A pragmatic analysis of figurative language used in HIV/AIDS discourse in Kenia: a case study of english and Kiswahili messages

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Abstract

This research investigates whether Kenyans from 42 mutually intelligible communities homogeneously comprehend AIDS posters. In this regard, the five research objectives are: (1) to investigate whether Kenyan AIDS posters are skewed towards implicitness or explicitness, (2) to access to what extent do addressees comprehend AIDS posters, (3) to carry out an in-depth lexico-pragmatic analysis of processes involved in the Kenyan AIDS discourse, (4) to study the various conceptualizations of AIDS in figurative discourse and analyze Kenyan mental representations of AIDS in various communities, (5) to examine ethno-cultural stereotypes inhibiting the implementation of AIDS posters. To achieve this, the study's conceptual framework comprises the Relevance Theory, the Conceptual Blending Theory and the Idealized Cognitive Model Theory. Further, in the analysis of 61 questionnaires distributed to Maseno Division and Eldoret Town respondents in Kenya, and also 21 AIDS posters drawn from various Kenyan NGOs websites engaged in AIDS campaigns, qualitative and quantitative techniques are used.

MAGONYA, Lilian. *A pragmatic analysis of figurative language used in HIV/AIDS discourse in Kenia: a case study of english and Kiswahili messages*. Thèse de doctorat : Univ. Genève, 2012, no. L. 742

UNIVERSITÉ DE GENÈVE

A PRAGMATIC ANALYSIS OF FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE IN HIV/AIDS DISCOURSE IN KENYA: A CASE STUDY OF ENGLISH AND KISWAHILI MESSAGES

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ACKNOWLEDGMENT

academic journey.

DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to all people who have been gravely affected by HIV and AIDS.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABC: A-Abstain, B- Be faithful, C- use Condoms.

ABCD: A-Abstinence, B-Be faithful, C- use condoms correctly and consistently, D- Diagnosis, know your status.

ACCs: AIDS Control Councils.

AIDS: Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome.

AIDA: Attention, Interest, Desire, Action.

AU: African Union.

BAKITA: Baraza la Kiswahili la Taifa. (Kiswahili Academy).

BT: Blending Theory.

CACCs: Constituency AIDS Control Committees.

CCC: Causal Cognitive Chains.

CDC: Center for Disease Control.

CECAFA: Confederation of East and Central Africa Football Association

CIA: Central Intelligence Agency.

CHAKIMA: Chama cha Kiswahili cha Afrika Mashariki (East African Council of Kiswahili)

CEOs: Chief Executive Officers.

CMT: Conceptual Metaphor Theory.

CP: Cooperative Principle.

CRF: Circulating Recombinant Forms.

CSW: Commercial Sex Workers.

DNA: Deoxyribonucleic acid.

ELISA: Enzyme Linked Immunosorbent Assay.

EU: European Union.

FBOs: Faith Based Organizations.

FHI: Family Health International.

GCI: Generalized Conversational Implicatures.

GRID: Gay Related Immune Deficiency.

HIV: Human Immunodeficiency Virus.

HTLV: Human T-cell Lymphotropic Virus.

4-H Risk groups: Haitians, Haemophiliacs, Heroin users and Homosexuals.

ICM: Idealized Cognitive Model.

IDUs: Injecting Drug Users.

KAIS: Kenya AIDS Indicator Survey.

KDHS: Kenya Demographic Health Survey.

KCPE: Kenya Certificate of Primary Education.

KCSE: Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education.

KEMRI: Kenya Medical Research Institute.

KNASP: Kenya National AIDS Strategic Plan.

KTN: Kenya Television Network.

LVCT: Liverpool Voluntary, Counselling and Testing, care and treatment.

MET: Metaphor.

MMH: Massive Modular Hypothesis.

MOH: Ministry of Health.

MSM: Men who have sex with men.

NACC: National AIDS Control Council.

NASCOP: National AIDS and STD Control Programs.

NGO: Non-governmental organization.

NTV: Nation Television Network.

NPA: New Primary Approach.

PAR: Paraphrase.

PEPFAR: US President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief.

PLWA: People living with AIDS.

PTQ: Proper Treatment of Quantification.

PSI: Population Services International.

RT: Relevance Theory.

RNA: Ribonucleic Acid.

SIDA: Syndrome Immunodéficitaire Acquis. (French Acronym for AIDS)

SIV: Simian Immunodeficiency Virus.

SFOPH: Swiss Federal Office of Public Health.

STDs: Sexually Transmitted Diseases.

TB: Tuberculosis.

TOM: Theory of Mind.

TOWA: Total War Against AIDS.

UN: United Nations.

UK: United Kingdom.

US: United States.

UNAIDS: Jointed United Nations on Programme on AIDS and HIV.

UNGASS: United National General Assembly Special Session on HIV and AIDS- Country Report Kenya.

VOA: Voice of America.

VCT: Voluntary Counselling and Testing Unit.

WHO: World Health Organization**.**

WOGS: Wrath of God Syndrome.

ABSTRACT

The present linguistic endeavour is a pragmatic analysis of figurative language used in HIV discourse in Kenya with specific reference to Kiswahili and English AIDS posters. Capitalizing on the linguistic status of English and Kiswahili, the official and national languages of Kenya respectively, behaviour change communicators extensively use the two languages in sensitizing the Kenyan multilingual community on the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). From the foregoing, chances of misunderstanding culturally unfamiliar metaphors in English and Kiswahili AIDS posters are high, since Kenya comprises approximately forty two (42) mutually unintelligible speech communities. Having such a background in mind, our research is designed to undertake a pragmatic analysis of figurative language employed in the Kenyan AIDS-related discourse. Taking cognizance of the diversity in figurative language, the research is particularly keen on metaphors, irony, similes and metonymy in AIDS posters. In addition to this, an examination of lexico-pragmatic processes operating in the syntax of Kenyan AIDS messages is undertaken.

From a cognitivist viewpoint, the conceptual framework guiding the study invites a wealth of ideas from the Relevance Theory (RT), Blending Theory (BT) and Idealized Cognitive Models (ICM) aimed at finding scholarly answers to a research problem seeking to establish whether Kenyans of dissimilar socio-cultural and educational backgrounds, homogeneously comprehend AIDS messages coined in English and Kiswahili languages. From the aforementioned problem, the justification for undertaking this linguistic endeavour stems from insightful recommendations brought forth by two Kenyan AIDS affiliated organizations under the auspices of the Kenya Demographic Health Survey (KDHS) and the National AIDS and Sexually Transmitted Diseases Program in Kenya (NASCOP), (cf. KDHS, 2003 and NASCOP, 2005), which strongly lobbied for more explicit AIDS related messages in sensitizing the Kenyan population on HIV and AIDS. This verdict was passed following cases of miscomprehesion of AIDS messages amongst Kenyans, a case in point being the *A-Abstinence, B- Be faithful, C-Use condoms* (ABC) slogan (cf. Magonya, 2007). Moreover, from a cognitive linguistics viewpoint, there is a conspicuous absence of pragmatic research in the area, yet the scholarly input of epidemiologists, feminists, literary scholars and anthropologists is overwhelming. In an attempt to fill this lacuna, the present study aspires to generate scholarly insights in an under-researched area by pragmatists.

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To systematically investigate the research problem, the study is guided by the following five objectives; first, to investigate whether Kenyan AIDS messages are skewed towards implicitness or explicitness. Second, to assess to what extent do addressees comprehend AIDS messages and whether they incur any comprehension difficulties. Third, to carry out an in-depth lexico-pragmatic analysis of processes involved in the comprehension of AIDS messages. Fourth, to study various conceptualizations of AIDS from a figurative perspective, and identify varieties of figurative language employed in the Kenyan AIDS discourse. Fifth, to examine ethno-cultural stereotypes inhibiting implementation of AIDS messages in Kenya. Derived from the cited objectives, we compute two hypotheses: one, to a great extent, ethno-linguistic stereotypes contribute to a retarded pace in behaviour change in Kenya by consistently nullifying the communicator's message. Two, Kenyan addressees incur a cognitive strain in processing figurative discourse used in AIDS slogans, hence impacting negatively on the fight against AIDS in Kenya.

The research methodology merges qualitative and quantitative techniques for both data collection and data analysis procedures. As pertaining data collection, on one extreme, the primary data is obtained from mixed open and closed questionnaires distributed to a target population of sixty one (61) respondents. The purposively-sampled population is drawn from both high and low prevalence regions with thirty three (33) respondents selected from a high HIV prevalence region (28%), within Maseno division in Kisumu County of Nyanza province in Kenya and compared to another twenty eight (28) respondents from a low prevalence region (12%), within Eldoret town in Uasin Gishu County of Rift Valley province in Kenya. Using stratified random sampling from HIV negative respondents and snowball sampling for seropositive respondents, our respondents' sample comprised married couples and single persons drawn primarily from eight Kenyan ethnic communities namely: Kikuyu, Luo, Kalenjin, Kisii, Luhyia, Meru, Turkana and Maasai communities. On the other extreme, secondary data is obtained from a random sample of twenty one (21) AIDS campaign posters as from 1980 to 2010, which were analyzed to establish whether communicators are skewed towards using explicit or implicit AIDS messages. Quantitative techniques using descriptive statistics and inferential statistics with the assistance of MS Excel, are used to complement the qualitative analysis.

Research findings emerging from the analysed data reveal, first we affirm the existence of a cognitive model by which peoples' embodied experiences with AIDS are conveyed in conceptual metaphors,

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similes and metonymies (see *Figures 14* and *15*). Alongside the cognitive model, African mental representations of AIDS subscribe to Rosch's (1978) principles of categorization by having a superordinate level, basic level and subordinate level, which depict inclusiveness (vertical dimension) and exclusiveness (horizontal dimension) of conceptual categories (cf. *Figure 27*). Moreover, the negative ethno-specific mental representations of AIDS contribute to its stigmatization, for instance the Luhyia refer to AIDS as *muhunzi* (zombie or the living dead), whereas the Kalenjin term for AIDS is *kimaltel* (the beast). Second, using the Gricean maxim of brevity by adopting simple syntactic constructions such as *AIDS Kills* in *poster 11* enhances the addressees memorability of the AIDS poster. Contrastively, AIDS posters having complex metaphors such as the SEX IS A GAME metaphor not only defy Occamistic principles but are cognitive strenuous to less educated Kenyans, who not only misunderstand culturally unfamiliar metaphors but even complex metaphors (cf. Sections 5.7.2, 5.7.4 and 6.2.1.1 on *AIDS kills* propositional radical, poster V and SEX IS A GAME metaphor). In simpler terms, behaviour change communicators can enhance memorability of AIDS messages by using simpler constructions such as *AIDS kills,* which was consistently recalled by both Maseno division respondents and Eldoret town respondents.

In connection to this, behaviour change communicators should opt for local icons as ostensive stimulus in AIDS posters instead of national celebrities, for addressees might fail to recognize the latter category as paragons (cf. Sections 5.7.4.1.1, 5.7.4.1.2 and *Appendix 21* on the evolution of Kenyan AIDS posters). Third, based on experiences and perceptions of Kenyan respondents with various ailments, the study confirms the existence of disease-related implicatures and a ranking system for AIDS *vis à vis* other ailments such as Ebola, AIDS, syphilis, herpes, cholera, malaria and headache. Beginning with the most feared ailment to the least feared ones, the ailments are ranked differently depending on one's seropositive status, a case in point is in Eldoret town where HIV negative respondents ranked the ailments as follows: Ebola, AIDS, herpes, syphilis, cholera, malaria and headache. Whereas, HIV positive respondents subscribed to the following system: Ebola, AIDS, syphilis, herpes, cholera, malaria and headache. The ranking differences of ailments is attributed to the fact that HIV negative respondents associate herpes with AIDS, therefore closely ranking the two ailments. On the contrary, HIV positive respondents do not make the AIDS-herpes association hence ranking it in the fourth position as presented in section *5.7.7.3*. Fourth, it is difficult to determine whether Kenyan AIDS posters are skewed towards implicitness or explicitness for communicators concurrently used the two

pragmatic processes in AIDS posters and in their accompanying syntactic constructions as shown in the analysis in section 6.1, which is consistent with natural language where literal and figurative language coexist (cf. Glucksberg, 2001).

From the research findings, it is recommended that behaviour change communicators should employ less complex conceptual metaphors in AIDS posters and their accompanying linguistic expressions. And if metaphors are used, then pre-testing for comprehensibility among addressees is imperative. Pre-testing will narrow the margin of widespread miscomprehension of AIDS posters, by teaching addressees the communicator's intentions in a particular metaphor. Also more campaigns should sensitize Kenyans on their culture-specific mental representations of AIDS which are synonymous to its stigmatization as articulated by the data and discussions in section 5.7.6. Moreover, despite having numerous AIDS campaigns for almost two decades, to date images of skinny seropositive persons and condoms in AIDS posters are culturally sensitive, which is an indicator of both AIDS's stigmatization and sexuality are still being labelled taboo in the Kenyan society. Besides having more campaigns to defuse the AIDS stigma, medics should investigate region-specific implicit assumptions of ailments by the non-medic populations and sensitize the latter on their erroneous assumptions on ailments (cf. 5.7.7, 5.7.7.1 and 5.7.7.2). Finally, behaviour change communicators should investigate region-specific prototypes of high risk groups, this is because within Maseno division in Kisumu County of Nyanza province, respondents considered wife-inheritors as a less representative category of high risk group within the region, yet wife inheritance as a cultural practice is known for fuelling the spread of AIDS in Nyanza province in Kenya as shown in section 5.7.7.4.1 in *Table 30*.

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.0 THESIS OUTLINE

This dissertation comprises six chapters each addressing relevant topics essential in investigating and understanding our research problem. To guide our discussions systematically, the chapters are organized in the following ways. The first chapter entails the statement of the problem, research objectives, research hypotheses and defines the study's theoretical framework comprising ICM, BT and RT by looking at their major tenets and application in analyzing Kenyan AIDS posters.

The second chapter discusses the background of the study, the scientific nature, transmission and origins of AIDS, distribution of AIDS worldwide and within Kenya, some contentious issues within behaviour change communication with reference to AIDS posters, and analyses various examples of figurative discourse on AIDS across the globe. Additionally, given that the linguistic choice of AIDS posters is restricted to those coined in English and Kiswahili languages, a brief historical account on the evolution of the cited languages with reference to consequences of language contact between them, particularly with the creation of a hybrid language known as *Sheng'*[1], alongside Kenyan English and pidginized varieties of Kiswahili, is discussed.

The third chapter is oriented towards understanding the implicature-explicature debate. Particular emphasis is placed on implicatures and their interrelations with other pragmatic inferences such as entailments, particularized implicatures, generalized implicatures and presuppositions by reviewing literature by Paul Grice, Stephen Levinson, Laurence Horn, Kent Bach, Robyn Carston, Simons Mandy, Paul Cohen, Robert Stalnaker, Ariel Cohen and other relevant contributions by pragmatists on pragmatic inferences.

The fourth chapter reviews literature on the metaphor by examining relevant insights from Max Black, John Searle, Andrew Ortony, George Lakoff, Zoltán Kövecses, Sam Glucksberg and also the relevance theoretical viewpoint to the metaphor. The chapter equally discusses metonymy, irony, personification

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1   A corroborated form of Kiswahili that extensively borrows loanwords from both English and African languages in Kenya, *Sheng'* is commonly spoken by the youth from mainly economically challenged neighbourhoods to enhance in-group communication. (cf. Kang'ethe, 2004)

and similes.

The fifth chapter outlines the research methodology, data analysis and findings from both Eldoret town respondents and Maseno division respondents. On one hand, in respect to methodology, the areas of study, sampling procedures of both respondents and AIDS posters, data analysis using qualitative and quantitative techniques are well defined in this section. On the other hand, research findings cover areas such as recallability of AIDS messages, miscomprehension cases of Kenyan AIDS posters, cultural assumptions rendering AIDS messages irrelevant, disease-related implicatures, categorization of AIDS and other ailments by HIV negative and seropositive persons, categorization of high risk groups, culture-specific stereotypes on gender and protection use, mental representations of AIDS in Kenyan communities and addressees' perceptions of sexually explicit pictorial metaphors in AIDS posters.

The sixth chapter comprises two parts, the first part is an analysis of twenty one (21) Kenyan AIDS posters written in either English, Kiswahili or *Sheng',* to establish whether they are skewed towards implicitness or explicitness. Also analyzed is the most recurrent and cognitive strenuous conceptual metaphor namely the SEX IS A GAME metaphor that featured in various AIDS campaigns as from 1998 to 2010. In this section, rare cases of similes and irony in Kenyan AIDS poster are examined. The second part of the chapter, provides a general overview of the study discussed in its summary and recommendations for further studies.

1.1 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

To adequately achieve the objectives of the present research as articulated in our thesis outline, it is imperative to clearly frame its research problem premised on borrowed ideas from relevance theorists, cognitive linguists and cognitive psychologists. Literature in pragmatics and intercultural pragmatics pinpoints the causative agents of misunderstandings within literal and non-literal language. Searle (1979), Forceville (1996), Wilson & Sperber (2000) and Wilson (2006a) are convinced beyond any reasonable doubt that when processing figurative language, addressees are compelled to invest additional cognitive efforts in utterance comprehension. Translating this within relevance theoretical terms, the degree of relevance in such an utterance will be lower, unless addressees evade the cognitive

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strain via using the path of least effort and stop once expectations of relevance have been fully satisfied. Contrastively, Lakoff & Johnson (1980), Lakoff & Turner (1989) and Gibbs (1997) assert that generally metaphors and other tropes are not only omnipresent in language but are interlaced with our conceptual capacities, hence facilitating easier comprehension of linguistic phenomena within a speech community. Apparently, this line of thought is cautioned by Lakoff's & Johnson's (1982) observation on the metaphoricity debate, by pointing out that whenever one is exposed to a metaphor that he does not culturally live by, there is an imminent danger of partially understanding the metaphor, coupled with cognitive difficulties in processing such a metaphorical discourse. Lakoff's & Johnson's (1982) arguments are confirmed by Schäffner (2004), whose study shows how cultural differences between the source language and target language hampers translation of metaphors. Further, from the literal or explicature perspective, Moeschler (2007) demonstrates how misunderstandings are heightened in intercultural communication, especially when two persons from different cultural backgrounds share a common language for communicative purposes. An oversight on the communicator's part would be to erroneously assume that his addressee possesses similar knowledge and beliefs, which unfortunately might be untrue, thus leading to a communication breakdown. Additionally, commenting on culture and categorization, cognitive psychologists posit that different speech communities have dissimilar ways of perceiving phenomena and categorizing concepts. This eventually conceives a breeding ground for stereotypes or preconceived notions, a status if unchecked impacts negatively on a community, as stereotypes nullify positive information on a category due to culturally bias preconceived notions. (cf. Scollon & Scollon, 1995)

Taking into consideration the above insights, our research problem is framed within the context of behaviour change communication and focuses on the Kenyan multilingual community hosting approximately forty two (42) ethnic groups, with their respective cultural beliefs. The speech communities achieve their inter-communicative goals either via English or Kiswahili. However, we are conscious of the fact that the behaviour change communicators' linguistic repertoire extends beyond English and Kiswahili languages, as AIDS posters are equally coined in African languages. Against this backdrop, the research problem is charged with the pragmatic duty of establishing to what extent does a communicator's linguistic choice for implicit or explicit AIDS posters affect the addressee's comprehension of AIDS messages. By investigating the correlation between the spread of AIDS *vis à vis* the pragmatic structure of the messages, together with various cultural stereotypes frustrating the

implementation of AIDS messages in Kenya, we are more concerned with finding convincing answers to the following series of questions. One, how is AIDS conceptualized in the Kenyan figurative discourse and among Kenyan communities? Two, do Kenyans easily understand implicit AIDS slogans or their explicit counterparts? Three, what are the chances of Kenyans from various ethnic communities, having different cultural and educational backgrounds unevenly comprehending AIDS slogans? And four, what are some of the socio-pragmatic issues frustrating the implementation of the advice offered by these slogans? By answering these questions, the present study will hopefully succeed in injecting a linguistic perspective into the AIDS pandemic, given that the input of pragmatics and cognitive linguistics in health communication remains uninvestigated.

1.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

To systematically study our research problem, the present research will be guided by the following objectives.

The first objective of the research is to investigate whether Kenyan AIDS messages are skewed towards implicitness or explicitness. For any pragmatist, finding out whether addressees easily comprehend implicit AIDS messages as opposed to explicit ones or vice versa within human communication, is indeed relevant for behaviour change communicators, since they will overtly weigh the merits and demerits of communicating implicitly or explicitly when sensitizing Kenyans on AIDS. The second objective, which is closely related to the first objective, as researchers, we want to assess the extent to which addressees comprehend AIDS messages, and establish whether they incur any comprehension difficulties. In other words, an investigation highlighting some of the challenges facing addressees from diverse ethno-linguistic and socio-economic backgrounds may yield interesting findings, especially if behaviour change communicators erroneously subscribe to the generalized-working assumption that Kenyans evenly comprehend AIDS messages, whereas such an assumption could be untrue if not far-fetched.

The third objective of this pragmatic endeavour attempts to carry out an in-depth lexico-pragmatic analysis of processes involved in the comprehension of AIDS slogans. It is an open secret among relevance theorists that decoding logical forms of utterances is a multi-tasked enterprise, (see section

1.6.3.1 and chapter 3), whereby addressees are engaged in a series of cognitive processes geared towards enriching incomplete logical forms, computing implicit assumptions and their respective conclusions or even unearthing both higher level explicatures or their basic level counterparts. As pragmatists, we are conscious of the fact that behaviour change communicators are unaware of such cognitive processes, therefore any assessment on whether different addressees successfully recover logical forms of various AIDS messages via the aforementioned lexico-pragmatic processes will be pertinent to the study.

The fourth objective is aimed at studying various conceptualizations of AIDS from a figurative perspective and identifying categories of figurative language employed in the Kenyan HIV discourse. As pragmatists, we want to study some mental representations associated with AIDS in Kenyan communities and in the same token, establish their correlation with AIDS-related stigma from a cultural viewpoint based on arguments derived from the causal cognitive chain of mental and public representations as articulated by the relevance theoretical thesis on epidemiology of beliefs. (cf. sections 1.6.3.3 and 5.7.6)

The fifth and final objective is designed to examine typical ethno-cultural stereotypes inhibiting implementation of AIDS messages in Kenya (cf. sections 5.7.5.1, 5.7.9 and 5.7.9.1). Going by one argument of the idealized cognitive models outlined in section 1.6.2, that our cognitive abilities facilitate comprehension of phenomenon using metonymic-based cognitive models, naturally, we use part of an entity and employ it in a generalized way to an entire category, a case in point is Lakoff's (1987, 1999) BACHELOR concept, which as a social stereotype, invites generalized erroneous assumptions of a care-free man in numerous amorous relationships on one extreme, while discrediting the image of a caring, responsible, unmarried adult male as a bachelor on the other extreme. It is within such a background that our study investigates typical Kenyan AIDS stereotypes that have generated a plethora of misconceptions about AIDS.

1.3 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES

A researcher relies on hypotheses in order to confirm or dismiss a fact that is directly or indirectly related to his empirical study. In this respect, the present research subscribes to the following two

hypotheses. The first one being; to a great extent, ethno-linguistic stereotypes contribute to the slow pace in behaviour change in Kenya as they consistently nullify the communicator's message. To avoid unnecessary repetition, as seen in the case of BACHELOR, the underscored point is that AIDS stereotypes could be used in passing erroneous judgments or conceptualizations of the disease. The long-term repercussions of holding wrong mental assumptions on AIDS is that addressees embrace incorrect cognitive models and beliefs about AIDS, hence frustrating efforts employed both in sensitizing people on AIDS and containing its spread. Concurrently, communicators are faced with a tedious task of constantly being taken back to the drawing board to coin AIDS messages aimed at dismissing erroneous assumptions.

The second hypothesis contends that Kenyan addressees incur a cognitive strain in processing figurative discourse, hence impacting negatively on the fight against AIDS in Kenya. To briefly expound on this point, relevance theorists advance the thesis that figurativeness in utterances is an open invitation to additional processing efforts as the syntactic construction eventually generates a range of weak implicatures. Our argument holds that Kenyan addressees could be unknowingly misunderstanding AIDS messages based on the processing efforts used in comprehending AIDS messages. At this point, we want to stress that AIDS is a sexually transmitted disease and in many African societies the sexuality discourse is muted. Hence, reference to the topic is mainly via figurative language or euphemisms which to a certain extent is cognitively strenuous to the addressee, especially in the context of culturally unfamiliar metaphors or peculiar metonymic expressions. In simpler terms, addressees will take a generous amount of time in processing AIDS messages.

1.4 JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY

The relentless fight against AIDS within the 21st century has clearly witnessed a wind of change within the mode of communication on HIV discourse, with various countries embracing sexually explicit slogans and imagery to sensitize their citizens on the detrimental effects of AIDS. In low HIV prevalence regions like Switzerland, under the umbrella of the on-going LOVE-LIFE STOP AIDS campaign, Swiss behaviour change communicators are successfully exploiting the power of explicit imagery and messages in sensitizing her population on HIV and AIDS, leaving no room for sugar-coating issues related to human sexuality (cf. Magonya, 2007). On the contrary, such an explicit

approach towards HIV and AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa is yet to see the light of the day, as matters relating to human sexuality have traditionally been labelled as taboo (cf. Apte, 1989). That notwithstanding, historically sexually transmitted ailments are not only demonized but cohabit with pejorative implicatures associated with shame, perverseness, promiscuity or divine retribution for perverseness (cf. Sontag, 1988, Doka, 1997, Obbo, 2004, Schoepf, 2004a, Barnett and Whiteside, 2006). From this standpoint, an investigation on figurative discourse in Kenyan HIV slogans is timely in its adoption of a cognitivist approach in explaining and pinpointing certain linguistic issues, which communicators might underestimate or ignorantly downplay when coining AIDS messages. In certain respects, the study will be an eye-opener to communicators to reasonably weigh the merits and demerits of implicit and explicit AIDS messages, thus armed with sound pragmatic judgment, health communicators could possibly design the way forward in behaviour change communication.

By sowing the seeds of pragmatics into the HIV debate, the research's findings will hopefully bring to the communicator's attention the pitfalls of some Kenyan messages and equally highlight some contentious issues drawn from the addressees' perspective. Put another way, communicators will be enlightened on why their AIDS slogans are slowly being implemented in Kenya; yet aggressive campaigns have been operational since the late nineties. On the same note, various multinational organizations such as UNAIDS, Center of Disease Control (CDC), Population Services International (PSI) among others, can stand to benefit from insights emerging from intercultural pragmatics that can be synthesized into HIV and AIDS pandemic debate. Traditionally, most researches on AIDS have been skewed towards investigating gender-bias norms, promiscuity, homosexuality, migrant labour and economic effects of AIDS. However, a linguistic approach on AIDS undeniably remains unexplored. By undertaking this study, we espouse notions from intercultural pragmatics and cognitive linguistics, in an effort to understand how communicators design their slogans, how addressees from different cultural backgrounds understand, conceptualize, interpret and implement AIDS messages and further examine how various ethno-linguistic stereotypes inhibit implementation of AIDS messages. In short, we are aspiring to enrich literature in pragmatics while simultaneously influence policy in behaviour change communication by demonstrating how various target groups comprehend AIDS-related messages in Kenya.

1.5 SCOPE AND LIMITATION

In undertaking any research, defining one's scope and limitations are essential in studying any scientific phenomena owing to time constraints. Going by this lead, the proposed research will be limited in several dimensions namely, its linguistic choice, area of study, number of respondents, number of posters to be analyzed and number of theories adapted for its conceptual framework. First, in terms of linguistic choice, we will specifically focus on AIDS posters written in English and Kiswahili and ignore posters coined in vernacular languages. Second, the time frame guiding our choice of posters will be limited to twenty one (21) posters produced between 1980 to 2010. Third, the area of study will be confined to a high HIV prevalence region of 28% in Maseno town, within Kisumu County, in Nyanza province in Kenya and a low prevalence region of 12% in Eldoret town, within Uasin Gishu County, in Rift Valley province in Kenya. The comparative analysis is meant to establish whether there are any differences or similarities in the addressees' interpretations of AIDS messages in dissimilar prevalence regions. Fourth, the target population of our respondents will be approximately sixty (61) in number, within the age-bracket of twenty years to fifty five years (20-55). The respondents will comprise: unmarried seropositive persons, unmarried HIV negative persons, married seropositive couples and married HIV negative couples. Respondents will be drawn specifically from the Luo, Kikuyu, Meru, Turkana, Abagusii, Kalenjin, Maasai and Luhyia speech communities. Moreover, aspects relating to gender, socio-economic and educational backgrounds will be considered during administration of questionnaires to the target population. Finally, our conceptual framework is exclusively confined within the boundaries of the Relevance Theory, Idealized Cognitive Models and Blending Theory.

1.6 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

1.6.1. OVERVIEW OF THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK SECTION

The manual guiding any academic research is always its theoretical or conceptual framework. In this regard, this section presents the major tenets of our conceptual framework that espouses a wealth of ideas from the Blending Theory, Idealized Cognitive Models and Relevance Theory by tracing their development and equally outlining their respective major tenets while striving to stress on their utility

in the present study. In the final section, we present a general overview of areas of convergence and divergence in the three theories.

1.6.1.1. Blending Theory

Conceptual Integration theory christened the blending theory (henceforth, BT), is the brainchild of two renown cognitive linguists namely, Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner. The backbone of BT on one hand, rests on a pragmatic merger of Fauconnier's mental spaces theory grounded in cognitive semantics. On the other hand, there is a dose of Lakoffian Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) developed by George Lakoff and Mark Turner, so that conceptual integration is charged with the responsibility of unearthing "on-line" cognitive mechanisms underlying meaning construction for local understanding. To achieve this task, BT extensively capitalizes on the speaker's long-term memory, the actual speech situation and socio-cultural knowledge otherwise known as backstage cognition that undergoes continuous modification as thought and discourse evolve (cf. Grady, Oakley & Coulson, 1997, Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, Evans & Green, 2006). In terms of its applicability, BT meets perfectly the qualification of the brand name " a jack of all trades theory", in the sense that it has been successfully employed in both linguistic and non-linguistic research especially in the domains of philosophy, mathematics, metaphor, grammar and counterfactuals, whereby it develops an algorithm of how cognitive faculties construct meaning (cf. Fauconnier & Turner, 2002 and Fauconnier, 2005). BT advances the thesis that meaning construction is a complex process, which surprisingly is elusive to the human mind. Apparently, the complexity of meaning construction has been camouflaged as a simple process sustained by two factors. First, going by evolution, right from birth to adulthood, human beings have been actively using their cognitive abilities to comprehend phenomenon, hence it is possible for the brain to be deceived that meaning construction is trivial. Second, meaning construction takes place in micro-seconds thus blinds one from appreciating its complexity (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002). Moreover, the underlying ideology advanced by Fauconnier (1997) is that meaning construction is an on-going and hi-tech mental operation occuring in virtually any domain involving communication and thought. In actual fact, we construct mental domains on the basis of background knowledge and conceptual models under the umbrella of mental spaces.

1.6.1.2. Blending Theory and Mental spaces

In the previous section, we mentioned in passing that BT's framework is partially based on the mental spaces theory. Using Fauconnier's (1997, 2002) arguments on mental spaces, to facilitate comprehension purposes, mental faculties normally construct small conceptual packets. The packets or mental spaces entail: elements, structured frames, cognitive schemas and a dynamic force. As stipulated in BT, mental spaces function in conjunction with backstage cognition enumerated below:

(1) *Julie purchased coffee at Peter's shop.* (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002)

In example (1), we will identify elements, frame, cognitive models and the dynamic force of the mental space in question. As a point of departure, elements include: *Julie*, *purchase*, *coffee, at*, *Peter* and *Shop*. The structured frame mapping the entire utterance is a commercial transaction involving Julie and Peter, whereby Julie spends her own money to buy Peter's coffee. For the case of cognitive models emerging from the frame entail *drinking, buying* and *selling*, owing to the fact that Peter assumes the role of a coffee seller, whereas Julie is both the coffee buyer and consumer as defined by the cognitive models. The function of dynamic force is to cement the above-mentioned mental space components, and for the effective functioning of a mental space, these relations liaise with other vital relations within the human conceptual system.

1.6.1.3. Topology of a blend

Having understood the working operations of a mental space, we relate its operations to the blend's topology. The basic components of any simple blend entail two input spaces, a generic space and an emergent space or the blend. The function of input spaces is to induce cross-space mappings between the two mental spaces bearing more or less similar features mirrored in either space. The generic space is assigned some encyclopaedic functions aimed at providing appropriate lexical entries for the mirrored features appearing in the two input spaces. In other words, the input space features' correlate with those features projected in the generic space. The emergent structure entrenched in the blend is a unique product of conceptual blending. In fact, it hosts a sub-section of input spaces' features selectively projected into the blend. Emergent structures are a byproduct of a three-fold process of

composition, completion and elaboration also known as running the blend. An in-depth explanation of the functioning of a blend is best explained using the expression in (2)

(2) *If Clinton were the Titanic, the iceberg would sink*. (Fauconnier, 2005)

In the above counterfactual[2] blend capturing an imaginary scenario, whereby the famous Titanic supposedly fails to sink on high seas. By contrast, historically, the sinking of the Titanic after hitting an iceberg recorded massive deaths estimated at over one thousand persons in 1912. The blend simply shows the Clinton-Lewinsky's affair failed miserably in tarnishing Clinton's reputation as the American president, meaning he is comparable to an unsinkable Titanic in spite of hitting an iceberg. In this respect, composition takes place via partial cross-space mapping of Clinton on the first input, with the Titanic on the second input to produce a Clinton-Titanic. The aftermath of the cross-mapping procedure, gives the completion process a leeway for making additional alterations on the Clinton-Titanic, for instance by using historical facts on the Titanic derived from our backstage cognition and transposing them onto the Lewinsky and Clinton affair. The product of composition and completion conceives an elaborated blend, such that, we actually conceptualize an unsinkable Clinton-Titanic, who fails to suffer a similar fate as the historical Titanic as shown in *Figure 1*.

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2 In his definition of a counterfactual Fauconnier (1997: 14) adopts Charles Fillmore's example of an angry babysitter telling off a rebellious child, "...If I were your father, I would spank you...", for the sentence to be regarded as a counterfactual, it has to simultaneously have a presupposed reality and an imaginary scenario, with the latter being a total contradiction of the actual state of affairs. The babysitter is obviously not the child's biological father, who is probably lenient, and forgiving. On the contrary, the babysitter is more of a disciplinarian, and therefore maps her own dispositions onto the child's father, so that we visualize a scenario where the babysitter takes the place of the rebellious child's father and disciplines it. The mapping of dispositions is guided by a pragmatic principle known as ego-centric attribution that makes the speaker's behaviour and beliefs desirable.

Figure 1. Clinton the Titanic blend

In *Figure 1*, the 4-spaced model shows a typical structure of a blend. The bold lines depict cross-space mappings between the blends, while the dotted lines represent mappings connecting inputs to both generic spaces and the blend. From the information above, the counterfactual blend has two input spaces, one hosting the Titanic cruise ship plus an iceberg as an obstruction. The second input has Clinton, the former American president, implicated in the Lewinsky scandal, hence a major obstacle and virtually a threat to his marriage and reputation. The partial cross-space mapping between inputs facilitates the mapping of the Titanic onto Clinton, with a replication of a similar process for the Lewinsky scandal onto the iceberg. In the emergent structure, composition facilitates the construction of the Clinton-Titanic idea, as well as the Lewinsky affair as an iceberg. Further, via completion, the backstage cognition injects all relevant background information, whereby Titanic was a famous cruise ship, known for sinking after hitting an iceberg in 1912. On the contrary, during his term as the American president, Clinton the Titanic encounters the Lewinsky scandal as an obstacle, but instead of a downfall following his brief impeachment in 1998, we are surprisingly faced with a situation where Clinton fails to sink like the Titanic for he was acquitted by Senate in 1999, and immediately after

resumed office as the American president. This means via the elaboration process, the blend entertains the idea that it is undeniable the Clinton-Lewinsky affair harmed Clinton's reputation to some extent, however, he amazingly still continued with his term in office and his marriage to Hillary remained intact.

Having pointed out the basic components and operations of a blend, it is important to acknowledge that a blend's lifeline is sustained by several vital operations. The operations work towards relating components in a blend to achieve a human scale via compressing what is diffuse, reinforcing vital relations, striving to obtain a global insight of a blend to eventually come up with a story as in example (3).

(3) *Imagine a lecture on evolution and a professor says: "...The dinosaurs appeared at 10 pm, and were extinct by quarter past ten. Primates emerged at five minutes to midnight. Human's showed up at the stroke of twelve..."* (adapted from Evans & Green, 2006: 419)

In the above extract, the professor touches on human evolution using a partitioned 24-hour clock. If one adheres to scientific literature documented by Charles Darwin among other naturalists**,** one is bound to challenge the professor's line of thought by arguing against the impractibility of construing evolution as a process taking billions of years within a 24-hour time frame. Conversely, BT capitalizes on vital relations, which according to Fauconnier & Turner (2002: 94) link input spaces and their established outer space relations to generate compressions in the blend. In this scenario, time and space vital relations are compressed, such that evolution which normally takes billions of years is compressed into a 24-hour clock. For Evans & Green (2006), the possibility of reducing time into a few notable events like in the case of (4) is known as syncopation.

(4) *My life has consisted of a few notable events: I was born, I fell in love in 1983 and was briefly happy, in 1990 I met my future husband. We got married a year later. As I look back the time seems to have disappeared in housework and drudgery.* (cf. Evans & Green, 2006: 421)

Apart from time and space relations, there are several types of vital relations under the following headings: representation, cause and effect, role and value, change, identity, analogy, disanalogy, part-

whole relation, property, intentionality and uniqueness relation. To briefly discuss the vital relations, first and foremost in case of representation, the underlying operation is to identify entities that can effectively represent one another within an input space, like an icon of a type-writer can stand in for a copy typist. As such, the outer space relations are compressed into the inner space giving the blend a unique interpretation. Second, the cause and effect vital relation is the domain where causality thrives on, a case in point is a smoking advertisement reading: WARNING: SMOKING CAUSES IMPOTENCE. Here, a smoker is cautioned against smoking since impotence is one of its renown side-effects. In the advertisement, the time vital relation is compressed in such a way that one perceives smoking as a causative agent of impotence within a limited time frame, yet impotence is a long-term effect of smoking (cf. Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 81). Third, role and value vital relations can be explained using the Clinton-Titanic in example 2 and *Figure 1*, where Clinton as a value assumes the role of an American president while Titanic as a value has the role of a cruise ship. The essence of this vital relation is to map roles onto their corresponding values. Fourth, the change vital relation captures transitional patterns within a blend, owing to the compressibility of outer-space relations into inner-space relation as in the construction: *the ugly duckling has become a beautiful swan* (Evans & Green, 2006: 422). For the occurrence of change in such a blend, time is compressed so that the ugly duckling and the beautiful swan acquire a similar identity via the uniqueness vital relation. Fifth, for cases of analogy and disanalogy, they complement each other and sometimes are regarded as two sides of the same coin. Taking the ugly duckling example, although we are talking about the same creature, a disanalogy exists between an ugly duckling and a beautiful swan. A clear example of analogy is by Fauconnier & Turner (2002: 99) who contend that analogy is dependent of Role-Value compression.

(5) *Stanford is a West Coast "analogue" to Harvard*.

The blending frame of example (5), has the same frame of an American university, with the role of a prestigious private American university. One input has the value Stanford, whereas the other input has the value Harvard. The blends of the two inputs are linked via analogy, on the basis of their identical roles. Sixth, the part-whole vital relation is naturally metonymic, for instance one can point at the face on a picture and utter "That's Jane Doe", instead of saying "That's Jane Doe's face". In the mapping, one input space bears the face that happens to be Doe's salient feature, whereas, in the second input the whole-person is projected. In the blend, whole-person fuses with the face, leading to a unique blend

merging the part-whole connection of Doe's face and Doe-the person. Seventh, vital relations of property and intentionality are explained in the following manner, the property vital relation focuses on features possessed by the object like a *blue cap* has the property *blue*. On the intentionality angle, the blend deals with contextual emotive aspects relating to memory, hope, aspirations and desires. A good example will be an utterance like *we fear it will rain*, registers the speakers' sentiments towards an unfavorable weather. And lastly, for uniqueness relation, most blends are compressed into it like the case of the ugly duckling and the beautiful swan, where the duck supposedly changes into a unique swan. The foci of blending is to achieve a human scale.

1.6.1.4. Blending Networks

Blending networks are discussed under four major categories: these are simplex networks, mirror networks, single-scope networks and double-scope networks. The subsequent sections will discuss major characteristics of each network.

(i) Simplex networks**.**

Simplex networks operate under the guidance of a unique frame governing the entire blend. The cross-space mapping between inputs is simply structured to facilitate the projection of roles from the first input, to its corresponding values in the second input. In this way, the blend succeeds in producing compatible inputs thus minimizing chances of clashing. A good example of simplex networks is one case involving a family domain in (6).

(6) *Paul is the Father of Sally.*

Within the family domain in (6), the simplex network has different roles for father, mother and children. Thus, the first input hosts roles of Father and Daughter, whereas the second input hosts their respective values namely; Paul and Sally. Being the domain of role-value vital relations, on one extreme, Paul as a value is assigned the role of Sally's father. On the other extreme, Sally as a value acquires the role of Paul's daughter. In a simplified way, it means that thanks to the cross-mapping processes between the first and second inputs, it is possible for the blend's outer space inputs to be

compressed into its inner space via the three-fold processes of composition, completion and running of the blend, hence creating a new inner space blend hosting: father of Sally as shown in *Figure 2.*

Figure 2: Father of Sally blend   **Source: Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 121)**

(ii) Mirror networks

In Mirror networks, inputs share the organization frame just like in simplex networks, however the element's input spaces distinguishes the two networks, meaning that mirror network inputs, as the name suggests, hosts corresponding events, participants or activity within the inputs. Utterance (7) is an example of a mirror network involving an imaginary debate where Kant is engaged in a heated discussion with an English philosopher.

(7) "...*I claim that the reason is a self-developing capacity. Kant disagrees with me on this point. He says innate, but I answer that that's begging the question, to which he counters, in Critique of Pure Reason, that only innate ideas have power. But I say to that, what about neuronal group selection? And he gives no answer...* " (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 60)

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In this counterfactual debate, we have a common organizational frame of *philosophers debating about a problem,* however emerging differences in specific inputs, with one input portraying Kant as an 18th century German philosopher, and the other input has a 20th century English philosopher. In the blend, Kant with his works, writings and arguments occupies one input space. The second input is occupied by the English philosopher's thoughts, arguments and works. Further, none of the inputs has the debate frame, but in the blended space, we picture two philosophers engrossed in a heated debate, as Kant and the modern philosopher employ a common medium of communication in their discussion. Being a fictitious debate, the modern English philosopher carries the day while Kant's ideas are rendered irrelevant. As opposed to simplex networks, mirror networks entertain clashes in certain features. Looking at the Kant debate closely, one notices that Kant is German as his thoughts are confined to 1784 philosophical writings, thus his ideas are being discussed posthumously by a contemporary English philosopher. In this respect, there is a clash at the level of elements describing each philosopher as demonstrated in *Figure 3*.

Generic Space

Thinker
Claims and musings
Mode of expression
Language
Issue
Purpose
Time

Kant (K$_2$)
Claims and Musings
Writing
German
Reason
Search for Truth
1784

Input 1

Me (M$_2$)
Claims and Musings
Speaking
English
Cognitive Process
Search for Truth
Kant $_2$
K$_2$ dead
K$_2$ never aware of M$_2$

Input 2

K
M
Claims, counterclaims
Questions and answers
Speaking
English (same language)
Cognition
Search for the truth
Same time, t
M, K alive
M aware of K
K aware of M

Debate Frame:

Rhetorical actions
Agrees, retorts, challenges, anticipates,
concurs, reinforces, questions,
answers. Argumentation, connectives
affirmation and negotiations. However,
therefore, on the contrary, exactly,
enough, not so fast.
Yes, No, Yes and No.

