chiefs, assistant chiefs, police, hawkers,members of vigilante groups and traders in Kisumu.

A History of vigilantism and the insecurity situation in Kisumu city since 1986.

1. Based on your knowledge how did the vigilante groups emerge in this town?

2. Based on your knowledge which factors helped to the establishment and sustenance of these groups? And why?

3. Based on your knowledge or experience or both for about how many decades has the vigilante groups been active in this city?

4. According to your knowledge or experience or both what do you consider to be the main role of the vigilante groups in Kisumu's insecurity during the reign of?

    i.   Daniel Moi regime

    ii.   Mwai Kibaki's regime

    iii. Uhuru Kenyatta

Justify each of your position in each regime?

5. Based on your knowledge or experience or both how has the presence of the vigilante groups affected security in this city.

6. Based on your knowledge or experience how has the life of following categories of people been affected by the operations of the vigilante groups in Kisumu city?

    i.   Politicians

    ii.   Manambas

    iii. Traders, hawkers

7. Based on your knowledge and experience has the presence of non-state actors and the existence of state security affected security of Kisumu city? If Yes, How?

8. Based on your knowledge and experience are there conditions that mark their operations, if Yes which ones? And how do either of the group benefit?

Thank You for Your Time and Ideas

KIAMBATAMISHO

Mwongozo wa mahojiano ya kina kwa wakazi wa mji wa Kisumu. Machifu, nahibu ya machifu, polisi, wanachama wa makundi ya wanamgambo na wauzaji ndani ya Kisumu. Mimi ni mwanafunzi wa chuo kikuu cha Maseno. Ninafanya utafiti kuhusu madaya: Historia ya wanamgambo na ukosefu wa usalama jijini Kisumu tangu mwaka1986.

Mafunzo haya ni ya kielimu kwa minajili ya kuhitimu mahitaji ya kutuzwa shahada ya uzamili ya sanaa katika idara ya historia na Akiolojia. Ninaomba kwa unyenyekevu ili utoe taarifa muhimu itakayoniwezesha kufanya utafiti huu ufaulu. Usiri au ufichaji utahakikishwa hasa ukiombwa na mhojiwa/wahojiwa.

1. Kwa kutegemea welewa wako makundi ya wanamugambo yalizukaje mjini?

2. Kwa kutegemea welewa wako ni sababu zipi zilizowezesha kuundwa na uendelevu wa makundi haya? Na kwa nini?

3. Kwa kutegemea welewa wako au tajriba au zote makundi haya ya wanamgambo yamekwepo katika jiji hili kwa miongo mingapi?

4. Kwa kutegemea welewa wako au tajriba au zote unafikiria kuwa nini ndilo jukumu kuu la wanamgambo katika ukosefu wa usalama ndani ya Kisumu wakati wa enzi ya:

   i. Utawala wa Daniel Moi

   ii. Utawala wa Mwai Kibaki

   iii. Utawala wa Uhuru Kenyatta

   (Thibitisha msimamo wako kwa kila utawala)

5. Kwa kutegemea welewa wako au tajriba au zote makundi ya wanamgambo yameathiri vipi usalama katika jiji hili?

6. Kwa kutegemea welewa wako au tajriba maisha ya makundi yafuatayo ya watu yameathiriwa vipi na shuguli za wanamgambo jijini Kisumu?

   i. Wanasiasa

   ii. Utingo

   iii. Wauzaji, wachuzi

7. Kwa kutegemea welewa wako au tajriba, je, uwepo wa watendakazi wasio wa serekali na uwepo wa usalama wa serekali umeathiri usalama wajiji la Kisumu? Kama ni ndio, vipi?

8. Kwa kutegemea welewa wako au tajriba, kunayo masharti yanayoongoza shuguli zao? Kama ni ndio, ni yapi? Na pande zote za makundi zinafaidi vipi?

Asante kwa muda wako na maoni yako

OKANG' II

Gigomatayolalruok gi girube mapwoth mar jodak ma Kisumu town jotij sirkal, jo ohala, manamba, derepe, jouso kod jo ohand aswekra (focus group guide)

Chakruok

Amosi nyinga en Bernard Omondi Ouma, anjapuonjre mar mbalariany ma Maseno kama atiegra e digri mar Masters e mgao mar Histori kod Archeology. Gie sani atimo risach e wi historia mar ang'enge gi arita marach e boma ma Kisumu chakre higa 1986. Abiro bedo mamor kaponi ibiromiya sani mondo idwok penjo ma ondik piny kanyo.

Akwayigimuolomondo iyie ichiw dwoko manyalokonya mondo risach niodhimaber. Abiroketoginimopondo kendo nyingi bendeibiropandi kaponing'anomidayodhogeokwayokamano. Erokamano.

Tielo mar A: Lerewing'ato

Nyingi…………………………………………………

Sex………………………………………………Sub location/Estate…………………..