Blend

Figure 3: Debate with Kant Network   (Source: Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 62)

(iii) Single-scope networks

A contrastive analysis between single scope-networks and mirror networks is that on one hand, the latter functions with two almost identical inputs sharing an organizational frame. On the other hand, the

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former operates with different organization frames with one assigned the role of organizing the frame and is referred to as the framing input. The framing input contributes a larger share of features than the other input known as the focus input, for the latter has a subordinate function in the blend. As such, the general organization of blend is the asymmetrical. Taking the case of Fauconnier's and Turner's (2002) example, in a situation where two competing Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) are compared to two men in a boxing ring, as one CEO overpowers the other one with powerful blows and succeeds in tossing him outside the ring. In such a situation, the framing input contains the boxing component and the focus input has the business component, of which the former is more influential in the blend's organization. At the level of clashes, single-scope networks behave like mirror scope network in the sense that the occurrence of clashes within inputs is the norm. For single-scope networks, clashes are a product of two dissimilar organizational frames constructing the network. This simply means there is no visible correlation between boxers in the framing input and CEOs in the focus input. Clashes in the single-scope networks are erasable by considering the framing input as the backbone of the organizational frame. In brief, the framing input and the focus input in single-scope networks equally accommodate metaphorical expressions, which bank on the source and target domains. A sketch of a single-scope network is shown in *Figure 4*.

Figure 4: Boxing Chief Executive Officers (CEOs)
Source: Fauconnier & Turner (2002: 128)

(iv) Double-scope networks

A double-scope network is made up of two inputs having entirely different organizational frames and thus clashing of their respective inputs is inevitable. The overall structure of the frame governing the blend is symmetrical since it accommodates elements from both inputs. Such blends are highly creative due to clashes in the input. A typical example of a double space network involves a Computer Desktop interface. Here, the blend comprises one input having an office frame or scenario where there are files, folders, desktops and trash cans. On the other input, we have a computer, with its icons on a desktop, whereby a single click of the mouse is sufficient to command the computer to work on files by deleting, printing, editing and scanning them among other commands. Said differently, to some extent the computer desktop functions like an office whereby disposable files are thrown in trash cans or recycle bins in computers and relevant documents are stored in files and folders. (cf. Fauconnier & Turner, 2002)

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1.6.1.5. BT and Governing principles

The working mechanisms of a blend are reinforced by constitutive principles (e.g. cross-space mapping and selective projections) and governing principles also called the optimizing principles, with the latter's functions oriented towards optimizing the emergent structure. This means that a single governing principle can work in conjunction with another principle or sometimes operate in parallel wavelengths within a blend. There are six governing principles in BT under the following headings: the topology principle, pattern completion principle, web principle, unpacking principle, relevance principle and last but not least the integration principle. In a general way, we will pinpoint the major tenets of each principle to comprehend their respective roles within the conceptual integration theory.

(i) Topology principle

Vital relations in a mental space topology constitute the lifeline of a particular blend. A single blend can accommodate several vital relations, which ensure that inner space inputs work in liaison with outer-space outputs. The topology principle is oriented towards maximizing the blend-input relations. Some relations within the topology can be drawn from previous examples that we have illustrated, like it is possible to compress one vital relation into another relation; we have witnessed how the representation relation can be compressed into part-whole metonymic vital relation. Taking " That's Jane Doe " example, apparently the speaker sees Jane Doe's photo as standing in for the actual person. This is just but a glimpse of how a blend's topology can be structured by its principle summarized below:

> Other things being equal, set the blend and inputs so that useful topology in the inputs and other outer space relations is reflected by inner-space relations in the blend. (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 327)

Inasmuch as topology advocates for compressions within the blend, there has to be a system of checks and balances. Put differently, to some extent topology restrains compression to avoid the risk of a disintegrated blend, especially if compression attempts to erase important aspects of the blend's topology.

(ii) Pattern completion principle

The pattern completion principle is inclined towards having a tightly integrated frame. To give the example of *Figure 4*, being a single-scope network having an organization structure drawn from a boxing contest, is applied in a scenario depicting a cut-throat competition between two CEOs, to such an extent where their business rivalry is comparable to two boxers engaged in a physical fist-fight with either having a fifty-fifty chance of winning. Thus, all relevant information is then condensed within the integration principle to be in line with the pattern completion principle thesis that states:

> Other things equal, complete elements in the blend using existing integrated patterns as additional inputs. Other things equal, use a completing frame that has relations that can be compressed versions of the important outer-space vital relations between inputs. (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 328)

(iii) Web principle

Fauconnier and Turner (2002) argue that the web principle aspires to maintain connections between mental space inputs. Its major concern covers the blend's organization network. In some aspects, the web principle coexists with the topology principle, given that if the input-blend relationship is coordinated perfectly, then a replication of a similar pattern is observable in the inputs. The only marked difference is between inputs and blends, and their emergent structures, that cause a mismatch between the blend and input topologies. The web principle equally invites integration of aspects within the blend, an example is the Clinton-Titanic case, we project the Lewinsky's affair as a sinkable iceberg and not a sinking Titanic, and we also accommodate aspects related to the reputation and dignity of the American President and his office. The thesis advanced by the web principle is:

> Other things being equal, manipulating the blend as a unit must maintain a web of appropriate connections to the input spaces easily and without additional surveillance or computation. (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 331)

(iv) Unpacking principle

The unpacking principle is grounded on the following mantra:

The principle can be accused of diluting arguments of both integrated web and topology principles, as it is skewed towards dismantling the blend. Applied loosely, the term "dismantle the blend" can be elaborated by the Debate with Kant blend, where there is a counterfactual scenario having two philosophers supposedly engaged in a heated discussion. Going by the integration principle, a dismantled blend makes it easier for one to perceive Kant as an eighteenth century German scholar with his ideologies and the other twentieth century English scholar with his school of thought. This shows that the unpacking principle paves way for the blend's reconstruction.

(v) Relevance principle (Network Relevance)

The BT's relevance principle is structured as follows:

> Other things being equal, an element in the blend should have relevance, including relevance for establishing links to other spaces and for running the blend. Conversely, an outer-space relation between the inputs that is important for the network should have a corresponding compression in the blend. (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 333)

In an ideal situation, satisfying expectations of relevance is the topmost priority for any communicator. By extension, the same relevance principle is applicable within blending circles. Expectations of relevance in inputs are realized once an element in a blend relates faithfully to other elements in various spaces. Consequently, a listener is encouraged to follow connections boosting the network's relevance. In addition, the speaker's role will be to plant pro-relevance elements in the inputs and exclude those capable of inducing unwanted connections.

(v) Integration principle

A blend's prime objective is designed to achieve an integrated blend; the enormous task involves harmonizing various clashes within inputs and containing them in a single blend. Once one task is accomplished, then running the blend will be much easier and eventually leads to obtaining a human scale. In this respect, integration principle is actually the glue holding topology and web principles

within the blending theory. The principle is briefly articulated as:

Achieve an integrated scale. (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 329)

Having discussed major tenets of the Blending theory, the study stands to benefit from various components of BT touching on imagination and creativity of the human mind. That notwithstanding, the other merit of the theory is that its applicability stretches beyond literal and non-literal language. Based on this strength, the theory possesses the necessary and sufficient conditions to facilitate the analysis of figurative language in Kenyan HIV discourse by demonstrating the complexity of cognitive systems when processing information for local understanding purposes.

1.6.2. IDEALIZED COGNITIVE MODELS (ICM)

1.6.2.1 Background on ICM

People use concepts to categorize things and they act on those categorizations. Without the ability to conceptualize and categorize, we cannot function at all, either in the physical world or in our social or intellectual lives. The theory of categorization is therefore central to any understanding of our conceptual system, and therefore necessary to any understanding of how we human beings function and what makes us human. (Preface, Lakoff, 1982)

A discussion on ICM is incomplete without recourse to categorization, more particularly within the backdrop of the Aristotelian classical theory articulating objectivists ideologies and its rival counterpart christened the natural categorization theory rooted in experientialism. Before looking into the cited respective schools of thought, it is necessary to stress that all human senses actively participate in categorization of phenomenon by adhering to a top-down hierarchical structure comprizing three levels these are: the superordinate level, the basic level and the subordinate level. Respecting the mentioned levels, by visual perception, whenever we see an aeroplane flying overhead, at the superordinate level it is classified as a MEANS OF TRANSPORT. At the basic level, it is simply referred to as an AEROPLANE. Based on the plane's specific features, the subordinate level will accurately determine whether it is a CHARTER PLANE, CONCORDE or JUMBO JET. Using our olfactory abilities, we are capable of distinguishing aroma at the superordinate level of MEALS. Therefore, picking up the scent of EGGS at the basic level is hardly a problem, and further using our visual perception, categorizing

eggs as OMELETTES, POACHED EGGS or BOILED EGGS falls under the subordinate level. Taking the case of our auditory abilities, approaching footsteps of someone wearing high-heeled shoes, would unquestionably generate the superordinate level of A HUMAN BEING and disqualify a WILD ANIMAL. For commonsense dictates that humans and not animals put on high-heeled shoes. Automatically, and based on our world knowledge, the processed mental image, would naturally associate high-heeled shoes with the concept A WOMAN at the basic level. Fine grained details mostly derived from our interactional properties, assign the woman a more specific job group like: A WORKING LADY, A SALES PERSON, A BUSINESS WOMAN or A FEMALE LAWYER at the subordinate level. Our taste buds located in the tongue are not exempted from categorization processes, from the superordinate category of BEVERAGES, one is able to distingush TEA from COFFEE with ease at the basic level structure. The subordinate level will further discern whether one is having ICED TEA, BLACK TEA or MILKED TEA or whether we are having purely BLACK COFFEE, EXPRESSO or CAPPUCCINO. So far, we have just sampled an angle of categorization, which extends to virtually any concept within the cultural experience of human kind. This is not to insinuate that categorization is exclusively a cognitive process designed for humans. On the contrary, lower animals like rodents are known to categorize with accuracy shadows of predatory birds hunting for them as a potential source of food (Barsalou, 1992: 32). For Barsalou categorization is a matter of subscribing to the model in *Figure 5.*

Figure 5: Barsalou's categorization model   **Source: Barsalou (1992: 32)**

Revisiting the earliest schools of thought on categorization, a contrastive analysis of objectivism and experientialism reflects divergence in their respective schools of thought. First and foremost, objectivism hosts two lines of thought namely; objectivist nativism and objectivist empiricism. In respect to the former, categories in the mind are regarded as innate suggesting that right from birth our cognitive faculties enable us to distinguish categories. Therefore, nativism disregards the concept of interactional properties as a categorization component, where cultural experiences with the object equally play a key role in its categorization as stipulated by the natural categorization theory (Rosch, 1978; Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff, 1999 and Kövecses, 2006). On the other extreme, objective empiricism posits that categorization is merely a product of evolution whereby a considerable level of time aids in the process. Barsalou's (1992) conceptualizes categorization as both nativist and empirical for it is both an inborn capacity functioning in conjunction with interactional properties. He justifies his case by arguing that facial expressions related to anger, frowning and fear are innate categories in humans, babies are never taught to smile or burst out in tears as a manifestation of fear whenever some loud noise suddenly disrupts their tranquility. However, they seem to perform the cited actions on their own. In short, for experientialists the impracticality of divorcing cultural experiences from our inborn cognitive faculties is a reality, as they complement each other.

Second, under the umbrella of reductionism, objectivism stipulates that human thought is perceived as atomic and can be disintegrated into primitives. The counter argument from an experientialist approach in Lakoff's (1987) viewpoint is that thought is actually a cognitive model, hosting both basic level entities assigned the duty of generating mental images and kinesthetic schemas with complex internal stuctures, which are governed by an internal logic. In other words, thought cannot be mere primitives as stipulated by objectivism.

Third, objectivism posits that the prerequisite for category membership is simply a matter of fulfilling all the necessary and sufficient conditions, for instance to fit in the CHAIR category, the following features; has four legs, used for sitting on, and has a back are necessary and jointly sufficient for category membership, without any of the mentioned features, the concept ceases to be a chair (Kövecses, 2006). This conditionality therefore signals the notion of categorical uniformity, by virtue of meeting similar conditions prescribed to members of a particular category (Lakoff, 1982). On the contrary, experientialists construe category membership as upholding the principle of

representativeness, whereby some members are more similar to a predetermined prototype than other less representative members. A case in point is Rosch's (1978) example of the robin being more representative of a bird than penguins and ostriches. Moreover, experientialists regard objectivist's categorization of CHAIR as having a rigid boundary absurd, for experientialism subscribes to the notion of fuzzy or flexible boundaries. For example, having a one-legged chair without a back is no reason to disqualify it as not being a chair. Therefore, demarcating conceptual boundaries is almost a futile effort, presupposing that categorical uniformity lacks weight in experientialism. Moreover, under the experientialism umbrella, there is a hierarchical structure guiding categorization, with the topmost being the superordinate level, for example FURNITURE, then the basic level, for instance CHAIR and finally the subordinate level having entities such as KITCHEN CHAIR or DINING CHAIR catering for different types of chairs. The basic level has been singled out as the domain where cognitive economy thrives best. A sample of its characteristics include: first and foremost, it is the level where concept memorability and comprehensibility is both easier and faster than in any other level. Second, acquisition of basic level terms precedes the other two levels, for children learn the term *chair* prior to learning *furniture* or *kitchen table*. Such taxonomic classifications are bounded by the notion of inclusiveness, where the concept FURNITURE includes CHAIR, and even KITCHEN CHAIRS. Third, this is the domain where mental images are formed, apparently the same phenomenon neither occurs in the subordinate nor superordinate level. And finally, cultural variation is mostly witnessed at the basic level, a reason for this non-universality of concepts as par Kövecses (2006) is attributed to either underutilization or overutilization of conceptual capacities. In respect to the former, taking the case of TREE in two settings like an urban center and in the countryside. Most urbanites have limited interaction with trees and tend to generalize the term *tree* to cover different tree species. On the contrary, persons in the countryside will accurately distinguish between an *oak tree* and a *maple tree* or between a *baobab tree* and a *mahogany tree*. Another instance of overutilization of cognitive processes occurs in a situation where horse breeders opt to use various horse species at the basic level, a position where non-horse breeders would have the most neutral term *horse*. This means that expertise can influence categorization of concepts. (cf. Lakoff, 1987, and Kövecses, 2006)

Fourth, objectivism is skewed towards upholding truth conditions in concepts to reflect objective reality. Put differently, meaning is essentially literal. By contrast, in experientialism, meaning can either be literal or figurative since language is perceived an innovative enterprise, whereby literalness coexists

with figurativeness, by accommodating metaphors and metonymy as creative operations of the human mind (cf. Lakoff, 1982, Gibbs, Lima and Francozo, 2004). In the light of objectivism, objective reality should correspond to truth conditions and not falsity. Additionally, the mind is not creative but mechanical, with more of computer-like functions manipulating abstract thoughts. The fifth issue associated with creativity is that experientialism entertains the idea that our experiences are embodied. This simply means that they cannot be divorced from our mental faculties. Objectivism believes in the converse, by stipulating that the mind is transcendental and is not dependent on the body. In short, the embodiment notion does not arise in this case.

From the foregoing, the many irreconcilable differences between classical theory and natural categorization theory, paved way for other theories among them ICM. In fact, Lakoff (1982) considers prototypes as originating from oversimplified generations of cognitive models. Moreover, aspects such as experientialism, image schemas, metaphor and metonymy are incorporated within the cognitive model structure, on grounds that reason is conceptual as described by cognitive models in the concept of BACHELOR under the frame of MARITAL STATUS.

According to ICM, the concept BACHELOR is an abstraction used in reference to an unmarried male adult and is culture-specific (Lakoff, 1987, 1999). As we will observe shortly and according to Lakoff (1987) this definition is contentious since homosexuals, the Pope, priests and even Catholic brothers who take the vow of celibacy unqualify to be called bachelors. However, going by recent societal changes, certain nations have liberalized same-sex marriages between gay couples, as the term "partner" is comfortably applied in such contexts instead of "spouse". The situation becomes tricky as one wonders whether unmarried homosexuals should now be regarded as "bachelors". Another controversial issue regards a clique of ex-communicated Catholic priests affiliated to the Reformed Catholic church, who identify themselves as "married priests", a typical example is the ex-communicated Zimbabwean Arch-Bishop Emmanuel Milingo. Therefore, one wonders if there is a category of "married priests", then would it be appropriate to regard unmarried Catholic priests as "bachelors"? The list of controversies is unending, another bone of contention lies around the notion of an "unmarried male" and "marriageable age", if approached from an African context with reference to a community like the Kalenjin in Kenya, male circumcision is a rite of passage marking the transition between childhood and adulthood. After the rite, boys falling within the age-group of thirteen to fifteen

years are culturally perceived as men. Going by the Kalenjin culture, at a tender age of fifteen years, the former initiate is eligible for marriage. Contrastively, in Western cultures, a fifteen year old boy neither meets the qualification of an adult nor a bachelor. In different words, the concept of an adult male is culturally elusive. In brief, we are faced with a delicate situation on how to handle prototypical effects and for this reason, Lakoff (1987) admits that ICM provides a lee-way in categorization by saying cognitive models are not devoid of imperfections and can either host perfect or imperfect models. ICM also has provision for cluster models which employ several single cognitive models, each offering a definition for an elusive concept like MOTHER. In an ideal situation, one would be tempted to think of a mother under the biological model. However, ICM proposes several models for the concept MOTHER outlined below:

i. Genetic model- the female who contributes the genetic material is a mother.

ii. Nurturance model- the female adult who nurtures and raises the child is the mother of that child.

iii. Marital model- the wife of the father, is the mother.

iv. Genealogical model- the closest female ancestor, is the mother.

v. Surrogate model-She has contracted to give birth and that's all. She may or may not have provided the genes, and she is not married to the father and is not obligated to provide nurturance. And she has contractually given up the right to be the legal guardian.

vi. Foster model- She did not give birth to the child, and is being paid by the state to provide nurturance.

vii. Stepmother model- She did not give birth or supply the genes, but she is currently married to the father.   (adapted from Lakoff, 1987: 74)

To enrich this list, we add.

viii. Spiritual model- In the Catholic Church, the Virgin Mary is considered the spiritual mother among Catholics, and she is sometimes referred to as Our Mother Mary.

ix. Respect model- Within certain African societies, any elderly woman is respectfully referred to as a mother.

x. Ideal model- A rebellious child in uttering "You are not my real mother", either to its biological or stepmother, could be implying that there is an ideal mother, who is not expected to question

or reprimand the child.

For Lakoff (1987), a MOTHER cluster model enables one experience the cognitive diversity in categorizing the concept MOTHER, single cognitive models arise as socio-cultural factors seem to generate different *mother* models, thus making it difficult to have a unique definition for *mother*. There are also metonymic cognitive models whereby a concept is perceived or understood in terms of another. An example is a scenario where one waitress says to another: *The ham sandwich just spilt beer all over himself* (Lakoff, 1999: 397). In such a scenario, ham sandwich probably represents a regular customer accustomed to ordering a ham sandwich at a particular restaurant. Therefore, his regular order is used by the waitress to stand in for the person. The formula proposed by Lakoff (1987: 84) for determining a metonymic model is arrived at in the following manner:

-There is a "target" concept A to be understood for some purpose in some context.

-There is a conceptual structure containing both A and another concept B.

-B is either part of A or closely associated with it in that conceptual structure. Typically, a choice of B will be uniquely determined in A, within that conceptual structure.

-Compared to A, B is either easily understood, easily remembered and easily recognized or more immediately useful for the given purpose in the given context.

-A metonymic model is a model of how A and B are related in a conceptual structure; the relationship is specified by a function from B to A.

In short, a metonymic model strives to demonstrate how A and B are related in a conceptual model, with B considered a sub-category of A. Metonymic models are beneficial when accounting for existing stereotypes in a society, as generalizations of certain societal attributes commence with associating such attributes with a particular entity. If we revisit our MOTHER example, some people consider a housewife to be the best example of a mother. Such a stereotype is a cultural construction perceiving women as homemakers and generalized to a wider category of mothers. Working women on the other hand, who are bread winners are not regarded as best examples of mothers in certain societies. Social stereotypes as viewed by Lakoff (1987, 1999) are overtly and consciously used in speech communities to aid in reasoning, passing judgment and defining cultural expectations in societies. Sometimes, they can be erroneous and fuel misconceived notions especially when the stereotype is charged with

negativity. To illustrate our point using the BACHELOR stereotype, the blanket assumption is that typical bachelors are: macho, carefree and promiscuous. Thus accepting soft spoken and civilized bachelors comes with some level of difficulty.

Cognitive models are also known to function on typical cases, where certain entities are considered as true representations of a category, roses and carnations can be regarded as typical flowers, as opposed to water lily or bougainvillea. Furthermore, sometimes culturally dictated categories are examined from ideal dimensions. Taking the case of MOTHER, to some people, an ideal mother is endowed with exemplary cooking skills, extremely industrious, ever patient and all loving, such a model stands as a best example of a mother. Other models include paragons, salient members, generators, sub-models and radical categories. In paragons, one strives to comprehend a category by using an icon, brand name or a popular idol. In actual fact, the paragon acts as a role model worthy of emulating, for instance Shakespeare in Literature, Chomsky in Linguistics, Aristotle in Philosophy or Gandhi in religion. It is important to stress that paragons are not necessarily outstanding examples but also worst examples are classified as paragons, for instance the biblical Cain who was Abel's brother is a worst example of a brother. For salient members, one metonymically uses a salient category to make generalizations about a memorable event. A real example is the recent recalling of some Chinese toys, owing to the presence of lead in them, such an incidence can serve as a cognitive reference point to make a sweeping statement that all toys fabricated in China are harmful to children.

In the case of generators, a member of one category can produce another category, a good example is how natural numbers with reference to integers between zero and nine are responsible of generating complex numbers via multiplication and addition of single-digit numbers. For sub-models, they rely on cognitive reference points to aid in reasoning or estimating sizes of categories, in the case of natural numbers, sub-models will be digits like ten or a hundred since they are multiples of ten acting as reference points for other numbers. Finally, as we have seen with the case of MOTHER, there are radical categories depicting central and peripheral relations, where some models of mother such as the biological model and nurturance model are regarded as central, as opposed to the step-mother model or surrogate model. Such categories are conventional and emanate from one's socio-cultural environment hence creating room for several cognitive models for MOTHER. In summary, what we have been explaining so far are the main cognitive reference points that ICM employs in the comprehension of

concepts. (cf. Lakoff, 1987, 1999)

1.6.2.2. Structure of cognitive models

According to Lakoff (1987), ICM is a cognitivist theory founded on a theoretical framework of four theories namely; frame semantics, conceptual metaphor theory, mental spaces and cognitive grammar. A cognitive model comprises two symbolic structures. One is the building-block structure that permits the model to stand out as an independent structure while equally hosting dependent entities on its structure. Two, an ICM has gestalt features whose overall meaning is arrived at via understanding the meaning of its constituents, for its constituents are dependent on the whole structure. A case in point is the CONTAINER schema, having entities like INTERIOR, EXTERIOR and BOUNDARY, thus analyzing the INTERIOR in isolation without reference to CONTAINER renders the cognitive model meaningless. There are four categories of ICMs as shown below:

(i) Image-schematic.
(ii) Metaphoric.
(iii) Metonymic.
(iv) Propositional structure. (Adapted from Lakoff, 1987: 68)

The image-schematic model epitomizes embodiment that virtually relates human experience by integrating it within a given frame. Revisiting the CONTAINER schema, we perceive things as either being inside or outside a container. Quoting several expressions reflecting the CONTAINER schema like: *he is out of business*, *he is in trouble*, *he is in a comma* and *Kenya is out of the Olympics this year,* are image schemas guided by the logic that if A is in container B, and X is in A, then X is in B. The metaphoric model heavily relies on mental spaces, especially in carrying out mapping between two conceptual domains hosting source and target domains within an image-schematic frame. An example is the LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor, we sample a few metaphors like: *we have come a long way, we are heading nowhere* or *we are at crossroads*. In the examples, the source domain is JOURNEY whereas the target domain is LIFE. One important component of metonymy is that it operates on one conceptual framework, unlike the metaphor which functions on two. In conclusion, the proposition schema consists of arguments and its predicates. Also included in a proposition are semantic roles

defining the semantic functions of the agent, experiencer and instrument. Generally, ICM will be beneficial for the research in two perspectives; first, various schemas act as cognitive reference points for the analysis of figurative discourse particularly for metaphors, personification and metonymy. Second, we will examine social stereotypes and folk models associated with AIDS in Kenyan communities.

1.6.3. Relevance Theory

The relevance theoretical framework developed within the realm of human communication, and is the brainchild of two pragmatists namely; Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson. The two relevance theorists perceive relevance as an indispensable component of the human mental architecture. In other words, man is cognitively tuned to attend to the most relevant stimuli amidst a range of competing stimuli. RT operates within the framework of two principles labelled the first and second principles of relevance.

(i) Cognitive or first principle of relevance

The cognitive principle of relevance is primarily concerned with the maximization and computation of relevance. The mainstream argument of the cognitive principle is that :

> Human cognition tends to be geared towards the maximization of relevance. (cf. Sperber & Wilson, 1995/1986a)

The cognitive principle pragmatically calculates relevance in terms of processing efforts and positive effects summarized in the following manner:

i) Other things being equal, the greater the positive cognitive effects achieved by processing a given piece of information, the greater its relevance for the individual who processes it.
ii) Other things being equal, the greater the processing effort involved in the processing of a given piece of information, the smaller its relevance for the individual who processes it.
    (cf. Sperber & Wilson, 1986b: 544).

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In brief, it can be deduced from (i) and (ii) that relevance is not only inversely proportional to processing efforts, but also directly proportional to positive effects. Through this analysis in order to yield positive effects addressees must invest minimal efforts in processing a given utterance. Furthermore, according to Wilson & Sperber (1986), Wilson & Smith (1992) and Wilson & Sperber (1998) arguments, the processing effort is affected by factors related to the utterance's form like its syntactic complexity, dialect, register, word frequency and familiarity. Further, the relevance comprehension roadmap purports that one should follow the path of least effort and stop once expectations of relevance have been satisfied (cf. Wilson & Sperber, 2000 and Wilson, 2006a). Additionally, being a communicative theory, RT acknowledges that verbal comprehension is a multi-tasked pragmatic endeavour. This means that addressees are actively engaged in a series of lexico-pragmatic processes for instance: determining the illocutionary force of the utterance, recovering unarticulated concepts (free-enrichment), disambiguating ambiguities and interpreting metaphoric expressions. Furthermore, it equally involves unearthing implicatures and explicatures by formulating and confirming hypotheses. Wilson & Sperber (2004) state that the RT comprehension procedure enables one to obtain the speaker's informative intention encoded in the logical form, since verbal comprehension generates a range of speaker's meaning. According to Sperber & Wilson (1986b, 2005) and Wilson & Sperber (2004), derivation of explicatures and implicatures involves a series of subtasks not confined to any chronological order[3] :

(a) Construction of a hypothesis about the explicit content. In RT terms, this is via decoding of explicatures.
(b) Construction of any appropriate hypothesis about the intended contextual assumptions. (implicated premises)
(c) Construction of any appropriate hypothesis about the contextual implication. (implicated conclusion)

As mentioned in our earlier discussions that there is no prescribed procedure for determining explicatures and implicatures in utterances, it therefore means that they operate via the on-line procedure that cognitively facilitates the parallel mutual adjustment of explicatures and implicatures until they arrive at an interpretation which satisfies expectations of relevance. (Sperber & Wilson,

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3 In order to understand minute details of the above schema, see the discussion on section 1.6.3.1

1986a)

(ii) The second or communicative principle of relevance

The communicative principle advances the thesis that :

Every act of ostensive communication communicates the utterance presumption of its own optimal relevance. (Sperber & Wilson, 1995/1986a: 158)

It further argues that an utterance is optimally relevant iff :

(a) It is relevant enough to be worth the hearer's processing effort.
(b) It is the most relevant one compatible with the speaker's abilities and preferences.
    (Sperber & Wilson 1995/1986a: 158)

For Wilson & Sperber (1998), the communicative principle aims at delimiting the cognitive principle, since relevance is not 100% guaranteed. It therefore constrains relevance within a more realistic parameter, whereby optimal relevance posits that we only attend to information worthy of being processed by our cognitive faculties. To guide the processing efforts, the surest way of achieving optimal relevance is by ostensive-inferential communication via speaking, gesturing or writing, as these modes of communication heighten expectations of relevance. The logical reason being that ostensive communication comprises two components namely; communicative and informative intentions outlined below:

1. **Informative Intention:**
    The intention to inform the audience of something.
2. **Communicative Intention:**
    The intention to inform the audience of one's informative intention.
    (Source : Wilson & Sperber 2002: 255)

In such a scenario, one overtly draws his addressees attention, in an effort to guide them towards

realizing his communicative intentions by ensuring that both his informative and communicative intentions are mutually manifest. A typical example will be in a restaurant setting, I might purposely wave my wallet infront of my friend's eyes to indicate that I will settle the bill after consuming a sumptuous meal (see Wilson, 2003: 118). The communicative principle considers utterance comprehension as a cost-sharing endeavour. In other words, both communicators and their respective addressees have been bestowed certain unwritten linguistic responsibilities. On one hand, addressees as stipulated in (a) have the moral obligation of identifying the speaker's communicative intention amidst a range of implicatures or contextual assumptions. On the other hand, in (b) communicators using mind-reading strategies, are expected to predict their addressees cognitive environment, specifically their cognitive resources that will assist them in comprehending messages. From the foregoing, certain risks are inevitable for instance communicators might overestimate or underestimate their addressee's mental assumptions or addressees might totally fail to comprehend the message, leading to a communication failure. In view of this rather delicate situation, Sperber & Wilson (1986a) stress that the notion of a neutral-style in communication is far-fetched, as communicators cannot neither be too explicit nor implicit. It is simply a matter of chancing that the speaker's intention will be easily understood by his addressees.

1.6.3.1. Explicatures and Implicatures

Within verbal communication, pragmatists perceive implicatures and explicatures as important aspects in utterance comprehension. Sperber & Wilson (1986a: 182) define an explicature as :

Any assumption communicated by an utterance U is explicit if and only if it is a development of a logical form.

In the above definition, an explicature is linguistically encoded and inferred. By contrast, the implicature is exclusively an inferred assumption. In order to derive both explicatures and implicatures, one engages in a series of lexico-pragmatic processes. Taking the explicature as an example, the hearer is charged with the responsibility of identifying the correct propositional form guided by the principle of relevance. Other additional processes are disambiguation, reference assignment and free enrichment. In respect to disambiguation, languages are riddled with many ambiguous constructions capable of

being disambiguated contextually for instance the expression *They managed to place a mole in the rival organisation* (adapted from Cruse, 2000: 371). Using this utterance, the word *mole* when taken in isolation is ambiguous, owing to the fact that it could mean *a rodent-like animal, a small lump on the human body* or *a spy*. However, since the context involves human relations within institutions then *mole* is contextually disambiguated to specifically mean that *a spy* has been placed in the rival organisation. The other lexico-pragmatic process is reference assignment, it basically consists of identifying referents of a referring expression exemplified in (8).

(8) *A: I'll make the salad dressing.*
     B: The oil's on the top shelf.   (adapted from Cruse, 2000: 371)
     A: I can't see it.

In (8) taking *oil* as a case in point, the addressee capitalizes on general knowledge or background assumptions, to infer that *salad oil* is one ingredient used for salad dressing. Thus, the referent of *oil* is more specific by referring to *the oil needed to make the salad dressing* and not any other oil. Finally, free-enrichment involves recovering grammatical or semantic components of a proposition to reconstruct its full propositional form exemplified in (9).

(9a) *It is raining.*
(9b) *(Enriched construction): It is raining in Christchurch, Newzealand at time +1.*
        (adapted from Carston, 2000: 3)

Example (9a) is a reduced form of (9b) which has been enriched to have its authentic proposition form. The recovery of unarticulated concepts necessitates that addressees rely heavily on the cognitive environment by using either the immediate contextual situation, extralinguistic knowledge or stored information in his memory. Additionally, in utterances it is possible to distinguish two types of explicatures these are: the basic level explicatures and higher level explicatures. The latter are described as metarepresentational, given that they convey the illocutionary force or attitude expressed by the former as shown in examples (10a)-(10c).

(10). *Peter: Will you pay back the money by Tuesday.*

Mary: I will pay it by then.

(10a) *Basic-level explicature: Mary will pay back the money by Tuesday.*

(10b) *Higher level explicature: Mary is promising to pay back the money by Tuesday.*

(10c) *Higher level explicature: Mary believes she will pay back the money by Tuesday.*

(adapted from Sperber & Wilson, 2005: 274)

Furthermore, in terms of the degree of explicitness, less explicit constructions demand more processing efforts and inference as in (11c) and (11d) than their more explicit counterparts like the case of example (11a) and (11b).

(11a) Mary Jones put the book by Chomsky on the top shelf in her study.

(11b) Mary put the book on the top shelf.

(11c) She put it there.

(11d) On the table. (adapted from Carston, 2001: 5)

To wind up the discussion on the implicature and explicature issue, Sperber & Wilson (1986a) observe that implicit verbal communication is weakly communicated, as opposed to its explicit counterpart owing to its use of weak implicatures.

1.6.3.2. Relevance and Loose language

Communicators portray linguistic creativity by concurrently using literal and non-literal forms. The latter, being of key interest in this section, has been christened differently in pragmatic literature as figurative language, vague or loose language. It entails using metaphorical expressions, similes, hyperbole, irony and approximations. From RT's perspective, a communicator has two distinct ways of achieving relevance either by using strong implicatures or weak implicatures. In this respect, he capitalizes on using a wider range of weak implicatures to register additional cognitive effects on the addressees. As a result, he endorses a heavier contextual impact on the message. An example is the following metaphorical expression *John is a lion* where the communicator is indirectly implying that *John is brave*. For the addressee to comprehend the metaphor, a comparison between *John's* attributes and those of a *lion* is essential at this point. In such a scenario, the communicator simply employs the

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utterance interpretively to represent his thoughts about *John* by comparing him to a *lion*. Sperber & Wilson (1986a) posit that metaphors thrive on resemblance, where it is possible for propositional forms to share similar logical and contextual implications, as one utterance is employed to faithfully represent a thought or another utterance. In this context, the speaker transposes his mental images of a *lion* onto *John* for the addressee to decode. Subsequently, it necessitates that the addressee accesses his mental encyclopaedic assumptions on the ad hoc concept LION* (See discussion by Wilson, 2006a on lexico-pragmatics) to yield a wide range of implicatures such as lions are *brave, strong* or *fearless*.

These are mapped onto *John's* features, owing to the fact they resemble a *lion's*. Therefore in reference to *Figure 6* as advanced by the relevance theory*, the case of metaphors and irony fall under interpretive use of language as in (i) on grounds that they capitalize on the relationship between a proposition and attributed thoughts or utterances via the notion of resemblance of either implicit assumptions or logical properties. Under (ii), imperatives and interrogatives are regarded as interpretive uses of language focusing on the relationship between speaker's thoughts and desirable thoughts. For instance when someone asks you "What are you thinking about?", could interpretively suggest that it is desirable and consistent with the speaker's intentions to know what his interlocutor is thinking about. In (iii) assertions qualify as descriptive use of language whereby one simply conveys his thoughts on the current state of affairs as in the sentence *The maturity of American Democracy has been reflected in the 2008 elections,* paints a true picture of contemporary American politics. And finally included in (iv) are utterances having requests and offering pieces of advice, which are equally descriptive uses of language but are slightly different from those in (iii) for they are meant to describe desirable state of affairs, for instance, supposing we take a hypothetical example of a notice outside the library reading: *KINDLY SWITCH OFF YOUR MOBILE PHONES, BRAINS AT WORK*. The message is politely requesting students to maintain silence within the library premises for any unnecessary noise is disruptive to readers.

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                    ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────┐
                    │      The propositional form of an utterance  │
                    └─────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                                      │
                             is an interpretation of

                    ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────┐
                    │          A thought of the speaker            │
                    └─────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                                      │
                               Which can be

            An interpretation of                    Description of

   ┌──────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────┐   ┌──────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────┐
   │ An attributed    │ │ A desired thought│   │ An actual state of│ │ A desirable state│
   │ thought          │ │                  │   │ affairs          │ │ of affairs       │
   └──────────────────┘ └──────────────────┘   └──────────────────┘ └──────────────────┘
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(i) Irony and metaphor   (ii) Imperatives and interrogatives   (iii) Assertions   (iv) Questions

Figure 6: Aspects of verbal communication   **Source: Sperber and Wilson (1986a: 232)**

Having grasped the basics of interpretive and descriptive use of language, we examine other interpretative use in similes and irony. Taking the case of similes, the encoded concept is retained in the utterance's syntactic structure, hence the possibility of constructing ad hoc[4] concepts is rendered impossible in a construction such as *Mary is a bulldozer* versus *Mary is like a bulldozer.* More so, the simile is skewed towards truth conditions, unlike in metaphors (cf. Moeschler & Reboul, 1994 and Carston, 2002a: 94). Another entirely different interpretive use of language is the case of irony. Here, the speaker conveys contradicting ideas divorced from what is actually encoded in his utterance. In the sense that the uttered statement is a converse of the actual state of affairs. Most ironical statements are naturally echoic and equally register a spectrum of speaker's attitudes or opinions ranging from scorn, mockery, disappointment to happiness as in the case of utterance (12).

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4 Carston (2002a) relevance theoretical definition of ad hoc concept is similar to that of Barsalou whereby the encoded meaning of a lexical concept can be narrowed or broadened during utterance comprehension. Carston's argument is that in saying *Ann is happy*, the encoded concept HAPPY entails a wide range of positive state of mind, whereas, the contextually understood meaning of the lexical term HAPPY* is much narrower and denotes a brief intense feeling of joy or a sense of satisfaction.

(12a) *What a lovely weather.*

(12b) *It seems to be raining.*   (adapted from Sperber & Wilson, 1981: 550)

In example (12), the speaker must have noticed how bad the weather was and decided to register his disappointment by asserting the converse of the actual state of affairs. In (12b), the addressee confirms the irony, since genuinely a lovely weather is associated with sunshine and not rain (For elaborate discussions on irony see section 4.7). Looking at the case of hyperboles, the speaker amplifies or exaggerates the actual state of affairs. In this respect, Sperber & Wilson (2006a) contrast the hyperbole with the metaphor by arguing that for the case of hyperboles, the exaggeration is quantitative while for metaphors it is qualitative. In other words, hyperbolic expressions involve some level of lexical broadening, whereas for metaphors they can be either be lexically broadened or narrowed as in this sentence *Joan is the kindest person on earth* (adapted from Sperber & Wilson, 2006a: 187). If we were to truly determine whether *Joan is the kindest person on earth* in a real life setting, it would be not only a next impossible task but a tedious venture. The speaker has simply used a hyperbole to explain *Joan's level of kindness.*

1.6.3.3 Epidemiology of Beliefs

> Human cognition, interaction and culture are thoroughly intertwined, without cognition and interaction, there will be no culture. Without culture, cognition and interaction will be very different affairs. (Sperber, 2006)

The above opening quote by Sperber echoes Lakoffian thesis on experientialism on the triadic and intricate relationship that typifies cognitive faculties, environment and culture. The utility of the relevance theoretical component under the materialistic epidemiology of beliefs, otherwise christened "population thinking" cannot go uncited in this work. Its fruitition will become evident especially when tackling our fourth objective aimed at studying various conceptualizations of AIDS in Kenyan communities, in an attempt to establish the correlation between ethno-specific mental AIDS representations with the AIDS-related stigma in sections 5.7.5.1 and 5.7.6. As a matter of precision, we are keen on the underlying microprocesses sustaining the causal cognitive chain of Kenyan mental and public representations of AIDS. In offering an explanation to this cognitive web, revisiting Dan Sperber's anthropological insights of epidemiology of beliefs is compulsory in accounting for the emergence, stabilization and evolution of African mental representations of AIDS.

In reference to Sperber (1996: 1-2), the etymology of the term "epidemia" is rooted in the Greek language, with its ascribed meaning being *to stay* or *arrival in a country*, the passage of time has created sufficient room for the term to lend itself to other semantic domains to equally denote the arrival of things such as diseases and customs. Being a staunch relevance theorist and taking full advantage of interpretive use of language, Sperber transposes the logical properties of epidemia to the field of widespread cultural beliefs or representations. Alongside his definition, Sperber embraces both psychological and ecological factors as causative agents for the cultural contagion of beliefs or assumptions. From an anthropological perspective, Sperber & Hirchfeld's (2004) definition of the controversial term *culture* (See Sperber and Claidière, 2007) is defined as the widespread distribution of information, representations, expressions in people's minds and people's behaviours. The definition presupposes that within a cultural setting, it is hardly peculiar to encounter a certain degree of family resemblance in mental representations, behaviours and expressions of a speech community (cf. Sperber 1996 and Boyer 2001). Sperber's and Claidière's definition is unlike that of Neo-Darwinism proponents and their evolutionary biologists contemporaries credited with insisting that culture is a replication of ideas under the genetic "meme" model, whereby culture is construed as a genetically engineering machine charged with the duty of replicating ideas within a cultural setting. Nonetheless, scholars such as Sperber (1996) and Boyer (*ibid*) remain dissatisfied by the genetically-motivated cultural transmission thesis. In its place, they contend that ideas are reconstructed and transformed during cultural transmission. Briefly, there is an obvious rejection of the meme thesis, thanks to preservative processes like memory, imitation, learning and communication. The mentioned processes ensure that any content transformed via communication is more or less faithful to its initial representation (cf. Dretske, 1988, Tomasello, 2000).

A cursory glance at the basic architecture of the theory shows that mental representations are packaged with their own semantic properties. They also come under two labels namely: mental representations and public representations. The former are individualized, cognitively internalized representations, manifested in forms of beliefs, thoughts and intentions. Whereas, the latter comes under more explicit forms like utterances or written literature. The transition between mental representations to public representations and *vice versa* is both facilitated by imitation and communication. In one perspective, under imitation one registers a behaviour and re-produces a similar behaviour based on one's observation. Additionally, a mental process converts observation into action. On the other perspective,

communication entails production of public expressions of mental representations, coupled with other processes geared towards giving a mental interpretation of a public representation. Seemingly, this is the essence of communication since the communicator expresses an idea meant to be interpreted by an addressee. Briefly, imitation is responsible for the preservation of production of public behaviours, whereas communication plays the role of preserving mental representations in an overlapping sequence sketched in *Figure 7*. (Sperber, 2004, Žegarac, 2007: 39)

Figure 7: Mental and Public representations schema

To sustain and maintain the microprocesses of cultural transmisson and evolution, a plethora of ecological and psychological factors are accountable. Using AIDS as a case in point in discussing psychological factors under the labels of memorability and motivation, first, memorability of representations influences their distribution by the ubiquitous usage of simplified metonymic expressions used in reference to AIDS such as the Slim Disease, Jumbo Jet disease, among others as outlined in chapter 2, sections 2.3 and 2.3.1. Conversely, complex constructions would not only be cognitive strenuous on addressees but difficult to recall. And second, motivation, more particularly the receptivity of a system towards a certain course of action or desire is greatly determined by motivational states of an organism, at times both are necessary to influence a particular behaviour (cf. Dretske, 1988 and Sperber, 1996). For instance, AIDS is a killer disease, armed with such a knowledge, one is motivated to sensitize people on the disease to decrease its prevalence rates. However, in Dretske's opinion (1988) if motivation is unreinforced with desire or if an organism internal system is unreceptive towards change, then one will remain indifferent towards behaviour change. Clarifying this point, Dretske employs the case of two trained rats, Reggie and Ronnie who are subjected to a similar

stimulus, purposely designed to encourage them to press a button whenever they wanted to obtain food in order to satisfy a certain desire, obviously hunger. However, owing to unreconciled motivations, surprisingly it is only Reggie who persistently presses the button when hunger pangs bite. Contrastively, Ronnie remains indifferent towards the same stimulus. The applicability of a similar phenomenon to AIDS-related cases is plausible in the sense that people can be sensitized on AIDS and sexuality using similar media. However to satisfy their sexual desires, some will opt for protection and others will remain indifferent towards using protection. From this angle, their internal motivation states are unreceptive towards behaviour change.

In respect to ecological factors, they entail recurrence of situations giving rise to external memory resources notably, AIDS literature or programs in the electronic media. Other ecological factors are institutions such as NGOs, councils of elders, governmental agencies and multinational organizations dealing with AIDS related themes. These bodies aid in encouraging or discouraging practices fuelling its spread globally. The discussed factors may in one way or another influence a wider coverage on "population thinking" on AIDS in human societies.

1.6.3.3.1. Intuitive and Reflective beliefs

Sperber (2006) defines beliefs as a disposition to express to, assent to and act in accordance with some proposition or behave in a manner symptomic of the belief. The definition therefore captures the components of a belief in terms of expressions, actions and behaviours synonymous to the beliefs. Our mental capacities are programmed to hold representations as beliefs via causal cognitive chains sustained by inference, memory, perception and motor abilities. To exemplify this, you notice your friend Martha frowning and would naturally form the following beliefs:

-Martha is frowning.
-Martha is worried about something.

These assumptions are deduced via visual perception of Martha's facial expression. Her frowning, acts as an input for perceptual processes which eventually generates a conceptual representation as its output via inferential processes that compute implicit assumptions, to deduce relevant conclusions. To

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arrive at the conclusion that there is something worrying Martha, you might have to recall via your memory or metarepresent a previous chat with Martha regarding her ailing mother, now hospitalized in a nearby health institution. This lays the foundation for inferential processes already outlined. Then, based on one's sound knowledge of Martha's personality, arriving at the conclusion that a frown is registered on Martha's face, signals the fact that Martha is disturbed. In this case probably Martha's ailing mother is having a toll on her. Automatically, this fact invites some motor actions on your part, as you might resort to give Martha a reassuring hug or probably take some time off to keep her company for the rest of the day. The enumerated processes serve as a demonstration of the causal cognitive chains (CCCs) involved in processing beliefs.

There are basically two strains of beliefs namely: intuitive and reflective beliefs. The striking differences between the two is that on one hand, intuitive beliefs are first-order beliefs, guided by the common-sense doctrine. Therefore they are innate, unconsciously held and commonly processed via perception and communication. Generally, intuitive beliefs maintain a homogeneous structure in most cultures. On the other hand, reflective beliefs are second-order beliefs, meaning they are subjected to metarepresentational capacities. They are consciously spread and solely propagated via communication as in the case of rumours, hence depicting a range of diversity in their appreciation of phenomenon. Due to this fact, they are semi-propositional or half-understood or appear mystical to the human mind. Good examples include religious discourse or beliefs in supernatural powers. Another example would be that of a child who has hardly mastered the concept of death, and is told by his mother that so and so has died. The child will cognitively represent this sentence within the following frame: "Mum says (my mum should be trusted on this matters) that so and so is dead." Based on the argument of authority, the child's mother who can supposedly be trusted as a credible source of information, guarantees the child the necessary confidence to entertain this belief. Naturally, as the child matures, he later masters the concept of death, in short, the reflective belief graduates to an intuitive belief because the child now understands death as a concept (cf. Sperber, 1996). The possibilities of a belief remaining reflective forever is not far-fetched like most religious doctrines or certain culture-specific beliefs, end up being salient on the basis that their counter-intuitiveness, outrightly violates naive biology, naive physics or naive psychology. Boyer (2001) classical example of an outrageous claim that Ebony trees are endowed with cognitive faculties enabling them to recall conversations people hold within their vicinity. Surprisingly, such a sensational belief is capable of being relevant to certain addressees, since it takes