Higni………………………………………………..Location…………………………….

Namba……………………………………………Ward…………………………………

County…………………………………………..Sub-County/District………………………..

Gi kaka in'ngeyogi kaka iseneno, bende nitiere gigoma nyiso kaka gitigo, kakamano, gin mage?

To e kaka riwruogo go konyore?

Erokamano kuom secheni kod paro michiwo.

3. Giekakaing'eyo kata gi kaka iseneno kata duto,

Riwuoge mag ang'emge giasebedo ebomaka kuom higni adi

4. Gi kaka ing'ieyo kata gi kaka iseneno kata duto,

En ang'o ma ikawo kaka tijriwuoge mag ang'engi gi eyor koso arita kwe eboma ma Kisumu e ndalo magi

   i.   Tend Daniel Moi

  ii.   Tendmwaikibaki

 iii.   Tend Uhuru Kenyatta

 iv.   (chiwlerewipachiewitelokatolo)

5. Gi kaka ing'eyo kata gi kaka iseneno kata duto,

Bedo mar riwruoge mag ang'enyegi sehinyoaritakweehoma ma kisumoeyo mane?

6. Gi kaka ing'eyo kata gi kaka iseneno,

Ere kaka ngima mag juknaondikpinykanyo go

163

Oselekore kaluwore gi tije joang'enge gieboma ma kisumo?

i. Josiasa

ii. Manambe

iii. Jo ohalagijoaswekra

7. Gi kaka ing'eyo kata kaka iseneno,

Bendebedo mar jotijemaok mag sirkalkodbedo mar aritakwe mar sirkalosekelelukruok e

boma ma kisumokakamano e yo mane?

8. Gi kaka in'ngeyogi kaka iseneno, bendenitieregigomanyiso kaka gitigo, kakamano, gin

mage?

To e kaka riwruogo go konyore?

Erokamanokuomsechenikodparomichiwo.

KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS		
INFOMANT	KII	DATE
K-003	"	2/4/2021
"	"	4/2/2021
"	"	3/4/2021
"	"	21/3/2021
		3/4/2021
		2/4/2021
		8/4/2021
		4/4/2021
		3/4/2021
K-004	"	22/3/2021
"	"	01/3/2021
"	"	03/3/2021
		2/4/2021
K-005	"	23/3/2021
		18/12/2021
		3/4/2021
		2/4/2021
		4/4/2021
		5/3/2021
		4/4/2021
		3/4/2021
		2/4/2021
		2/4/2021
		4/4/2021
K-009	"	4/4/2021
"	"	2/4/2021
"	"	2/5/2021
"	"	7/4/2021

"	"	4/3/2021
"	"	6/4/2021
"	"	3/4/2021
K-017	"	5/4/2021
		2/4/2021
		4/4/2021
		10/3/2021
		5/4/2021
		6/4/2021
		7/042021
		3/4/2021
		4/1/2021
		3/2/2021
		3/4/2021
		2/2/2021
K-019	"	5/4/2021
"	"	6/4/2021
"	"	3/4/2021
K-024		19/3/2021
		19/3/2021
K-026	"	4/3/2021
		3/4/2021
K-031	"	5/4/2021
K-033		4/4/2021
		4/3/2021
K-036	"	5/4/2021
		4/4/2021

ORAL INTERVIEWS		
INFOMANT	IO	DATE
K-003	"	1/3/2021
"	"	4/4/2021
"	"	2/4/2021
"	"	6/4/2021
"	"	4/3/2021
"	"	20/4/2021
"	"	3/4/2021
"	"	5/4/2021
		3/4/ 2021
		4/3/ 2021
		3/4/ 2021
		1/4/2021
K-004		2/3/2021
		3/4/2021
K-005	"	4/4/2021
"	"	2/4/2021

"	"	2/2/2021
		4/3/2021:
K-009		4/32021
		20/2/2021
		2/3/2021
K-017	"	5/4/2021
		2/4/2021
		8/4/2021
		5/4/2021
		3/4/2021
K-025		2/4/2021
K-026		4/4/2021.
		1/3/2021
K-033	"	4/4/2021
"	"	5/4/2021
K-034	"	4/4/2021
K-035	"	4/3/2021
K-036	"	3/4/2021

FGDs

Place	Date
Kondele	5/4/2021
Nyalenda B	2/4/2021
Market	1/4/2021
Kaloleni	26/4/2021
Shauri Moyo	4/2/2021
Railaways	21/2/2021
Kolwa Central	4/3/2021
Migosi	2/3/2021
Kolwa East	4/3/2021
Nyalenda A	22/2/2021
Manyatta B	2/2/2021

Appendix V: **Proposed Work Plan**

I propose to do this work within one year. The proposed work plan is as follows:

Phases	Description of activity	Duration(time)
Phase one	Drafting the proposal	January-February 2019
	Typesetting, printing and binding the proposal document	March -April 2019
	Presentation of the proposal document to the researchers' supervisors for defence.	May – June 2019
Phase two	Preparation for the field study including: Making pilot survey Contacting local administration/leaders and identifying key informants and focus groups Testing the data collection instruments/tools (interview guides and questionnaires) Recruitment and training of field assistants.	 June 2019
	Analysis of pilot survey and corrections/ amendments to questionnaire and other data collection tools	November 2019
Phase three	Intensive field work. Conducting interviews with key informants	December 2019
	Holding discussions with focus groups.	April 2021
	Administering questionnaires.	April 2021
Phase four	Coding the data	April 2021
	Analysis and interpretation of data	June – July2021
Phase five	Report draft writing, compilation and supplementary consultations.	July2021
	Writing of conclusions and recommendations	July2021
	Writing, typesetting and binding of the thesis Presentation of the thesis to the department.	August2021 September2021

NB: Subject to adjustment

Appendix VI: SGS Approval Letter

MASENO UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES

*Office of the Dean*

Our Ref: MA/FA/00017/2016

Private Bag, MASENO, KENYA
Tel:(057)351 22/351008/351011
FAX: 254-057-351153/351221
Email: sgs@maseno.ac.ke

Date: 19th May, 2020

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

**RE: PROPOSAL APPROVAL FOR OMONDI BERNARD OUMA —
MA/FA/0017/2016**

The above named is registered in the Master of Arts in History in the School of
Arts and Social Sciences, Maseno University. This is to confirm that his
research proposal titled "A History of Vigilantism and the Insecurity Situation
in Kisumu City Since 1986." has been approved for conduct of research
subject to obtaining all other permissions/clearances that may be required
beforehand.

Prof. J.O. Agure
DEAN, SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES

Maseno University   *ISO 9001:2008 Certified*

168

Appendix VII: Ethical Review Letter

MASENO UNIVERSITY ETHICS REVIEW COMMITTEE

Tel: +254 057 351 622   Ext: 3050
Fax: +254 057 351 221

Private Bag – 40105, Maseno, Kenya
Email: muerc-secretariate@maseno.ac.ke

REF: MSU/DRPI/MUERC/00861/20

Date: 27th October, 2020

TO: Omondi Bernard Ouma
PG/MA/FA/00017/2016
Department of History and Archaeology
School of Arts and Social Sciences
Maseno University
P. O. Box, Private Bag, Maseno, Kenya

Dear Sir,

RE: A History of Vigilantism and the Insecurity Situation in Kisumu City since 1986

This is to inform you that **Maseno University Ethics Review Committee (MUERC)** has reviewed and approved your above research proposal. Your application approval number is MUERC/861/20. The approval period is 27th October, 2020 – 26th October, 2021.

This approval is subject to compliance with the following requirements;

i.   Only approved documents including (informed consents, study instruments, MTA) will be used.

ii.   All changes including (amendments, deviations, and violations) are submitted for review and approval by Maseno University Ethics Review Committee (MUERC).

iii.   Death and life threatening problems and serious adverse events or unexpected adverse events whether related or unrelated to the study must be reported to Maseno University Ethics Review Committee (MUERC) within 24 hours of notification.

iv.   Any changes, anticipated or otherwise that may increase the risks or affected safety or welfare of study participants and others or affect the integrity of the research must be reported to Maseno University Ethics Review Committee (MUERC) within 24 hours.

v.   Clearance for export of biological specimens must be obtained from relevant institutions.

vi.   Submission of a request for renewal of approval at least 60 days prior to expiry of the approval period. Attach a comprehensive progress report to support the renewal.

vii.   Submission of an executive summary report within 90 days upon completion of the study to Maseno University Ethics Review Committee (MUERC).

Prior to commencing your study, you will be expected to obtain a research license from National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI) https://oris.nacosti.go.ke and also obtain other clearances needed.

Yours sincerely

Prof. Philip O. Owuor, PhD, FAAS, FKNAS
Chairman, MUERC

MASENO UNIVERSITY
APPROVED
27 OCT 2020
ETHICS REVIEW COMMITTEE

MASENO UNIVERSITY IS ISO   9001:2008 CERTIFIED

169

Appendix VIII: Research Permit

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

Ref No: 935089

Date of Issue: 19/February/2021

RESEARCH LICENSE

NACOSTI

**NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION**

This is to Certify that Mr.. Bernard Omondi Omondi of Maseno University, has been licensed to conduct research in Kisumu on the topic: A HISTORY OF VIGILANTISM AND THE INSECURITY SITUATION IN KISUMU CITY SINCE 1986 for the period ending : 19/February/2022.

License No: NACOSTI/P/21/8964

935089

Applicant Identification Number

Director General
NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY &
INNOVATION

Verification QR Code

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Scan the QR Code using QR scanner application.