the ordinary PLANTS ontological category and appends unto it some "special characteristics", which outstandingly distinguishes the universal botanical classification of a normal Ebony tree as shown in *Figure 8*.

```
┌─────────────────────────┐            ┌──────────────────────────────────┐
│     New Information      │            │         Ontological Entry        │
├─────────────────────────┤  ┌──────────────────┐ ├──────────────────────────────────┤
│   Special ebony trees   │──│ Ebony trees are  │─│ PLANT:                           │
│   recall conversations  │  │     plants       │ │ Has a typical shape, grows and   │
│                         │  └──────────────────┘ │ dies, is inanimate, needs water  │
└─────────────────────────┘            │ and soil                         │
                                       └──────────────────────────────────┘

        ┌──────────────────────────────────────┐
        │              NEW ENTRY               │
┌───────┴──────────────────────────────────────┴─────────────────┐
│              SPECIAL EBONY TREES                                │
│  Has typical shape, grows and dies, needs water and soil,      │
│  recalls conversations                                          │
└────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

Figure 8: Special Ebony Tree schema   **Source: Boyer (2001: 63)**

Figure 8 presents an unnatural or special variety of Ebony tree having all the essential features of a plant (all PLANT features) plus ability to recall conversations, as in special Ebony tree (PLANT) + capacity to recall conversations. Apparently, this line of reasoning is compatible with the AIDS IS SORCERY metaphor analyzed in *Section 2.3* where in Zambia a respondent argues that "AIDS is caused by invisible insects send by sorcerers" (cf. Sabatier, 1988: 127). The relevance theoretical position in this matter stipulates that although viewing AIDS as sorcery or insisting that Ebony trees have auditory capacities might appear irrational in some cultures, in certain cultures, such views are both rational and relevance-oriented for their "irrationality" cognitively wins the attention of their addressees by virtue of their counter-intuitiveness or paradoxical nature and quickly becomes widespread in a community (cf. Sperber, 1996). The point on "attention grabbing" of extraordinary situations has been experimented in two groups of four months old infants by Premack & Premack (2003: 17) whereby one group is shown a ball supported by a platform falling down, immediately upon the platform's removal, hence obeying the laws of gravity. The second group of infants is presented with a different phenomenon, whereby contrary to the infants expectations, the ball "fails" to fall down

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after the platform's removal. This unusual turn of events arrests the infants' attention for a longer time, as they remain perturbed by a ball capable of defying gravity. In this respect, Premack's & Premack's experiment still confirms Sperber's and Boyer's arguments on reflective beliefs. They add that expectancies are inherited from our hominid ancestors and extraordinary events become eye-catching or attention warranting as articulated by relevance theorists.

1.6.3.3.2. Cultural Diversity and Modularity

1.6.3.3.2.1. Notions on Modularity

The scientific-theorizing on modularity initially the brainchild of the celebrated linguist Noam Chomsky, has extended its tentacles into a multidisciplinary arena by constituting a subject of discussion for developmental psychologists like Lev Vygotsky, philosophers René Descartes and Immanuel Kant, psychologists such as Adriaan de Groot and Edward Thorndike, evolutionary psychologists like Leda Cosmides and John Tooby and cognitive anthropologists like Lawrence Hirschfeld, Dan Sperber among others. The cognitive mystery that modularity attempts to demystify is to provide a cognitivist explanation for man's diverse wealth of knowledge. To address this issue, polarized views have emerged between scholars with many lobbying for specialized-cognitive modules as the logical answer for numerous functional roles of our mental apparatus, while a handful arguing that cognitive modules are actually domain-general in nature (Fodor, 1983; Gelman & Hirschfeld, 1994, Premack & Premack, 2003).

In line with this view, Fodor (1983) gives his proper account on modularity by distinguishing input systems from central systems. In his perspective, input systems are not only modular but comprise all five human senses of touch, smell, taste, sight and hearing, inclusive of language. Defining features of inputs are: One they are mandatory and function automatically, for instance our auditory abilities are compelled to capture noises within our locality. Two, they are fast in processing information, as a process like shadowing or rather repeating someone's utterance takes approximately a quarter of a second. Three, accessing input for computational systems when processing mental representations in the central systems is limited. The causative agent of this constraint is that input processing adheres to hierarchical interlevels, which prioritize certain inputs at the expense of others. A good example is one

might fail to register a beard on someone's face, yet the beard was processed by the face recognition module when processing the person's physical features. Four, inputs being domain-specific have specialized functional roles for designated purposes and cannot be domain-general. Five, inputs are informationally encapsulated owing to their domain-specificity and constraining interlevels, inputs downplay certain information by processing specific stimulus. Supposing a well known friend attempts to poke your eyes, you will automatically blink without necessarily thinking about your friend's life history. Six, due to their encapsulation, modules are hardwired to channel the flow of information from one region to another. Seven, inputs are not immune to defects, any deformalities affecting the language module located in the broca's area within the left-hemisphere of the brain, will obviously interfere with speech recognition or its production. Eight, the ontological development of inputs is paced, we do not learn language instantly but ascribe to a certain chronology starting from the babbling stage, one-word constructions, simple sentences to complex ones. All in all, the striking difference between central systems comprising thought, reasoning and belief fixations, and input systems is that they are nonmodular. More so, inputs systems subserve the central system via processing outputs of transducers (cf. Fodor, 1983).

Fodor's distinctive categorization of modularity has not gone unchallenged by numerous scholars, for instance, Carruthers (1998) is uneasy about non-modularity of central systems and preferably views them as quasi-modular, (see Smith, 2003), given that they have conceptual inputs rather than perceptual inputs. Moreover, the possibility of having domain-specificity characterizing reasoning because social reasoning differs from philosophical reasoning or any kind of reasoning, whereas in matters of belief fixation, fixation of religious beliefs is dissimilar from fixation of scientific ones. Further, Carruthers (*ibid*) refutes the issue on module inaccessibility for there is concrete evidence from cognitive science, supporting the accessibility of modules thesis. Smith (2003) using a Chomskyan yardstick, construes Fodorian classification of language as a component of input systems as one-sided. His thesis is that language being the custodian of knowledge qualifies as a central system. Language therefore is quasi-modular, meaning that it basically possesses some features of modules with the exception of information encapsulation. Additionally, language vocabularies are conceptual and not perceptual. Premack & Premack (2003) have querried the notion on mandatory functions of modules. In their perspective, module functions are not even permanent but actively function for a limited period. A case in point being the language module which enables one easily acquire his first language. Surprisingly,

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this is inapplicable to adult second language learners who rarely achieve native-like competence. Sperber (2005) equally remains unconvinced about the same issue addressed by Premack & Premack (2003). He instead uses inattentional blindness in justifying his claims by contending that supposing mandatoriness was a defining feature of modules, then a familiar face in a large audience, should not go unrecognized. This serves as a confirmation that not all module functions are mandatory, if that was the case then no familiar faces will go unnoticed in a large crowd. Then for most massive modularists, man has numerous modules at his disposition, to sample a few there is the number module, face recognition module, reading module and many others, with the most rudimentary and universal ones being naive biology, naive psychology and naive physics modules. In different words, Fodor's input system classification of modules covers a smaller radius of man's long list of modules. There are numerous counter-arguments on Fodorian modularity, and what we have highlighted serves just as a sample of contentious issues in modularity that extend beyond the scope of our work. Our main interest in this section is channelled towards discussing issues pertaining to massive modularity, particularly from the viewpoint of evolutionary psychology, a school of thought supported by Sperber (1996, 2005).

1.6.3.3.2.2 Reflections on Massive Modularity

For many massive modularity condisciples, the conspicuous hand of evolutionary psychology satisfactorily explains domain-specificity of modules using a historical paradigm. Cosmides & Tooby (1994), Samuels (2000) and Sperber (2005) exude confidence in natural selection, an equipped tool-kit hosting a plethora of evolved domain specific cognitive adaptations, designed by selection pressures to solve recurrent species-specific adaptive problems. According to Cosmides & Tooby (2005: 64) adaptive problems are those problems whose solutions affect reproduction and in normal circumstances, they are more or less homogeneously adapted by man or any other organism, as copying strategies to numerous recurring challenges or problems in their respective ecosystems.

To illuminate certain notions on massive modularity, Samuels (2000), like Sperber (2005), defends the massive modularity hypothesis (MMH) or domain-specificity in his eye-opening revision of the nativist theory (cf. Carruthers, 2005), by pinpointing its remarkable strengths, weaknesses and goes a notch higher by challenging its neurobiological critics. Beginning with its strengths, MMH is a cognitive tool at the disposal of evolutionary psychologists with its utility witnessed when accounting for problem-

solving mechanisms adapted by organisms. Its tenets revolve around: innateness of the human mind, computational mechanisms characterizing operational functions of our cognitive apparatus as an information-processing device, adaptivity of our mental faculties designed by natural selection and finally massive modularity of our cognitive faculties. Just like Gelman & Hirschfeld (1994) and Sperber (2005), Samuels attempts to offer a definition for modules using two labels : Chomskyan modules and Darwinian modules. Chomskyan modules are more of truth evaluable representations having their origins in Chomskyan universal grammar. On the other hand and from the father of natural selection theories (cf. Cosmides & Tooby, 2005), Darwin modules are a duplication of MMH features as they are innate, domain-specific, designed by natural selection among others. Additionally, when talking about modularity two versions have been proposed by Samuels, namely: strong and weak modularity. The strong modularity states that modularity covers the entire mind. Contrastively, the weak modularity argues that the mind is largely modular, leaving a seam-allowance for some non-modular components of our cognitive faculties (cf. Premack & Premack, 2003). In full support of modularity, there is overwhelming evidence from research on Theory of Mind (TOM), where autistic persons are known to register dismal performance in false-belief tasks attributed to the impairedness of their theory of mind module. On the contrary, individuals suffering from William's syndrome excel in similar tasks thanks to their intact TOM module (cf. Carruthers, 1988, Pinker, 2002). According to Samuels, the major bone of contention in MMH lies in two approaches, notably the optimality argument and its solvability counterpart, used in explaining domain-specificity. Optimality argument states that massive modularity is accounted for by natural selection, the sole process organisms exploit in problem-solving. Therefore, making it the potential source of domain-specificity. The same situation is applicable to the solvability argument stipulating that the cognitive architecture needs a minimal adaptive behaviour. In this respect, adaptive behaviours vary from one domain to another. A general-domain module would hardly work for all domains or could ignite a cognitive explosion due to a computational fatigue (cf. Gelman & Hirschfeld, 1994).

Against the background of such claims, Samuels still insists that there is need for a clear explanation on massive modularity, while simultaneously confirming that MMH is an influential theory that remains unshaken by its neurobiological critics. The critics outrageous claims suggest that apart from organisms depicting innate tendencies, tissues too are capable of the same. According to Samuels such views will be met by unreceptiveness from nativist scholars and cannot be accommodated within nativist

doctrines. From the foregoing and in accordance with Fodor (1983), problem-solving mechanisms are hardly peculiar to man. Our hominid ancestors were unimmune to uncountable problems bedevilling them. In the long run, the heightened demand for domain-specific solutions was both inevitable and timely in addressing pressing issues like conflict management, predator avoidance and male selection. Moreover, acquisition or innately guided-learning mechanisms acted as a guarantee that adaptive behaviour receives a wider environmental coverage. To achieve this effect, an organism has been programmed to learn a specific adaptive behaviour. In simpler terms, the brain as an information-processing device, obtains information from the environment and processes it by producing utterances or behaviours. It is therefore the custodian of all programs designed to solve the organism's past and current problems (cf. Cosmides & Tooby, 1994, 2005). Additionally, it is important to state that uneveness in the distribution of a behaviour or skill is normal within a population as Gelman & Hirschfeld (1994) and Carruthers (1998) point out that excellent chess players are not only endowed with refined visual perception skills but good memory from past played games thus enabling them to make well calculated moves on the chessboard. A first time novice chess-player is unlikely to make such spectacular moves. Also within this same line of thought, Simpson, Carruthers, Laurence & Stich (2005: 11-12) posit that selection pressures can contribute to different behaviour patterns as sometimes people resort to adapting non-adaptive behaviours, of which have been bypassed by time, in scenarios requiring adaptive behaviours, a concept they clearly describe using Dunbar's (1999: 784) words as "having a stone-aged mind in a space-aged environment" or as Pinker (2002: 101) rightly puts it in this quote:

> The study of humans from an evolutionary perspective has shown that many psychological aspects (such as our hunger for fatty food, for social status and for risky sexual liaisons) are better adapted to the evolutionary of our ancestral environment than to the actual demands of the current environment.

To put the quotes into context, it is arguable that in our contemporary world, AIDS is a societal problem. Its incurability demands activation of the AIDS avoidance sub-module subserving the disease avoidance module. Thanks to scientific research, the known AIDS avoidance adaptive strategies at our disposal are abstinence and using protection. For those who religiously follow any of the two strategies, they are rightfully subscribing to adaptive strategies needed for curbing the spread of AIDS and HIV. Conversely, it is regrettable that there are people across the globe who for one reason or another have thrown caution to the wind and resorted to embracing non-adaptive strategies by either not abstaining

or not using protection in their casual sexual encounters. This therefore makes one wonder whether there is a problem with the learning component designed to influence behaviour or whether they entirely lack the learning program designed to make them adapt the required AIDS avoidance strategy. At this point we lack relevant answers to this question, but we will revisit the issue in the subsequent chapters.

To give some conclusive remarks on this lengthy discussion, we would like to inject the fact that problem-solving is not exclusively a human affair. Under the umbrella of Garcia effect, rats are endowed with an innate poison aversion module, which bars them from ingesting toxic substances (cf. Sperber, 2005). Vervet monkeys too as shown by Cosmides & Tooby (1994) who cite the work of two primatologists Dorothy Cheney and Robert Seyfarth, observe that vervet monkeys have evolved a tripolar alarm call system as a predator aversion strategy for their three major predators notably: leopards, eagles and snakes. Whenever, a leopard is within the vicinity a vervet monkey will be seen climbing a tree. If an eagle is soaring in the air, then the monkey will look up in the air and dive in the nearby bush. The snake's presence is signalled by the monkey standing on its hind legs while cautiously looking at the grass. On the contrary, Uganda's vervet monkeys behave differently to another predator like a dog as Premack & Premack (2003: 119-120) point out. The monkeys seem to be driven by emotions when applying all the three signals at once to signal the dog's presence in the following manner. When the dog is still at a distance the monkey produces a snake alarm call. As the dog slowly approaches the call changes to an eagle's alarm call. Then when the dog is very near the monkey releases a leopard's alarm call. According to Premack & Premack, emotions are a drawback in the Uganda's vervet monkeys communication because it obviously misleads other monkeys into employing unsuitable predator aversion strategies. For instance, in anticipating an eagle, the vervet monkey will dive into a bush and unknowingly becoming an easy prey for the dog or even a leopard. In our opinion, Ugandan vervet monkeys only have chance encounters with dogs, therefore they have no dog alarm calls at their disposal. In a way, this explains their haphazadous application of all the alarm calls in reference to a dog. In brief, the vervet monkeys' survival strategies are just but tactics used by the monkeys to solve a predation problem. The strategies spread within the vervet monkey population via imitative learning (cf. Tomasello, 2001). In conclusion, we have given a modularist view on how AIDS can conceptualized as a problem that can be effectively solved, if people strictly adhered to AIDS avoidance strategies.

1.6.3.4. Conclusion

Discussions on the theoretical framework have clearly demonstated three different approaches revolving around human communication and cognition. Each theory has its unique contribution to our research, first BT's will unveil appropriate conceptual packets required to comprehend AIDS posters by Kenyan addressees. Second, the analysis of various stereotypes, cognitive models and image schemas on AIDS will be specifically under ICM's jurisdiction. And third, RT will competently handle communication aspects, relevance comprehension procedures, lexico-pragmatic processes in AIDS messages and equally Kenyan AIDS mental and public representations from an evolutionary perspective within the context of cultural diversity. In another perspective, it is important to highlight on the areas where the three theories converge. First and foremost, they are all in accordance with the fact that culture is an important component of human cognition. In respect to this, relevance theorists insist that culture under the lens of social-cognition is contagious owing to the fact that the epidemiology of beliefs is sustained by a causal cognitive chain revolving around public and mental representations, which banks on communication acting as a transmitter of shared experiences in a cultural setting. Second, the theories are effective analytic tools for analyzing literal and non-literal language without any linguistic bias. Third, they are in agreement on the concept of metarepresentation as discussed in RT or rather representation as seen in the vital relations in conceptual blending and also in metaphoric and metonymic components of a cognitive model confirming that thoughts can be used interpretively. Finally, cognitive efficiency seems to be recurring in all the three theories, as processing of information is supposedly effortless. However, an antithesis to this line of thought is that factors such as dialect, style and use of weak implicatures as in the case of metaphors are known to impact a cognitive strain on addressees. All in all, the conceptual framework will act as an analytic tool for studying Kenyan AIDS slogans, as illustrated by the following Kenyan AIDS poster that demonstrates the working operations of our conceptual framework.

Poster 1: "A real man waits" AIDS campaign in Kenya

In the above poster bearing the message *A real man won't be pushed by his friends to have sex. A real man waits* is a scenario where the communicator's informative intention is to preach abstinence among African men by discouraging them from falling prey to peer-pressure, structured by African masculinity that drives many men towards indulging in sex. If we first analyse the slogan using the relevance theory and conceptual blending theory, then it is crystal clear that the picture accompanying this blend serves us with two scenarios, whereby in the first scenario we see a man confronted with his rather aggressive peer-group. He is actually struggling to fend off their overwhelming influence. Apparently, their domineering influence is geared towards forcing the man to engage in irresponsible behaviour regardless of the raging AIDS epidemic. If for some reason or the other, the man succumbs to their demands, then his chances of contracting the killer disease will be obviously heightened. In an effort to reverse such an unfortunate situation, the communicator presents us with the second scenario, where we note the conspicuous absence of the peer-group influence, and we are instead served with an image of a composed man, looking focused and probably capable of making sound decisions devoid of any peer-group influence. In actual fact, this second image depicts the real picture of a typical gentleman who decides to WAIT*. In order to arrive at the encoded meaning of WAIT, relevance theorists would be tempted ask the following question to decode the utterance's logical form via enrichment and saturation.

– *A real man won't be pushed by friends to have sex at time, t. A real man waits. [For what?] [To have sex at the right time which is time Z, which is probably in matrimony]*

In this regard, the relevance theory treats the usage of WAIT as an interpretative use of language,

whereby any situation requiring waiting calls for patience. In the same vein, when the same notion is transposed in the context of sexuality and AIDS, waiting faithfully represents chastity, by one making a personal decision to be sexually inactive for a length of time. The term WAIT* as an adhoc concept lexically narrows to mean practising abstinence or remaining sexually inactive until in marriage or in a steady relationship. A real man therefore does not engage in any irresponsible sexual behaviour for the sake of pleasing his friends but exerts self-control at all times. In general, the message strives to promote abstinence or delayed sexual debut among the youth, and this is clear in its descriptive usage of an advice preaching abstinence as a desirable state of affairs in the AIDS era.

Another reading to this message which cannot go unmentioned is that the communicator is revisiting

a popular idiom of a real man[5] as used by African men in their in-group discourse. In the African context, the adhoc concept A REAL MAN* is culturally accepted in both mental and public representations of most male Africans, in the sense that in a society where polygamy was and is still acceptable, the African encyclopaedic entry for the concept of A REAL MAN*, is not only a breadwinner, the head of the family who is both strong and fearless but is also a sexually active man, capable of proving his manhood by sustaining several amorous relationships with women. Moreover, in some cultures a polygamous man is perceived as "a real man". Contrastively, a man who is either in a monogamous relationship or not sexually active falls short of meeting the necessary and sufficient conditions of a REAL MAN* in some African societies. In the light of the AIDS epidemic and its hard-hitting repercussions, multi-partnered relations are strongly discouraged for they fuel the propagation of HIV worldwide. Apparently, one of the safest mode of curbing the spread of HIV is via abstinence or maintaining one sexual partner and not many partners. In short, this message proposes a revised meaning to the concept of a REAL MAN*, thanks to a cognitive process sustained by the on-line parallel mutual adjustments of implicatures and explicatures to specifically mean a man who practises abstinence and equally able to maintain one steady relationship. Having provided that background information using the relevance theory, we now analyse the same poster using the conceptual blending theory, in *Poster 1* the conceptual blend hosts two input spaces, which enables one have a counterfactual scenario hosting a real man-the promiscuous one, who is juxtaposed to a real man -the gentleman as shown in the conceptual blend in *Figure 9.*

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5 In some perspective, some African men would use male circumcision as a measure for determining one's masculinity therefore they would regard uncircumcised men as falling below the culturally set standards for a REAL MAN.

Generic Space

Type of man

Sex life

Nature of relationship

Beliefs and attitudes

Input Space 1

A real man- the promiscuous one

Is involved in a multi-partnered sexual relationships

Is controlled by peer pressure

Does not subscribe to abstinence

Input Space 2

A real man-the gentleman

Has one steady relationship

Resistant to peer -pressure and focused

Believes in abstinence or waiting

Blend

Real man-no longer promiscuous/ Real man -the gentleman

Is in a steady relationship

Resistant to peer-pressure and focused

Believes in abstinence or waiting

Figure 9: A real man conceptual blend

In this particular blend, we have a mirror network blend, with a common organization frame that re-examines the African understanding of a real man from a cultural perspective. In the first input, we have the traditional real man-as a promiscuous man, who subscribes to the masculinity thesis by believing in a multi-partnered sex-life. Additionally, his life's decisions are determined by his peers. Moreover, in his perspective, the abstinence discourse is far-fetched if not non-existent. On the other hand, the second input contains the real man-as a gentleman possessing different qualities from the real man- as a promiscuous man. He is a strong abstinence supporter or maintains one stable relationship. Furthermore, his autonomous decisions are not dictated by his peers. Through the process of running

the blend, in the emergent structure, the assertive image of a real man- as a gentleman carries the day as his features are mapped onto the REAL MAN* in the blend. Meaning that the addressee's interpretation is that in the AIDS era, the cultural construction of a REAL MAN-as a peer-influenced promiscuous man is outdated, thanks to the vital relations of time, disanalogy, change and cause and effect. To elaborate on this point further, the time relation is compressed as it juxtaposes the cultural conceptualization of the real man-as a peer-influenced promiscuous man within precolonial times, with a real man-the gentleman in the contemporary AIDS era. This therefore calls for some level of disanalogy, such that one is encouraged to differentiate between the real man-as a promiscuous person *vis à vis* a real man-as a gentleman as highlighted on in the mirrored networks. It is at this crucial point that the change vital relation reconstructs the identity of a real man to fit modern times hence disqualifying the pre-colonial conceptualization of a real man. In simpler terms, the communicator is advocating for the image of a real man- as a gentleman and not that of a promiscuous man. We have arrived at such a conclusion on the basis of the cause and effect relation. To make our line of argument clearer, the communicator is guided by the logic that AIDS is a sexually transmitted disease, therefore anyone engaging in promiscuity is obviously heightening the risk of infection. In the long run, the number of seropositive persons will increase. Whereas, on the other hand, the effects of having one steady relationship is negligable unlike someone in a multi-partnered relationship. From the foregoing, the blend proposes a renewed identity for the term A REAL MAN as shown in the blend's emergent structure as seen in *Figure 9*.

The ICM approach in analyzing the AIDS message will be slightly different. For instance, taking the construction *A real man won't be pushed by friends to have sex. A real man waits,* is a situation dealing with a social stereotype of a REAL MAN as a cognitive model embodied in the cultural experience and conceptualizations of what it means to be a real African man. In some cultures, the concept of a REAL MAN necessitates that the man has to fulfill a certain number of conditions for instance, a man who is financially stable, a gentleman, a responsible man and a bread winner. However, in the patriarchal African society apart from fulfilling these conditions, certain African communities especially among male Africans must have been programmed to view a REAL MAN under the masculinity paradigm hence creating a seam-allowance for a man engaged in a several amorous relationships with different women. A real man therefore becomes a socially generalized cognitive model, accommodating a variety of men upholding a peer-driven ideology of a REAL MAN. In this case, the communicator

strives to inject a renewed version of a REAL MAN who is a gentleman and is patient enough to lead a chaste life in the AIDS era. To arrive at this model, the communicator uses negation in the cognitive model, in order to understand the operational function of negation in cognitive models, there is need to revisit Lakoff (1987: 130-133) who extensively elaborates on pragmatic presupposition under the backdrop of negation by espousing ideas from Charles Fillmore. Fillmore as cited in Lakoff (1987) defines a pragmatic presupposition as a construction where *P* is a presumption of sentence *S*, if whenever a speaker says *S*, he is committed to saying *P.* Using the following illustrations, we will be able to comprehend the role of negation in understanding cognitive models.

(13*a) John is thrifty.*
(13b) John isn't thrifty
(13c) Spending as little money as possible is good.
(13d) John is stingy.
(13e) John isn't stingy.
(13f) Spending as little money as possible is not good.
　　(adapted from Lakoff 1987: 130-133)

Fillmore's thesis is that (13c) is taken for granted in both (13a) and (13b), likewise, (13f) is taken for granted in (13d) and (13e). However, when we consider a construction such as (13k)

(13k) *John isn't stingy, he is thrifty.*

We are faced with a contradiction, where the first half of the construction presupposes (13c), whereas the second half presupposes (13f), and owing to the conspicuous presence of the negation in construction (13k), in one perspective, we are able to understand that *thrifty* is defined in an ICM where (13c) holds. On the other perspective, *stingy* gets its definition in an ICM where (13f) holds. In brief, negation has the capacity of commissioning the acceptability or inacceptability of an ICM, and applying it to the case of (13k), the negation enables one to conclude that the most appropriate way of interpreting the construction is that John's stinginess is an incorrect way of understanding the utterance, regardless of the fact that stinginess as a background condition presupposes that spending as little money as possible is not good. In other words, the speaker wants us to focus on John's thriftiness, as

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foregrounded in the construction thus suggesting that minimising one's financial expenses has its merits.

Having viewed examples of the positioning of negation in cognitive models and how it enhances utterance comprehension, we are compelled to comment on how negation functions in the *A real man won't be pushed to have sex by friends. A real man waits*. AIDS slogan. In this particular slogan, the negation is outside the cognitive model and based on its background features, it rejects the *being pushed*-ICM or *being forced*-ICM, which is leading the man astray by advocating for irresponsible behaviour. It therefore proposes a suitable replacement for the *being-forced*-ICM, by foregrounding the *waiting*-ICM or *patience*-ICM as the utterance's recommended interpretation. In different terms, the sentence asserts that leading a chaste life is safer for men than engaging in a peer-endorsed irresponsible behaviour, which is a high risk behaviour in the AIDS era.

From our analysis, what we have strived to do so far is to simply capture the working operations of the three cognitivist theories in the analysis of a Kenyan AIDS poster, which competently handle aspects related to culture, cognition and metaphoricity. Being an introductory part of the dissertation, we have systematically presented some core areas of the study, beginning with the thesis outline that provides the dissertation's roadmap, we then defined the statement of the problem, which generated two research hypotheses. We proceded further to use arguments in justifying our pursuit for this scholarly work. In relation to this, we ensured that a well defined scope and limitations of our study were expounded on, and finally, we outlined the major tenets of our conceptual framework while illustrating the working operations of RT, BT and ICM as pragmatic tools in the analysis of a Kenyan AIDS poster. In a nutshell, the introductory section demarcates the parameters within with this study is premised.

"The epidemic is not just about medicine or public health." Barnett and Whiteside (2006: 30).

"AIDS is more than a disease. It is more than a public crisis." Poku (2005: 9)

CHAPTER TWO: BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

2.0. INTRODUCTION

This section comprises five sub-sections laying the foundation for the study's background. The first section provides a general introduction into the study and extensively discusses the scientific architecture of the virus, its working mechanisms and modes of transmission. The second section deliberates on controversies surrounding the genesis of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) pandemic by espousing arguments drawn from feminists, medical anthropologists and epidemiologists while scrutinizing them under the lens of cognitive linguistics and intercultural pragmatics. Such an approach is indeed inevitable owing to the wealth of literature on Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and AIDS explored by the aforementioned groups. In this way, their relevant insights feed into the introductory section of our research, while striving to maintain a pragmatic orientation. Discussions emerging from the chapter highlight aspects related to metaphoricity buttressed by notions espoused from relevance theory, conceptual blending theory, idealized cognitive models and other pertinent views on the metaphor sourced from cognitive linguists. In the third section, a brief assessment of the epidemic's geographical distribution provides a comprehensive overview of its magnitude worldwide. The fourth section traces AIDS development in Kenya commencing from its humble beginnings to its current status. Particular focus is directed towards key governmental initiatives which either mitigated or influenced AIDS propagation in Kenya. The final section of this chapter offers a socio-historical account for the current linguistic status of English and Kiswahili in Kenya by merging aspects related to language policy and language contact.

2.1. BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

Human beings reside in a cultural world, whereby the standard procedure of expressing our experiences is either registered implicitly or explicitly within our linguistic repertoire. Cognitivists such as Lakoff & Johnson (1980), Gluckberg, Manfredi, & Mc Glone (1997), Gibbs (1997), Fauconnier & Turner

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(2002) concur that our socio-cultural experiences mould the mental fabric of our cognitive faculties. These experiences are uniquely conveyed in syntactic constructions to mirror our conceptualization of naturally occurring phenomenon in our world. To build up on this line of thought, we will consider some real usages of conceptual metaphors: when talking about life, especially under the guidance of LIFE IS A PLAY conceptual metaphor, expressions such as: *There were many things going on behind the scenes during Obama's campaign, she is playing many roles at once* or *he is always playing the fool* characterize our speech. In reference to time management, we are bound to be directed by the conventional metaphor TIME IS MONEY in expressions like: *spend your time wisely* or *we have wasted so much time arguing over nothing*. As regards to death, we conceptualize DEATH AS A JOURNEY in touching expressions like: *he left us this morning* or even *he has completed his journey on earth*. To capture heated arguments, we naturally resort to variants of ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor in constructions such as: *he kept on attacking my points* and *Sarah resorted to shooting each and every point Lilian raised*. Likewise, other abstract concepts like theories are capable of portraying metaphoricity based on the conceptual structure of THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS, in utterances such as: *your arguments are shaky* or *what exactly is your logic built on?* (cf. Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Lakoff & Turner, 1989 and personal examples).

Having considered these few cases, our synopsis holds that life, death, arguments and theories are hardly peculiar phenomena to our cultural world. Their metaphoricity is processed effortlessly[6] by our cognitive faculties, hence downplaying their figurativeness. Our simple line of reasoning is that if love, arguments, theories and so forth are reliably hosted by conceptual metaphors, then the possibility of having specific figurative expressions coined around fearful infectious ailments like AIDS is beyond doubt. This being the case, the following series of questions deserve convincing answers; first, can pragmatics offer a conceptual account for culture-specific conceptualizations of AIDS? More particularly, would cognitive linguists comfortably weigh the merits and demerits of using metaphorical language in culturally diverse societies such as Kenya? Adding a final question, does pragmatics satisfactorily handle aspects like miscomprehension, cultural assumptions and stereotypes associated with AIDS and its slogans? Against this backdrop of unanswered questions, we are optimistic that pragmatics can reliably offer convincing answers to the above questions. In this light, pragmatics could

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6   Effortless processing of metaphors is a contentious issue as relevance theorists such as Dan Sperber, Diane Blakemore, Deirdre Wilson and Moeschler support the thesis that weak implicatures or metaphorical utterances will require a generous amount of processing efforts, unless one opts for the relevance comprehension procedure and stops processing the utterance once expectations of relevance are realized.

be the custodian of the linguistic key capable of unlocking many locked doors in human communication that have posed challenges to behaviour change communicators. Taking cognizance of the fact that extensive research on AIDS has traditionally been dominated by feminists, economists, anthropologists and epidemiologists. It would be unjust for pragmatists to lag behind the engaging AIDS debate, by failing to contribute to knowledge. In brief, our contribution to the epidemic is timely and insightful.

2.2. NATURE OF AIDS AND ITS TRANSMISSION

AIDS is an infectious disease caused by a virus called Human Immunodeficiency Virus. It is a close relative of the Simian Immunodeficiency Virus (SIV) found in primates. In scientific literature, HIV is referred to as a retrovirus and classified under the lentivirus category. The latter category describes the nature of the virus owing to its slow-paced nature in developing into full-blown AIDS. Apart from human retroviruses, retroviruses are known to exist in sheep, cats, horses and cattle (Avert, 2008c). An example of the HIV virus is shown in *Figure 10.*

Figure 10: HIV structure   **Source (Avert, 2008c)**

In terms of transmission, HIV is propagated via exchange of infected bodily fluids through various channels namely: unprotected sexual intercourse, contaminated blood in unscreened transfusions, through sharing contaminated needles by Injecting Drug Users (IDUs) and also prenatally via a mother's placenta to the child or postnatally through breastfeeding (cf. Mann *et.al* 1989). Once in the blood stream, HIV selectively attacks or appends itself with the assistance of its nail-like spikes onto

the cell membrane of white blood cells also known as CD4 receptor or lymphocytes. This step is vital for the virus's survival because its replication is only possible within a host's cell. Medically speaking, this means that HIV destroys cells assigned the duty of safeguarding one's immune system against infections. Apart from the blood, the virus is known to reside in certain brain cells called macrophages. In an ideal situation, a normal human being hosts between 1000 and 1600 CD4 cells per a millilitre of blood. By contrast, a seropositive person records below 200 CD4 cells (cf. Poku, 2005; Barnett and Whiteside, 2006). The virus then perforates the lymphocytes cell membranes to gain access to its nucleus. The genetic material incompatibility between the human cell called Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), and Ribonucleic acid (RNA) in the AIDS virus compels the virus to convert its genetic material into DNA, a process known as reverse transcriptase. Under the DNA camouflage, the virus comfortably occupies the host cell and remains undetected by the immune system (cf. Montagnier and Gallo, 1988; Doka, 1997; Barnett and Whiteside, 2006 and Avert, 2008c). During the first weeks of infection, also known as "the window period", the victim develops rashes or flu that clears off after a couple of days. Incase any HIV tests are undertaken during the window period, results will always remain negative until the period elapses. HIV testing is either done using the Western blot method or the Enzyme Linked Immunosorbent Assay test (ELISA). Thereafter, for almost a decade[7], the virus remains latent before a person develops full-blown AIDS. In this time frame, the virus progressively replicates by producing up to 10 billion new viral particles capable of destroying 200 million CD4 T-helper cells daily (cf. Iliffe, 2006 and Barnett & Whiteside, 2006). The long term effects of the viral infection leads to a dilapidated immune system, subjecting the body to a plethora of opportunistic infections such as tuberculosis, typhoid and herpes. Subsequently, once with a collapsed immune system the victim eventually succumbs to infection.

Scientifically, HIV is dichotomized into two major strains. On one hand, the most virulent kind found worldwide is HIV-1. On the other hand, HIV-2, seldom occurs and is rampant in West Africa, it is considered a closer relative of SIV than HIV-1. In scientific discourse, it is not peculiar for viruses to cross over from animals to human beings. A case in point is the recent avian flu that crossed over from birds to humans. Being a retrovirus known for accelerated mutation rates, HIV-1 is classified under

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7 The latent period varies regionally, for people in Southern countries where the standard of living is regretably low coupled with poor treatment and nutrition, the period is shorter as it ranges between 7 to 8 years. On the other hand, seropositive persons in developed countries are advantaged and have a longer lifespan of up to 12 years owing to better living conditions and accessibility to quality treatment. Children are rather unfortunate mainly because of their underdeveloped immune systems hence they can only survive up to their fifth year or die even before that time elapses. MOH (1993)

three strains namely: M, N and O. From group M only, 90% of HIV infections across the globe fall under this category. There are several subtypes classified under alphabetical titles like A, B, C, D, F, G, H, J and K. Sometimes different subtypes fuse in a single cell, hence creating a new variety of HIV termed as circulating recombinant forms (CRFs). Groups N and O are found in Central Africa region and Cameroon respectively. Moreover, subtypes are equally region-specific for example, subtype A is found in Russia, subtype B in Europe, America and Japan. Whereas, subtype C in India, Nepal, South Africa and East Africa (cf. Iliffe, 2006 and Avert, 2008d). To date, AIDS is incurable, however seropositive persons depend on antiretrovirals as a life prolonging mechanism. For uninfected persons, they are compelled to weigh the options between safer sex and upholding abstinence. Newly explored dimensions in AIDS research are oriented towards promoting male circumcision in reducing AIDS infection.

2.2.1 SOME REFLECTIONS ON AIDS AND COMMUNICATION

Humanity dwells in an ecosystem hosting both dangerous and relatively harmless micro-organisms. Sometimes dangerous organisms are known to cross the species barrier only to ignite a series of pandemics hence challenging man to look into the fastest ways of neutralizing their effects. Going by historical literature, AIDS is not the sole epidemic to bedevil humanity. In the 14th century, the bubonic plague also known as *the Black Death* virtually downsized and halved Europe's population. Also included in the same list of ailments with plague-like affiliations entail diseases such as syphilis, cholera and influenza. Still relying on the history of humanity, sexually transmitted diseases such as gonorrhoea, syphilis, herpes and now AIDS by nature invite the following implicatures: perversion, immorality, unfaithfulness and moral decadence (cf. Sontag, 1988; Doka, 1997). Given that our linguistic research is premised on AIDS, we are obliged to briefly present its global statistics as well as highlight its socio-economic repercussions in an effort to cultivate a profound understanding of its magnitude worldwide.

For the past twenty years, the AIDS pandemic has indeed proven to be a major challenge and a subject of concern to the global community. This stems from the unceasing AIDS related deaths worldwide, coupled with its incurability. Looking at AIDS statistics since its inception in the eighties, figures tagged onto its mortality rate stand at 24 million, with Sub-saharan Africa registering 20 million deaths

in total. Further, according to a United Nations (UN) prediction, if the situation remains unchecked, it is estimated that by 2025, the number will augment to 60 million (Poku, Whiteside and Sandkjaer, 2007). Notorious for being the major cause of death in African and Asian continents, the heightened AIDS mortality rates have yielded a myriad of socio-economic repercussions manifested in form of AIDS orphans, low productivity, reduced life expectancy, absenteeism, manpower loss and a general reversed development. In the light of the status quo, it cannot be overemphasized that AIDS has impacted negatively in the aforementioned continents. To counteract the prevailing situation and in a race-against-time-fall-back plan, most multinational organizations such as the UN, World Health Organization (WHO) have mobilized resources by; channelling them towards supporting extensive research on HIV and AIDS, boosting the quality of AIDS treatment and medication, and finally generously funding various AIDS campaigns. The latter initiative is geared towards sensitizing humanity on the detrimental effects of AIDS. A cursory glance at the most recent (2007) statistics by UNAIDS, it is estimated that by the end of 2006, 33.2 million were seropositive, marking a 16% reduction in HIV infections as compared to 2006. Furthermore, out of the 2.1 million recorded deaths, 1.7 million occurred in Africa, confirming that the continent is indeed the AIDS hotbed worldwide. Nevertheless, despite the alarming statistics, plummeting prevalence rates have been recorded in several countries for instance Kenya, Zimbabwe and Cote d'Ivoire. This is in contrast to countries like Russia, Spain and France that recorded an increase in HIV infections (UNAIDS, 2007).

From the foregoing, underneath the rosy picture created by declining prevalence rates, a general consensus is that more persons are either succumbing to AIDS infection or getting affected by the disease globally. Moreover, inasmuch as Africa recorded a decline in HIV cases, 70% of AIDS related cases spring from the African continent with its effects still bedeviling the continent. It is against this background that we zero in on Kenya, whose current prevalence rate is 7.4% up from 6.1% (cf. KAIS[8] -2007, (2009). However, from a communication angle, research findings of the Kenya Demographic Health Survey (KDHS) (2003) reveal that a cross-section of Kenyans experienced comprehension difficulties with a particular explicit message dubbed *A- Abstain, B-Be faithful, C-use condoms* (ABC) AIDS slogan. Pragmatically speaking, our diagnosis of the miscomprehension problem is as a result of the communicator's miscalculation of the addressees cognitive environment, especially in the manner in which addressees were to decode the slogan's propositional form. Before accounting for the way in

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8   KAIS stand for the Kenya AIDS Indicator Survey 2007,

which miscomprehension occurred, it is imperative to consider the cultural context upon which the message is premised. First and foremost, the communicator's informative intention was to sensitize a patriarchal African community on AIDS. Second, being a society dominated by masculinities, engaging in multi-partnered relationships or extramarital affairs is not culturally alien. Sometimes people practise safe sex with casual encounters and not with their stable partners. In the same society, the possibility of having people who do not subscribe to safe sex doctrines with either stable or unstable partners cannot be overruled. Third, culturally dictated gender imbalances hardly provide any room for women to negotiate for safe sex (cf. sections 5.7.9 and 5.7.9.1). Armed with this knowledge, we now revisit the ABC slogan, our thesis is that the communicator might have erroneously assumed that his audience via saturation,[9] would decode the logical form as outlined in (I4A).

(I4A) A- Abstain. [Until what point?] [In matrimony]

B- Be faithful. [To who?] [To your spouse or faithful partner]

C- Use condoms. [With whom?] or [In your long-term or casual encounter?] [In all your casual intimate relationships].

Contrastively, addressees might have erroneously enriched and saturated the communicator's message by inaccurately inferring its logical form as in (I4B), leading to miscomprehension of the slogan.

(I4B) A- Abstain. [Until what point?] [In a stable relationship, unstable relationship, until puberty].

B- Be faithful. [To who?] [Not 100% guaranteed, most people are incapable of being faithful to their spouses]

C- Use condoms. [Under what circumstances?] [Sometimes in casual encounters but never with my spouse] or [Condom use is foreign to the African culture] or [My religion condemns their usage]

To explain what is happening in (14B), the addressee will probably stop abstaining once in either a stable or unstable relationship. The verdict of common sense is that the latter option rarely leads to matrimony and the probability of having several unstable relationships prior to a stable relationship cannot be overlooked either. In this respect, we are dealing with a case of miscomprehension and the

9 According to Carston (2001) Saturation one of the processes involved in uncovering of covert indexicals or implicit arguments of a propositional form.

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addressee will continuously expose himself to the virus so long as he is in unstable relationships. Our assumption is that the communicator was specifically referring to a stable relationship, leading to matrimony and not several unstable relationships. Already in component (B) and (C) of (I4B), there are contentious issues emerging. In (B) the addressee replaces the communicator's *Be faithful to your spouse* with *it is impossible to be faithful to one's spouse* thus implying that he has no intention of being faithful to his or her spouse. Therefore, the initial (B) component under (I4A) is declared null and void. A similar scenario occurs in option (C), in particular when one chooses options like *condom use is foreign to the African culture* or *my religion condemns their usage* casts doubts whether the addressee will subscribe to the safe sex thesis. Deducing from (I4A) and (I4B), we maintain that the communicator's decoded logical form is divorced from his addressee's. Our simplified explanation advances the argument that any addressee using inferences in (14B) will have misinterpreted the ABC slogan. Moreover, to cater for miscomprehension among addressees, the ABC slogan was fortified to read *A-Abstinence, B- Be faithful to a partner whose HIV status you know, C- use condoms correctly and consistently* and *finally D-Diagnosis know your HIV status* to be probably decoded as in (14C)

(14C)   A- Abstinence. [Until what point?] [In matrimony]

B-Be faithful to a partner whose HIV status you know. [Why?] [To avoid spreading or contracting AIDS].

C – Use condom correctly and consistently. [When?] [In your casual sexual relationships]

D- Diagnosis, know your HIV status[10]. [Why? or Then what?] [To be able to protect yourself and others from AIDS].

In our perspective, the possibility of differently saturating D component is viable. To put it in simpler terms, in Kenya, various reasons compel Kenyans to take HIV tests like: a wedding requirement, securing a scholarship or as a sign of commitment in relationships. Therefore, based on this information, it would be too naive for the communicator to automatically expect:

D- Diagnosis, know your HIV status [Why? or Then what?] [To be able to protect yourself and others from AIDS]. Since [Why?] can entertain various overt indexicals like: [As a wedding requirement], [to

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10 The KDHS (2003) revealed that Kenyans take AIDS tests either after being referred by doctors or following a high risk exposure especially for IDUs, Commercial Sex workers among others. Sometimes, social reasons like insurance requirements, securing a scholarship and for future plans, constitute reasons for HIV testing. In the survey, it was noted that 86% of Kenyans attended VCT because of a social reasons and not for medical reasons.

secure an international job], [as a visa requirement] or [to secure a scholarship]

From our observation, we are convinced that miscomprehension occurred at the level of saturation. Being a purely inferential process, some addressees could have wrongly completed the indexical as outlined above. Despite the common usage of the ABC slogan, scholars like Poku (2005) and Downing (2006), insist that it failed miserably in sensitizing people on AIDS by downplaying certain socio-cultural aspects of African communities. Subsequently, the addressee comprehension pattern was impeded by socio-cultural barriers. Apparently, Downing (2006: 103) contends to curb miscomprehension of AIDS slogans, messages have been fortified, for example the Uganda's AIDS campaign dubbed *Love faithfully to avoid AIDS* was altered to *Love carefully to avoid AIDS*. Further adjustments were made to the same AIDS slogan following an afterthought that lovers need not to *love carefully* but *love cautiously* or *suspiciously* for their partners could be already seropositive without their knowledge. The message was finally modified to read *use condoms to avoid AIDS*. As previously observed with the ABC slogan, it is highly doubtful whether the Ugandan counterpart will be devoid of erroneous assumptions. From this standpoint, one question begs to be answered, if some Kenyan addressees experienced comprehension difficulties with explicit AIDS messages, can a re-enactment of the same occur in figurative or implicit messages? Moreover, for scholars such as Johnny & Mitchell (2006: 756), studies on AIDS slogans are timely and insightful as summarized in the following citation:

> While it can be assumed that the mere ubiquity of these posters has helped raised global consciousness about HIV and AIDS related stigma and discrimination, what is less visible is how these posters might be interpreted within cultural contexts...certainly little is known about the global impact of the campaigns and how different target groups might construe the messages found in campaign posters.

From a cultural perspective, Johnny & Mitchell investigate the impact of cultural ideologies on HIV campaigns. Their thesis advances the argument that traditionally most world AIDS campaigns propagated Western ideologies while sidelining cultural diversity in non-western societies. This cultural oversight is harmful, not forgetting its key role in aiding audiences to interpret AIDS messages. Using a textual analysis of 2000-2003 UNAIDS World AIDS campaign poster using *Poster 2* on stigma and discrimination, Johnny's & Mitchell's analysis espouses visual features drawn from communicative theories. The features include: surface meaning, narrative structure, ideological meaning, oppositional meaning and clarity. To expound further, surface meaning focuses on the poster's overall interpretation. The narrative structure unearths the story behind the visual images. The intended meaning basically

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conveys the communicator's message to the target audience. Ideological meaning explains the underlying assumptions and implications of campaign messages, whereas oppositional meaning gives provision for alternative textual interpretations emerging from cultural assumptions. Finally, clarity deals with the general ease in interpreting the poster.

Poster 2: 2002-WORLD AIDS CAMPAIGN POSTER

Source: Johnny & Michelle (2006)

Poster 2 uses a male parental figure to preach the harsh realities of AIDS stigma. In certain societies, a father is the epitome of patriarchy, symbolizing power and authority. At the surface level, the disapproving look registered on the father's face suggests that he has just disowned his own son, articulated by the words "You're not my son anymore" inscribed in the poster. Therefore, the relationship between him and his son has been severed. In the message, the communicator's intended meaning or implicit conclusion is that his son's HIV status has contributed to the breaking down of father and son relationship. Said differently, stigma and discrimination does not spare family ties and deducing from the disclaimer *fight fear, shame, ignorance and injustice worldwide*, the message revokes such unwanted and retrogressive attitudes towards People Living With AIDS (PLWA). In Johnny's & Michelle's perspective, the poster's interpretation will not be homogeneous. Alternatively, in certain patriarchal societies, where the male gender is considered culturally superior to the female gender, addressees would be tempted to emulate the male character in *Poster 2* by discriminating against seropositive persons. In this way, the message reinforces AIDS stigma via culture-specific norms. Furthermore, the communicator foregrounds the key words *You're not my son anymore* at the

expense of the disclaimer written in small letters at the bottom of the message reading: *fight fear, shame, ignorance* and *injustice worldwide*. Hence this analysis is a demonstration of how audiences misinterpret AIDS campaign posters via erroneous implicit assumptions. Forceville (1996) argues that there is no standardized procedure for analyzing pictures for they are culturally elusive as exemplified in *Poster 2*.

Johnny & Mitchell (2006) concur with Forceville (1996) who insists that context is never text bound, it extends towards the physical environment, a domain where culture resides. Illustrating his point, Forceville uses an advertisement to demonstrate causes of miscomprehension from a cultural angle. He strongly claims that the prerequisite for interpreting a pasta sauce advertisement called *Panzani*, requires addressees to be conversant with a tomato, a string bag and pasta. Supposing pygmies were served with such an advertisement, yet they are unfamiliar with the Western culture, then problems aligned to miscomprehension will not be peculiar. The underlying reason begin that the commercial introduces culturally alien concepts to a society where tomatoes or pasta are virtually non-existent. In fact, Forceville is very much conscious about cultural diversity to the point of cautioning communicators against underestimating the degree to which an advertisement is culturally sensitive. His strong recommendation is that cultural knowledge is an indispensible asset for communicators, a double-edged sword with the ability to unveil culture-specific interpretations and pinpoint possible miscomprehension patterns across cultures.

According to Banks & Thompson (1996) even the medical field is not exempted from the headache of miscomprehension, as doctors and patients subscribe to dissimilar conceptualizations of illnesses and their respective preventive measures. A case in point is when a patient suffering from high blood pressure skips or reduces his dose based on self-diagnosis that he is feeling "well" and not experiencing any bodily pain. Unknowingly, this naive diagnosis defies medical ethics for one cannot always be conscious of a spontaneous ailment like blood pressure. Developing solid arguments on non-scientific models used by non-medics in a study limited to lay metaphoric mental models describing the cardiovascular system, high blood pressure and heart attack sampled from several categories of respondents namely; college students, passengers in an airport and building and ground staff. Banks & Thompson (1996) findings reveal that the cardiovascular system is metaphorically perceived as a plumbing system, with the heart conceptualized as a pump. The perception of veins and arteries is

defined in terms of pipes and tubes. Nonetheless, inconsistencies emerge among respondents regarding the working operations of the circulatory system. Some stipulate that blood flows from the brain to other body organs, for others it flows from the heart and later returns to the same location via the same vessels, very few respondents are able to give detailed scientific accounts of blood circulation. Similar observations are made when respondents talk about high blood pressure based on two models: the biophysical model and velocity model. Adherents of the former argue that it is the magnitude of the blood's force against the walls of arteries that causes blood pressure. Velocity model adherents are convinced that accelerated blood flow triggers the pressure. Even though respondents mention salt and lack of exercises as risk factors for blood pressure, they provide simplified explanations like salt has the capacity to clog, harden or constrict arteries and remained tight-lipped about any scientific interpretation of blood pressure for salt consumption creates a homeostatic imbalance, thus compelling the body to retain water for regulating the imbalance.

In respect to heart attack, some respondents believe factors like stress, hereditary factors or lack of exercises induce it. In one perspective, others insist that bursting of arteries trigger heart attacks. For others, a clogged coronary artery leads to a heart failure. From Banks and Thompson's analysis, disciples of the artery model will strive to prevent heart failure by focusing on diet. On the other perspective, muscle theorists will focus on exercises and overlook diet in preventing heart attack. The point we are putting across is that different people have different cognitive models for interpreting illnesses, and in some cases they are misleading as pointed out in the role of salt and exercises in causing blood pressure. Banks and Thompson's insight is that mental models are mechanical and simply spring from our general knowledge, hence lacking scientific backing. In this aspect, they are a potential source for a patient's misconception of illnesses. Another way of putting it, for Banks and Thompson cognitive efficiency is the root cause of miscomprehension in medical discourse, for the simplified explanations of ailments and risk factors by non-medics are readily processed, retained and memorized, unlike the complicated scientific jargon-like explanations. They also stress that different communities employ different cultural models in understanding ailments, thus causing misunderstandings between the patient and the doctor. At this stage, it is important to point out Banks and Thompson's scholarly contribution can be traced back to Lakoff's notion of alternative hypothesis (1982, 1987), where Lakoff stipulates that human beings can conceptualize a single concept using several inconsistent models and those models used by non-experts are known as folk models for they

tend to conflict with scientific models. To illustrate his point, Lakoff takes the example of electricity, conceptualized by some people as the flow of electrons. Whereas, others view electricity as a continuous fluid flowing like water. From this perspective, it would be within our scholarly interest to determine whether AIDS cognitive models existing in various Kenyan communities are scientifically compliant or are erroneous AIDS models, which will be revisited in sections 5.7.7, 5.7.7.1 and 5.7.7.2.

Cultural issues also feature in translation, Schäffner (2004) argument demonstrates how translating metaphors from one culture to another dissimilar culture is usually hampered by linguistic and cultural constraints. Using evidence from German and English political texts, Schäffner stipulates that Gorbachev's Eastern European metaphor EUROPE AS A HOUSE, advocating for communality among European nations to be one family, is hatched and conceptualized within the Eastern European linguistic environment. In this culture, a single multi-story apartment block has several entrances, hosting several families with their individual flats. Apparently, EUROPE AS A HOUSE metaphor fails to blend in with the American culture and poses comprehension difficulties, owing to the fact an ideal American family house hosts a single family and not several families.

Against the backdrop of explicatures, Moeschler (2007) examines how explicatures are causative agents of misunderstandings in intercultural discourse. Using the relevance theoretical approach, he captures a communicative scenario between two competent speakers of French but from different cultures; a European named Jacques and a non-European host, from North Africa in the following exchange:

(15a) Jacques: Hello, my plane reservations have been made. I will arrive at Y on April 10th at 8.40 pm, and will leave Y on the 14th at 2 pm. **Can you tell me how to get from Y Airport to X?** I'm counting on you for the hotel reservation at X.
(15b) Host: "... Concerning traveling from Y Airport to X, you can take the train at the airport, with a change at Z station and you will arrive at X downtown station, it is 2 min from the W where a room has been booked...." (Moeschler, 2007: 88)

By Jacques uttering *Can you tell me how to get from Y Airport to X?* , he is covertly requesting his addressee to pick him from the airport, after all he is a foreigner and unfamiliar with the North Africa

environs. In this regard, without his host's assistance locating his hotel will be a tedious task. Unfortunately, Jacques intention escapes his host's attention, who immediately gives precise directions to Jacques hotel. From the foregoing, Moeschler argues that chances of misunderstandings occurring are heightened in situations where persons of dissimilar cultures master a common language for communication purposes. In most cases, the speaker's working assumption is that his beliefs and knowledge correspond to those of his addressee's. Using a relevance theoretical framework, Moeschler demonstrates how an addressee's failure to access the accurate higher level explicature results into miscommunication. In his relevance theoretical model, he traces the root cause of the above misunderstanding within the realm of implicatures and explicatures.

1. Basic explicatures are the minimal level of communication. If development of the basic explicature fails then ordinary misunderstanding will occur.

2. Higher-level explicature is the middle level of communication. If development of the higher-level explicatures fails, then strong misunderstanding will occur.

3. Implicated premise is the most sophisticated level of communication majorly reinforced by our knowledge of the world. Accessing implicated premises becomes more challenging when speakers have divergent social, cultural and behavioral assumptions.

4. Implicated conclusion is the second highest-level of communication. Since implicated conclusions entail speaker's intentions and the strength of the intended meaning. Failure to recover strong implicature is worse than failing to recover a weak implicature. (cf. Moeschler, 2007: 87)

Adhering to the above roadmap, we would expect from Jacques utterance in (16), the basic level explicature (16a), and higher level explicatures outlined in (16b) and (16c) respectively would be computed by his host in the manner below:

16. *Jacques: How should I go from the airport to X?*

(16a) Jacques is going from the airport to X at 10 pm on Saturday, on the 10th of April.

(16b) Jacques is asking how to get from the airport to X at 10 pm on Saturday, on the 10th of April.

(16c) Jacques wants to know how to get from the airport to X at 10 pm on Saturday, on the 10th of April.

The addressee will probably proceed to entertain the following implicated premises in (17a) and (17b) to arrive at the implicated conclusion in (18)

(17a) If Jacques is asking how to get to X from the airport, then Jacques does not know the direction towards X from the airport.

(17b) Jacques would prefer not to go to X alone.

(18) Jacques is asking for someone to pick him up from the airport in the order to go to X.

For Moeschler, the addressee strictly adhered to the relevance comprehension procedure by following the path of least effort and stopping once expectations of relevance are realized. Meaning, the addressee must have stopped processing the utterance after recovering the higher level explicature (16b). He therefore understood the utterance literally based on his false cultural assumptions despite the fact they shared a common language. In brief, Moeschler stipulates that there are three causative agents of intercultural misunderstandings. One is attributed to false assumptions resulting in false higher explicatures. The latter are caused by falsely attributed shared beliefs and knowledge between the speaker and his addressee. In other words, speakers might blindly assume that their knowledge and beliefs are reconciled with those of their addressee's, yet such an assumption might be a mirage. Jacques assumes that his addressee has the Western mentality of being a perfect host and would take the personal initiative of collecting Jacques from the airport for he is not conversant with the Northern Africa region. Another one is wrong evaluation of the communicator's preferences and abilities, exemplified when the addressee applied the principle of least effort and stopped processing the utterance after inferring the higher level explicature in (16b). And finally, linguistic competence of a non-native speaker is another causative agent for misunderstandings, for the potential risk being both the addressee and communicator might assume that they share similar beliefs on the basis of sharing a common linguistic repertoire, yet this could be untrue. In summary, Moeschler proposes an investigation on the extent to which cultural differences in explicit or implicit communication triggers misunderstandings.

Taking cue from Moeschler, the present study will integrate some of his ideas, especially when investigating whether comprehension of figurative AIDS slogans among Kenyans of diverse cultural and educational backgrounds is homogeneous. It is a truism that there exists a literature deficit in

studies focusing on figurative AIDS discourse from both intercultural pragmatics and cognitive linguistics viewpoints hence warranting linguists' attention. By focusing on Kenya as an area of study, she serves as a microcosm of how some African cultures conceptualize and comprehend figurative AIDS messages. In this respect, the proposed pragmatic endeavour is an examination of how behaviour change communicators use figurative slogans in addressing a culturally diverse audience. Particular focus will be directed towards identifying various aspects fuelling the miscomprehension of AIDS messages. The research is aimed at highlighting the conceptualization of AIDS within the realm of figurative HIV discourse employed in Kenya. By extension, an investigation on various implicatures, explicatures, lexico-pragmatic processes derived from AIDS messages are incorporated in our research objectives. Further, various stereotypical models adopted by Kenyan communities in describing AIDS and categorizing seropositive persons are equally part and parcel of our research objectives. In brief, the research aspires to inject new insights in cognitive linguistics, behaviour change communication and intercultural pragmatics.

2.3. ANALYSIS OF FIGURATIVE DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGIN OF AIDS

The genesis of the AIDS pandemic is indeed a contentious issue riddled with controversies on one hand and dogged with traded accusations and counter-accusations across continental spheres on the other hand. In actual fact, ongoing scientific research and debates are yet to convincingly unveil the identity of the first AIDS patient or even determine with exactitude the actual geographical location where AIDS emerged. Apparently, the latter is a sensitive matter worldwide and only approached through divergent schools of thought, all fronting a myriad of ideologies on the killer disease under headings like: the African hypothesis, the Haitian connection, the Hunter theory, Conspiracy theory, the Divine retribution theory among others as presented in this section. A sizeable number of scholars such as Mann *et al*. (1989), Doka (1997) and Avert (2008a), concur that origin of AIDS rests unknown. Nonetheless, there is some level of speculation among epidemiologists advancing the thesis that HIV was already in existence by 1930s, albeit in endemic forms within the central African region (cf. Chin, 2007, Avert, *ibid*). Some scholars like Sabatier (1988) and Iliffe (2006) contend that the earliest cases of HIV within the grasp of scientific literature were around 1950s, following the demise of an American suffering from AIDS related symptoms like fever and pneumonia in 1952. Then, in 1959 a Haitian and a British Sailor died of the same ailment. Later, in 1977, a Danish surgeon working in Zaire

and a Zairean woman succumbed to AIDS. These isolated cases affirm the presence of AIDS prior to its actual realization in the eighties. Thereafter, serious documentation on AIDS commenced around 1980 in United States, particularly in New York and San Francisco cities, following cases of immuno-suppression initially noticed among gay persons. Out of ignorance, epidemiologists erroneously thought that they were dealing with a rare skin cancer known as Kaposi Sarcoma, commonly found in the Mediterranean region and sub-Saharan Africa. As time passed by, AIDS was equally witnessed among heroin users or injecting drug users (IDUs), haemophiliacs and Haitian immigrants. Together with homosexuals, the cited three groups met the necessary and sufficient conditions to be categorized as the 4-H[11] risk group of AIDS carriers. In an effort to christen the new disease, physicians and the general community subscribed to various stereotype-based metonymic models and creatively assigned AIDS various names (cf. on stereotypes, Lakoff, 1987).

Formally, in scientific discourse, AIDS was referred to as Human T-Cell Lymphotropic virus (HTLV) and coexisted with terms such as *gay plague* or *gay related immune deficiency* (GRID), with the last two terms being byproducts of stereotypical generalizations computed from few cases of seropositive gay persons and transposed to the entire gay community. A replication of a similar procedure was employed in reference to AIDS as the *Haitian disease*, *the African disease* or Africa as *the AIDS continent*. Following incidences of few infections among Haitians in New York, AIDS was racially generalized to the whole Haitian immigrant community. And judging from the Haitians' African ancestry, the disease was labelled *African*. In other areas like in Zaire, AIDS was termed a *white man's disease* for its association with white homosexuals (cf. Schoepf, 2004b). Other byproducts of metonymic references on AIDS include names like: *the charter disease*, *the jet age disease* and *the jumbo jet disease*, under these circumstances, the aerial means which catalyzed AIDS propagation globally during sexual liberation era in the 1970s, especially by rich gay tourists, represented the dreaded disease. And even more recently, among the Sukuma community in Tanzania, AIDS is called *mia mbili* (two hundred Tanzanian shillings), a monetary term standing in for the dues rendered for prostitution, which apparently is one of the prime factors fuelling the spread of AIDS within the region (cf. Mshana *et al.* 2006: 50).

For Lakoff & Johnson (1980: 39) metonyms just like metaphors are ingrained in our conceptual

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11 4-H stands for the earliest AIDS high risk groups comprising haemophiliacs, homosexuals, heroin users and Haitians, we notice that all members of the 4-H group begin with capital letter H, hence the name 4-H.

faculties and aid immensely in structuring our thought patterns. In numerous ways, metonymy equally registers our attitudes towards issues. Quoting Lakoff's maiden example of *ham sandwich is waiting for his cheque*, he maintains the waiter's reference to his regular customer as *ham sandwich* is dehumanizing. Seemingly, the waiter is not keen on his customer as a person, but simply as a customer *per se*. In the same vein, reference to AIDS as *the gay disease*, *the white man disease, the African disease* or *the Haitian disease* metonymically registers homophobic and xenophobic attitudes. Such dehumanizing attitudes towards the aforementioned groups lowered their dignity by associating them with a dreaded infectious disease. Labelling AIDS using various names is compatible with Lakoff's (1982) argument on categorization, especially the manner in which mental faculties are actively engaged in categorizing abstract and concrete entities such as illnesses, social relationships, governments, events and emotions. Just to mention in passing, branding AIDS as a *Haitian disease, a gay disease, an African disease* or *a white man's disease* is quite hyperbolic. Going by concrete facts, it is highly doubtful whether the entire African, white, gay or Haitian communities were infected with AIDS. On the contrary, the disease unfortunately infected a few members of the aforementioned communities. From this standpoint, the cited labels are exaggerations to the extent of falsely implying that AIDS affected an entire community. In accordance with Lakoff & Johnson (1980), Forceville (1996: 15) and Katz (1996: 4-5) posit that even metaphorical constructions are already charged with affective or attitudinal components. Their line of argument is that President George Bush once compared Saddam Hussein to Hitler as quoted in the following sentence in Katz (1996: 5) *Saddam Hussein is the Hitler of our era*. The idea being marketed here is recounting Saddam dictatorial regime in Iraq automatically evokes both painful and traumatizing emotions from some Iraqis as Hitler would for certain Jewish communities. On the contrary, a construction like *She is a Mother Teresa,* invites an inexhaustible list of virtues, implicatures or positive attitudes ranging from humility, devotion, religiousness, simplicity to sincerity. Continuing with our discussion on AIDS, a final attempt at finding a suitable scientific name for the killer disease was in 1982 when the Center for Disease Control (CDC), officially settled on the name AIDS (cf. Agadazi, 1989; Doka, 1997; Barnett & Whiteside, 2006; Avert, 2008a).

As AIDS gained currency in the United States (US), gay activists employed war metaphors by advocating for *War on AIDS* or *AIDS is War* to call for rigorous measures in dealing with the epidemic, for instance, through extensive research, better medication and aggressive AIDS prevention campaigns.

It is arguable that the metaphor guiding their conceptualization of the disease is AIDS IS WAR or CONTAINING AIDS IS WAR. Similar variants of the same metaphor were witnessed in United Kingdom (UK), Uganda, Haiti, Ghana, South Africa and Switzerland (cf. Warwick, Aggleton, and Thomas, 1988: 114; Farmer, 1992: 12; Bujra, 2002: 227; Kauffman & Lindauer, 2004; De Waal, 2006: 17 and Magonya, 2007: 62). In Warwick *et al.* study on the way youth (aged between sixteen and twenty one years) perceive the AIDS pandemic in the North and South West of England. Among the youths, employing militaristic metaphors is inevitable since AIDS is conceptualized as a destructive ailment holding the human body hostage in a battleground, as captured in their perceptions of AIDS in (19).

(19) *Responses from British youths on their perception of AIDS*

Sue: You actually die from AIDS anyway, coz what it is...it's a virus that **breaks down your resistance.**

IW: So you die from other things.

Sue: And it **kills your resistance**, but you don't actually die from AIDS, you can die from bronchitis or pneumonia or something like that.

Joe: AIDS **destroys** your immune system ...you die of something else entirely.

Terri: AIDS **kills off** one lot of cells and leaves other cells **defenseless** and therefore your body doesn't die from AIDS, it's a disease that puts you at risk from anything else. **Cuts down your chances** from it and you can die from more or less anything else.

(adapted from Warwick *et al.,*1988: 114)

Taking note of expressions such as *breaks down your resistance* (under AIDS IS A DESTRUCTIVE FORCE conventional metaphor)*, kills your resistance, leaves the other cells defenseless* and *cuts down your chances* alerts us that we are dealing with a destructive virus that virtually destabilizes the body's defense system. In this regard, its destructiveness is conceptualized within AIDS IS WAR metaphor and by extension includes any form of struggle for liberation, with its lexical terms derived from the source domain of the military semantic field as attested in words like: *defenseless* and *killing*. Other terms denoting a collapsed immune system are marked by terminologies such as *breaks down* or *cuts down one's chances from it and you can die from more or less anything else,* in the assessment of the damaged system. Farmer (1992: 12) notes down comments of a seropositive man known as Dieudoné on his views on AIDS in the following quote:

> ... What I see is that poor people catch it more easily. They say that the rich get *Sida* (AIDS). I do not see that. But what I see that the poor person sends it to another. **It is like an army (firing on civilians), brothers shooting brothers**...

In such a statement, the respondent adopts a simile to buttress his argument on the viral propagation is likened to a death sentence under the SENDING IS TRANSMISSION OF AIDS metaphor where *a poor person sends it to another.* In different words, spreading AIDS is interpretively[12] likened to a military execution, with the army firing on innocent civilians instead of foes and therefore in the expression *brothers shooting brothers*; one is faced with a state of hopelessness as AIDS is spread indiscriminately to unsuspecting persons be it the unborn, the young or old. Further, from this standpoint, the respondent conceptualizes AIDS from the metaphorical perspective of HIV TRANSMISSION IS A MILITARY EXECUTION. Similar war-like sentiments have at one point in time been expressed by the former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan who argues that *the impact of AIDS is no less destructive than that of warfare itself, and by some measures, far worse* (UNAIDS, 2000: 39). In Ghana, Bujra (2002) affirms the existence of an AIDS campaign designed for the military bearing messages *put the boot on AIDS* or *take the firing squad on AIDS.*

While according to De Waal (2006: 17) the AIDS IS WAR conventional metaphor was used by Ugandan Muslim clerics as early as 1989, as they advocated for a "jihad on AIDS" and cross-checking with The New Encyclopedia Britannica (2003: 550) *jihad* (jehad) has its etymology in Arabic with its central sense being a religious warfare undertaken by Muslims to propagate Islam by waging war against non-believers. Through semantic broadening, its extended senses accommodates the concept of an aggressive campaign or a crusade for some cause in four perspectives namely: by heart, tongue, hand and sword. First and foremost, by heart is more or less advocating for spiritual purification where one engages in a spiritual warfare aimed at denouncing evil. Second, by tongue means proclaiming Islamic doctrines with the aim of propagating Islam. Third, by hand is actually a way of supporting Islamic ideologies by correcting what is wrong or disconfirming misconceptions about Islam. And finally by sword, implies fulfilling one's duty by waging war physically to non-believers. Armed with this information from our background cognition, when one talks of JIHAD ON AIDS* in the context of

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12 According to Sperber and Wilson, (1986,a) utterances can either be employed descriptively to represent the actual state of affairs or interpretively where an utterance faithfully represents another, for example an ironical sentence is both echoic and emotive in its depiction of speakers attitudes towards an attributed thought.

an epidemic, one is actually declaring total war against the disease, but when juxtaposed with normal wars where missiles, tanks, machine guns and other weapons of mass destruction that anyone can ever think of will be pertinent, the JIHAD ON AIDS* cognitively invites other "weapons of mass destruction" in the following manner interpretively: first, by heart, one makes a personal decision to either fight AIDS by abstaining or opt for safer sex. Second, by tongue, necessitates that one becomes an AIDS ambassador charged with the sole duty of spreading the AIDS prevention gospel by sensitizing ignorant persons on the disease while refuting any scientifically spineless AIDS folk models. Third, by hand overtly invites financial, medical and moral support channelled towards AIDS related projects and equally assisting both infected and affected persons. In the same vein, it also calls for condemning actions frustrating the fight against AIDS by defusing its stigmatization. And finally by sword, the physical war on AIDS is a matter of encouraging various prevention techniques like using protection, abstinence and transfusing only screened blood just to cite a few. In Switzerland, the STOP AIDS campaign 2003 coined such as slogan for gay and straight persons in *Poster 3*.

Poster 3: The 2003 SWISS STOP AIDS campaign slogan

(**Sources: STOP AIDS campaign, 2003 and Magonya, 2007: 62**)

Poster 3, suggests that the conventional metaphor in operation is PREVENTION OF AIDS IS WAR. Said in another way, AIDS is matter of life and death; it is essentially a combat requiring the right ammunition ostensively depicted by the pictorial representation of a condom in the STOP AIDS construction as a SELF-DEFENCE* mechanism employed by both gay and straight persons to effectively fight AIDS. Finally, in South Africa, the renown South African Archbishop and Nobel laureate Desmond Tutu in Kauffman and Lindauer (2004), banks on the historical backdrop of apartheid and perceives AIDS as the new apartheid. His line of argument is that AIDS poses a threat to our modern society and winning the war against AIDS invites the same spirit, political will, commitment and passion that South Africans and international community invested in erasing apartheid

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in South Africa. In other words, the AIDS IS APARTHEID conceptual metaphor, whose source domain is grounded in apartheid, maps aspects related to prolonged struggle and aggressiveness of the international community onto fighting AIDS in the target domain. If the same spirit of nationalism effectively worked in South Africa, then humanity is being challenged to embrace internationalism in eradicating the killer disease. Sontag (1988) equally gives extended senses of the enemy in other fields for instance in the politican arena where a French politician, Jean-Marie Le Pen once described his political rivals as *sidatique* (AIDS-ish), to suggest that they were his political enemies, just like the HIV virus is an enemy of human kind.

According to Sontag (1998) employing military metaphors in medicine springs from the fact that the human body is perceived as a fortress accompanied by the following attributes: frailness, mortality and vulnerability. Any incoming disease or ailment is perceived as an alien invasion of microscopic organisms in the form of bacteria, protozoa and viruses (cf. Warwick, Aggleton and Homas, 1988). Automatically, the body's internal mechanisms respond by mobilizing immunological "defenses". In medical discourse, diseases are described as invading societies captured in expressions like: *Malaria attacks Somalia* or *war on Polio in Africa* or *there is* a *high alert on avian flu in Jamaica* or comments like *I was attacked by measles last summer* (personal examples). Each of the cited statements is overtly calling for a defense mechanism geared towards averting heightened mortality rates triggered by any disease. To summarize on AIDS IS WAR metaphor, Lakoff & Johnson (1980) suggest that as rational beings, we are constantly engaged in physical, social, mental or even verbal battles. Faced with a win or lose scenario, establishing a strong defense system is imperative, further, effective counter-attacking strategies with the ultimate goal of eliminating a foe have to be in store. Like in most wars, the aftermath of any war is assessed in terms of deaths, casualities and survivors who are lucky to be unscratched, the last two categories will forever guard traumatizing war memories throughout their lifetime. In the same token, for more than two decades humanity has been staged in the health battlefield, with HIV and AIDS being our prime opponent as infected persons die in each passing day, their families remain affected whereas those who remain unscratched by the scourge register mental images associtated with the killer disease as seen in the implicatures associated with AIDS outlined in (20g).

For Sontag, dreaded diseases are construed as an alien "other" and enemies of modern war. Sometimes,

the simple act of demonization or stigmatization of infectious diseases is further transposed onto the patient. Sampling real life cases, Alcorn (1988), Helman (1990) and Doka (1997) argue that some diseases are capable of acquiring a social identity status and culture-specific meanings. Thereafter, such a status provides a breeding ground for diverse interpretations or pragmatically speaking yield certain assumptions or implicatures derived from the ailment. For Alcorn, metaphoricity in diseases generally connotes a feared notion and by extension applicable to aspects related to corruption, pollution and human weakness. We are familiar with utterances such as: *the drug addict contracted AIDS through using contaminated needles*, to imply the presence of impurities in the needles. Expressions such as *the cancer of corruption has wasted away economies in Southern countries* or *His only shortcoming is that he suffers from occasional bouts of verbal diarrhoea* (personal examples), the last two expressions capture moral decadence and human weakness respectively. Alcorn is convinced beyond any reasonable doubt that ailments like leprosy, syphilis and cancer inherited the abovementioned connotations, no wonder to date such linguistic expressions account for societal malpractices, pollution and moral decay.

Apart from the cited cases, when we further sample various examples, for instance *polio* evokes the concept of innocence for it attacks harmless little children, *leprosy* was initially ostracized and even in biblical discourse lepers were considered outcasts. A *syphilitic* was equally appalled and associated with perversity and promiscuity. Surprisingly, AIDS has inherited implicatures associated with *syphilis*. *Cholera* is associated with filth and uncleanliness. In Alcorn's perspective, around the 19th century *tuberculosis* (TB) made one "interesting" simply because of the socially exclusive quarantines. Its persistent cough was associated with ugliness and uncultured behaviour. In comparison to *cancer*, it was widely believed that a TB patient's death was painless, unlike the agony a cancerous patient underwent. For *cancer's* case, the New Oxford American dictionary (2005) is in accordance with Helman (1990) and Doka (1997), in that figuratively *cancer* is synonymous to any evil or destructive phenomenon, having similar mannerisms as the unrestrained cancerous cells which are detrimental to the human body. Further, in pragmatics *cancer* can be regarded as a category extension[13], since its name springs from its tumors resembling limbs of crabs. Interestingly, the slang term for a cigarette known for causing lung cancer is referred to as *cancer stick*. For Sontag, AIDS depicts metaphoricity in two

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13 A type of approximation in lexical pragmatics whereby the extended concept shares contextual similarities with its encoded term. The brand name *Kleenex* as an example is applicable to all categories of tissue paper. Likewise Chomsky can represent any renown linguist. (See Carston & Powell, (2005) and Wilson (2006a)

perspectives; first, HIV intrusion within the body is likened to cancer, especially if we consider the latent period where AIDS remains asymptomatic for almost a decade. Second, AIDS is a reminiscent of syphilis[14] and generates implicature invoking pollution.

For Nzioka (2000), though in accordance with Sontag, views ambiguity in AIDS for simultaneously hosting moral and physical contamination. On one hand, physical contamination arises from its transmission via contaminated bodily fluids through sexual intercourse, unscreened blood from infected donors during transfusions, contaminated needles shared among IDUs and prenatally or postnatally via a mother's infected blood or breast milk respectively. On the other hand, moral contamination signals the tarnished identity branded on seropositive persons, non-existent when they were HIV negative. For AIDS, categorization oscillates between two options: *the guilty persons* and *the innocent victims,* in the former category, homosexuals, injecting drug users, commercial sex workers and promiscuous persons have traditionally been accused of spreading AIDS and their predicament evokes less sympathy. In the latter category, children, faithful spouses and haemophiliacs are innocent victims perceived as victims of circumstance. Moreover, calling AIDS a *plague* is synonymous to a social and psychic catastrophe, and by extension a name for frightening diseases. From this standpoint, the negative charge associated with AIDS to the extent of euphemistically referring to AIDS-related deaths as "dying from a long illness or a tragic road accident", to defuse any embarrassment associated with it, which probably explains why to date no nation has overtly accepted the AIDS architect title (cf. Sontag, 1988; Helman, 1990 and Nzioka, 2000).

To tailor our discussion using a pragmatics orientation by demonstrating how implicit assumptions emerge from certain illnesses, consider the constructions below:

(20a) I have a flu.

        Implicit assumption: Flu clears off in a couple of days just keep warm.

        Implicit conclusion: If X has flu and for X to recover quickly, X needs to keep warm.

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14 Contagious and fearful diseases have a blame game history, with foreigners or marginalized persons always being the culprits. According to Aggleton, Hart and Davies (1989) and Doka (1997), Germans blamed the French for syphilis, the latter blamed former, the Flemish blamed the Spanish and the Japanese blamed the Portuguese. For AIDS, According to Sabatier, (1988) and The Panos Dossier (1988), the US blamed homosexuals and Haitians, Europeans and Asians blamed Africans, Asians blamed American seamen. In Japan, Philippines and other parts of Asia, AIDS was perceived as a foreign disease. In other regions, high risk groups like truck drivers, students, prostitutes and ethnic minorities were blamed for spreading AIDS.

(20b) I have gonorrhoea. (Take the case of a stable relationship)

    Implicit assumption: Gonorrhea is a sexually transmitted disease so either X or X's partner is unfaithful.

    Implicit conclusion: Both X and his partner need to see a doctor.

(20c) I have cholera.

    Implicit assumption: X must have ingested unhygienic foods or substances.

    Implicit conclusion: With the correct medication, cholera is curable therefore X will be fine.

(20d) I have asthma.

    Implicit assumption: X must always have an inhaler and dress warmly.

    Implicit conclusion: Asthma can be contained, but frequent check up is recommended for X.

(20e) I have a headache.

    Implicit assumption: X must be fatigued, X should probably take a rest and probably some paracetamols to clear the headache.

    Implicit conclusion: X will feel better after taking a rest.

(20f) I have malaria.

    Implicit assumption: X needs to take a dose of quinine or seek medical attention.

    Implicit conclusion: If unchecked malaria can kill.

(20g) I have AIDS.

    Implicit assumption: X has AIDS; AIDS is a killer disease, how unfortunate.

    Implicit conclusion: X will die, for AIDS is incurable.

(20h) I have cancer.

    Implicit assumption: X has cancer, if X's cancer is benign, then it is not life threatening. However, if X's cancer is malignant, death is inevitable, how unfortunate.

    Implicit conclusion: Benign cancer is manageable through chemotherapy, malignant cancer is a killer disease.

(20i) I have Ebola.

Implicit assumption: X has Ebola, Ebola is a both contagious and kills in a matter of days.

Implicit conclusion: X has a few days to live.

The computation of the above implicit assumptions and conclusions is based on our general knowledge and experiences with diseases to cognitively generate disease-specific implicatures. Based on our experience, the way one regards malaria will definitely be dissimilar from his perception of incurable diseases like AIDS, Ebola and malignant cancer. Likewise, flu, cholera, headaches will be accorded less seriousness and not stigmatized as AIDS, Ebola and malignant cancer would be. Going by scientific conventions, curability of benign cancer and malaria largely depend on their early detection and they only turn lethal in advanced stages. In our opinion, the implicatures derived from utterances (20a) to (20e) have no association with death thus the diseases are taken lightly. However, right from (20f) to (20i), the image of death in the implicatures is a perfect ingredient for fear. The fear gains momentum especially if the disease erases a large human population like in AIDS case. This is unlike malaria where fewer death incidences are reported. From this perspective, our claim is that Sontag's (1988) term "social meanings" associated with AIDS, can in another way be treated as implicit assumptions. The equation guiding our hypothesis posits that production of death-related implicatures when conversing about AIDS is directly proportional to AIDS stigma. The more we perceive AIDS in the light of death, the more reinforced will be its stigma. This probably explains why potential killer diseases such as pneumonia, malaria, asthma are not stigmatized like AIDS for their implicit assumptions are devoid of fearful notions like massive death. (cf. Sections 5.7.7.1, 5.7.7.2 and 5.7.7.3)

Another reading into our observation is drawn from the cause and effect framework underlying any disease. There is always a micro-organism or a factor inducing an ailment, whose effects will be manifested in one's body. In fact, topping the list of most fearful ailments are those registering mass deaths, then closely followed by those claiming few persons, and finally at the bottommost are "harmless" ailments, sparing human lives as shown in *Table 1*.

Table 1: Perception of diseases

Disease	Cause	Effects	Perception	Diagnosis
Mild flu	Virus-(airbone).	Running nose, fever	No image of death.	curable
Cholera	Bacteria (vibrocholerea) via contaminated water or food.	Diarrhoea	No image of death.	curable
Asthma	Hereditary factors or smoking	Breathing difficulties.	No image of death.	curable
Headache	Stress, overworking.	Persistent headache can lead to migraines	No image of death.	curable
Malaria	Parasite from the female anopheles mosquito.	Vomiting and fever, if unchecked it leads to death. (but not massive deaths)	Image of death	Curable if detected early
Cancer	Irregular multiplication of cells.	Pain, loss of hair and weight loss.	No image of death in Benign cancer cases.	Benign cancer is curable
		Leads to death if malignant.	Image of death in malignant cancer cases	Incurable if malignant
Ebola	Virus	Haemorrhagic fever, excessive internal bleeding, leads to death in a matter of days if not weeks (massive deaths)	Image of death	Incurable
HIV	Virus	Weight loss, leading to death. (massive deaths)	Image of death	Incurable

From *Table 1*, curable diseases lacking serious repercussions notably; headache, flu have no capacity to generate stigma. Conversely, once a disease registers its effects in terms of death, to be precise, widespread death like in cases of AIDS and Ebola, then the disease automatically induces fear and stigma. As a matter of fact, the conceptualization of death is processed automatically and precedes thoughts related to the incubation period of diseases like AIDS, Ebola and sometimes cancer. This simply means that the incubation period comes in as an afterthought, partly because the addressee via the relevance comprehension procedure, follows the path of least effort by first processing death, then afterwards thinks of the length of time one has before expiring.

Continuing with the hypotheses on the probable origin of AIDS, after AIDS was reported in the US, North American scientists were convinced that AIDS must have originated elsewhere and highly questioned whether such an infectious disease would have remained unnoticed for a long time in the American continent. Therefore, research was directed towards Third World countries, as additional HIV cases were reported in Haiti, Rwanda, Tanzania, Zaire, Belgium and France (cf. Agadazi, 1989, Barnett & Whiteside, 2006). At this particular moment, under the umbrella of the African hypothesis theory, the widespread speculation was that AIDS emerged from Africa, accompanying it were pejorative terms for Africa as *the AIDS continent*, insinuating it is a continent riddled with promiscuity, debauchery and hyper-sexualized lifestyles. Apparently, this assumption was perceived as entertaining racist undertones as observed by Sabatier (1988), Agadazi (1989), Oppong', Craddock, Kalipeni and Jayati (2004), Ogot (2004), Schoepf (2004a) and Poku (2005). In this connection, as Sabatier (1988) cites the former Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda in 1987 using THE PROPAGATION OF AIDS IS A JOURNEY metaphor opines that : *What is important than knowing where this disease came from is where it is going* (p.33), suggesting interpretively that as scientists were busy trading accusations across the globe, AIDS was spreading its tentacles and claiming lives worldwide. At this stage, we would like to stress that perceiving an illness as a journey has equally been employed to talk about cancer in Semino's, Heywood's and Short's (2004: 1277-1287) research on conceptual metaphors used in describing cancer drawn from the discourse of cancer patients and oncologists in United Kingdom (UK), reveals the spreading of cancerous cells in the body is viewed as a journey exemplified in the following constructions:

(21) *Conceptualizations of cancer among cancer patients and oncologists*

   (a). Doctor: The thing is the

       Patient: um

       Doctor: **The way it gets there is through the bloodstream**, and it gets to the dotted around in various parts of the skeleton and er and so there are multiple.

   (b). Doctor: Chemotherapy can reduce chances of **things coming back.**

   (c). Doctor: It is that bit there but it's no different now from what it was if it doesn't.

       Patient: It hasn't **travelled** any more then.

In the constructions written in bold, both patient and doctor metaphorically conceptualize the insidious

development of cancerous cells in the body as a journey. To be precise, in the two expressions: *the way it gets there is through the blood stream* and *it hasn't travelled any more then*. Moreover, the resurfacing of cancerous cells is figuratively seen as: *coming back of cells,* all englobed within the conceptual metaphor of DEVELOPMENT OF CANCER IS A JOURNEY. On the other hand, looking at the film industry, Sontag (1988) quotes a film director Alan Tanner of the film *La Vallée Fantome* (1987), expression: *cinema is like cancer* then correcting himself *No, it is infectious as AIDS*. This simile entertains the idea that cinema is not only addictive but infectious, in the sense that movie fanatics are continuously recruited into the cinema audience. Relating this to the spread of AIDS, statistics attest that the number of seropositive persons is on the rise. Figuratively speaking, the global spread of AIDS virus is likened to cinema addiction tendencies witnessed among movie fanatics (Sontag, 1988). Echoing President Kenneth Kaunda's PROPAGATION OF AIDS IS A JOURNEY metaphor in his reasoning that concentrated efforts should have been invested in containing the disease, rather than channeling much attention towards its origin, Dr. S. I. Onkware, the head of Uganda national AIDS council, employs AIDS IS A SNAKE conceptual metaphor by arguing, ...*There is a snake in the house. Do you sit and ask where the snake came from? Should you be more concerned with what action needs to be taken now that the snake is in the house?*...(Sabatier, 1988: 92-93). The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (2007) defines a *snake*[15] as a reptile having an elongated cylindrical limbless body. In a general perspective, snakes are dichotomized into venomous snakes and non-venomous snakes, with the former being lethal as opposed to the latter category. When employed figuratively, a *snake* entertains the following ideas: a treacherous or deceitful person or thing, a secret enemy or lurking danger. An expression such as *Beware! He is a snake in the grass* captures the aforementioned notion. And to elaborate further, within the embodied experience of Christians, the fall from grace of humanity has been greatly pegged on the serpent's deceitfulness, which first convinced Eve into eating the forbidden fruit in the Garden of Eden and she persuaded Adam to eat the same fruit. Discontented with man's disobedience, God cursed the serpent as articulated in the Biblical passage quoted below:

> ...because thou has done this, thou art cursed above all cattle, and above every beast of the field, upon thy belly shall thou go, and dust shall thou eat all the days of thy life; and **I will put enmity between**

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15 We have diverse experiences with the snake, for instance the Greeks, Romans and the Norse regarded snakes as manifestations of the gods. Among the Egyptians, the snake was perceived as the symbol of fertility. However, from the Christian's perspective, in some biblical verses snakes are viewed negatively, while in others, people are encouraged to be as wise as snakes. And even in medicine, the symbol of the snake was adapted to demonstrate its healing power which has a biblical origin.

thee and the woman and between thy seed and her seed; it shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise her heel...(The Holy Bible-The King James Version, 1992, Genesis 3: 1-14)

From the above citation, it is crystal clear that right from the Book of Genesis and from the general knowledge of Christians, the relationship between humanity and the snake has ever since been on the warpath, of course exceptions would be snake charmers or persons passionate about keeping snakes as pets. As commissioned by God in the Bible, whenever one encounters a snake, you will either struggle to kill it or alternatively the snake will strike you prior to your attack. On the other hand, a *house* has numerous meanings, but adhering to this context its confined meaning is an abode, a dwelling place, and by extension, denotes members residing in that particular home. As a result of the parallel mutual adjustment of implicatures and explicatures, the ad hoc concepts SNAKE* and HOUSE* denote a secret enemy possessing a lethal venom and the world houses humanity.

Further, the AIDS AS A SNAKE metaphor resurfaces in a comment on AIDS prevention made by the President of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni was quoted in a Ugandan press called *The New Vision* as cited in De Waal (2006: 99) that *a person who keeps poking his fingers into every hole in anthills, ultimately gets beaten by a snake.* If we liaise with our background cognition to comprehend the figurative statement, in some African societies, termites are a local delicacy and a viable source of proteins. They can be either consumed raw or fried depending on one's preference. However, once termites have effortlessly toiled to construct an anthill, for some reason or another, the termites desert the anthill which ultimately becomes the haven for venomous snakes or even relatively harmless rodents like moles. Therefore, an unsuspecting "termiter harvester" who regularly uses his bare hands without any gloves in his "termite harvesting escapades" will one day fail to get his appetizing dish of "fresh termites" but will be an unfortunate victim of a snake bite. Now, if we transpose this information onto our cognitive faculties and process it within the AIDS context, President Museveni is strongly discourging a multi-partnered sexual lifestyle in his condemnation of promiscuity, driven by the mantra of "variety is the spice of life" while aimlessly seeking for sexual pleasure from any quarter is figuratively represented in the expression; *poking ones fingers into every hole in anthills.* It is arguable that the imagery evoked here is a re-enactment of sexual penetration without protection. Unfortunately, for this particular "termite-harvester", the grave repercussions of his blind "termite-harvesting skills" results into a "lethal snake bite", the latter figuratively represents AIDS virus, hence putting his life at risk in the name of looking for "termites" minus the necessary "protection".

Continuing with the African hypothesis discussion, this theory has been bolstered by several factors[16]. Moreover, other raised questions sought to establish with exactitude the manner in which HIV crossed over to human beings. Moreover, it was unclear to scientists how American homosexuals contracted the disease. Several "exotic" proposals were brought forth like, there were polio vaccines contaminated with monkey cells and administered to Africans based in Congo region. This theory has since been dismissed by scientists (cf. Agadazi, 1989 and Avert, 2008a). Others hypothesized using the hunter theory that probably monkey hunters in Central Africa region had wounds, hence acting as a bridge ferrying the virus from its host into humans. A close relative of this theory explores a myriad of "maybes" like maybe hunters consumed raw infected monkey meat or even prostitutes were paid by rich tourists to engage in bestiality acts with monkeys. Another angle proposed by scientists is that AIDS must have previously existed in endemic forms in some isolated regions of the world for instance the Caribbean or Africa. Catalysts such as urbanization or rural-urban migration must have spearheaded its global propagation to regions where people lacked immunity hence becoming virulent. Such theories have received a negative reception in Third World countries and regarded as racially slanderous by scholars such as Sabatier (1988), Mann *et al.* (1989), Farmer (1992), and Schoepf (2004a, 2004b).

Having explored the African hypothesis, a Haitian connection to the pandemic is examined. According to Farmer (1992), Sabatier (1988), Doka (1997), Chin (2007) and Avert (2008a), around the mid 1970s, a cultural exchange program was initiated between the Zaire and Haiti governments. Following the vacuum created by the exit of the Belgians, several Haitians immigrated to Zaire to engage in economic development within the Congo region. It is insinuated that Haitians must have contracted AIDS from Zaire. Thereafter, infected Haitians introduced HIV to their homeland upon returning from Africa. Further, Haitian immigrants in America equally spread it there. Farmer (*ibid*) and Schoepf (2004b) have unanimously rejected the Haitian connection theory and even other theories alluding that Haitians contracted AIDS by consuming uncooked African swine meat or through voodoo cults involving blood rituals. In this connection, Farmer cites a faithful Haitian connection disciple who resorts to

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16 First and foremost, compared to other world regions, the Congo region has traditionally recorded the highest number of seropositive persons worldwide. Second, there was concrete scientific evidence showing striking similarities between the Simian Immune Virus (SIV) found in African green monkeys and HIV. Apparently, SIV causes AIDS-like illness in macaque Asian monkeys, hence providing sufficient evidence that there was a viral cross-over from primates to humans. Scientists like Montagnier & Gallo (1989) whose scientific teams discovered the AIDS virus argued that SIV is only 50% related HIV thus disqualifying it as the actual ancestor of HIV. More puzzling is the immunity of the African green monkeys predominantly found in the Asian continent, where AIDS was virtually uncommon in the early eighties.

figurativeness in conveying his thoughts on Haiti being regarded as a potential source of HIV captured in these words: ... *A clue from the grave, as though a zombie, leaving a trail of unwinding gauze, bandages and rotting flesh, had come to the hospital's Grand Rounds to pronounce a curse...* (p: 2). Looking at the imagery used in describing AIDS in terms of graveyards, zombies and rotting flesh, invites the conceptualization of AIDS IS DEATH PERSONIFIED or AIDS IS A CURSE. Apparently, this comment coincides with the famous 1987 Australian's *Grim Reaper AIDS campaign* shown in *Poster 4*. In advertisements, the Australian audience was served with an image of a decomposing grim the reaper who every night indiscriminately bowled over human skittles in an underworld bowling alley. In this alley, no baby, child, man or woman was spared from its merciless assaults and elimination. Although the campaign had its pros of successfully forcing down the throats of Australians the harsh realities of AIDS. Its cons were manifested in dissenting voices, critiquing its imagery as both disturbing and traumatizing to its audience, thus reinforcing AIDS stigma in Australia (cf. Winn, 1991: 34, Avert, 2008b). Borrowing a leaf from Lakoff & Johnson (1980), personification of death as grim reaper is cognitively accommodated by the PEOPLE ARE PLANTS metaphor. It floats the idea that people are harvested by the reaper, and death is conceptualized as an agent assigned the duty of claiming human lives in an expression like *his life was cut short by death*. Further, from an emotive angle, our feelings towards the reaper and feelings on death must be reconciled. Grim is a hooded skeleton, carrying his execution weapon, the scythe. In *Poster 4*, it is preventive measures against AIDS that endorses a one hundred percent protection against grim's scythe, which in the present context is the AIDS virus.

Poster 4: Australia's "Grim the reaper " AIDS poster

Source: AIDS ACTION (2008)

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Fauconnier & Turner (2002) present a mental representation of grim reaper's conceptualization with the aid of a conceptual blend. Their argument stipulates that grim is the final product emerging from a complex blend. The first space captures the reaper in a harvesting scenario. In the second space, there are elements describing a stereotypical human killer, the third space labelled human death presents the image of a dying person by capturing the actual state of dying. The fourth and fifth spaces under the label of causal tautology contain an abstract pattern of causality, where particular events or circumstances lead to someone's death. The final space presents us with Grim the Reaper's image as death personified in the blend's emergent structure as exemplified by both *Poster 4* and *Figure 11*.

Human Death

Causal Tautology

Killer

Reaper

Reaper

CAUSE

Being cut down

reaps

plant

Killer

CAUSE

dying

kills

victim

Manner
Specific event of dying
Individual

Empty cause
CAUSE
elements of class
of events

Death in General

CAUSE

Event of dying

by specific means

person who dies

Blend

Death the Grim Reaper
Reaping/Killing/ Causing Death
Plant/ Victim/ Person who dies

Figure 11: The Australian "Grim the reaper" blend
Source: Fauconnier & Turner (2002:292)

In terms of physical appearance, Evans & Green (2006) contend that grim reaper hosts metonymic aspects. First, the skeleton stands for death. Second, the hood covering the reaper's facial features

represents concealment typical of murderers or killers preference for masks. Third, the scythe stands for the manner grim executes his killing. And fourth, grim reaper emerges from the blend rather than from the input spaces. Taking cue from Australia, France's AIDS campaign has in the recent past incorporated personification using an eerie imagery of the deadly virus. For instance, using a poster of a nude man tightly clutched within the embrace of a monstrous scorpion, with its venomous sting already directed towards his spinal cord or a woman making love to a gigantic spider as exemplified in *Poster 5*. In this pictorial metaphor[17] of AIDS IS A VENOM, there are no glaring dissimilarities between grim the reaper, a scorpion or spider. They sufficiently meet all qualifications of potential death emissaries either in the form of a scythe or a venomous sting, hence it is crystal clear the victim's fate has been sealed. Borrowing a leaf from Greek mythology, among proposed theories justifying Orion[18] The Hunter's death is one advancing the thesis that Artemis, Apollo sister, sent a giant scorpion to eliminate Orion, for she remained green-eyed towards his amorous relationships with women like Eos, the goddess of dawn. A striking issue is a replay of Orion's death appears in France's poster where the scorpion is the emissary of death (cf. The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2003: 1000). Lakoff & Turner (1989: 17) confirm our line of argument in their statement that death personified is equally manifested in the imagery of a beast trying to devour somebody, apparently this idea is well captured by both the monstrous scorpion and gigantic spider in *Poster 5*.

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17 Forceville (1991) posits that there are verbal and non verbal metaphors, the former exists in most constructions, while the latter is represented in a pictorial form. Pictorial metaphors adhere to conceptual mapping principles from the source domain to the target domain. In the interpretation of pictorial metaphors aspects such as denotation and connotation are quite helpful.

18 In the Greek mythology, Orion the hunter was renown for his handsomeness and hunting prowess. According to some legends, he was probably Poseidon's son. At one moment, he fell in love with Merope, Oenipion's daughter, and ended up assaulting her. Driven by vengeance, Oenipion made Orion blind. Fortunately, Orion's vision was restored by the sun's rays and he later relocated to Crete to live with Artemis (daughter of Zeus). Legend has it that Artemis was in love with Orion and upon learning of his amorous relationship with Eos, Artemis sent a scorpion to exterminate Orion. Other variants advance the theory that Apollo (Artemis's brother) masterminded Orion's death, another variant is that of Mother Earth sending the scorpion to kill Orion for daring to hunt down any animal on Earth. (cf. The New Enyclopaedia of Britannica, (2003) and Buxton, R. (2004: 76) The Complete World of Greek Mythology. London: Thames and Hudson Limited)

Poster 5: France's AIDS campaign posters

Source: http://scienceblog.com/omnibrain/2007/04/disturbing_french_aids_poster.php.

Still within the context of graveyards and death, in Tanzania among the Sukuma tribe, AIDS is referred to as *pembe nne* (four corners). By using the *four corners´* title, the Sukuma community is employing category extension, whereby the geometrical shape of graveyards and coffins, normally rectangular in shape is interpretively used in reference to the killer disease. The term *pembe nne* stems from their embodied experience with AIDS based on the numerous burials of departed friends or family members. The extended sense of death by conventional metaphors is clearly captured by the Kenyan AIDS *Poster 6* used as a sensitization tool, whereby the former Catholic Archbishop of Nairobi diocese: Nding'i Mwana a' Nzeki is used as a paragon[19], representing the clergy's views on AIDS, who basically subscribe to the thesis of chastity before matrimony.

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19 Lakoff (1987) talks of paragons as cognitive models used in categorization. In this scenario, one uses a popular idol and adopts it as a prototype or role model for the entire category. For instance, Shakespeare is a role model for poets, as Chomsky is for Linguists. Contrastively, relevance theorists treat it as category extension, where Ndingi represents any spiritual leader who supports abstinence as an AIDS prevention strategy.

Poster 6: Pamoja Tuangamize UKIMWI campaign in Kenya (Together we can stop AIDS campaign)

Source: NACC (2008)

A much simpler explanation accompanying the poster is that AIDS is compared to serving term in prison. In this particular case, one's health is imprisoned by ailments or rather opportunistic infections. The on-line parallel mutual adjustment of implicatures and explicatures, reliably allows addressees to arrive at the most relevant interpretation of the poster that AIDS jeopardizes any chance of living a disease-free lifestyle. Rather, one's health is enslaved by diseases marking the end of a disease-free lifestyle. In reality, AIDS is not a prison where people serve life sentences, neither has it overcrowded cells nor stern prison wardens. Nevertheless, liaising with our encyclopaedic entries, we merely transpose a sub-set of the prison environment features like: prolonged suffering, social seclusion, psychological and physical torture onto the ad hoc concept AIDS PRISON*. In this respect, like prisoners, AIDS patients equally suffer psychologically and healthwise. In numerous ways, they are stigmatized and socially secluded by uninfected persons hence commissioning the "death" of their social lives. For prisoners, a life sentence seems eternal, in the same vein, seropositive persons perceive prolonged illness as endless suffering. The abstinence option, has an assurance of a disease-free lifestyle. It is arguable that abstinence is synonymous to chastity and is one of the Christian virtues preached in any pulpit. For African medics[20] and health practitioners, abstinence is the safest way of preventing AIDS and a person upholding abstinence comfortably reduces chances of infection. In a

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20 In the African continent delayed sexual debut among the youths is encouraged by health practictioners, this means youths are encouraged to abstain and if they are unable to do so, they have the option of using condoms, see the analysis in the ABC AIDS slogan in section 2.2.1

similar perspective, rarely will a law abiding citizen be caught on the wrong side of the law. Below is a conceptual blend having a single-scope network capturing our discussed ideas under the image schema of CONTRACTING AIDS IS IMPRISONMENT OR HAVING AIDS IS PRISON. A simplified translation of *Figure 12* in conceptual integration terms is that the blend's framing input is governed by the prisons frame, while its focus input is designed within the context of chastity as presented in the blend.

Generic space.

CONCEPT
NATURE
MODE OF PREVENTION

Input space　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　**Input space**

AIDS
DEADLY LONG TERM AILMENT
ABSTINENCE

PRISON
ENFORCED CONFINEMENT
ABIDE BY THE LAW

AIDS /
DEADLY LONG TERM AILMENT/
IMPRISONED HEALTH
Blend　ABSTINENCE/ ABIDE BY THE LAW

Figure 12: Abstinence is not a life sentence. AIDS is blend

Alternatively, the ICM treatment of the *Abstinence is not a life sentence. AIDS is* slogan, based on the negation *not* is outside the cognitive model, it therefore foregrounds the AIDS IS A LIFE SENTENCE cognitive model against a background advocating for ABSTINENCE AS A LIFE SENTENCE model, meaning that the negation actually nullifies the concept of *Abstinence as being a life sentence* and embraces a cognitive model promoting the conceptualization of *AIDS as a life sentence,* of which the latter corresponds to the interpretation that emerges after the elaboration process has taken place in a

blend.

In some countries like Zaire as observed by Schoepf (2004a, 2004b) and Iliffe (2006), because of the conspiracy theory[21], most Zaireans in the 1980s lived in denial to the extent of corroborating the French acronym *Syndrome Immunodéficitaire Acquis* (SIDA) to *Syndrome Imaginaire pour Decourager des Amoureux* (Imaginary Syndrome to Discourage Lovers). Its South African counterpart was dubbed *Afrikaner Invention to Deprieve of us Sex* (cf. Philips, 2004: 34). In Zaire, faithful adherents of this thesis virtually denied the existence of AIDS and fronted myopic beliefs that "healthy looking" individuals were supposedly immune to HIV. In an attempt to avert mass deaths in Zaire, the government resorted to use a pictorial metaphor of a termite-infested tree, depicting a tree at various stages of wilting and life slowly ebbing out from it until its ultimate death. In terms of metaphoricity, the image articulates the PEOPLE ARE PLANTS metaphor, where one day we are budding with life and the next day we expire. In addition to this, it conveys the idea that AIDS is a long term ailment, unbias, with everyone being susceptible to infection. Borrowing ideas from the conceptual blending theory (cf. Fauconnier & Turner, 2002), the termite-infested tree is a perfect example of how vital relations are fully operational in the blend. This simply means that for purposes of local understanding, Zaireans were able to comprehend the message via vital relations as traced in the following manner. The time vital relation was compressed in the blend such that the 10 year asymptomatic latent period was compressed into clips showing the tree in various stages of falling until its ultimate death is marked by its falling. Whereas, representation relation comes in whereby on one hand, the tree corresponds to the human body. On the other hand, the termites represent the virus.

According to The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (2007) termites easily ingest wood and their destructiveness neither spares trees nor any timber products. Using this encyclopaedic information from their backstage cognition, Zaireans via analogy relation were able to relate the destructiveness of termites in trees, to the actual elimination of white blood cells by HIV, hence watering down one's immunity leading to death. Armed with such an understanding, Zaireans must have employed the cause and effect vital relation to deduce that the tree's death was instigated by termites. To be precise, it is an effect of the wood being devoured by termites. In the same light, HIV causes death in humans hence

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21 This theory on the origin of AIDS contends that the HIV virus is a genetically engineered biological warfare, hatched in the US under the auspice of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) at 1977 at Fort Detrick, Maryland. (cf. Ogot, 2004:1, Barnett & Whiteside 2006: 7, Chin, 2007: 8)

the immediate effect of a collapsed immune system triggered by the virus. In this respect, our argument is that the image schema guiding the pictorial metaphor is LIFE IS A TREE or PEOPLE ARE PLANTS. As long as we are alive, we are standing, our death on the other hand, is symbolized by our falling, as presented by the termite-infested tree.

Up to this point, we are conversant with many metaphors emerging from the semantic field of cosmology and religion coined from the tree as a symbol of life motif in many cultures. Titles referring to such a tree converge around the cosmic tree, world tree, tree of life or tree of knowledge. In Norse mythology, the cosmic tree (yggdrassil) in *Figure 13,* is essentially a big ash tree supporting the whole universe. Its branches extend towards the heavens with parts of its roots ending up in the underworld (Niflheim), some sections stretch into the land of giants or humans (Johunheim) and other parts of the same roots venture into the domain of gods (Asgard). Along its base, three wells christened: the well of fate (Urdarbrunnr), source of wisdom (Mimibrunnr) and the dwelling place of a monster that gnawned at the tree's roots known as the roaring kettle (Hvergelmir), are found (cf. The New Encylopaedia Britannica, 2003: 841). An interesting angle developed by the Encyclopaedia Americana (1977: 677) and O´ Donoghue (2007) is that the same cosmic tree's roots were constantly being consumed by serpents, while its leaves eaten by snags. Shortly, the metaphor governing the tree is a representation of the antagonism between life and death since the serpents, snags and the monster pose a major threat to the cosmic tree's survival. In this sense, a re-enactment of a similar phenomenon recurs in the Zairean pictorial metaphor of the termite-infested tree. The New Encyclopaedia Britannica (*ibid*) argues the world tree represents a human understanding of cosmos approached from two angles under the theses of the tree of knowledge and tree of life. In the former, the tree diagrammed in *Figure 13*, acts a bridge separating heavens and earth, symbolizing relations between the gods and men. In the latter approach, the tree is perceived as the source of life under the watchful eye of supernatural beings, hence echoing the Garden of Eden scenario. In this respect, the tree symbolizes immortality. Unfortunately, if for any reason whatsoever the tree is cut down, then it ceases to exist thereby suffering a similar fate as the Zairean AIDS pictorial metaphor.

Figure 13:Yggdrassil world tree diagram

Source: Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_tree. (Consulted on 3rd March 2008)

The Zairean termite-infested tree metaphor is closely related to a Kenyan term describing a seropositive person in *Sheng'*, a Kiswahili slang, by saying *Anamdudu*, literally meaning *He has the insect*, where the ad hoc concept INSECT*, is lexically narrowed to denote the AIDS virus (cf. Kang'ethe, 2004). The expression is synonymous to another Kenyan expression *He is sick,* which equally undergoes lexical narrowing, where SICK* encoded meaning is *he is seropositive*. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that within Haiti and the Eastern African region, AIDS is metonymically referred to as the *SLIM* disease* (cf. Sabatier, 1988, Adagazi, 1989, Montagnier and Gallo, 1989; Farmer, 1992 and Poku, 2005), the concept of SLIMNESS specifically stems from severe weight loss as an AIDS symptom induced by diarrhoea or any other opportunistic infections. The metonymy outlined here relies on slimness as an AIDS symptom to effectively represent the killer disease. In many African societies, slimness was highly discouraged, as it made one look unhealthy, as *slimness* was a symptom of malnourishment and ill-health. Therefore, by labelling AIDS the slim disease, to some extent reinforces the stigma associated with it, for in most cases judging, from one's queer slim physique especially after being subjected to a marathon of opportunistic infections, it becomes easier to pinpoint a seropositive person. Closely related to the figurative use of deficiency as an AIDS symptom, in France, Louis Pauwels described some striking students as *ils sont atteint du sida mental* (they are suffering from mental AIDS) for their questionable intellectualism (cf. Sontag, 1988). In other words, their intelligence had been watered down in the same manner AIDS drains one's immunity.

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From another viewpoint, other people perceive CONTRACTING AIDS IS A MISFORTUNE or CONTRACTING AIDS IS AN ACCIDENT depending on their conceptualization of the disease. Sabatier (1988: 124) cites a truck driver plying between Dar-es Salaam in Tanzania and Rwanda, unshaken by AIDS, the driver contends that "...*It is one of the risks you have to face. For example my truck might **breakdown** in a **dangerous place** or I might have an **accident**. AIDS is no worse*..." (see also, Warwick, Aggleton and Thomas, 1988 and Mshana *et al.* 2006). A similar reaction is surprisingly noted by Silberschmidt (2004: 240) when interviewing men on AIDS and Masculinities in Tanzania as a male interviewee said "*You never know if you will be run over by a **matatu** or **dala dala** (local bus in Kenya and Tanzania respectively) to-morrow ... why should this prevent me from walking in the street*". In this regard, we witness cases of figurativeness in AIDS discourse, as a truck driver uses an analogy of *a mechanical breakdown in a dangerous place* or *an accident* imported from his driving experiences in explaining how AIDS is contracted, and in either case it is the victim who suffers most. For the Tanzanian man, one's multi-partnered sexual lifestyle that leads one to contract AIDS is associated with a spontaneous "road accident". However, that should not deter him from pursuing his sexual relationships with women as articulated in his expression " *Why should this prevent me from walking in the street* ". To the best of our knowledge, a street is the melting pot of all sorts of characters, mostly strangers to us. In this sense, the man is rather careless with his choice of words regarding his sexual life. In other words, one is tempted to think that he is not cautious with his sex life, and will easily go out with anyone in the "street".

Related to the notion of unprecedented accidents in expressing one's understanding of AIDS, Frankenberg (1989: 26) cites Princess Anne[22], Queen Elizabeth's daughter for having commented metaphorically on the AIDS pandemic that: *mankind has scored an own goal against itself*. The concept of HUMANITY SCORING AN OWN GOAL AGAINST ITSELF* from Princess Anne's comment simply slices a subset of features from the football semantic field, where it is almost sacrilegious for any footballer to score against his own team. In fact, if anything such a move is unthinkable in any match and should be avoided at all costs. With this knowledge, the soccer semantic domain hosts the ad hoc concept SCORED AN OWN GOAL AGAINST ITSELF,* to denote the grave repercussions for immorality among human beings, is likened to scoring against one's own team. Another reading into Princess Anne's comment of *humanity scoring an own goal against itself* is that it

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22 Princess Anne is also referred as The Princess Royal

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is embodied in the British fanaticism with soccer. It is an open secret that the British football teams such as Manchester United, Liverpool and Arsenal have an international audience and fanatics. Moreover, football as Britain's national sport is not taken lightly. Having been born and bred in the British football culture, Princess Anne simply singles out one of crimes of football to register her personal conceptualization of AIDS.

From a theological viewpoint and an extended sense of CONTRACTING AIDS IS AN ACCIDENT OR IS A MISFORTUNE, unlike cases of unplanned accidents discussed above, the occurrence of misfortune is pegged on sin or some supernatural causative agent (cf. Sperber, 1996, Boyer, 2001). Going by Sontag (1988) and Bujra (2002), some people conceptualize AIDS as a form of divine retribution for flouting societal mores associated with sexuality. Bujra (2002: 29) figuratively contends that the clergy perceive

> AIDS is a big stick sent by Almighty God to warn people, a constant reminder that they should refrain from wickedness and uphold faithfulness in their matrimonial lives or else suffer a horrible death.

The ad hoc concept BIG STICK* is synonymous to a *cane* and a most suitable definition provided by the New Oxford American Dictionary (2005: 250) for *cane* in our discussion is "a slender stick used as an instrument of retribution". In this sense, the image schema is AIDS IS DIVINE PUNISHMENT, with the cane lexically broadened to represent AIDS as a symbol of retribution, discipline and reformation. From this standpoint, some Christians had even christened AIDS as "Wrath of God Syndrome" (WOGS) marking the genesis of the Apocalypse (cf. Doka, 1997: 63).

Other social-cultural explanations for AIDS fall within the black magic context. To contextualize this school of thought below by referring to the renown works of the anthropologist Evans-Pritchard among the Azande community in Sudan, Pritchard (1937: 64) argues

> Witchcraft participates in all misfortune, and is the idiom in which Azande speak about them, and explain them. Witchcraft is a classification of misfortunes, while differing from each in other respects have a single common character their harmfulness to man

For Farmer (1992), Haitians initially understood AIDS as voodoo or an ailment caused by black magic. In Zambia, it was equated with *tuyebela,* synonymous to sorcery as people sought a mythical

explanation for the disease as caused by *invisible insects sent by sorcerers* (Sabatier, 1988: 127). Such a view of AIDS might appear irrational but appears rational in certain cultures and becomes not only relevant but quickly widespread. It is counterintuitive as Sperber (1996) and Boyer (2001) would argue for it takes the normal INSECT ontological category, and apprends to it special features like invisibility and emissaries of sorcerers. The concept blatantly defies naive biology doctrines such that scientifically AIDS is caused by a virus and not *invisible insects sent by sorcerers*. Even in Zaire and South Africa as pointed out by Schoepf (2004b) and Phillips (2004) respectively, AIDS was initially pegged on sorcery. Further, among the Luo in Kenya, for a longtime AIDS was associated with *chira*. The latter is culturally defined as a curse befalling anyone who flouts social norms or taboo like in the case of incest. *Chira* by association shares certain symptoms with AIDS especially if one uses weight-loss as a paradigm. The marked difference being *chira* is contained through traditional rituals, unlike AIDS which remains incurable. As such AIDS IS TABOO schema was and still is prevalent in some African societies as in Gabon and Congo where it was labelled *mwanza* and in Ethiopia as *amenmin* (cf. Iliffe, 2006). In Tanzania, the Sukuma speech community have two mental models for AIDS in their cultural cognition: "the real AIDS" and "the false AIDS". The former is the incurable killer disease and the latter also called *lusumbo* and is a folk model of a "curable" AIDS, for its victim has been bewitched by masters of the dark arts. Such an AIDS classification is misguided and dangerous because AIDS is incurable and equally an infectious disease (cf. Mshana, *et al.*, 2006). Shortly, it can be deduced that some African communities have AIDS IS TABOO or AIDS IS SORCERY image schemas. From this viewpoint, the nearest cultural representation of fearful aspects associated with AIDS is explained under the witchcraft conceptual framework coupled with the fact that for almost two decades its origin has been enigmatic. Moreover, most mysterious phenomena are culturally associated with sorcery or superstition. Another twist to the AIDS pandemic elevated to a mythical level is a popular myth in some South African communities is that having intercourse with virgins cures AIDS (cf. Philips, 2004 and Schoepf, 2004b). This again is a fallacy conspicuously lacking a scientific backing.

In an entirely different perspective, faithful adherents of the denial culture adopt AIDS IS A MYTH conceptual metaphor to justify their cause. In their view, there is no oddity in uttering statements like: *There is no AIDS, I do not believe in AIDS, AIDS does not exist* and *there are no people dying of AIDS*. By challenging AIDS's existence such statements uphold an utopian thesis of an "AIDS-free" world. Besides diversity in conceptualizations of AIDS across cultures, even HIV prevention techniques are

unexempted from ubiquitous usage of figurative language, for instance in Switzerland as observed by Magonya (2007), there are slogans like: *Ne sautez jamais sans filet* (Do jump without a net), or *comme un gant* (it fits perfectly) are promoting condom usage. Talking about AIDS clearly exhibits various levels of metaphoricity, and in addition to the Zairean case, in Uganda during the onset of AIDS, people were encouraged to "zero graze" (cf. Montagnier & Gallo, 1989; Mann *et. al.*, 1989 and Obbo, 2004). Zero grazing springs from the semantic field of dairy farming where cattle feed on hay in paddocks (cf. Collins English Dictionary, 1995). This means their movement is restricted therefore impeding cattle from grazing freely. At the back our minds, we know that it is virtually impossible for human beings to zerograze. Cross-checking with the Darwinism school of thought, there is no tangible evidence in the course of evolution certifying that man once evolved into a cow to graze freely with other animals. Nevertheless, as an ad hoc concept, ZERO GRAZING* is employed interpretively in the field of behaviour change communication to mean confining oneself to one faithful partner as opposed to leading a multi-partnered sexual lifestyle. Conversely, in the East African context there are two widespread similes that counter the AIDS prevention discourse by belittling condom use in expressions like: *using protection is like eating a sweet with a wrapper* or *using protection is like taking a shower with a raincoat on* (cf. Obbo, 2004: 81 and Schoepf, 2004a: 34). From these comments, a computation of implicit assumptions and their respective conclusions are shown in (22)

(22) X utters (as basic level explicature): "Practising safer sex is like eating a sweet with a wrapper."

Higher level explicature: X is suggesting that practising safer sex is like eating a sweet with a wrapper.

Implicit assumption: Sweets are never eaten with their wrappers. If one eats a sweet with its wrapper, he is not in a position to fully appreciate its sweetness. That being the case using protection makes sex less pleasurable.

Implicit conclusion: I will not use protection.

A similar procedure is applicable to the expression *using protection is like showering with a raincoat on*. In ordinary situations, people enjoy their shower minus their clothes on. The implicit assumption here is that people shower in the nude. Therefore, if one takes a shower with a raincoat, the body is denied an opportunity of coming into contact with the water. Meaning no showering has actually taken

place. In the same vein, the implicit conclusion in (22) is echoed here. Other cultural stereotypes or folk models enhancing condom unpopularity in the African continent include: they are laced with the AIDS virus, they encourage promiscuity or they can affect the womb. Further, in most patriarchal African communities such as the Abagusii in Kenya, the Owambo in Namibia or Zulus in South Africa, it is almost sacrilegious for women to negotiate for safer sex for it generates the following implicit assumptions: unfaithfulness, promiscuity or mistrust of her partner (cf. Obbo, 2004; Heike, 2005 and Silberschmidt, 2005). Moreover, similar implicit assumptions and conclusions recur when women want to buy condoms as exemplified in (23) is our own understanding based on pragmatic principles:

23. *Supposing an African man and a woman wanted to separately buy a packet of Trust[23] condoms from a pharmacy, notice the pharmacist's gender-specific implicit assumptions:*

(23a) The African man says (the basic level explicature): May I have a packet of *Trust* condoms please.
   High level explicature: The African man is requesting for a packet of *Trust* condoms.
   Pharmacist's implicit assumption: This man is going to be intimate with his partner anytime soon and is buying condoms for protection.
   Pharmacist's implicit conclusion: This man is both responsible and cautious about his sexual life.

(23b) An African woman says (the basic level explicature): May I have a packet of *Trust* condoms please.
   Higher level explicature: The African woman is requesting for a packet of *Trust* condoms.
   Pharmacist's implicit assumption: This woman must be leading an immoral life.
   Pharmacist's implicit conclusion: This is an irresponsible woman who must either be a prostitute or a promiscuous person.

In the above scenario, we notice striking differences in the pharmacist's assumptions when dealing with a male customer and a female customer both buying a similar product meant to protect themselves from AIDS as outlined in (23a) and (23b). It is well documented that women are biologically susceptible to

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23 Trust is a brand for male condoms manufactured in Kenya.

contracting AIDS, the pharmacist's implicit assumptions and conclusions demean the female customer, while frustrating her efforts towards protecting herself against AIDS. Pejorative labels such as "promiscuous", "loose " or " immoral" emerging from the negative implicit assumptions and conclusions in (23b) are abhorred by any woman. Strange enough, the man in (23a) is accorded more rational implicit assumptions and conclusions that categorize him as a responsible being. As outlined above, these gender-specific implicit assumptions, conclusions and categorization of women in this scenario impact negatively on the fight against AIDS. Supposing the pharmacist's puts the female customer's assumptions on the same pedestal as her male counterpart, certainly more African women would be aggressive in practising safe sex minus the pejorative assumptions (cf. sections 5.7.9 and 5.7.9.1). Contrastively, in a European society like Switzerland, where safer sex practices are not only culturally acceptable, the LOVE LIFE STOP AIDS campaign has explored erotism in pictorial metaphors. The image metaphors convey the message that failure to practise safe sex among persons is likened to engaging in risky sports like fencing without the necessary clothing as shown in *Poster 7*. As noted by Magonya (2007), the message sells idea that man's body is vulnerable and must be at all costs protected against HIV by taking the necessary precautions with one's sexuality.

Poster 7: Switzerland's Love Life "STOP AIDS" 2006 campaign

Source: Swiss Federal Office of Public Health (SFOPH, 2005)

2.3.1 The AIDS cognitive model

As outlined in the extensive discussions in previous section, we have attempted to structure various conceptualizations of AIDS worldwide, in outlining conceptual metaphors AIDS lives by, examples include: AIDS IS WAR, PROPAGATION OF AIDS IS A JOURNEY, AIDS IS DEATH, AIDS IS DIVINE RETRIBUTION, CONTRACTING AIDS IS AN ACCIDENT OR A MISFORTUNE, PEOPLE ARE PLANTS, AIDS IS A SNAKE, AIDS IS GRIM REAPER/DEATH PERSONIFIED, AIDS IS TABOO, AIDS IS A MYTH and AIDS IS SORCERY. These metaphors are few pointers of how society has in recent past depicted AIDS negatively based on our embodied experience with AIDS, and to avoid unnecessarily duplication of material so far discussed, our experiences can be summarized within an AIDS cognitive as shown in *Figure 14.*

7. DEATH (*Pembe nne* in Tanzania metonymically geometrical shape of the coffin)
(Loss of the AIDS war by the death of AIDS victims)

1. **AIDS IS A KILLER DISEASE** represented by the
(Logical form= AIDS CAUSES DEATH)
metaphorical mental representation
of death: a snake in Uganda,
Grim Reaper in Australia, a gigantic scorpion
or spider in France. Destructive forces of nature
for instance a violent wind, destructive pests such as termites
or caterpillars see section 5.7.6

Intellectual weakness: In France (*Ils ont le sida mental*- Sontag (1988)
Silimu (Slim/Wasting Disease) East African metonymy
(*metaphoric and metonymic expressions capturing the weakening
aspect of AIDS*)

2. PROPAGATION OF AIDS IS A JOURNEY
*What is important than knowing where this disease came from is
where it is going* (Sabatier,1988: 33)
Factors spearheading the spread of AIDS: Gays- metonymic expression-Gay plague,
In Tanzania, the dues paid for prostitution stands for the killer disease
Two hundred shillings. (Mshana, *et al.* (2006)
or the aerial means of AIDS propagation, *the Jumbo Jet disease*)

6. LOSING THE AIDS WAR (AIDS is incurable, for the time being we only strive
to contain it by prevention, as we are yet to defeat it)

Fighting Political Foes: *Ils sont Sidatiques* (Le Pen in France, cf. Sontag, 1988)

(metaphorical extension of FIGHTING AIDS IS WAR metaphor in a political arena)

*Accidents
happen in
journeys*

Pro-AIDS discourse
Champions play it safe
(Kenyan poster V, see chapter 5)
-Zero graze (Obbo, 2004)

Counter AIDS discourse
-*Mets les preservatifs à l'index*[24]
(French clergy)
-*AIDS does not exist* (a common expression
especially in low prevalence areas)
-*Using protection is like eating a sweet with its wrapper*
(cf. Obbo, 2004: 81, Schoepf, 2004a: 34)

5. FIGHTING AIDS IS WAR
In Ghana: *Put the boot on AIDS*
Take the firing squad on AIDS (cf. Bujra, 2002)

3. CONTRACTING AIDS IS AN ACCIDENT
Misfortunes/supernatural causes
*You never know if you will be runned down by a
matatu* or *dala dala* (public transport vehicle in
either in Kenya or Tanzania), Silberschmidtl (2004)

*Enemies are always
fought*

*The AIDS journey towards the human-
body*

4 AIDS IS A FOE TO THE HUMAN BODY
It breaks down your resistance (cf. Warwick, *et al,* 1988, 114)

Figure 14: THE AIDS COGNITIVE MODEL

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24 This example was given by my supervisor, Professor Jacques Moeschler during our discussions on the counter AIDS
discourse among the French clergy who were against the use of condoms in France by using the expression *Mets les
preservatifs à l'index.*

Moreover, using a Lakoffian approach, we can deduce from our line of discussion that AIDS is a radical category having its central and peripheral components captured in *Figure 15*. On one hand, central categories depict AIDS negatively using imageries such as death personified like Grim reaper and the serpent, accidents, misfortunes, destructive supernatural forces like sorcery, beasts and destructive pests like termites or metonymic representations of AIDS by using a coffin to stand in for death. On the other hand, peripheral categories are less representative cognitive models of what AIDS is for instance erroneous cognitive models such as AIDS is a myth, talking about AIDS is a taboo or AIDS is sorcery. At this point, we want to stress that AIDS as sorcery can be categorized as both a radical category and peripheral category. AIDS falls in the former category if one employs witchcraft as an interpretive use of language to express a destructive force (cf. Pritchard, 1937:64). Witchcraft is a recurrent theme in most cartoons and fiction, where it impacts harm on others and can be likened to the destructive termite in the Zairean termite-infested tree metaphor. As regards to the latter category, whenever one opts to believe that AIDS is attributed to sorcery, then he is simply ignorant of the scientific truisms about the viral disease.

Figure 15: Cultural Conceptualizations of AIDS

Central categories

AIDS as a snake, termite, Grim reaper, gigantic, scorpion coffin , accident and sorcery

Peripheral categories

AIDS as a taboo, AIDS as sorcery, AIDS as a myth

2.4 GLOBAL OVERVIEW OF THE PANDEMIC

A proper description accounting for the global propagation of AIDS across continental spheres is disproportionately patterned, with heightened mortality rates skewed towards African, Asian and

Caribbean nations. By contrast, records of lower prevalence rates are registered in Northern countries where AIDS is regarded as a chronic disease. Adding to this, there is overwhelming evidence of regional diversity of the risk groups, a factor some scholars consider as mirroring cultural lifestyles in different societies. Taking the example of the African cultural setting, HIV transmission is primarily via heterosexual relations, with vulnerable groups being women and young adults falling in the age bracket of fifteen (15) to twenty four (24) years. A plethora of factors accounting for the spread of AIDS across continental Africa include: gender-affiliated imbalances, culturally mandated multi-partnered relations or masculinities, biological factors, poverty, dilapidated health facilities, migrant labour, urbanization and ethnic wars (cf. Van Niekerk, 2005, UNAIDS, 2010). Whereas in European and Asian societies, high risk groups entail: IDUs, homosexuals and CSW. Cases of heterosexual transmission in European nations feature predominantly among immigrants from high prevalence regions.

Guiding our discussion with concrete evidence from the global UNAIDS report (2010), towards the end of 2009, the total number of people living with AIDS inclusive of children totalled 33.3 million, documented new infections were 2.6 million. Further, a continental analysis of UNAIDS (2010) data confirms that Africa bore the brunt of the disease by recording 1.3 million deaths. Being the homeland to 10% of the world's population, Africa hosts approximately 22.5 million PLWA, translating to (65%) of AIDS related cases globally. Nonetheless, what is surprising about the same continent is that the most affected countries located in southern Africa register peaked prevalence rates above (18%) examples are Zimbabwe (18%), South Africa (15% to 39%), Swaziland (26%) and Botswana (32%). On the contrary, Northern, Western and Eastern African countries recorded much lower prevalence rates as in Madagascar (0.2%), Nigeria between (1.6% and 10%), Senegal (0.7%), Burkina Faso (2%), Kenya (5.9%), and Somalia (2.3%) (UNAIDS, 2007). A cursory glance at urban and peri-urban statistics reveals that the former registered higher prevalence rates than the latter areas. To a great extent, geographical imbalances are predetermined by the usage of antiretroviral treatment by infected persons. In addition to this, certain cultural practices like male circumcision known to reduce chances of infection are widely practised in North and West Africa. Within Africa, Senegal and Uganda can be singled out as shining examples of nations that reversed the epidemic by discouraging certain aspects of their culture fuelling the spread of AIDS. For example, the Senegalese government ensured that both religious groups and civil societies preached safe sex in both religious and public circles, marking an increase in condom use in a conservative Muslim community. Such bold moves by the religious

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fraternity are yet to see the light of the day in countries where safe sex is demonized as the hallmark of immorality. In Uganda, a government's initiative launched AIDS campaigns in 1987 in sensitization of Ugandans at a time when the denial culture was rife in the region. Hence, publicly addressing matters of sexuality in a society where the discourse was muted. (cf. Kauffman, 2004 and Van Niekiek, 2005)

Moving away from the African continent, in Asia declines in prevalence rates have been noticed in Cambodia and Thailand. Unlike in Africa where AIDS transmission is predominantly in heterosexual relations, high risk groups in Asia comprise: IDUs, CSW, and Men who have sex with men (MSM). Contrastively, North America, Western and Central Europe, there are roughly 2.3 million PLWA, which is far much less than half of Asia's statistics, and ten times smaller than Africa. High risk groups in Europe are more or less similar to the ones found in Asia, MSM, CSW and also to some extent among heterosexuals immigrants from high prevalence regions. In summary, despite the declines and stabilized prevalence rates, various scholars have argued that the big bang effect of AIDS is yet to be realized, so far we are witnessing the iceberg's tip, its submerged portion is yet to rear its ugly head. In other words, the AIDS nightmare is far from over as attested by the global statistics in *Map 1* (cf. Barnett & Whiteside, 2006).

Map 1: GLOBAL ESTIMATES OF ADULTS AND CHILDREN LIVING WITH AIDS IN 2009

Eastern Europe and Central Asia 1.4 million

North America and Central Europe 2.3 million

South and South East Asia 4.9 million

Caribbean 240,000

Middle East and North Africa 460,000

Central and South America

Sub Saharan Africa 22.5 million

Oceania 57000

Total Number of People Living with AIDS: 33.3 million

Source: UNAIDS (2010: 23-61)

2.5 AIDS IN KENYA

This sub-section chronicles the scourge's development in Kenya; it provides a roadmap for its humble beginnings with specific attention on the underlying factors shaping the AIDS pandemic in Kenya. Confining the discussion to key issues to avoid digressing from the core notions of our study, the section's objective is geared towards tracing the growth of AIDS in Kenya in its examination of the government's position and machinery employed in curbing the scourge. In brief, such an account is relevant for the study's background by pinpointing both strengths and weaknesses of the Kenyan government in handling the pandemic from the eighties to its current status. By the end of this section, a reasonable explanation is offered in accounting for the AIDS situation in Kenya.

2.5.1. A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF AIDS IN KENYA

A discussion on the AIDS pandemic with reference to Kenya can be broadly dichotomized in two perspectives; the denial phase and governmental intervention phase. Under the realm of denial phase, initial AIDS reports in the eighties were treated with indifference especially from the governmental side. This was hardly peculiar for non-commitment towards AIDS related cases was an escapism vent for most African countries as well as their Northern counterparts. People naively hypothesized that AIDS was short-lived and its ultimate eradication was certain. As a matter of preference, most countries aligned themselves to the denial culture, as under-reporting and doctoring cases of HIV infection became the order of the day. Overwhelming was the AIDS stigma that its overall assessment was translated as economically incompatible with foreign investment and a foe to sustainable development. The onset of AIDS in Kenya was characterized by rationed governmental input in containing the scourge. The relatively few AIDS cases in Kenya, convinced the government that AIDS was more of a health issue to be solely handled by the Ministry of Health docket hence unworthy of national concern. Other reasons proposed for the government's inaction for almost sixteen years: belittlement of AIDS as less threatening than other ailments like Malaria, government indecisiveness in formulating policies and AIDS councils. Later, corruption, bad governance, sub-standard health facilities, exorbitant prices pegged on antiretrovirals by multinational companies and poverty were among a long catalogue of factors that characterized the scene during the first eleven years of the AIDS pandemic in Kenya (cf. Ogot, 2004).

Unknown to many, AIDS was underestimated thus a conducive environment was created for its unmonitored spread, even health practitioners were uncertain of the actual AIDS statistics in Kenya in the early eighties (cf. Nzioka, 2000 and NACC, 2004). Contrary to the United States where AIDS emerged around 1980, in Kenya, the earliest AIDS cases were around 1983 and its first victim was a Ugandan[25] journalist who passed on a year later (cf. Ogot, 2004). During the same period, Kenyan's prevalence rate was 3.3% and later rose between 20% and 30% by 2001, with a record of over 1.5 million deaths (MOH, 1993 and PSI, 2003). Owing to its relatively new status and an enigma to even

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25 According to the history of AIDS in East Africa, Uganda was the most devastated country by AIDS in the eighties which virtually depopulated many regions like Kagera. In Kenya, many foreigners died from the disease in particular those from Congo and her immediate neighbours. The AIDS belt in East Africa stretched from the Congo region, Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania among other East African nations, with prostitutes, migrant workers and long distant truck drivers fuelling its spread. (Ogot, 2004)

renown scientists, the Kenyan categorization of AIDS was demarcated along lines of high risk groups, branding AIDS a disease for prostitutes, truck drivers, promiscuous persons, urbanites and sinful persons. Naturally, the branding misguided some Kenyans not falling within the cited groups of "immunity" from AIDS. By 1985, the Ministry of Health further noted an epidemiology of AIDS folk models among Kenyans like: AIDS was transmissible through mosquito bites or through sharing utensils and it was synonymous to some curable traditional illness like *Chira* and *Ishira* among Luo and Luhyia communities respectively. With this realization and other few pockets of AIDS reports, the constitution of an AIDS national advisory committee in 1986 was inevitable. Its responsibilities entailed facilitating research, spearheading sensitization on AIDS through vibrant campaigns and monitoring its spread in Kenya. Shortly, AIDS campaigns in Kenya commenced three years after the first AIDS cases were reported in the country. (cf. Ogot, 2004)

In the same year, the Ministry of Health gazetted AIDS as a "notifiable disease", meaning henceforward, blood screening was a prerequisite for blood transfusion. A green light was given for aggressive campaigns through the media and finally a presentation of annual AIDS statistics was to be compiled by medical practitioners. Another inaugurated body in the Ministry of Health was the National AIDS Control committee. Its prescribed duties involved developing five year strategic plans towards promoting AIDS awareness and clinical management of AIDS control in Kenya. The second phase of the five-year plans, falling within 1992 and 1997 marked a turning point in the history of AIDS in Kenya. In 1992, the National AIDS Control Program was engaged in the sensitization of Kenyans on AIDS through: family life education programs, encouraging treatment of Sexually Transmitted Diseases (STDs), promoting counselling services and home-based care for patients. It equally lobbied for a strong political will from the government, civil societies, private sectors and further called for the inclusion of AIDS into the national development plans (MOH, 1993). Two years later, the government engineered the merger between programs monitoring sexually transmitted infections (STIs) and AIDS-related programs, resulting in the birth of the National AIDS and STD Control program (NASCOP), for the two programs were actually interrelated. Later in 1997, marking the government intervention phase, parliament endorsed the *Sessional Paper number 4 in 1997* launching a direct appeal for governmental intervention in curbing the AIDS pandemic. In this respect, the government acknowledged the futility of wishing AIDS away, following the augmenting prevalence rates. In various ways, the government's sixteen year conspicuous absence was a major setback in

fighting AIDS in Kenya. This initiative, albeit belated, was incapable of reversing the widespread AIDS network in the country.

By 1999, AIDS was virtually bringing the Kenyan government to its knees, with an alarming computation of five hundred Kenyans daily succumbing to the epidemic. The heightened mortality rates compelled the former President Daniel Arap Moi to declare HIV and AIDS a national disaster. Simultaneously, the government launched the National AIDS Control Committee (NACC) and for the first time the office of the president became directly engaged in the surveillance of AIDS in conjunction with NACC (cf. Ogot, 2004, KAIS, 2009). The main responsibility assigned to NACC was to monitor[26] AIDS pandemic in Kenya. To guide its working framework, NACC repackaged itself by adopting a multisectoral approach hence deviating from the traditional Ministry of Health approach.

As opposed to his predecessor, President Kibaki has demonstrated aggressiveness in AIDS campaigns. In 2003, President Kibaki, using the AIDS IS WAR metaphor, founded the "Total War Against AIDS" (TOWA) initiative. The approach incorporated the clergy as well as the international community to be involved in fighting AIDS in Kenya. Further, he constituted the Cabinet AIDS Control Committees (CACC) to encourage cabinet members to be pro-active in AIDS related matters in the country. In a way, it was generally acknowledged that AIDS had surpassed public health boundaries by affecting the entire Kenyan community. In connection to this, a total of forty four surveillance sites were strategically positioned in towns like Kisii, Nairobi, Kisumu, Mombasa and other towns to provide updates on the pandemic. Two approaches[27] are employed in determining national prevalence rates. From this perspective, the UNAIDS (2007) classifies the AIDS pandemic in Kenya as generalized, in the sense that 75% of persons contract HIV through heterosexual intercourse. Other risk groups include CSW and their clients, migrant workers, discordant couples, women and young girls, however risk groups like IDU and MSM are relatively few.

Currently and according to the KAIS 2007 (2009), there are 1.42 million Kenyans infected with AIDS.

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26 There are three main policies governing the functions of NACC under the "three one's policy" comprising; one agreed country level monitoring and evaluation system, one national AIDS coordinating authority with a broad multisectoral mandate and one agreed HIV/AIDS framework to coordinate all AIDS related programs.

27 The two ways of determining prevalence rates include: One is by anonymous testing for HIV amongst expectant women attending prenatal clinics to approximate adult prevalence rates. By this method, predicting infant mortality rates is easier. The second way entails undertaking surveys for instance five-year demographic health surveys, carried out by Non- Governmental Organizations like by the Kenya Demographic Health Surveys, or by the Population Services International.

Further, Kenya's prevalence rate for the age-group between 15-64 years stands at 7.4% up from 6.1% from the 2003 Kenya Demographic Health Survey. Regarding the patterning of region-specific prevalence rates in Kenya, current estimates show that 1,027,000 adults living with HIV are in rural areas and 390,000 live in urban centers. The uneven distribution in prevalence rates across the eight provinces is as follows: Nyanza (14.9%), Nairobi (8.9%), Coast (8.1%), Rift Valley (6.3%), Western (5.4%), Eastern (4.6%), Central (3.6%) and North Eastern (0.81%) (cf. KAIS, 2009: 20). In terms of challenges facing Kenya in the phase of the pandemic, we cannot overstress that being a microcosm of African countries, Kenya is not exempted from the plethora of negative repercussions associated with AIDS outlined in sections *2.4* and *2.5.1*. Even in the new millennium, AIDS is charged with a heavy dose of stigma with only 13% of the Kenyan adult population having undergone voluntary HIV testing. Reluctance towards testing probably springs from equating AIDS to a death sentence. (cf. KDHS, 2003)

In Kenya, various attempts have been explored in defusing AIDS stigma using several AIDS campaigns, examples include *Maisha campaigns*, *Trust campaigns* and *Tume-chill campaigns*. Popular idols, artists, musicians like *Kalamashaka*, *DJ Pinye*, *Reddykulass*, *Edward Kwach, Lorna Irungu*, *Mercy Myra*, former Nairobi Catholic *Archbishop Ndingi mwana à Nzeki* and even *President Kibaki* have been effectively used as paragons to sensitize the population on AIDS using the campaigns. In our perspective, the AIDS situation in Kenya would have never claimed millions of lives had the government considered her immediate neighbours Uganda and Tanzania as mentors. From the beginning, the two countries regarded AIDS as a national issue beyond the capacity of the ministry of health and established vibrant AIDS councils which adopted multisectoral approaches in the early eighties. Conversely, it took almost one decade and a half of little input in AIDS. Our reasoning is that if prevalence rates dropped from 14% in 2000 to 6.1% in 2007 thanks to the multisectoral approach adopted by the government in 1999, then our conclusion is that had such a measure been implemented fifteen years ago, maybe Kenyans would be regarding AIDS as a chronic disease like their Western counterparts rather than an epidemic.

2.6. LINGUISTIC STATUS OF ENGLISH AND KISWAHILI IN KENYA

In the previous section, we provided insights on the AIDS pandemic in Kenya by tracing its

development, status and pinpointed its bedeviling challenges posed to the Kenyan society. In adherence to our research hypotheses, objectives and problem, additional background information on the linguistic status of English and Kiswahili is indeed relevant and consistent with this pragmatic endeavour focusing on figurative AIDS slogans coined in English and Kiswahili languages. The subsequent discussions give a brief historical account on the two languages by focusing on the repercussions of the language contact between English and Kiswahili in Kenya.

2.6.1 ENGLISH AND KISWAHILI IN KENYA

Kenya, an ex-colony of Britain, is a sovereign anglophone country located in East Africa. Her geographical boundaries are delimited as follows: Ethiopia to the North, Somali to the East, Indian Ocean to the South East, Tanzania to the South, Uganda and Lake Victoria to the West and Sudan to the North West (Le Petit Robert, 1988). Administratively, Kenya comprises eight provinces namely; the Coastal province, Nyanza province, Rift Valley province, Nairobi province, North Eastern province, Eastern province, Central province and Western province, when combined the provinces host approximately 33 million persons from diverse cultures (Githiora, 2008). *Map 2* presents the linguistic map of Kenya.

Map 2: LINGUISTIC MAP OF KENYA

In sociolinguistics, languages are assigned various functions depending on their linguistic status in a community. From an international perspective, English and Kiswahili are classified under the docket of international languages, a title co-hosting languages such as: German, French, Russian, Chinese and Spanish. Globally, English is spoken as a language of diplomacy, scholarship, commerce and international trade. Most transnational corporations like the UN, World Bank, European Union (EU) and African Union (AU) extensively rely on English for communicative purposes either as a native language, foreign language or second language. It is noteworthy to mention that in terms of number of speakers, international recognition and functions, English outmatches Kiswahili. Armed with such outstanding linguistic credentials, English is perceived as a passport to civilization, prosperity and economic advancement in most societies (cf. Kembo-Sure, 2003; Schmied, 2004b and Githiora, 2008).

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As the most widespread Germanic language globally, statistics of English speakers is approximately over one billion, ranking it second after Chinese (Crystal, 1987, 1997).

Kiswahili is a Bantu language, currently spoken by approximately 80 to 100 million persons either as a native language, second language or a foreign language in East and Central Africa (Mulokozi, 2002). Under the AU umbrella, Kiswahili is recognized as an international language alongside Arabic, Afrikaans, Hausa and Portuguese. Since the early sixties eminent African scholars among them the Nigerian writer Wole Sonyinka, the Ghanaian writer Ayi Kweli Armah and also the Kenyan historian Ali Mazrui have relentlessly lobbied for the upgrading of Kiswahili to a continental lingua franca status, a scholarly input which rests unimplemented to date (Mazrui & Mazrui, 1995 and Mulokozi, 2002). In East and Central Africa, Kiswahili coexists with various national and official languages enumerated as follows: Tanzania (English), Congo (Kikongo, French, Lingala and Tchiluba), Uganda (English and Luganda) and Rwanda (French and Kinyarwanda).

Outside the African continent, several reputable institutions and centers of academic excellence in Europe and America for example, School of Oriental and African Studies of University of London, University of Los Angeles, University of Hamburg and University of Beijing have established vibrant African languages departments, offering degree courses in Kiswahili as a foreign language. In the same strength, in the media circles, Kiswahili is one of the broadcasting languages actively employed in reputable stations namely: the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Voice of America (VOA), Radio Moscow, Deutsche Welle, Radio Beijing among others. The print media also promotes Kiswahili alongside English, in reference to Kenya, English dailies and magazines like *The Daily Nation, The East African Standard, Kenya Times* and *Weekly Reviews* are complemented with Kiswahili magazines like *Taifa Leo* catering for readers competent and conversant with Kiswahili (cf. Mazrui & Mazrui, 1995 and Kishe, 2004). Moreover, the local media stations like Citizen TV, Nation Television (NTV) and Kenya Television Network (KTN) respectively air evening news in Kiswahili in their respective editions of *NTV jioni* and *KTN leo*. In respect to their entertainment line-up, English programs alternate with Kiswahili soap operas and comedies such as *Wash & Set, Tahidi high, Inspekta Mwala*, *Wingu la Moto*, *Plot 10* and *Vioja Mahakamani* having a remarkable audience both in Kenya and Tanzania. In terms of publications, Kiswahili competes with English, numerous publications and translations have been done in Kiswahili, in fact Shakespearian literary texts like *Merchant of Venice* and *Julius Caesar*

were personally translated by Julius Nyerere, the first President of Tanzania. (Mazrui & Mazrui, 1995: 82)

In general, linguistic functions assigned to languages serving as either official or national languages are predetermined by their colonial masters or postcolonial legacies for instance linguistic dominance backed by the political will of the intelligentsia. Sometimes, a merger of the cited aspects prescribes language functions in a speech community. Taking the case of Kenya both aspects shaped her language policy with the eventual separation of linguistic powers between English and Kiswahili being demarcated along the following parameters: English is assigned the official language status serving as the sole language of administration, commerce and a medium of instruction in all learning institutions. On the other hand, the national language docket is retained by Kiswahili, facilitating inter-ethnic communication across the forty two (42) mutually unintelligible speech communities geographically dispersed across her eight administrative provinces. Percentages accompanying the representation of the forty two ethnic languages in Kenya are distributed along these lines: sixty five percent (65%) of Kenyans are Bantu speakers drawn from communities like the Akamba, Luhyia, Taita and Kikuyu mainly found in Eastern, Western, Coastal and Central provinces. Kiswahili is equally classified as a Bantu language, spoken by two-thirds of Kenyans from various speech communities. Nilotic tribes comprising communities like: The Luo, Kalenjin, Turkana, Pokot, Maasai and Teso found in Nyanza and Rift Valley provinces constitute thirty percent (30%) of Kenyan ethnic communities. Cushites entailing the Rendile, Borana, Oromo and Somali ethnic groups are largely occupants of North Eastern and Eastern provinces have a three percent (3%) representation in the Kenyan linguistic map. The final two percent (2%) falling outside the mentioned groups, springs from the Indo-European phylum represented by Hindi, Panjabi, Gujarati and English languages, and are predominantly spoken in major urban centers like Nairobi, Mombasa, Nakuru and Kisumu (Githiora, 2008). As a matter of fact, it is estimated that English is spoken by between fifteen percent (15%) to twenty percent (20%) of Kenyans in formal circles (cf. Skandera, 2003). On the other hand, in informal settings or even when addressing a culturally diverse audience Kiswahili becomes the most suitable medium of communication.

From this perspective, thanks to Kiswahili's neutrality dating pre-colonial times along the East African region, it is a symbol of Pan-Africanism unifying all ethnic communities by erasing tribal boundaries through social cohesion. Its remarkable strengths were manifested during the First and Second World

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wars, for colonialists capitalized on it as a language of command in the King African Rifles (KAR), owing to the fact that African soldiers were drawn from diverse ethno-linguistic groups in the East African region. In Tanzania, it virtually defused ethnic tensions by emerging as a socialist tool which inculcated socialist ideologies (*ujamaa*) orchestrated by the late President Julius Nyerere as early as 1967, under the auspices of Arusha Declaration and Education of Self-Reliance policy (Mazrui & Mazrui, 1995; Mugambi, 2008 and Topan, 2008). Literally speaking, one emerging issue is that delinking Kenya's history from the linguistic functions of English and Kiswahili is a futile effort.

2.6.2 HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF ENGLISH AND KISWAHILI IN KENYA

According to historical literature, Kenya was officially a British colony between 1895 and 1963 (Shopen, 1987, Kang'ethe, 2004). Prior to the arrival of English language in East Africa, Kiswahili had firmly established itself as a lingua franca. Its linguistic network extended between the Horn of Africa, along the Somali coastline to the Comoros Islands located in the North of Madagascar. Towards the inland, Kiswahili was extensively used along caravan routes stretching from the Mombasa coastline to the Congo region towards the heartland of Central Africa. That notwithstanding, its geographical coverage extended towards the Lake Victoria region shared by Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania. For years pre-dating the 10th century, Kiswahili was the language of commerce and facilitated transactions between Arab merchants and Bantu tribes like the Mijikenda, Akamba and Giriama. For some scholars, the term *Swahili* or *Suaheli* has its etymology in Arabic, meaning *the coast* or *by extension the coastal people* . Whereas, *Kiswahili* having the "ki-" prefix denotes the language spoken by the *Waswahili* (cf. Heine, 1979; Shopen, 1987; Mazrui & Mazrui, 1995; Schmied, 2004b; Mukuthuria, 2006 and Mugambi, 2008). There are inconsistencies regarding exact cradle of Kiswahili. On one extreme, Heine (*ibid*) mentions the Tana River estuary alluding that it was initially spoken along the Kenyan coast. On the other extreme, Shopen (1987) cites the Shungwaya region located along the Somalian coastline. All in all, the bottom-line is Kiswahili commenced as a language of a minority speech community along the coastal region and took a generous number of centuries to evolve into an East African lingua franca. Heine proposes a three-fold account all premised on language contact motif but subscribing to different versions on the genesis of Kiswahili. The first thesis argues that Kiswahili is the byproduct of intermarriages between Arab traders and Bantu women, subsequently, their offspring acquired a mixed syntax derived from Arabic and Bantu languages. The second thesis holds that the linguistic contact

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between Arabs, their dependents and slaves from various Bantu communities was a perfect recipe for Kiswahili's emergence. The final thesis mirroring Kiswahili's syntactic truisms posits that Persian and Arab immigrants learnt Bantu languages. Thereafter, via unidirectional borrowing, they injected some Arabic terms into Kiswahili. The latter theory probably explains the predominant Bantu syntax in Kiswahili, with its lexicon hosting sixty five (65%) percent of Bantu words and the other thirty five percent (35%) are loanwords from both Arabic language and non-Bantu languages. Bantu language loanwords in Kiswahili include: *bunge* (*parliament*) borrowed from the Ha of Tanzania, *ikulu* (Statehouse) a Nyamwezi loanword (also spoken in Tanzania), *Njuli* loanword from the Kamba community in Kenya meaning *a protagonist*. Whereas, Arabic loanwords include *elimu* derived from *elim* (education), *wakati* derived from *waqt* (time), *hakim* derived from *hakimu* (judge) (Kin'gei, 2002: 116).

Alongside Kiswahili, more specifically at the dawn of the 19th century during the scramble and partition of Africa by European nations, missionaries and colonial administrators arrived at the East African coast, marking the genesis of English in Kenya. In order to effectively administer the indirect-rule policy, the imperialists constrained English usage to a few autochthons, mostly sons of pre-colonial chiefs, who acted as conduits between the masses and government officials (Kembo-Sure, 2003). Concurrently, the usage of Kiswahili (the Kisetla variety) was beneficial in addressing the uneducated masses and equally persons of lower cadre like domestic workers. During this period, both missionaries and settlers possessed polarized convictions regarding Kiswahili. For colonial administrators, Kiswahili was capable of arousing the spirit of nationalism by unifying Africans to overthrow the colonial government. Missionaries harboured fears that Kiswahili was synonymous to Islam and would eventually impede ecumenical activities in Christian strongholds (cf. Mazrui & Mazrui, 1995 and Mungai, 2002).

To downsize islamicism in Kiswahili, two Germans namely; Ludwig Kraft, a missionary and Carl Meinhof a linguist, replaced the authentic Arabic orthography of Kiswahili with a Latin Script. By 1882, Kraft developed the first *Dictionary of Suaheli* (Shopen, 1987 and Topan, 2008). Inasmuch as missionaries colluded with colonial administrators, a conflict of interest arose regarding the medium of instruction in missionary schools. Therefore, during the colonial period language policies juggled with a trilingual framework, with Pro-English policies sometimes fronting the teaching of vernacular in the

early stages of learning, then later introducing English. Conversely, Pro-Kiswahili policies fronted Kiswahili as a medium of instruction in the first stages of primary education then English as a medium of instruction after the fourth year of primary education. Some policies integrated the three languages, starting first with the vernacular language, then Kiswahili and English in the final stages. However, their campaigns were short-lived for by 1957, through the inauguration of the New Primary Approach (NPA), English was endorsed as the medium of instruction in learning institutions as opposed to Kiswahili. In short, towards the dawn of independence, the English language had completely eclipsed Kiswahili in Kenyan schools. (Mungai, 2002)

The post colonial era policies were skewed towards maintaining English as the official language at the expense of Kiswahili, for the elitist class valued the former and paid lip service to the latter. In fact, the first post-independence commission dubbed the Kenya Commission of Education (Ominde) report of 1964 advocated for English usage in learning institutions, while stressing on Kiswahili's importance in the education arena for it was a symbol of nationalism. By 1969, a parliamentary act endorsed the constitution of a bilingual parliament. Put in another way, motions could be discussed in English and Kiswahili, however official government documents remained written in English. As expected, some Afro-Saxons had reservations about Kiswahili. An example is the former Attorney General Sir. Charles Njonjo, at one time dismissed Kiswahili as an alien language to the Kenyan community because of its Arabic heritage. By contrast, in the neighbouring country of Tanzania, by 1962 Kiswahili was effectively being used as medium of communication in government and was unanimously declared Tanzania's official language (Mulokozi, 2002 and Mafu, 2003). Fortunes changed for Kiswahili in 1985, following recommendations from the Mackay Report leading to the launching of the 8-4-4 system (meaning eight years of primary education, four years in secondary education, then four years of university education), Kiswahili become a compulsory and examinable subject during the first twelve years of primary and secondary education (Githiora, 2008).

Another way of interpreting the linguistic status of English and Kiswahili is by arguing that for the past forty-five years since independence, English has consistently been the medium of instruction in Kenya. Further, when we resort to mathematics, Kiswahili has effectively served communicative purposes in the East African region for roughly eleven centuries. On the other extreme, English language is roughly two centuries old in Kenya; however the emerging irony is that the general performance in English and

Kiswahili in national examinations is dismal. The situation is not exclusive to Kenya, but also applies to Tanzania and Uganda, in a region where English is spoken by 30% of Ugandans, 20% of Kenyans and 5% of Tanzanians (cf. Rubanza, 2002; Kembo-Sure, 2003; Kang'ethe, 2004; Schmied, 2004a and Mukuthuria, 2006). As Rubanza appropriately puts it in a simile, the falling standard of English in Tanzania is attributed to the fact that "English is equated to a school uniform and you put it when you go to school and you take it off at home". Students are contented with classroom-based English, which is riddled with errors or L_1 interference, coupled with lack of native speaker models, are just but a sample of factors accounting for poor performance in English in East Africa. Presenting a true case of falling standards of English and Kiswahili in Kenya, *Table 2* displays the national performance of primary school students who sat for the Kenya Certificate of Primary Education (K.C.P.E) in 2006.

Table 2: 2006 KCPE PERFORMANCE PER SUBJECT

SUBJECT	Performance mean (%) 2006		
English	All (average) 40.68 %	Female 41.22 %	Male 40.22 %
Kiswahili	52.0 %	53.7 %	53.01 %

From the outlined results, the English performance in 2006, is worrying despite the slight improvement from 39.3% in 2005 to 40.68% in 2006, with female candidates performing better than their male counterparts. On one hand, a cursory glance at the average marks reveals that they fall below the average mark of 50% confirming that the students failed in the English language exam. On the other hand, the performance in Kiswahili is slightly above average with percentage mean of 52%. The worrying performance in the aforementioned subjects is replicated in high schools as Kang'ethe (2004) stipulates that in 2003, the national average scores in Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education (KCSE) in Kiswahili and English were 38% and 39% respectively.

By looking at these results, we are compelled to revisit our statement of the problem, an alternative way of putting it, English and Kiswahili languages are the most used languages in AIDS related messages in Kenya. Now, if the proficiency level in both the official language and national language is unsatisfactory, then it would be interesting to unearth the comprehension patterns of Kenyans from various ethno-linguistic groups when interpreting figurative AIDS messages. Already in our

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introduction, Moeschler (2007) alerts us on miscommunication problems in explicatures induced by linguistic proficiency of non-native speakers. The simple point we are stressing is that English is a Germanic language having its unique figurative expressions designed to capture European realities and social cultural experiences. Whereas, Kiswahili is a Bantu language with its own figurative expressions capturing its socio-cultural experiences. In this regard, our study investigates the comprehensibility of English figurative expressions in AIDS messages in the African setting. More so, our pragmatic concerns are invested in comprehending how Bantu speakers who are not necessarily Kiswahili native speakers like the Abagusii, Luhyia and Gusii speakers and non-Bantu speakers such as Kalenjin and the Luo interpret both English and Kiswahili AIDS messages.

2.6.3 KENYAN ENGLISH AND PIGNIZED KISWAHILI VARIETIES

With specific reference to Kenya, closely related to the unsatisfactory results in English and Kiswahili language in the East African region, is the concept of English varieties in Africa. The trilingual contact between English, Kiswahili and vernacular languages is the brainchild of Kenyan English, and this stand equally holds for pidginized Kiswahili varieties. As a point of departure, some features of Kenyan English qualifying as incorrect English constructions include:

(24a) The use of double pronouns
   * " Uh myself uh I started working at Muhimbili in nineteen eighty seven ."
(24b) Instead of : I started working at Muhimbili in nineteen eighty seven.
      (adapted from Schmied, 2004a: 937)

The bone of contention in (24a) is that in Standard English it is ungrammatical to have two pronouns in the noun phrase docket. In this particular case, we have a reflexive pronoun "myself" together with the personal pronoun "I". However, (24b) qualifies as correct usage of English for the noun phrase contains a single pronoun. Using double pronouns is a phenomenon transferred from either Kiswahili or one's vernacular where double pronouns are grammatically acceptable. Like the Kiswahili syntax will consider sentence (25) grammatical.

(25) Mimi   ni-na-itwa   Lilian (I am called Lilian)

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1.sg   I TAM.Call   Lilian.

Literary speaking, it means something like *Me, I am called Lilian*, thereby flouting conventions of Standard English. Alternatively, *I am called Lilian*, is a grammatical English construction. Sentences such as * *Me, I am going to the market,* comprising an object pronoun and a subject pronoun *Me* and *I* instead of *I,* are prevalent in Kenyan English despite their unacceptability in Standard English. Another incorrect use in Kenyan English involves inaccurate application of *yes-no* questions. Standard English normally requires both question and answer should have a uniform pattern as in *Yes, it is* or *No, it isn't*. Kenyan English disrespects this rule as demonstrated in (26).

(26) Question: These problems are uh not biological.

   Answer: * Yes, they're not biological.

   Instead of: No, they're not biological.

   (Schmied, 2004a: 936)

Apart from these cases, phonological problems attributed to one's L$_1$ influence are hardly strange in Kenyan English. Let us consider some examples, among the Kikuyu and Meru speakers of Central province spoken widely around the Mount Kenya region, there is a tendency among speakers to replace the retroflex /r/ with the lateral /l/ so that a word like *lorry* [lþri] will be mispronounced as [rori], or some people might say *play* [pleI] while referring to *pray* [preI] (Schmied, 2004b: 26). Prenasalisation typifies the speech of Meru speakers, particularly in their articulation of the terms such as *good* [gʊd], *boy* [bɔI] and *big* [bIg] will be phonetically realized as [ngʊd],[mbɔI] and [mbIg], mirroring phonetic aspects of the Meru phonemes that subscribes to the CV-CV structure which is uncharacteristic of the English language.

Among the Luo speakers found in Nyanza province around the Lake Victoria region, pronouncing the voiceless dental fricative [s] is a problem, for it is not accommodated within dholuo[28] phonemes. Alternatively, most Luo native speakers replace the dental fricative with the voiceless palatal counterpart [ʃ], hence articulating the term *sugar* [ʃʊgaR] as [sʊgaR] or *fish* [fIs] instead of [fIʃ]. For Kalenjin speakers of the Rift Valley Province, both the voiced bilabial plosive [b] and the voiced velar

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28 Dholuo refers to the Nilo-Saharan language of the Luo speakers found in Western Kenya, along the lake Victoria region.

plosive [g] are conspicuously absent in their phonemic system. Therefore, words like *book* and *game,* will be articulated as [pʊk] instead of [bʊk]or[kem] instead of [gelm]. Other Kenyanisms entail deletion of prepositions in certain words as in *fill* instead of to *fill in*, *pick* instead of *pick up* Constructions like, **Kindly fill this form,* as opposed to the Standard English's *Kindly fill in this form* or **He went to pick his wife from the market,* instead of its standard counterpar*t, He went to pick up his wife from the market* are typical of Kenyan English (cf. Kembo-Sure, 2004: 112). In the same vein, it is important to stress that Kiswahili has its fair share of incorrect constructions arising from its pidginized varieties (cf. Heine, 1979). A typical example is the tendency among Luhyia speakers of Western province to insert the *-nga* suffix after the roots of certain Kiswahili verbs marking habitual tendencies marked by the *Hu-* tense marker as in example (27a).

(27a) Yeye   hu tu-   piga (He usually beats us).
      2.sg   TAM 2.PL beat
Some speakers would incorrectly say in pidginized Kiswahili:

(27b) *Yeye hutupiga<u>nga</u>

Alongside the aforementioned linguistic challenges, the trilingual coexistence of English, Swahili and vernacular languages has generated an offset of Kiswahili known as *Sheng'.* When English is contrasted with *Sheng',* the former is learnt formally whereas the latter is acquired informally. Moreover, *Sheng's* reputation of being an unstable language variety has its linguistic lifeline sustained by the syntax, morphology and phonology of English, Kiswahili and vernacular languages, to serve in-group communicative purposes among urban youths from economically challenged neighbourhoods (Kang'ethe, 2004). Under the watchful eyes of elites and purists, *Sheng'* is unacceptable and a corroborated medium of communication, and listed among the reasons promoting the falling standards of English and Kiswahili in Kenya (Githiora, 2008). Examples of *Sheng'* constructions are exemplified below.

(28a) That <u>jaama</u> feels so hot and he is <u>bila</u> doze.
      [That chap feels so hot, but he has nothing interesting to say]
(28b) I found <u>akina</u> Suzie just <u>maxing</u>.

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[I found Suzie and the rest just relaxing] (adapted from Kembo-Sure, 2003: 257)

Examining the above cases, in (28a) and (28b) the lexemes *jamaa, bila* and *akina* are Kiswahili words meaning *chap, nothing* and *the rest* in that order. However, the etymology of root verb *max* is difficult to determine as suggested by Kembo-Sure (2003), interestingly, it acquires an anglicized progressive tense marker-*ing* to express the notion of " relaxing ". Being the language for youth, *Sheng*' is gaining currency in Kenya in various ways. It is the exclusive language of communication in Y-FM radio station. Radio presenters from stations like Capital FM and Easy FM occasionally converse in *Sheng'*. In its written form, *Sheng'* is the medium of communication in the youth magazine called *Insyder* (corroborated form of "Insider "), and also used in two Kenyan newspapers named: *Daily Nation* and *The East African Standard,* particularly in the Daily Nation comical section dubbed *Head in Collusion* of *The Buzz* magazine and *Straight Talk* magazine in *The East African Standard.* As regards to lexical borrowing with reference to the East African context, English has a generous number of Kiswahili loanwords like *safari (journey), uhuru (independence), mzee (old man), panga (machete)* and *matatu (public transport system within East Africa)* Likewise, Kiswahili contains English loanwords assimilated into Kiswahili by adopting its standard CV-CV structure, in words such as *mashine (machine)* and *kilabu (club).* Some Kiswahili words have a Portuguese etymology, for instance *mesa* (table), *gereza* (jail), for the Portuguese colonized the East African coast for two centuries prior to the arrival of the Arabs (cf. Skandera, 2003). In addition to this, there are other Kenyanisms in English mostly terms from vernacular languages like *githeri (a dish comprising maize and beans from the Kikuyu community), chapati (Indian pancake), ugali (a Kenyan dish made from maize)* are accommodated in the Kenyan English lexicon. (cf. Kin'gei, 2002, Schmied, 2004a, Kembo-Sure, 2004)

2.7 Conclusion

To recount in a systemic manner the lengthy discussions of this chapter, first and foremost, our point of departure began with a generalized introduction to the study by defining the scientific nature of AIDS and further, focused on various image-schemas used in the conceptualization of AIDS across several ethno-linguistic communities. In the same vein, an outline of the divergent theories recounting the genesis of AIDS was dwelt on. Also integrated into the discussion, was a comparative analysis of AIDS *vis à vis* other ailments such as malaria, cancer, syphilis among others, by highlighting illness-specific

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implicatures and their cognitive effects. Second, in great lengths, we have discussed the global distribution of AIDS and further zeroed in on the Kenyan situation. Several issues raised that catalyzed its propagation include: indifference of the Kenyan government, dilapidated health facilities, corruption, bad governance and so forth, played a major role in determining the current status of AIDS pandemic in Kenya. In the final section, we have examined the co-existence of English and Kiswahili languages from a global and regional perspective. Our approach focused on the socio-historical factors shaping the current linguistic status in Kenya and the repercussions of linguistic contact between English, Kiswahili and vernacular languages ranging from linguistic interference, improficiency in English and Kiswahili, borrowing and hybridization of Kiswahili in the form of *Sheng'*. In summary, the entire chapter frames the study's background by promoting a pragmatic understanding on conceptualizations of AIDS in various cultural contexts, its distribution both globally and within Kenya, and finalizes on the linguistic status of English and Kiswahili, which are at the epicenter of our study because the AIDS slogans coined in cited languages will provide secondary data for the present research.

CHAPTER THREE: THE IMPLICATURE-EXPLICATURE DEBATE AND THE INTERRELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN IMPLICATURES, PRESUPPOSITIONS AND ENTAILMENTS

3.0 INTRODUCTION

In the first two chapters of the dissertation, we were basically outlining the background of the study. In this chapter premised on mainstream pragmatics, we review relevant literature on the implicature and explicature debate which will be essential in investigating our first objective aimed at establishing whether Kenyan AIDS messages are skewed towards implicitness or explicitness, which constitutes the subject of discussion in section 6.1. The extensive debate revolving around the implicature and explicature distinction otherwise construed as the pragmatic/semantic interface (cf. Horn, 1988) is all about the demystification of a triadic question oriented around sentence meaning, utterer's meaning and what is said. In Horn's (1988: 118) perspective and even Bertucelli (1997), although Paul Grice has overwhelmingly been credited for his ground work on implicatures, what needs underscoring is the pioneer work on the abovementioned topic by John Stuart Mill (1867: 501), who had given Grice a century's head start in his 19th century insights captured in his comments below:

> No shadow of justification is shown...for adopting into logic a mere sous-entendu of common conversations in its most imprecise form. If I say to anyone "I saw some of your children today", he might be justified in inferring that *I did not see them all*, it is most likely that I should have said so; even though this cannot be presumed unless it is presupposed that I must have known whether the children I saw were all or not. (Adapted from Horn, 1988: 118)

Already, Mill talks of imprecision in utterances using a scalar implicature viewpoint in alluding that conventional word meanings guide speakers in inferring the utterer's meaning. An exemplification of this is the expression *I saw some children today* implicates *Not all children were seen today*. Taking into account that the latter component remains unsaid on the surface syntax of the construction, it has an inferential tendency of pragmatically resurfacing as the sentence's implicature. From the foregoing, Mill's observation is just but a tip of the iceberg of a series of debates revolving around the implicatures-explicatures domain, propounded by numerous pragmatists as will be presented in the current chapter. The discussions in this chapter are sub-divided into five sections covering issues related to implicatures, their classifications and recovery procedures, pragmatic inferences such as presuppositions and figurative language as advanced by Paul Grice, Stephen Levinson and Laurence Horn. Alongside the stated topics, matters pertaining to explicatures, the recovery of logical forms with particular focus on lexico-pragmatic processes like free-enrichment, disambiguation, lexical

underspecificity, and expansion will be examined in the literature review, with specific reference to works by Robyn Carston and Kent Bach. And last but not least, to demonstrate the interlaced relationships between various categories of implicatures, specific attention will be given to presuppositions and entailments.

3.1 GRICEAN PERSPECTIVE ON IMPLICATURES

The first acknowledgement made by Grice on implicatures is that what a speaker says is divorced from what he is supposedly implying. Syntactically speaking, implicatures remain elusive to the surface syntax of a construction but have a peculiar way of surfacing after their inferential computation. This is only possible thanks to the underlying semantics premised on the conventional word meaning. The Gricean implicature's dichotomy falls broadly under the umbrella of conventional implicatures and conversational implicatures. A typical example of a conventional implicature is in (29)

(29) A and B are talking about a mutual friend C, who is now working at a bank. A asks B, how C is getting on with his job and B replies. *Oh quiet well, I think he likes his colleagues and hasn't been to prison yet.*   (adapted from Grice, 1989: 24)

To accurately comprehend the utterance in (29), the hearer relies on its conventional word meanings in the computation of its implicatures. Given such a context, one would be implying that X is untrustworthy, and it is just a matter of time before C's unprofessionalism will be unveiled. And knowing that the banking sector and dishonest persons are incompatible, C's unprofessional behaviour could eventually lead to his imprisonment. Such statements are what Grice labels conventional implicature, where the temporal adverbial *yet*, conventionally implicates an expected action scheduled to occur within a certain time frame. Alongside conventional implicatures[29], there are conversational implicatures or non-conventional implicatures intricately associated with discourse.

Conversational implicatures are more of universal conventions or presumptions interlocutors adhere to

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29 Bach (2006) argues that they are normally detachable but not cancelable, unlike conversational implicatures which are cancelable but nondetachable. He argues detachability should not be construed as an independent test and when one replaces a contrastive disjunction *but*, with the conjunction *and* in the sentence *She is poor but honest*. The expression *She is poor and honest* is apparently weaker than the former utterance. See also Horn's (1988) for other distinguishing features.

during ongoing discourse (Bach, 2006). In Gricean terminology, discourse is quasi-contractual, otherwise christened the cooperative principle (CP henceforward), and is operational under the guidance of four conventions known as maxims of manner, quality, quantity and relation. Specific requirements of each maxims include:

(a) Maxim of Quantity.

(i) Make your contribution as informative as it is required for the current purposes of exchange.

(ii) Do not make your contribution more informative as it is required for the current purposes of exchange.

(b) Maxim of Quality- Try to make your contribution one that is true.

(i) Do not say what you believe to be false.

(ii) Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

(c) Maxim of Relation- Be relevant.

(d) Maxim of manner- Be perspicuous.

(i) Avoid obscurity.

(ii) Be orderly.

(iii) Be brief.

(iv) Avoid ambiguity.   (adapted from Grice,1989: 26-28)

From the foregoing, we have simply outlined the core ones articulated in Gricean CP. Nonetheless, maxims remain unimmune to violations or exploitations. Said differently, flouting of maxims is not only restricted to discourse but is applicable in our daily activities. For instance, if we consider flouting of maxims of quantity and relevance as exemplified by Grice's example where supposing you are assisting me to repair a car, I expect your contribution to conform with the situation at hand. If I need four bolts, I expect nothing more or less than four bolts. Providing me with two or six bolts is tantamount to being uncooperative, and thus flouting the quantity maxim. Alternatively, if we take the maxim of relevance as another example, we then expect some level of rationality between contributions and their respective contexts. Supposing, I was baking a cake whereby using sugar as a cake sweetener is imperative, at this point, it would be impracticle for someone to hand me a packet of salt. Put in a different way, by handing me salt instead of sugar, my addressee's action would blatantly violate the relevance maxim thus contravening CP's thesis. As a guiding principle for conversational implicatures,

the Gricean (1989: 31) thesis is articulated along the following lines:

> First, a man who by (in, when) saying (or making as if to say) that *p* implicated that *q* may be said to have conversationally implicated *q*, provided that (1) he is to be presumed to be observing the conversational maxims or at least the Cooperative Principle. (2) The supposition that he is aware that, or thinks that, *q* is required in order to make his saying or making as if to say *p* (or doing so in *those* terms) consistent with this presumption; and (3) using metarepresentation abilities of the third order (my paraphrase of Gricean ideas on the cognitive structure of the implicature), the speaker thinks (and would expect the hearer to think that the speaker thinks) it is within the hearer's competence to work out or grasp intuitively that the supposition mentioned in (2) is required.

In brief, Grice contends that computation of conversational implicatures is probable as opposed to their incalculable conventional counterparts. The working out procedure first demands decoding the conventional meaning of words used. Included in the same process is the identification of referents and disambiguation of ambiguous constructions. Second, the process is reliant on cooperative principles and maxims. And third, linguistic knowledge or background assumptions are essential in this procedure.

Apart from conversational implicatures, Grice makes two further distinctions in the categorization of implicatures namely: particularized implicatures and generalized implicatures. On one extreme, an example of a particularized implicature adapted from Grice (1989) by Horn's (2006: 4) is the case of (30)

(30) (In a recommendation letter for a philosophy position)

(30a) John dresses well and writes grammatical English.
(30b) John is not good in philosophy.

As a particularized implicature, the utterance's meaning is inferred from a context-specific angle. In this situation, we are exclusively dealing with an evaluation of John's recommendation letter for a position in a philosophy department. The comment in (30a) offers guidance to the addressee in inferring the syntactically elusive and unsaid implicature in (30b). On the other extreme, a sentence such *I went into a house yesterday* qualifies as a generalized implicature. We arrive at such a

conclusion under the guidance of the indefinite article *a,* endorsing the fact that the house being referred to belongs to an unspecified referent or person. This being the case, it is highly doubtful whether the speaker is actually referring to his personal house but rather someone else's house. Unlike particularized implicatures like in (30), generalized implicatures are not dependent on any specialized contexts.

Grice extends the implicature question into the field of figurativeness by sketchily touching on irony, metaphors and hyperboles. From his viewpoint, the common denominator for figurativeness is premised on violation of the maxim of quality. In his perspective, any iota of figurativeness depicts categorical falsity. Taking the case of irony in a context where *X with whom A has been a close ally until now, has betrayed a secret of A's to a business rival.* A and his audience knows this. Said differently, it becomes mutually manifest to A and his audience that X betrayed A. In the light of this, A says *X is a good friend*. Grice's (1989: 34) reaction towards this is that it is obvious to both the audience and A that A's utterance is an unrealistic reflection of his beliefs towards X. Knowing that A's utterance fails to meet the qualification of a nonsensical utterance, he might be implying something else. The latter is a total contradiction of what he is saying. For Grice ironical utterances are converse of what is said. Taking the example of a metaphorical construction such as *You are the cream of my coffee* not only typifies categorical falsity, but also is pegged on resemblance between certain features of one's personality aligned towards traits of solid friendship, goodness, supportiveness and compatibility, which non-literally relate to the cream that normally embellishes one's coffee. At this level, we quickly take note of Grice's failure in giving an elaborate discussion on the role of resemblance as a core component of comprehending metaphoricity. Further, his classification of hyperboles and meoisis fall under exaggeration. Diagrammed in *Figure 16* is Horn's (1988) understanding of Gricean's categorizations of implicatures. The only area of divergence is Horn's introduction of the semantic and pragmatic paradigm into the implicature notion. (See also Stalnaker, 1991: 479)

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WHAT IS CONVEYED

WHAT IS SAID   WHAT IS IMPLICATED

(Truth-conditional aspects of meaning)   CONVENTIONALLY   NON-CONVENTIONALLY

                                  SEMANTICS

                        CONVERSATIONALLY   NON-CONVERSATIONALLY

            Generalized conversational   Particularized conversational
            implicatures   implicatures

                                  PRAGMATICS

Figure 16: Horn's schema on implicatures

Source: Horn (1988: 121)

Further, Horn says presuppositions are akin to implicatures bringing into mind Bach and Harnish (1984: 166) model to clearly elaborate this point diagrammed in *Figure 17*.

Figure 17: Bach and Harnish implicatures model

Source: Bach & Harnish (1984: 166)

For the moment, we are not going to discuss presuppositions with regard to the two models but will revisit the topic in *Section 3.5* of this chapter to demonstrate the interlaced relationships between pragmatic references notably presuppositions, entailment, particularized conversational implicatures, generalized conversational implicatures, conventional implicatures and conversational implicatures.

3.2 LEVINSON ON IMPLICATURES

Levinson (1983) injects his scholarly input on the Gricean pragmatic question constructed along the what is said and what is implied paradigm. In his viewpoint, concurring with Grice's holds that inferential processes underlying the comprehension of implicatures are sustained by a semantic platform. The said platform works in unison with the logical form and the utterance's truth conditions. This is the underlying logic behind the constant presence of a unique implicature in sentences having dissimilar syntactical structures as in (31)

(31a) Perhaps P

(31b) Maybe P

(31c) Possibly P

(31d) Potentially P

(31e) Possibly not P   (adapted from Levinson, 1983: 123)

All expressions from (31a) to (31d) each having different syntactic structures are apparently hosting a similar truth condition in the logical form of (31e). The semantic dimension for inferential mechanisms of implicatures equally extends to the case of scope ambiguity as in (32)

(32) All the arrows didn't hit the target.

The sentence will either have a wide scope reading as in (32a) or a narrow-scope reading in (32b)

(32a) $\sim(\forall\chi\ (A(\chi) \longrightarrow Hit(\chi, \text{the target})))$.

(i.e it is not the case that for all χ, if χ is an arrow, then χ hit the target) (Some of the arrows hit the target)

(32b) $\forall\chi\ (A\ (\chi) \longrightarrow \sim (Hit(\chi, \text{the target})$

(i.e for all χ, if χ is an arrow, then it is not the case that χ hit the target). (None of the arrows hit the target)

(adapted from Levinson, 1983: 123-124)

Therefore the two readings are a byproduct of the semantic representation underlying the sentence's surface syntax.

Tracing footsteps of Grice's critics, Levinson presents his constructive criticisms on the Gricean list of properties designed for conversational implicatures notably: cancelability and detachability of implicatures. And further discusses his views on tropes with specific reference to metaphors. For starters, regarding cancelability of implicatures, Levinson opines that in ambiguity cases, one reading will always be maintained regardless of the fact that some level of cancellation has taken place, cases in point are in (33a-c) as adapted from Levinson (1983: 119)

(33a) Joe taunted Ralph and Ralph hit him.

(33b) First Joe taunted Ralph and then Ralph hit him.

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(33c) Joe taunted Ralph and Ralph hit him, but not necessarily in that order.

In the example, we are able to entertain the reading in (33a), while the sequential *and then* resurfaces in (33b) and in (33c). Even though, the presence of negation in the subjunctive clause nullifies the previous reading, we still retain a similar reading as in (33a), meaning some implicit reading is retained even if we insist that implicatures are cancelable. On matters touching on non-detachability, there is a risk of double standardness especially if we still consider ambiguous constructions using wide-scope and narrow scope paradigms in (34a-c)

(34a) Not all arrows hit the target.
(34b) Some arrows hit the target.
(34c) Some if not all arrows hit the target.

In (34a) and (34c) have similar truth conditions, however (34a) implicates (34b), and not (34c) owing to its cancellation in (34c).

To the four properties of implicatures proposed by Grice namely; defeasibility, calculability, cancelability and non-conventionality, Levinson (1983, 2000) adds universality and reinforcability. We will clearly examine Grice's view on universality as addressed by Keenan in section 3.3, nonetheless, Levinson revisits the universality issue by giving cases of minimal cooperation within the court room discourse, where during cross-examination, a witness decides to breach for instance the maxim of quantity by being economical with information in constructions like in (35)

(35) C: On many occasions?
    W: Not many.
    C: Some.
    W: Yes, a few.   Levinson (1983: 120)

It is evident that there is extensive usage of scalar implicatures in the courtroom exchange in (35). Concurrently, the witness is striving to maintain the "less is more doctrine" of the quantity maxim. His selective choice of lower bound values *not many* and *a few*, down tones stronger implicatures from

being explicitly used by the counsellor as in *on many* occasions, or *some*. What Levinson is demonstrating is a case where minimal cooperation is active. Apparently, there is no much difference with Keenan's observation of Malagasy speakers (cf. Gazdar 1979). Reinforcability *à la* Levinson suggests that speakers explore the explicitness option in clarifying what was implied. For example, what I meant by requesting you to take additional classes, does not necessarily suggest that you are a fool. Contrastively, it implies that additional classes would improve the quality of your research. Here, surplus information reinforces the implicature by clarifying what the speaker meant in uttering *You should take classes in semantics*.

3.2.1 Generalized Conversational Implicatures (GCI)

The Levinsonian theory of Generalized Conversational Implicatures (henceforth GCI) extensively borrows from Gricean notions on utterance meaning and the recognition of speaker's intentions. Contrary to Grice's quadripartite maxim structure, GCI is framed within a tripartite schema comprising inferential heuristics, the first one being the maxim of quantity (Q- principle) stating speakers should "not provide a statement that is informationally weaker than your knowledge of the world allows, unless providing an informationally stronger statement would contravene the I-principle. Specifically, select the informationally strongest paradigmatic alternate that is consistent with the facts" (cf. Levinson, 2000: 76), in short, "Make your contribution as informative as required." In this regard, the addressee's preoccupation will be weighing strengths and weaknesses of alternate sets. The underlying logic being weaker logical operators implicate their stronger counterparts. Conversely, by adhering to the entailment principle, a stronger statement entails a weaker one. For clausal implicatures[30], the speaker has to explore opposing operators. This is to say, the manifestation of Q-implicatures adopts a contrastive paradigm, with alternates of a logical pair belonging to the same semantic field, while equally respecting some hierarchical structure determining their logical strength. This does not mean that all alternate sets are bounded by this rule, take for instance, pairs from the colour semantic field cannot be subjected to any hierarchy like in cases of emotive adjectives such as *Lilian is happy* versus *Lilian is overjoyed*. However, in our opinion regarding existence of alternate colour pairs, we feel that artists are somehow able to distinguish numerous colours using terms such as: warm colours, cool colours, bright colours or dull colours. Against such a background, coming up with a contrastive pair in

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30 Atlas & Levinson (1981) state that Gazdar came up with the clausal implicatures category in reference to a compound sentence *p* having a constituent sentence *q,* such that *p* entails neither *q* nor not *q,* as shown in the example above.

a sentence like *Lilian had a red dress*. With its opposing alternate, where red is a warm colour would artistically implicate *Lilian's dress was not a cool color*. Or even, if we consider *Lilian had a light green dress*, will have its contrastive alternate as *Lilian did not have a dark green dress*. In Levinson's view, Q-implicature is the domain responsible for the production of both scalar implicatures and clausal implicatures like in (36a-b)

(36a) Some of the boys came.

     Scalar implicature: Not all boys came.

(36b) If there is life on Mars, the NASA budget will be spared.

     Clausal implicature : There may or may not be life on Mars.   (Levinson 2000: 76)

In this case, in (36a) a weaker operator generates a stronger inference as in *Not all boys came*. In (36b) the subjunctive conditional raises contrasting alternatives expressing doubts over the likelihood of lifeforms in Mars. As we have seen in the cited examples, both scalar and clausal implicatures, inclusive of any pragmatic inference respecting the Q-principle framework, are characterized as both metalinguistic and generating negative inferences. By metalinguistic, we mean that they serve as evidence for what was supposed to be said but was left unmentioned. Thus, their recovery is purely inferential. To bring the point much closer at home, Levinson argues that the speaker's utterance *Some boys came* in (36a) is a weaker option in comparison to its stronger alternate *Not all boys came*. This serves as pointer of the speaker's inability to use a stronger quantifier *not all* as a most suitable replacement for its weaker counterpart *some*.

The second heuristics is the maxim of quantity (Q2) otherwise known as principle of informativeness (I-principle). It argues against making one's contribution more informative than required with the suggestion of what is expressed should be stereotypically exemplified. The philosophy behind the I-principle is " the maxim of minimization. Say as little as necessary: that is produce the minimal linguistic information sufficient to achieve your communication ends (bearing Q in mind)." The speaker is expected to be economical with his words. Whereas, the addressee is expected to effectively apply the enrichment rule aimed at unearthing the most suitable interpretation of what is being communicated by the speaker. The viability of this principle only holds so long as the speaker does not flout the maxim of minimization. Put differently, specificity as opposed to ambiguity, informativeness

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as opposed to misinformativeness, and simplicity as opposed to complexity, while adhering to the law of abbreviation by using simpler and concise constructions (as in *hall* as opposed to *auditorium*) are ways of arriving at stereotypical interpretations. Therefore, the latter are considered as connotations associated with meanings, though not necessarily part of meaning but have predetermined roles in utterance interpretation as seen in *I cut a finger*, I-implicates that *I cut my own finger* (we are however uncertain of the exact finger and the affected arm). The maxim would strengthen, enrich or narrow expressions in the following examples in (37a-d) (from Levinson, 2000: 37)

(37a) John's book is good.

Licenses I-principle inferences like; the one he read/ the one he borrowed.

(37b) John and Jenny bought the piano.

Implicates: together.

(37c) John came in and he laughed.

Preference for a local reference John and He.

(37d) If you mow the lawn, I'll give you 5 dollars.

Licences I-inferences: If you don't mow the lawn, I will not give you 5 dollars.

As mentioned, the I-principle is a matter of upholding informativeness through specificity. However, as observed by Atlas (2004), in very many aspects the I-principle though considered within the realm of GCI, shares some similarities with Bach's notion of sentence nonliterality[31] otherwise known as conversational implicitures. For instance, they both involve enriching, strengthening, default reasoning or sentence expansions to unearth richer versions of what is communicated. There are only three differences noted; first Bach treats them as neither non-implicatures nor non-explicatures but as an intermediate class labelled implicitures (cf. Bach 2001, 2002). Second, in Bach's perspective, the impliciture is part and parcel of what is said. Contrastively, Levinson treats I-principle inferences as not part of what is said but as a proposition appended on what is said. Levinson cautions that I-principle inferences work in conjunction with background assumptions and remain unimmune to cross-linguistic

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31 Their nonliterality is christened *sentence nonliterality* because what the speaker says is not literally what he conveys (not in the sense of figurativeness). It is a pervasive phenomenon in our daily discourse as in sentences like *Helen poured some wine* (intentionally) versus *Helen spilled the wine* (unintentionally). The bracketed propositions are what Bach (2001: 262) calls *conversational implicitures* for they constitute implicit quantification of what is said by the speaker. Given that they are dependent on the semantic content of what is said, speakers are able to compute them online. In Bach's own words "speakers can identify implicit qualifications on the fly, without having first to figure out the semantic content of the entire sentence." (p. 259)

variations (cf. Carston, 2002b, Horn, 2004). Third, I-inferences are essentially positive inferences. On the contrary, implicitures can be both positive and negative as seen in our earlier examples. They seem to survive the Gricean cancelability tests in an utterance like *Jack and Jill are married* (*to each other*) versus *Jack and Jill are not married (to each other)*. In short, unlike Q-principle inferences, I-principle inferences are skewed towards enrichment of what is said. By having a positive charge, they are dissimilar to scalar implicatures which are negated. Finally, they have no metalinguistic component to unveil what was supposed to be said but for some unknown reason was left unsaid.

The third (M-principle) articulates the following idea "what is said in an abnormal way isn't normal," and banks on the Gricean maxim of manner particularly, be perspicuous, avoid obscurity of expression, and avoid prolixity. According to Levinson (2000: 136), the speaker's maxim in this case is to "Indicate an abnormal, non-stereotypical situation using marked expressions that contrast with those you would use to describe the normal corresponding stereotypical expression." The speaker is therefore expected to look out for both odd expressions and marked ones. According to Levinson, marked expressions are riddled with complexity, rarity, non-neutrality, and are surcharged with connotative meanings. In brief, the M-principle is parasitic on the first two heuristics. It means that unmarked interpretations would readily pick up stereotypical interpretations unlike in marked expressions. Examples of operational functions of the M-heuristics are outlined in (38b) and (38d)

(38a) Bill stopped the car.
(by I-principle) in a stereotypical manner with a foot pedal
(38b) Bill caused the car to stop.
(by M-principle) Indirectly, not in the normal way (Bill caused the car to stop)

or
(38c) Her house is on the corner.
I-principle: Her house, of the normal variety, is on the corner.
(38d) Her residence is on the corner.
M-principle: Her immodest, pretentious house is on the corner. (cf. Levinson, 2000: 138)

Apart from their mentioned differences, Levinson adds that both M-principle (using sets of alternatives

that contrast in form but in inherent semantic content) and Q-principle (using alternate sets of the same form but having dissimilar semantic content sets) induce metalinguistic contrast which I-principle is incapable of producing. Another difference is that M-principle capitalizes on synonymous sets which differ in markedness, whereas Q-principle will capture semantically stronger and weaker operators. I-inferences as already observed, focus on stereotypical interpretations unlike the two other inferential heuristics. Finally, in terms of strength, chronologically the Q-principle is the strongest, followed by the M-principle and lastly the I-principle.

In his perspective, although Horn collapses both Q-principle and I-principle into a unique maxim Q, Levinson is convinced that their similarities should not be an excuse to overlook their granular differences. From the foregoing, unlike Grice's CP founded on a quadripartite maxim structure, GCI disregards the maxim of quality to give undivided attention to the maxim of quantity. As a theory of pragmatic inference, GCI perceives human communication from the third layer of utterance meaning where default logics[32] or preferred interpretations are premised. In Levinson's viewpoint, Grice was neither exhaustive nor offered an in depth distinction of GCI and Particularized Conversational Implicatures (PCI henceforth), and taking into consideration Grice's confession of the danger of confusing generalized implicatures with conventional implicatures, Levinson (2000: 16) develops his arguments on GCI by first offering a distinction with PCI as defined below

(a) An implicature i from utterance U is particularized iff U implicates i only by virtue of specific contextual assumptions that would not invariably or even normally obtain. (b) Implicature i is generalized iff U implicates i unless there are unusual specific contextual assumptions that defeat it.

Levinson's definition is not far from Grice's, since some specific contextual assumptions favor production of particularized implicatures, as opposed to their generalized counterparts. In his example in (40), Levinson (2000: 16-17) shows how different contexts generate a single GCI while having two

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32 Default logic is structured as A(x) (P(x) & M (Q(x)) Q (x)   (Conditionally assume Q (x)
      P(a)   (Known fact)
               DL
      Q(a)   (Assumed consistent fact)
 It is compatible with GCI because of its capacity to sustain defeasibility and default interpretations as a non monotonic inference. In a sentence like *The noise from the gun frightened off the birds*, will generate an inference such as *the birds flew away* , as in X is a bird, and X can fly, unless it is a non flying bird like a penguin. Levinson offers the default rule system underlying the cited sentence as bird(a): M flies (a)
              flies (a)

dissimilar PCI

(39a) Context 1

A: What time is it?

B. Some of the guests are already leaving.

PCI: It must be late.

GCI: Not all of the guests are already leaving.

(39b) Context 2

A: Where is John.

B: Some guests are already leaving.

PCI: Perhaps John has already left.

GCI: Not all of the guests are leaving.

In this case, GCIs behave like scalar implicatures (see discussion by Horn in *Section 3.3*) by accessing a stronger reading or default inference such as *Not all of the guests* are leaving as an interpretation of the weaker utterance *Some guests are leaving.* Whereas, PCIs subscribe to the context-specific maxim of relevance. Levinson remains convinced that GCI explains concepts that Grice left obscure especially in his example using an indefinite article[33] in (40a-b)

(40a) I saw a woman in my office.

GCI: Someone other than my wife/girlfriend/ mother.

Or

(40b) I cut a finger yesterday.

The GCI within the construction *I cut my finger yesterday* could be any of the following: my thumb/

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33 Levinson argues that whenever we use indefinite articles, they have a way of implicating a definite counterpart, as shown in the sentences below

(i) *I saw the man with a hat.*

 Entails: *I saw the man with a red hat.*

 Implicature: *I saw someone who I would not hesitate to describe as the man with a red hat.*

ring finger/small finger or middle finger. In both (40a) and (40b) the speaker uses an indefinite article (*a*), suggesting for some unknown reason he is not in a position to use the stronger definite article (*the*). Whereas in (40a) the indefinite article comes with the presumption of non-uniqueness and therefore gives a generalized interpretation that the woman was someone else other than my wife, girlfriend or mother. Apparently, even (40b) remains unspared from the generalized reading: the supposedly cut finger was mine and not anyone else's. This is regardless of the fact that the indefinite article is a relatively weaker expression, as opposed to a definite one. We obtain a more stereotypical reading thanks to the I-inference. The principle gives a more refined interpretation as in (40a) and for (40b) *I cut my finger*. The generalized nature of the expression in (40b) comes in when we cannot ascertain whether it was my thumb, my small finger, my middle finger or my ring finger which was cut and we remain uncertain of the affected arm. In a way, what Grice failed to explore were preferred readings emerging from indefinite or definite articles using the I-principle. Apart from his disagreements with Grice, Levinson has problems with relevance theorists for ignoring default logics, such an oversight by relevance theorists in Levinson's perspective negatively impacts on the theory, especially on its incapacity to make accurate predictions of GCI as in (41-42)

(41) A: If the spy had possibly more than two passports, then he may yet escape.

    B: He had two passports.

According to Levinson (2000: 58), a relevance theoretical interpretation to the above statement would be in (42)

(42) A: If the spy had possibly more than two passports, he may yet escape.

    B: He had at least two and possibly more passports.

    Deductive implication (alias R-implicature) He may yet escape.

Contrastively the GCI predicted interpretations would be those in (43)

(43) A: The spy may yet escape if and only if he may have had more than two passports.

    B: He had only two passports.

    Deductive implication: It's not the case that the spy may yet escape.

In this regard, Levinson recommends that relevance theorists should revise their theoretical framework by giving specialized attention to the GCI component.

Regarding metaphors and other tropes, Levinson's (1983) discussion is skewed towards metaphors, while sidelining other categories of figurative language like irony, personification and simile. For ironical constructions, he mentions in passing that they are an outright violation of the quality maxim. In the comprehension of ironical utterances, one needs to complement specific background assumptions with the trope's non-literal meaning to arrive at its literal meaning. Levinson expounds extensively on the metaphor by acknowledging its humble beginnings in Aristotelian rhetorics and its long tradition grounded on a semantic school of thought. He quickly comments on the close association of proverbs, parables and metaphors. Levinson examines both tenets and pitfalls of two semantic theories on the metaphor notably; the comparison theory[34] and the interaction theory[35]. His verdict on both theories is that they are wanting for lacking relevant pragmatic expertise for metaphor analysis. On one hand, taking the interaction theory stipulating that a sentence such as *The stone died* requires regrouping of individual atomic parts of the features of *die* and *stone* respectively, prior to the application of certain construal rules aimed at providing a literal meaning for the metaphoric expression above as explained in (44a)

(44a) Stone has features: Physical object, natural, non living, mineral and concrete.

   Die: A process with the end result of a living entity X ceasing to live.

   (cf. Levinson, 1983: 149)

The construal rules filter out undesirable features, while retaining required ones for interpretation purposes. For instance, the term *stone* being an inanimate object, acquires some animate features associated with mortal beings. Concurrently, the verb *die* undergoes some semantic transitions to be applicable to both animate objects and inanimate beings. After pinpointing weaknesses of the interaction theory, Levinson terms it as an inefficient account of metaphoricity. Moreover, for some unexplained reason the theory ignored the role of one's world view or background knowledge in

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34 Levinson (1983: 148) argument for comparison theory is that "metaphors are similes with suppressed or deleted predictions of similarity. Thus the statement *Lago is an eel*, is semantically equivalent to *Lago is like an eel.*

35 Levinson (1983: 148) stipulates that under interaction theory "metaphors are special uses of linguistic expressions where one 'metaphorical' expression (or *focus*) is embedded in another 'literal' expression (or *frame*), such that the meaning of the focus interacts with and *changes* the meaning of the *frame,* and vice versa".

metaphor comprehension. On the other hand, comparison theory is grounded on the assumption that metaphors are contracted similes like in (45a-b)

(45a) Universities are compost heaps.
(45b) Universities are like compost heaps.   (adapted from Levinson, 1983: 151)

It therefore means that metaphors are converted to similes, hence giving rise to the misconception that metaphors are similes and vice versa. In Levinson's opinion, the theory is a syntactic-semantic account for metaphors having its generous share of problems too. For instance, transforming metaphors into similes as in (45b) results in loss of metaphoricity. From the foregoing, Levinson's refutes this school of thought by arguing for a pragmatic approach to complement the semantic approach because metaphors are not necessarily understood via similes. In addition to this, he advocates for incorporation of cognitivist ideologies geared towards explaining analogical comparisons within two conceptual domains in metaphors. In connection to this, he further proposes the restructuring of the Gricean implicatures model to accommodate other tropes under the following two-phase procedure outlined in Levinson (1983: 157-158)

Stage 1: Locating a trigger i.e identifying the need for inference.
(i) In saying that *p,* S has generally observed the maxims, but *p* is nevertheless conversationally inadequate in some degree, requiring that *p*, be 'amplified' or 'repaired' with additional assumption *q*.
(ii) In saying *p*, S has flouted the maxim, whatever he means he cannot mean *p*, S preserves the cooperativeness, S must substitute some proposition *q* for *p*.

Stage 2: Inferring *q*
In the case of (a) H can use the reckoning involved in standard implicatures. In case of (b) H must (i) determine what kind of trope *p* is, (ii) apply the reasoning characteristic of a trope (iii) select among competing values for *q* on the basis of their conversational adequacy *vis à vis* the maxims.

From this schema, Levinson is more interested in hitting two birds with one stone. One is by clearly distinguishing metaphors from other tropes. And two by outlining a metaphorical comprehension procedure. But this model is only a pragmatic tool, and needs a cognitivist approach in explaining cognitive processes in metaphor interpretation, whose understanding extends beyond semantic and pragmatic boundaries. In general, it is arguable that Levinson has gone an extra mile than Grice in

addressing figurative discourse. He rejects the Gricean perception of metaphors as categorical falsity, since metaphors express real-life situations or certain truisms. To illustrate this, he uses an expression such as *Frege lived here* to either literally mean Frege actually lived in the said locality. Or metaphorically, Frege's ideas were posthumously discussed over the years within same locality, hence both concepts are true reflections of a historical fact. By neglecting the pivotal role of conceptual domains and their interrelations in metaphorical utterances under the umbrella of resemblance, Gricean notion on falsity leaves a lot to be desired. This is something bothering not only Levinson but other relevance theorists as such Dan Sperber, Deirdre Wilson, Robyn Carston among other scholars. In brief, what still remains is to clearly distinguish various tropes and establish their similarities and differences in chapter four. In the light of this, one Levinsonian confession is that distinguishing figurative language from explicit one is a Herculean task.

3.3 LAURENCE HORN'S PERSPECTIVE ON IMPLICATURES

The opening line echoed in most of Horn's articles is the genesis of the implicature debate is not a 20th century topic synonymous with the Gricean William James Lectures, but rather pre-occupied minds of the 4th century classical rhetoricians like Servitus and Donatus, who noticed traces of linguistic underdeterminacy in litotes. The latter logically operates on "less is more" paradigm, a phenomenon that is analogically reflected in the what is said and what is implied interface on the implicature question. The bone of contention being on one hand, the speaker's utterance is normally syntactically impoverished. On the other hand, the utterance's meaning is pragmatically richer in its propositional content. To some extent, Horn is very much supportive of Gricean views on CP, but cautiously injects the fact that a befitting title for CP should be presumptions or default settings charged with the duty of upholding rationality in discourse between interlocutors. In Horn's (2004, 2006: 35), own words on rationality within the relevance theoretic backdrop:

> In particular, the speaker's and hearer's joint (though tacit) recognition of the rational tendency to avoid unnecessary effort, and the inferences S expects H to draw from S's efficient observance of this tendency, are more explicable directly from rationality than from cooperation as such. While Grice (1989: 28) describes how the maxims apply in cooperative ventures outside language like baking a cake or fixing a car, a collaboration need not to be present, much less communication, at least for the quantity maxims. It seems plausible to assume that the general forms of both Q and R principles "Do enough; Don't do too much" govern ANY goal-oriented activity; a person brushing her teeth, a dog digging to bury a bone. In this way, maxim of quantity, in both proposed (Q and R) subforms, is a linguistic instantiation of these rationality-based constraints on the expenditure effort.

Apart from rationality, Horn is in disagreement with Grice on the universal applicability of maxims in various languages. The reason behind Horn's stand and a view strongly supported by Gazdar (1979: 51) stems from Keenan's (1976) research findings on Malagasy speakers of Madagascar. The findings dismiss Gricean thesis on the universality of maxims as quasi-contractual forms in naturally occurring discourse. For instance, Gazdar (1979) citing Keenan stipulates that Malagasy speakers portray the following features in their constructions:

-Speakers flout the maxim of quantity meaning they do not make their conversational contributions as informative as possible. For instance, when asked to state a person's location, they are known to reply using a disjunction, even if they are aware of the supposed person's locality.

-There is elision of the agent in their syntactic construction to conceal his identity and is a strategy aimed at not stating overtly the agent responsible for an action.

Using the two examples, both Gazdar (1979) and Horn (2006) amongst other dissenting voices of pragmatic scholars have unanimously adopted derogative adjectives in their endorsement of CP as riddled with puritan, ethnocentric and utopian ideologies, disfavouring its full-scale applicability in modern pragmatics. From this standpoint, we are more conscious of the underlying reasons for divergent paths amongst pragmatists either by expounding one maxim (the Relevance Theory unilaterally premised on Gricean's relevance maxim), or the dualist approach with Q and R-based maxims as in Horn's case or the Levinsonian tripartite approach banking on Q, I and M principles, rather than applying the Gricean's quadripartite maxim structure holistically, in their theoretical justification of implicatures

In reference to *Figure 16*, Stalnaker (1991) is in agreement with Horn (1988: 120) on the dualistic semantic and pragmatic interface as either overlapping or disjointed in the implicatures debate. The dual approach accords implicatures a pragmatic status especially if we apply Gazdar's simplistic equation of PRAGMATICS = MEANING-TRUTH CONDITIONS[36]. The Gazdarian equation automatically rejects implicatures as not falling within semantics but in pragmatics, since semantics caters for conventional meanings. Moreover, with regard to Gricean distinction between conventional

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36 Carston (2002b) finds Gazdar's pragmatic equation as a crude definition of pragmatics.

and conversational implicatures, Horn (1988: 123) demonstrates their differences in *Table 3*.

Table 3: HORN'S DISTINCTION OF CONVENTIONAL AND CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURES

Conventional Implicata	Conversational Implicata
(a) Make contribution to truth conditions, but constrain appropriateness of expressions with which they are associated.	
(b) *Unpredictable,* arbitrary part of meaning; must be learned ad hoc.	Natural concomitant of what is said or how it is said; non-conventional by definition.
(c) *Non-cancelable*; apply in all contexts of utterances.	Cancelable, either explicitly (by linguistic context) or implicitly (by extralinguistic context)
(d) Detachable: two synonyms may have different conventional implicatures.	Non-detachable if arising via one of the content maxims (quality, quantity, relation), detachable if arising via maxim of manner.
(e) Not calculable through any procedure; must be stipulated.	Calculable through cooperative principle and the maxims of conversations.
(f) Akin to pragmatic presuppositions (noncontroversial propositions speaker posits as part of common ground) (cf. Stalnaker, 1974)	Conceptually related to Mill's *sous-entendu* of common conversation (see above) or Ducrot's *sous-entendu* as discourse or rhetorical notion.
(g) Exhibit a well defined set of *projection properties* enabling the implicata of larger expressions to be computed from those of their subparts (Karttunen & Peters, 1979)	Projection properties unclear, since conversational implicatures "may be indeterminate" (Grice) but (cf. Gazdar, 1979) and Hirschberg (1985) on the determination of implicata

Source: Horn (1988: 123)

Another area of divergence between Grice and Horn regards maxims, Gricean theory works on four maxims notably: maxim of quality, quantity, manner and relation. Alternatively, Horn is comfortable with the maxim of relation (R-principle) and maxim of Quality (Q-principle) which seem to engage in pragmatic division of labor. A componential analysis for both R and Q principles reveals, R principle is speaker-oriented and is an upper bounding correlate of least effort stressing on minimization of forms (say no more than you must, modulo Q). It comprises maxim of relevance (be relevant) and the first two submaxims of manner (avoid obscurity) and be brief. The R-principle is exploited for inducing strengthening, briefer constructions, stronger values, and informativeness, because R-based principles are essentially speaker-oriented. The Q-principle is hearer-oriented with a lower-bounding basis to

guarantee sufficiency of informative content, (say as much as you can, modulo quality R). It consists of the first quantity maxim (make your contribution informative as required), along with two clarity maxims of ambiguity and obscurity, jointly exploited in generating an upper-bounding implicature within the context of scalar implicatures. Horn's Q-principle is actually a merger of Levinsonian Q-principle and the M-principle. Just to mention in passing, it is noteworthy to mention that the semantic and pragmatic interface is reflected within the operations of lower-bounded operators and upper bounded ones. Another reflection of this is exhibited in the propositional component triggering ambiguity in scalar implicatures. Interpreted in Horn's words, it is actually a contravention of the Occamistic principle arguing that "Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity" in the outlined examples. (cf. Horn, 2006: 22)

	1-Sided Meaning	2-Sided Meaning.
Pat has 3 children	at least 3	exactly 3
You ate some of the cake.	some if not all	some but not all
It is possible she'll win	at least	but not certain

Operational functions of scalar implicatures are best understood within the post-Aristotelian Square of Opposition as shown in Horn (2004: 11, 2006: 40), where A, E, and I have a lexicon representation, whereas the O vertex is highly resistant to lexicalization. (cf. Levinson, 1983)

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
Figure 18: SQUARE OF OPPOSITION

A = all/every F is G   I= Some F is/are G
E= No F is G   O= Not every F is G, Some F is not G

Further, *Figure 18* is accommodative to the following components.

DETERMINERS/ QUANTIFIERS.	QUANT ADVERBS	BINARY QUANTIFIERS	CORRELATIVE CONJUNCTIONS	BINARY CONNECTIVES
A: all α everyone	always	both (of them)	both...and	and
I: some α someone	sometimes	one (of them)	either..or	or
E: no α no one	never	neither (of them)	neither...nor	nor
(=all˜/˜some)	(=always)	(=both˜/˜either)	(=(both..and)	(=and˜)
O: *nall α *neveryone	*nalways	* noth (of them)	*noth...nand	*nand
(=some˜/˜all)	(=˜always)	(=either˜/˜both)	(=(either...or)	(=and˜/˜or)

The logic behind the Aristotelian square of opposition is articulated within the following lines of arguments:

-Corresponding A and E statements are CONTRARIES, they cannot be simultaneously true (though they may be simultaneously false)

-Corresponding A and O (and I and E) are statements are CONTRADICTORIES; members of each pair cannot be true or false simultaneously.

-An I statement is the SUBALTERN of its corresponding A statement (and O and E); a subaltern is unilaterally entailed by its corresponding superaltern.

-Corresponding I and O statements are SUBCONTRARIES and cannot be simultaneously false (though they may be simultaneously true).

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-As mentioned previously, for many World languages the O vertex is resistant to lexicalization, for instance quantification adverbs like *always or sometimes*, never have contracted forms like *nalways in the O vertex, instead it is grammatically correct to say *not always* or *sometimes not*. Levinson's (2000: 70) answer on the nonlexicalization of the O vertex is attributed to the redundancy constraint[37] whereby:

For any lexical item W that carries a generalized quantity implicature P, there will be no fully lexicalized counterpart W' that lexicalizes the content of P. Because I items on a square will implicate O items, there will be no lexicalized O items.

From Horn's (2006: 22) examples, we clearly see scalar implicatures having two-sided values, balancing between weaker values and relatively stronger ones. Whereby, negation of a weaker lower bounded operator in the construction *He did not eat some of the cake,* implicates a stronger upper-bounded operator signalled in *He ate all of the cake.* In discourse, a simplistic translation of Horn's (2006: 31) notion is that whenever a speaker utters a weaker construction like *if you mow the lawn, I'll give you $ 5,* it serves as an open invitation for his addressee to cognitively generate and logically develop a more enriched propositional form as in *if and only if you mow the lawn, I'll give you $5.* Horn's (1998, 2004, 2006) thesis is that the semantically oriented lower bounded implicatures are governed by truth conditions or utterance meaning, whereas generalized implicatures govern pragmatically oriented upper-bounded operators. To Horn's list of suggestions on negation, Gazdar (1979) and Levinson (2000) perceive negation as a ambiguous operator having bivalent meanings, with Levinson emphasizing on the scale reversal effects of negation. Having looked at Horn's argument unlike Grice, he acknowledges that explicatures are pragmatically determined by the context of a proposition and correspond to enriched meaning. He however does not elaborate on their recovery procedures. In Horn's perspective which is entirely grounded on Bach's notion of implicitures, the following constructions, more in particular the bracketed information (implicit quantification) should neither be construed as implicatures nor explicatures.

– I haven't had breakfast. (*today*)
– John and Mary are married. (*to each other*)

Bach (2006) emphasizes on the need for Horn to rethink the question of scalar implicatures as cases of

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37 Levinson's thesis is that I entails O and implicates q, corresponding O item entails q implicates p. An appropriate sentence will entail "at least,"implicate "not all," assertion of "not all," will entail "not all" and implicate "some"

implicitures and not implicatures. To illustrate this, in saying *Some boys went to the party,* a fuller and enriched version of what is conveyed by the speaker is that *Some but not all boys went to the party.* The four reasons disqualifying constructions above as neither implicatures nor explicatures according to Bach are; first of all they have no iota of explicitness in them. Second, they are inferentially derived. Third, they are skewed towards what is meant as opposed to what is said. Fourth, they are susceptible to cancellation by a simple denial like *John and Mary are not married.* Regarding enrichment of propositional forms, Horn adds that there are no universal principles guiding the process. In most cases, a speaker's beliefs or world knowledge are sufficient in determining suitable components for enriching a syntactic slot. (cf. Carston, 2002b)

It is noteworthy to mention that Horn extensively covers scalar implicatures but remains mute on the metaphoricity question unlike Grice and Levinson.

3.4 LINGUISTIC UNDERDETERMINACY: INSIGHTS FROM KENT BACH AND ROBYN CARSTON

3.4.1 KENT BACH ON LINGUISTIC UNDERDETERMINACY

Bach's ideology on implicitures is derived against the backdrop of Gricean conversational implicatures where the distinction between what is said and what is implicated, is associated with the syntactical order of sentential components. This is a notion Bach labelled as the syntactical correlation constrain. Using a semantic yardstick or the literalistic approach to the semantic component of what is said, Bach is conscious of the linguistic pervasiveness of communicative systems in hosting sentences appearing to be syntactically complete, yet at the semantics level, they fall below the benchmark of what constitutes a semantically complete utterance. This lacuna or incompleteness is what Bach calls sentence non-literality, for the supposedly literal sentences. Additionally, there is need for additional syntactical and lexical expansion in determining with exactitude what the speaker says. Put another way, what the speaker actually means or communicates will be contained within the bracketed components (otherwise known as the implicit quantification) as in (47a,b), the latter serves as evidence that sentences are semantically impoverished when they do not express complete propositions.

(46a) Jack and Jill went up the hill.   versus   Jack and Jill went up the hill. (*together*)

(46b) Jack and Jill are engaged.   versus   Jack and Jill are engaged. (*to each other*)

Or other semantically incomplete sentences in (47a-b)

(47a) Jack and Jill climbed far enough.   versus   Jack and Jill climbed far enough. (*to get a pail of water*)

(47b) Jack and Jill are ready.   versus   Jack and Jill are ready. (*to get married*)

For Bach (2001a,b, 2002, 2006), these are clear cases of implicitures and like implicatures, they are not part of what is said. Implicitures are developed from what is said and extend beyond what is said (Bach, 2001a: 151). And like cancelable conversational implicatures, implicitures equally possess same features since one can say *Jack and Jill have not climbed enough to get a pail of water* or *Jack and Jill are not ready to get married* or *even Jack and Jill are not engaged.* Bach notes that the semantic aspect of what is said was underdeveloped in Gricean literature on what is said and what is implicated debate. Moreover, in his view, a re-orientation of this debate should cover more ground in several ways.

(i) Using tropes and any nonliteral discourse, what one says is not necessarily what one means, illustrating this Bach (2001a: 149) says that when one tells a trusted friend who has just betrayed you by saying *You'll will be my friend for life.* What the speaker means is that he has delinked himself from a once stable friendship because of some betrayal.

(ii) In cases of a slip of the tongue or misspeak, speakers are never taken to mean what they say, and would immediately denounce the uttered statement, by replacing it with the accurate construction.

(iii) When the speaker means much more than what he says (as Grice observed).

(iv) A speaker can say something without meaning anything at all, in a sentence *Mermaids are flowers, they grow in mountainous regions*. This sentence would be rendered meaningless, in the sense that mermaids are mythical creatures and not plants.

According to Bach, all the enumerated categories should not be construed as part of what is said but what is meant. In relation to this, issues regarding the semantic and pragmatic interface are recurrent throughout our discussions touching on any pragmatic component be it ambiguities, implications, presuppositions and interpretations. In his perspective, the semantic aspect addresses what is encoded in an utterance's logical form inclusive of the sentence's truth conditions. These work in collaboration with any extralinguistic information capable of injecting a semantic value to the context. On the other extreme, the pragmatic aspect is more engaged in extralinguistic information surrounding utterances. So the two are inseparable aspects as observed by Jay Atlas, Laurence Horn among other scholars dealing with the implicit and explicit interface or semantic-pragmatic distinction.

Taking his critics into consideration, Bach outlines four schools of thought challenging his literalistic ideologies and has gone to great lengths in showing their respective pitfalls. The schools of thought are notably: the propositional approach, the "not an implicature view", the psychological approach and intuitive approach. To go through them briefly, the propositional approach erroneously holds that sentences express complete propositions and as already seen in examples in (46-47), this is false and the view has since been challenged by Carston (2002b) in section 3.4.2. The "not an implicature view" is based on Robyn Carston's views that all pragmatically derived meaning should be treated as explicatures for being constituents of the propositional form or what is said. Bach is against classifying explicatures under what is said even if they are inferentially derived. And his sentiments extend to the grouping of any non implicatures as part and parcel of what is said.

The psychological view synonymous with François Recanati insists that the literalistic view is not conscious of psychological realities[38]. In Bach's viewpoint, one cannot clearly define the psychological or cognitive reality behind Recanati's distinctions, for example a primary process can be inferential either because a proposition is semantically complete or incomplete. Bach does not see the correlation between the hearer's cognitive processes and semantics. In line with this, Bach questions their role in the literalistic school of thought. This is because hearers can infer what the speaker is communicating without necessarily identifying what the speaker is saying. And this is the basic logic behind the

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38 Recanati proposes a series of cognitive processes to guide a hearer in figuring out what the speaker is trying to convey. The primary process provides the first proposition identified by the hearer. The secondary process comes in when a further proposition arises from the primary process. There are also mandatory processes and optional ones. Semantic incompleteness will invite a mandatory process to unearth a semantically complete proposition. Optional processes have a peripheral role. In Bach's viewpoint, Recanati fails to give a cognitive reason behind such distinctions.

semantic notion of what is said. It is not restricted to a syntactical order or prescribed rules on how to arrive at the sentence meaning. Further, this is not construed to mean it ignores cognitive abilities for accessing or processing information. The only difference is that Bach proposes a cognitive process without any laid down conventions as outlined by Recanati. Finally, the intuitive view, stipulates that the literalistic school of thought downplays intuitions about truth or falsity of what is said. To put it in context, let us consider (48)

(48) I haven't taken a bath. (Bach, 2001a: 157)

The sentence will be termed true only if the speaker had not taken a bath on the material day. Nonetheless, its falsity becomes evident when we consider the fact that the speaker has been regularly bathing since childhood. In Bach's perspective, what the speaker is saying is true and the missing part of the puzzle is its implicit quantification (*today*), hence we have a semantically complete proposition of a speaker saying *He hasn't taken a bath today*. Therefore, Bach considers it irrelevant to think of this process as intuitive given that conventional meanings of words[39] are capable of handling issues related to truth conditional aspects as shown in the above example. In this respect, intuitions are non-semantic and are unworthy of serious attention in communication. Moreover, if we rethink people's cancelability judgments in the light of intuitions as pertaining expanded and unexpanded constructions, variations such as *Howard hasn't taken a bath today* and *Howard hasn't taken a bath* are inevitable. Speakers are likely to say that the former offers additional information conspicuously missing in the latter. Seemingly, this does not interfere with the semantic notion of what is said. According to Bach, what is said is determined linguistically and not affected by the speaker's intention in a particular context. All the above approaches ignored some fundamental components of the semantic notion of what is said. In matters pertaining to cooperativeness, where conversations within the Gricean lens are perceived as subscribing to the maxims of relevance, quality, manner and quantity, Bach is in agreement with Levinson, that maxims are more of presumptions, and speakers only resort to them under the assumption that their addressees are being truthful and relevant as discourse unfolds. The only issues Bach leaves pending are refined categorizations or typologies for the terms expansion of semantically complete sentences and cases of completion of semantically incomplete sentences. To obtain more

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39 Bach (2006) talks of sentences which can be true while having false implicatures, by saying *there is a gas station around the corner,* it does not follow it is open and selling gas. It serves as a demonstration of what the sentence implicates is dependent on its semantic content. Whereas, the speaker's communicative intention is the driving force behind what the speaker implicates.

literature on the exact terminologies for the cited process we need to consult Robyn Carston's thesis.

3.4.2 ROBYN CARSTON ON LINGUISTIC UNDERDETERMINACY, EXPLICATURES AND IMPLICATURES

Linguistic underdeterminacy as a pragmatic phenomenon has been christened differently with labels such as pragmatic intrusion, the explicature-implicature distinction, the semantic-pragmatic interface, all addressing issues converging around truth conditions, the logical form and the pragmatic processes underlying their recovery procedures. Carston (2002b) contribution on linguistic underdeterminacy echoes some of Bach's (2001a,b, 2002, 2006) ideas on subsentential propositions or semantically incomplete components of the logical form, perceived as a pragmatic intrusion into semantics. The only difference is that Carston employs a relevance-theoretic yardstick with specific reference to Sperber and Wilson (1986a), in giving convincing explanations for linguistic underdeterminacy, the explicatures-implicatures distinction and metaphoricity. If we can recall, the notion of explicatures has not been discussed throughout this chapter, this is to avoid unnecessary duplication of material since in the first chapter, we had a section on miscomprehensions in explicit communication by Moeschler (2007). Furthermore, RT theory is incorporated in our theoretical framework where the sub-categorizations of explicatures are mentioned. We will further examine, Carston's views on non-literal language which are pertinent to this work. Our point of departure begins with the linguistic underdeterminacy question, which according to Bach (2001a,b/2002), Carston (2002b), Sperber & Wilson (2006a) is undeniably an ordinary linguistic phenomenon, whereby the communicative channel among interlocutors is sustained by semantically incomplete logical forms. The hearer being on the receiving end has at his disposal, his cognitive apparatus guiding him towards deducing suitable interpretations via pragmatic inference, confined within an acceptable conceptual range. Carston (2002b: 19) argues that there is a three-fold way of approaching semantic underdeterminacy thesis notably;

(i) Linguistic meaning underdetermines what is meant.
(ii) What is said underdetermines what is meant.
(iii) Linguistic meaning underdetermines what is said.

In accordance with Bach, Carston stipulates that the underdeterminacy thesis was mentioned in passing by Grice, especially when he outlines the processes underlying the recovery of implicatures. This means that under the lens of semantic underdeterminacy, we possess a much clearer picture on the recovery procedures for fuller propositions via reference assignments, disambiguation, free-enrichment, underspecificity of encoded concept, and broadening of encoded concepts. Recovery of these components is a pragmatic process leading towards recovery of the explicit component of a proposition and not implicatures. This stems from the fact that it is an essential subpart of the logical form, synonymous to the explicature domain. It is this point marking the deviation of Carston views from Bach's in his treatment of semantic underdeterminacy as implicitures and not explicatures. In the examples below, we explore variants of semantic underdeterminacy which Bach simplistically termed as expansions or completions.

- Disambiguation

(49a) John plays very well.
(49b) John Murray plays some musical instrument very well.
(49c) John Murray plays the violin well.   (Carston, 2002b: 118)

In this case, in (49b)-(49c), the subject John is disambiguated in its referent specification as John Murray and overruling any other John as in the case of (49a). To some extent, (49b) is more informative than (49a) because of its specification of John Murray and not John Smith or John Douglas. However, this cannot be said for the vague expression *plays some musical instrument very well*. Therefore (49c) being the most informative statement in this context, it provides answers for the unarticulated concepts as in John (*which John? John Murray*) plays well (*what? the violin*) not satisfactorily accounted for (49a-b).

- Saturation

Saturation involves filling up empty slots of incomplete logical forms in the recovery of more or less full propositional forms as in (50a-b)

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(50a) It is the same (*as what?*)

(50b) Paracetamol is better (*than what?*)   (adapted from Carston, 2002: 22)

- Enrichment

Enrichment involves using additional propositions in the recovery of unarticulated concepts to obtain a complete logical form. It also entails adjusting meaning of encoded concepts either by narrowing or broadening. Unlike Grice who perceives aspects related to reference assignment, or disambiguation and probably if he had talked about enrichment, we hypothesize that Grice would have treated them as inferential mechanisms for computing implicatures rather than explicatures *à la* Carston. This also contrasts the Levinsonian GCI where the specification of I-inference contributes to implicit default readings and not explicatures.

(51) This food is raw.   (adapted from Carston, 2002b: 27)

In (51) *This food is RAW,* the lexical entry for the atomic concept RAW, is accompanied by its logical and encyclopaedic knowledge on what rawness entails and how one can determine raw food from well cooked food using one's taste buds. In (51), the food's rawness is not construed to mean that the food is entirely uncooked, but rather has received a sub-standard amount of cooking, to be labelled undercooked, inedible and outrightly disgusting, hence broadening the semantic radius of raw to include half-cooked food. It therefore means that some surplus information has been added to the logical and encyclopaedic entries of the RAW concept, aimed at widening its semantic radius to accommodate a broader meaning. The example in (51) is treated as an *ad hoc* concept, which is processed thanks to a single procedure of the parallel mutual adjustment of explicatures and implicatures to yield an interpretation satisfying expectations of relevance.

The reason underlying the occurrence of linguistic underdeterminacy has been subjected to theoretical explanations by Carston (2002b) under the convenient view and the essentialist view. On one extreme, the convenient view adopts the cognitive efficiency school of thought in its underdeterminacy thesis as being a cognitive strategy exploited by speakers applying minimal effort by using simpler, abbreviated or sub-propositional radicals as opposed to fuller propositions, is an effort-saving endeavour. Alongside

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the sub-propositional radical, there is a fuller propositional form on stand by and a ready substitute for the incomplete form. On the other extreme, the essentialist view having both a stronger version and its weaker counterpart. The former holds that inasmuch as semantic underdeterminacy is widespread, there are relatively few sentences having full propositions. Conversely, the latter version posits that it is extremely rare to have sentences fully encoding their logical forms. In connection to this, linguistic underdeterminacy is universal. Carston aligns herself to the weaker version by arguing that explicatures are neither fully explicit nor can be assigned a unique interpretation as demonstrated in (52a-b)

(52) A speaker says "Tom's Father," the utterance can be enriched and have the following explicit or logical forms.

(52a) The man wearing a pink tie and drinking a Martini at t, is the father of Tom Adam.

(52b) The nervous looking man standing in the doorway at the kitchen of Tom Adam's flat at t, is the father of Tom Adam.   (adapted from Carston, 2002b: 36)

What Carston is proposing based on these examples is that it will be naïve to retain a single notion of what is said, since different viewpoints are at the addressee's disposal in recovering subsentential propositions. This is solely because of the idiosyncratic nature of their respective encyclopaedic entries. Explicatures were overlooked in Gricean literature, Carston modest proposal is that even if relevance theorists like Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson, construed explicatures as either being the development of the logical form or are pragmatically obtained via inferential mechanisms, then the explicature definition still needs to accommodate sentential subparts entailed by the logical form as captured in the Carston's (2002b: 124) definition

An assumption (proposition) communicated by an utterance is an `explicature' of an utterance if and only if it is a development of (a) a linguistically encoded logical form of an utterance, or of (b) a sentential subpart of a logical form.

Examples of sentential subparts befitting to be labelled explicatures are in (53)

(53) Sam went to the party and Jane watched a video.

(53a) Sam went to the party.

(53b) Jane watched a video.   (adapted from Carston, 2002b:122)

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In both (53a) and (53b) we have subparts signalled by Carston's definition, we will not dwell much on the major sub-divisions of explicatures because this has already been addressed in our first chapter under the relevance theoretical framework. Apart from the notion of sentential subparts recommended by Carston on explicatures, it is clear that her conceptualization of explicatures is in line with the relevance theoretical approach. The issue she consistently stresses on is the notion that sentences are never fully propositional and there is no homogeneous way in which speakers recover logical forms.

In respect to implicatures, we are also not going to comment much because we have already dealt with them in the first chapter. The only issue we want to focus on is Carston's views on figurative language, which is the backbone of this work. In Carston's opinion, an expression such as *Jane is my anchor in the storm,* has its higher explicature (54)

(54) The speaker says that Jane is her anchor in the storm.

Being a metaphorical statement, it will cognitively demand the hearer to assign Jane some properties or a subset of properties associated with being an anchor, and also access a section of properties related with storms suitable in describing the above scenario. It is more of examining logical, lexical and encyclopaedic entries of ANCHOR and STORM concepts, and trying to gauge which features are both similar and compatible with Jane's behaviour, especially those in line with her supportive role as a friend in times of need. The cognitively relevant interpretations of such a metaphor will be along a conceptual range of weak implicatures such as *Jane is my pillar of strength in difficult times*, *Jane supports me in times of hardships* and *Jane has always been supportive when I am facing life's challenges*. This is a process sustained by metarepresentational abilities where an object resembles another within the context of interpretive use of language.

On metaphoricity, Carston contends that they are varieties of loose language, in the sense that unlike Grice who argued for categorical falsity, Carston stipulates that metaphors demonstrate both in(applicability) of linguistic encoded predicates within a single discourse. For instance, if one says that *someone is a block of ice.* In real life, it is impossible to equate human beings to blocks of ice. However, figuratively it is possible to accommodate the same notion using the concept of interpretive use of language. Now regarding the question of metaphors as contracted similes earlier discussed under

Levinson's comparison theory, Carston posits even though metaphors and similes in constructions such as *Mary is a bulldozer* versus *Mary is like a bulldozer* yield similar implicit assumptions, there are two different tropes having the following features. First metaphors as put in Gricean terminology depict categorical falsity, whereas similes are true since addressees perceive one concept as a true representation of the another. Second, metaphoric expressions readily facilitate construction of *ad hoc* concepts. Similes are incapable of undertaking a similar process. And the reasons outlined above offer an explanation as to why the comparison theory has since been dismissed. The other issue Carston brings out regards an in depth analysis of the interpretive angle of the relevance theoretical approach, involves a horizontal dimension and a vertical dimension in interpretiveness.

A concept (simple or structured)
encoded by the linguistic expression uttered

Is an interpretation of   Is an interpretation of

A constituent of the explicature................is an interpretation of.....................A constituent concept in a
recovered by hearer   thought communicated
                                                                                                                                            by the speaker

Figure 19: Interpretive representation
Source: Carston (2002b: 342)

The vertical angle caters for relationships between the encoded concept, the intended concept and the understood concept. The tripolar components constitute pillars of the underdeterminancy thesis. The horizontal angle of interpretiveness touches on the utterance's basic explicature and the speakers' thoughts. In short, Carston presents a dual dimension of interpretiveness which differs from the relevance theoretical approach. In accordance with Levinson (1983), Carston also calls for a cognitivist perspective to metaphoricity especially theories that demonstrate the image schematic features of abstract concepts in figurative discourse.

3.5 THE INTERRELATIONSHIPS OF PRAGMATIC INFERENCES: THE CASE OF PRESUPPOSITIONS, ENTAILMENTS AND IMPLICATURES

This section presents an analysis of intertwined relationships between various pragmatic inferences using presuppositions because our interest lies in highlighting intricacies surrounding classification of pragmatic inferences. To begin with, we examine the conceptualizations of entailment and presuppositions. For the latter, we will not review literature on the projection problem here since it extends beyond the scope of our work.

3.5.1 PRESUPPOSITION

This diversity of possible definitions and lack of clear boundaries may be disconcerting, but it is not unusual: since academic fields are congeries of preferred methods, implicit assumptions, and focal problems or subject matters, attempts to define them are wholly satisfactory (Levinson, 1983: 5)

Levinson's (1983) quotation above resonates thoughts of Gazdar (1979), Karttunen & Peters (1979), Wilson & Sperber (1979), Stalnaker, (1991, 2002) and Atlas (2004) which hold that at times offering a logical definition for presuppositions is a Herculean task. Infact Horn (1988) has explored a semantic-pragmatic interface in accounting for the tripartite and controversial question revolving around the semantic presuppositional account, the pragmatic presuppositional account and the projection problem[40]. So far, the most rudimentary definition in most pragmatic literature affirms the existence of both pragmatic and semantic accounts for presuppositions. The pragmatic account synonymous with Lauri Karttunen and Robert Stalnaker's schools of thought, is a Gricean driven account upholding rationality in communication. Speaker's intentions are channelled towards achieving mutual recognition of his addressee's beliefs, attitudes and intentions, a concept otherwise known as common ground[41]. In simpler terms, Stalnaker (2002: 1) contends that presuppositions are more of a speaker's propositional attitude, with the capacity of being publicized or a social attitude in the sense that "one presupposes φ, only if one presupposes that others presuppose it as well". The pragmatic inference is known to take for granted background information. Apart from Stalnaker's definition, one thing worth mentioning is that adherents of this account seem to converge around context, mutual beliefs or common ground,

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40 Projection problem is concern with understanding presuppositions in terms to compositionality. Put differently, it is an examination of presuppositions of complex sentences on the basis of their constituents (cf. Gazdar, 1979)
41 Stalnaker (2008) definition is that "common ground that φ in a group if all members accept for the purposes of the conversation that φ, and all believe that all believe that all accept φ and all believe that all accept φ", where to accept a proposition is to treat it as true for some reason.

assumptions and entailment as pointed out by Gazdar (1979: 104-106) (see also Wilson & Sperber (1975)

Thomas (1973: 6) definition construes presuppositions in terms of conversational implicatures "Sentence A pragmatically presupposes a proposition B relative to a context C if A conversationally implicates B relative to C and ¬ A conversationally implicates B relative to C."

Karttunen's (1975: 149) definition "A pragmatically presupposes proposition B iff it is felicitous to utter A in order to increment a common ground C only in case B is already entailed by C."

What such definitions succeed in showing are roles of context and common ground in the pragmatic account of presuppositions.

The semantic account of presuppositions as its pragmatic account counterpart has a generous share of definitions. Gazdar (1979: 90) outlines the following approaches

- A bivalent semantics approach under the lens of entailment ϕ presupposes ß iff
    (i) ϕ entails ß
    (ii) $\neg\phi$ entails ß
–   Three-valued logic: If ϕ entails ß and ß iff ϕ has the third value whenever ß is not true.
–   Trivalent semantics approach by Keenan : ϕ logically presupposes ß iff ϕ has the third value whenever ß is not true.

In all mentioned definitions, what is undeniable is that a semantic account is skewed towards truth-conditions. Its most simplistic definition is: *P presupposes that Q if and only Q must be true for P to have value* (cf. Wilson & Sperber, 1979, Stalnaker, 1991, 2002 and Abbott 2008), with entailment in some definitions being considered as a subcomponent of the semantic account[42] (cf. Gazdar, 1979, Levinson, 1983 and Bertucelli, 1997). Alongside the semantic-pragmatic interface in the presuppositional account is its simplified understanding of a presupposition as "Q is presupposed by asserting that P just in use under normal conditions, one can reasonably infer that the speaker believes that Q from either his assertion or denial that P." A simplistic version of this definition is : what is asserted and via inferential mechanisms generates presuppositions regardless of the presence of negation. For example, by asserting *John does not regret voting for Nader*, the speaker is presupposing

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42 Gazdar (1979) argument on incremented common ground as discourse unfolds would require some level of entailment, for instance when the speaker is aware that his addressee has not been informed about the speaker's newly acquired vehicle. Instead of saying *I'm sorry I am late, my car broke down*. One could say *I'm sorry I'm late, I own a car and my car broke down*. Definitely, with this new information will lead to the suspension of the presupposition in the second utterance.

that John actually voted for Nader. This contrasts implicatures like in a personal example in (55)

(55) Anne: Sarah is always the last person to submit her assignments.

Tom: Then Sarah must be a lazy student.

Anne: No, she isn't a lazy student, in fact she is one of my best students.

In the exchange above, it is crystal clear from Anne's opening statement on Sarah's lateness in submitting her assignments could imply numerous things. In Tom's perspective, which erroneously implies that Sarah is a lazy student. Therefore, Anne nullifies Tom's implicit assumptions about Sarah by employing cancelability in correcting Tom's utterance. However, as previously seen for presuppositions, this notion would not hold. Seemingly, the presence of negation fails to nullify the presuppositional content. Conversely, conversational implicatures remain unimmune to cancelability procedures. In Stalnaker's (1991) perspective, although pragmatic and semantic readings of presuppositions coexist, there are some added advantages for pragmatic presuppositions.

-The probability of entertaining contextual variations in the presuppositional account, in two different contexts like *My cousin isn't a boy any more* can have two readings. The first being *he is male* or it could have a second presuppositional reading of: *he has now feminine following a sex change*. A semantic account will consider it ambiguous.

-The strength of induced reference in presuppositions can be mildly or strongly suggested as in *Sam was surprised that Nixon lost the election,* strongly takes for granted that Nixon lost the election. Comparatively, *Sam was surprised that Nixon "lost" the election* presupposes that Nixon actually won the election.

-It relates to an ordinary communicative situation that adheres to rationality based on arguments on common ground or mutual knowledge. (cf. Horn, 2004, 2006)

Stalnaker revisits Karttunen's (1977) notion of plugs, filters and holes. Examples of plugs would be verbs such as *say, ask, tell* and *announce* and including external negation, because they inhibit the projection of presuppositions. Verbs expressing propositional attitudes like *fear, want* and *believe* complement presuppositions and act as filters by either permitting or inhibiting presuppositional

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phrases. While holes include factive verbs, semi-factives, modals, implicatives, aspectual verbs and internal negation which facilitate the construction of presuppositions. (cf. Gazdar, 1979: 109)

(56)
      If I   ⎫ regret later I had not told the truth, I will confess it to everyone.
             ⎬ realize
             ⎭ discover

The factive verb *regret* in the first construction presupposes that *I did not tell the truth*. In contrast, verbs such as *realize* and *discover* do not favor the production of a similar presupposition as the verb *regret*. However, according to Stalnaker, the bone of contention is the suspect classification of factive verbs and semi factive verbs, which is wanting if we consider what is happening in (57a-b)

(57a) If Harry discovers his wife is playing around, he will be upset.
(57b) Harry may realize that his wife has been playing around.

In both instances, the sentences having " semi-factive verbs" *realize* and *discover* are now porous enough unlike in (56) to entertain *Harry's wife is unfaithful* as their presupposition.

Moreover, in another example (58)

(58) Did you   ⎫ regret you had not told the truth?
              ⎬ realize
              ⎭ discover

Regret and *realize* sustain a presuppositional phrase of having lied, unfortunately not projected by the verb *discover*. Stalnaker's diagnosis of the problem in (58) is that it is triggered by the semantics of the verb *to discover*. Its projection failure is caused by the speaker making a presupposition without assuming the affirmative answer to the asked question. From what has been discussed, there is need to incorporate a semantic component in Karttunen's classification of holes, filters and plugs, within his pragmatic account. Atlas (2004: 47) pinpoints certain loopholes in Stalnaker's presuppositional theory. To begin with Atlas disagrees with Stalnaker's on speaker-hearer mutual knowledge or common ground in the comprehension of presuppositions, using Stalnaker's (1974: 202-3) own example in (59)

(59) I am asked by someone whom I've just met. Are you going for lunch. I reply, No, I've got to pick my sister.

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The speaker utters the statement in (59) under the assumption that his addressee is aware of his sister's existence. Therefore for Atlas, the common ground notion on pragmatic presupposition is not only irrelevant but insufficient. He proposes a replacement of the term common ground with accommodation, since it subscribes to the principle of noncontroversality enshrined in the maxim of relativity. This maxim argues for :

(i) Do not say what you believe to be highly noncontroversial that is to be entailed by presumptions of the common ground.
(ii) Take what you hear to be lowly noncontroversial that is consistent with the presumptions of the common ground.

In Atlas's view, accommodation is a process where a speaker consciously acts as if certain propositions are part and parcel of common background, yet they do not belong there. He may want to communicate a proposition indirectly, by presupposing it in such a way that the addressee pragmatically infers its presupposition. In addressing matters related to ambiguity in presuppositions, contrary to Grice's perspective on the *King of France isn't bald* construction*,* is ambiguous with two possible readings. The stronger reading suggesting that there is a unique existence of a King of France and the weaker reading implicating the existence of a unique King of France (cf. Grice, 1989, Atlas, 2004). Atlas contends that such scenarios are purely cases of semantic non-specificity and not ambiguity. In his words "the sentence is equivocal and the so called wide-scope and narrow-scope[43] senses are instead contextually specifications of the indeterminate literal meaning of the negative sentence" (cf. Atlas, 2004: 41).

Atlas (2004) recommends that any neo-Gricean account for explaining the pragmatic theory of presupposition should take into account the following issues:

(1) The semantic non-specificity between choice and exclusive negation.
(2) Neo-gricean mechanisms for utterances inference of semantically non-specific negative sentences.
(3) Principle of non-controversial default interpretations of statements.

Cohen (2006), just like Gazdar (1979) and Stalnaker (1991), uses a non-controversial and simplistic

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43 This phenomenon is clearly explained under Atlas's (2004) thesis of choice negation (or narrow scope) and exclusive negation (or wide-scope negation). To be more specific, in choice negation it is possible for (ө) of a statement *(ϕ)* to be true (false) in valuation of and only if *(ϕ)* is true (false) in valuation if and only if *(ϕ)* is false (true). If choice negation is paraphrased in English *Kepler didn't die in misery*, but Kepler has no reference, then the choice negation fails hence triggering a wide scope negation. Choice negation permits failure of truth-value for a sentence with false (not true presupposition). Exclusive negation will remain true, even if both presuppositions are untrue.

view by arguing that negation is a hole. It is laced with porosity and easily permits projection of properties. For Cohen, the logic behind presuppositions is that *if B follows from both A and its negation, then A presupposes B* like in examples in (60)

(60a) The King of France isn't bald.
(60b) The King of France is bald.

Moreover, the possibility of engaging in presuppositional denials are probable in examples such as

(60c) lacking projection properties.

(60c) The King of France isn't bald because there is no King of France.

What needs underscoring is supposing *the King of France is bald,* then the existence of a King of France is undebatable. Moreover, if *the King of France isn't bald*, then the existence of the King of France still remains unquestionable. On the contrary in (60c) these presuppositions are denied. Cohen proposes tests like negation as mentioned above and use of modals as holes like their internal negation counterparts in determining presuppositions.

(60d) If the King of France can be bald, then there is a King of France.

     versus

(60e) The King of France can't be bald because there is no King of France. (Cohen, 2006)

Just like Stalnaker, Atlas (2004: 48) concurs with him on the futility of offering a single definition to presuppositions with the exercise being comparable to difficulties encountered while trying to figure out the figurative/literal distinction. His thesis towards this view is that "As in pragmatics intrusion and semantic non-specificity show that context/content distinction is just more of a philosophical myth, another untenable dualism like figurative/literal distinction." (See also Bertucelli, 1997)

As if reading Atlas's and Cohen's minds, Abbott (2008) claims that Stalnaker's newly revised theory on common ground unsatisfactorily addresses presuppositions. In his previous accounts, Stalnaker associated presuppositions with reduced contexts. Further, new information was added on the presupposed propositions within the common ground paradigm. On the other hand, presuppositions being indirect conveyors of this information are constantly present regardless of the utterance's rejection or acceptance by addressees. Having retained the pragmatic account school of thought for

years, Abbott says that the pragmatic presuppositional account is dependent on the common ground thesis, thus the need for more empirical research to bolster Stalnaker's claims. Alongside these arguments, Abbott uses several examples in arguing for the revision of the common ground theory. In one example, Abbott believes in Malinowskian "phatic communication" signalled in sentences regarding the weather for instance *It's a beautiful day!* or *It certainly needs to rain soon,* which Abbott considers informative, and not instances of pretense as previously thought by Stalnaker. The same concept extends to other contexts, where an emcee may begin a lecture by saying *Our speaker tonight is Noam Chomsky* under the assumption that every person in attendance is familiar with Noam Chomsky. In disagreement with Abbott, Stalnaker insists that "phatic communion" qualifies as pretense. This is because utterances coined around obvious weather patterns, when initiating conversations are strictly reserved for establishing a rapport. In general, Stalnaker stands firmly on his common ground theory in handling pragmatic presuppositions.

Unlike Atlas (2004) and Cohen (2006), Abbott skepticism about David Lewis's accommodation[44] theory is evident especially in matters pertaining to contextual adjustment. In his example in Stalnaker (2002: 709)

(61) Alice to Bob: I can't come to the meeting, I have to pick my sister at the airport.

Abbort argument is that Stalnaker (2002) says that supposing Bob had no previous knowledge of Alice's sister's existence, Bob will work on the assumption that Alice is knowledgeable about what she is talking about and she would not be lying about having a sister. Based on what Alice has just asserted, Bob will adjust his common ground knowledge and beliefs to accommodate the assertion in (61). Simons (2006) is not enthusiastic about Stalnaker's point, because for Simons the common ground issue or accommodation does not arise. In the first place going by third order beliefs, Bob clearly knows that Alice knows that he does not know of the existence of Alice's sister, the theory's viability is more conspicuous if common ground is based on the utterance's conventional content. For we can only employ the conversational account if speakers beliefs of the projected common ground, work in conjunction with conventional presuppositions arising from the uttered sentence. In Simons (2006:

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44 David Lewis uses language as a scoreboard where contextual adjustments are probable, this is captured in his thesis that "if a time t, something is said that requires presupposition P to be acceptable, and if P is not presupposed just before t, then *ceteris paribus* and within certain limits presupposition P comes into existence at t. (cf. Lewis 1979: 340 as cited in Abbott 2008: 527)

19-20) own words

"...On my own view presuppositional account..involves recognizing the speaker's, plan to perform a speech act with a certain content, and possibly certain implicatures, then applying a version of the Principle of Charity, taking them to accept whether they must be in order for the plan to be reasonable, rational and cooperative...."

Further, Bertucelli's (1997), Simons (2006), as well as Abbott's (2008) stand regarding accommodation is that it should be taken with a pinch of salt for there is hardly any guarantee of one's speech being devoid of controversies. Without the said controversies, we would be talking of an utopian world where disagreements and massive protests are nonexistent. Alongside these issues, Abbott also thinks that Stalnaker takes the presupposition question lightly in his confession that defining presuppositions is likened to a wild goose chase, as he christens presuppositions as "relation X". Stalnaker (2002: 712) adopts such a label using an analogical reference made by Justice Stewart's comments on pornography summarized in the following line "we all recognize it when we see it even if we can't exactly say what it is" (p. 712), and a similar confession has been said by Simons (2006). Stalnaker (2002) equally stresses that finding definitions for presuppositions should not be prioritized, rather more attention should be channelled towards their functions. Once again, Stalnaker, echoes Atlas's views, which are similar sentiments of Wilson & Sperber (1979: 303), where they contend "But there seems to be no entirely satisfactory explanation of this behaviour, either in semantic or in pragmatic terms. The existence of presupposition behaviour is unassailable: Its theoretical status is increasingly puzzling". Until this point, maybe the puzzling nature of presuppositions is what compelled Stalnaker to label them "relation X."

Accommodation theory is not only problematic with assertions and presuppositions, Levinson (2000: 62-63) has queried the logic behind it in the light of GCIs, by using the case of definite and indefinite articles in (62a-d)

(62a) Jerry Rich came in. He walked over the window.
    (Licenses: local reference)
(62b) Jerry Rich came in. The man walked over the window.
    (Licenses: nonlocal reference)
(62c) The man entered. A man coughed.
    (Licenses: disjoint reference)

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(62d) The ship broke up. A five galleon of Spanish fleet had been irretrievably lost.

(Licenses possible conjoint reference)

In Levinson's perspective, accommodation is incapable of explaining the phenomenon in (62), while GCI effectively accounts for it. In (62a) there is anaphoric reference to Jerry Rich by the third person singular pronoun *He*. And the GCI theory for this scenario is that pronouns are minimal expressions inviting maximal interpretations. In (62b) a similar process is impossible because the M-principle inhibits the operation since the speaker has no intention of any co-referencing to occur. Comparatively, there is no co-joint referencing in (62c) but is present in (62d). The accommodation theory reading on co-referencing would be that the definite article invites a previously existing referent. Such an explanation would work for (62d) where the ship that broke up, has a conjoint referent: *A fine galleon* but not in (62c). According to Levinson, this school of thought should be rejected and instead a scalar implicature reading should be utilized. In different words, an indefinite expression is normally a weaker operator, owing to its unspecificity. It is therefore not taken to mean that using a weaker indefinite article would Q-implicate a definite article. In this respect, Levinson finds accommodation theory lacking a gratuitous inference perspective. His recommendation is for the incorporation of some GCI's ideas into accommodation theory to avoid making erroneous predictions in correferential expressions.

In response to Abbott's criticisms on Stalnaker's common ground theory, Stalnaker (2002, 2008) contends that pragmatic accounts for presuppositions should not be construed as his personal fabrication, but are enshrined in the Gricean logic exploring the pragmatic riddle of speaker's meaning (saying) and the utterance's meaning (implicatures). Put in another way, assertions are manifestations of what is said and are merely a fraction of what is meant. Presuppositions are the larger fraction of what is meant. In Stalnaker's (2008: 540) terminology

> One of the important upshot of Grice's development of this program was the recognition that the language device to facilitate meaning of things (for a language user, the simplest and most straightforward way to say something is to say it), once the device is in place, it becomes possible to use it to mean something different from what one says. In fact, given the general features of the concept of speaker meaning (to mean something is to act with a manifest intention to affect the attitudes of one's interlocutor by means of the recognition of that intention)

Therefore the computation of meaning will always occur within a background of assumptions, which are constantly updated with new information as discourse unfolds (cf. Karttunen & Peters, 1979: 14).

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For Stalnaker there is no much difference between cooperative principle conventions and the common ground logic. This is because in both cases a common background is present where speakers expect their addressees to make certain obvious inferences pertaining to ongoing discourse, which Stalnaker regards as having some level of "common ground." Accommodation within the common background context is more of contextual adjustments and this is something Stalnaker is conscious about. While Abbott is worried about controversiality, Stalnaker resolves this issue using the notion of non-defective and defective contexts. To elaborate on this point, it is normal for any communicative context to entertain both correct assumptions (non-defective contexts) and erroneous ones (defective contexts) within the common ground. An illustration of especially the latter is an utterance where Anne tells Bob *The man taking the Martini is a philosopher*, while Bob knows that such a statement is controversial, due to its falsity since the man is actually taking a Perrier and not a Martini, contrary to Anne's beliefs. To be in line with common ground logic, some corrective measures will be demanded in Anne's utterance if Bob is to accommodate it. The rectification of this error will involve Bob asserting that the philosopher Anne is alluding to is taking a Perrier and not a Martini. Alternatively, Bob can retain the utterance, while introspectively knowing that Ann's assumptions are not non-defective but defective. He might even let her entertain those erroneous thoughts, while he maintains his true assumptions on what the philosopher is drinking. Therefore, in Stalnaker's view, the possibility of ironing out controversiality within the accommodation context, is based on the notion of acceptance that what the speaker is uttering is true. From what has been discussed so far, Stalnaker's common ground view actually caters for accommodation via contextual adjustments, and has set aside measures for handling controversial issues touching on the accommodation and non controversiality domains.

3.5.2 ENTAILMENTS

A simplistic definition for entailments suggested by Moeschler in an informal discussion subscribes to the logic that

-P entails Q iff (i) if P is true, Q is true

          (ii) if P is false, Q is either true or false

Traditionally, unlike presuppositions whose survival is guaranteed under negation as in the case of (63a) and (63b), and in interrogative statements for instance *Were you convinced that Anna was telling*

the truth? to presuppose *I wasn't convinced that she was telling the truth.* The lifespan of entailments is short-lived once subjected to negations or interrogations (cf. Gazdar, 1979, Wilson & Sperber, 1979, Atlas & Levinson, 1981). In fact, Gazdar (1979: 108) uses Andrea's Howard example[45] in distinguishing implicatures, presuppositions and entailments in example (63- 64)

(63a) One of the two articles was published.
(63b) One of the two articles wasn't published.

Both (63a) and its negation (63b) presuppose (63c) and (63d) and in turn imply (63c) and (63d)

(63c) An article was published.
(63d) An article wasn't published.

However, the negation test gives a misleading result here, for instance (63a) entails (63c) and im-plicates (63e) which entails (63d).

(63e) Speaker knows that it is not the case that both articles were published.

Likewise, (63b) entails (63d) and im-plicates (63f), which entail (63c)

(63f) Speaker knows that it is not the case that both articles were not published.

For Wilson & Sperber (1979), thinking about presuppositions in terms of denials and interrogatives is not sufficient. They subscribe to a relevance-driven perspective in the hierarchical structure of entailments. In simpler terms, the principle of relevance selects prominent entailments to be foregrounded and retains less relevant information in the background. Examples in (64) show the explained entailment relationship.

(64) There is a funny smell, your coat is on fire.

(64a) There is a funny smell.

(64b) Your coat is on fire.   (Wilson & Sperber, 1979: 304)

Inasmuch as (64) entails both (64a) and (64b), in terms of the entailment's hierarchical structure as endorsed by relevance, (64b) will be foregrounded on the strength of its cognitive effects. On the contrary, (64a) is less relevant since it stresses on the funny smell instead of the fire, making it a

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45 This example is based on a personal communication between Gerald Gazdar and Andrea Howard in 1979, who talk about cases of pseudo-presupposition generated by conversational implicatures. We have used the example in demonstrating the intricate relationship between implicatures, presuppositions and entailment.

component of the background. There are numerous ways in which ordering of entailments can be achieved using syntactical or phonological aspects as in (65-66)

(65a) There is a funny smell and your coat is on fire.
(65b) There is a funny smell because your coat is on fire.   (personal examples)

In (65a) there is entailment ordering because information in the two main clauses have equal importance. Contrastively, in (65b), *There is a funny smell* is foregrounded because it is premised on the main clause, whereas *Your coat is on fire* is retained in the background on the basis of its position in the subordinate clause. Phonological ordering known as focal scale, commissions ordering of entailments based on prosodic stress to yield numerous pragmatic interpretations or dissimilar presuppositions induced by choices in the focal stress (66a) (See also Bertucelli, 1997, Simons, 2001)

(66a) There is a funny SMELL your coat is on fire.
(66b) There is a funny smell your COAT is on fire.   (personal examples)

In (66a) what should be foregrounded is a peculiar smell while the burning coat is obviously on the background. In (66b), the burning object namely, the coat is given prominence, whereas both the smell and fire are retained in the background. In Wilson's & Sperber's words, cases of contrastive stress used in capturing numerous background entailments, are actually manifestations of presuppositional traits as already seen in our previous discussions. Another area of convergence in entailments and presuppositions is where background propositions are preserved in denials and interrogatives. Normally, background information enriches foregrounded entailments. If one is true and the other is false, then it means that an infelicitous scenario is inevitable. The only distinguishing factor between these entailments and presuppositions is that the latter are linguistically determined and have no logical ties and formal properties unlike the case of standard entailment.

The bottom line in entailment ordering is simply that entailments possess an internal structure comprising a logical structure and substituting variables[46]. Besides the specified grammatical entailments, there are unspecified entailments lying outside the focal scope scale. Wilson & Sperber

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46 Substituting variable is a Chomskyian thesis that argues for a replaceable surface syntax representation for entailed constructions.

(1979) argument is that it is recommended to have their classification as follows, those entailed by the background, those which entail the background and those which neither entail nor are entailed by the background. Wilson & Sperber (1979) use the example in (67) to explain the above classification.

(67) There is a funny smell - your coat is on fire.

(67a) Some coat is partly burning.

(67b) Something is being consumed by fire.

(67c) Something somewhere is burning.

In the examples outlined, (67a) qualifies as grammatically unspecified entailments entailed by the background where my coat is partly on fire. Denying the statement is tantamount to suggesting that the unburnt side of my coat is still intact. (67b) is entailed in the background of my coat is actually burning and its denial would mean that the sentence is false as well as question its relevance. Whereas (67c) falls neither in what is entailed nor entailed by the background. This does not signal its irrelevance but rather it has some additional value on the foreground. In summary, Wilson & Sperber have proposed five (5) types of entailments.

-Foreground entailments- each of which must be relevant in its own right.

-First background entailments, act as presuppositions[47] and are used in determining the sentence's main idea. To clarify this point, Abbott (2006: 3) gives examples of entailed presuppositions. An entailed presupposition of the expression *Bill is sorry that it is raining* with its negative counterpart *Bill isn't sorry that it is raining* would presuppose *it is raining*. However, the initial statement's entailment would be *Bill feels bad about the rain*.

-Entailments which entail background, which may but do not have to be relevant in their own right.

-Entailments which are themselves entailed by the background, which may, but do not have to exhibit presuppositional behaviour.

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47 Bach (2006: 24) gives another example of entailed presupposition in a hypothetical situation where someone says to you *Nobody has ever long-jumped over 28 feet*, and you reply to such a statement is *What do you mean? Bob Beamon long-jumped over 28 feet back in 1968*. The latter statement clearly implies that someone has long-jumped over 28 feet, and its respective entailment is the fact that Beamon long-jumped over 28 feet.

-Entailments which neither entail nor are entailed by background, which should not be involved in normal interpretation and can be also so involved only at the cost of some (possibly intentional) infelicity.

To Wilson's & Sperber's (1979) entailment account, Atlas & Levinson (1981) add that there exists a semantic account to entailment rooted in Fregean thesis whereby truth conditions determine utterance meaning. And pragmatists have espoused the same idea in their treatment of semantic representations as logical forms. Therefore, owing to their semantic inseparability with the logical form, entailments are neither deniable nor cancelable (cf. Carston, 2002b). Another pressing issue with Wilson & Sperber's entailment hierarchical structure which Atlas & Levinson (1981: 30) find problematic is negation. Using the following examples, they claim sentences (68a) and (68b) presuppose (68c), however its first background entailment of (68b) and (68d) entails (68e)

(68a) It was John that Mary kissed.
(68b) It wasn't John that Mary kissed.
(68c) Mary kissed someone.
(68d) There is someone such that it wasn't he that Mary kissed.
(68e) There is someone that Mary didn't kiss.

In this case, the background (68d) cannot be regarded as the presupposition of (68c), the example counters Wilson's & Sperber's thesis on preservation of the background under denial or questioning. Another angle to the entailment debate is the concept of entailed implicatures explored by Carston (2002b: 196) in (69)

(69) Have you invited any man to the function.
B: I've invited my father.
Implicature: B has invited at least a man.

In (69), the atomic concept FATHER, like most concepts having three-fold sub-components comprising; the logical entry, encyclopaedic entry and lexical entry, enables the hearer access its logical entry to unearth its analytic inference rules for the concept father as A MALE PARENT. Using

common knowledge and assumptions within the docket of encyclopaedic entry, we deduce that father is a male parent not a female parent. Therefore, it cannot be overstressed that being masculine within the human kind species is synonymous to being male. The concept of FATHER entails a man as reflected in the proposition and serves as a good example of an implicated entailment.

Up to this point, we have pinpointed differences between entailment, presupposition and implicatures. It is undeniable that the various pragmatic inferences are interrelated as exemplified in cases such as implicated entailments and entailed presuppositions. As Bertucelli's (1997) rightly puts it, they are diverse manifestations of implicitness, meaning that they are by-products of inferential processes rather than the process itself. However, Bach (2006: 23) is rather cautious about Bertucelli's sweeping statement on implicatures. Bach clearly demarcates the boundaries between inference and implicature. On one hand, inference is construed as an activity performed by a reader in drawing explicit conclusions in what is said. On the other hand, when a sentence implies something, it means that the conveyed information is not overtly stated.

3.5.3 Interrelationships of pragmatic inferences

In our previous sections, a plethora of definitions have been outlined on how to dissociate various categories of pragmatic inferences be it presuppositions, conventional implicatures and entailments. In this sub-section, focus is on presuppositions by demonstrating cases whereby they pragmatically defy their prescribed inferential boundaries, by portraying features of conventional implicatures, conversational implicatures, implicit assumptions, entailment, particularized conversational implicatures and generalized conversational implicatures. According to Karttunen & Peters (1979), Horn (1988) and Bach (2001), there are instances where dissociating presuppositions from conversational implicatures is riddled with complications. That notwithstanding, the complexity of the matter becomes apparent when presuppositions assume the behaviour of the abovementioned pragmatic inferences. Starting with presuppositions as conventional implicatures. In their discussion, Karttunen & Peters (*ibid*) use the subjunctive conditional *if* in the exemplification of presuppositions depicting features of particularized conversational implicatures. In their analysis, they take into consideration the sentence meaning, context, conversational conventions and truth conditions, which more or less contextually dictate conventional meaning of lexical terms as in (70)

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(70)

    (i) If it were raining outside, the drumming of the roof would drown out our voices.

    (ii) If Mary were allergic to penicillin, she would have exactly the symptoms she is showing.

    (iii) If Shakespeare were the author of Macbeth, there would be proof in Globe Theater's records for the year 1605.

    (Adapted from Karttunen, & Peters, 1979: 4-5, 6)

Karttunen's & Peter's argument in the case of (i) is typical of any counterfactual condition. Naturally, both the hearer and speaker are conscious of the falsity stemming from the antecedent clause. In actual reality both interlocutors know that is it not the case that it is raining, hence the improbability of their voices drowning is far-fetched. In other words, commonsense prevails since logically the utterance's truth conditions cannot sustain a false statement, the speaker commits himself to the utterance's truth conditions by implying that there is no rain within his surroundings by using a false consequent clause. Contrastively, in (ii), the antecedent clause is true in presupposing that Mary is allergic to something else other than penicillin, no wonder she portrays some overt allergic reaction. This is in line with Karttunen's & Peter's view, owing to the true nature of the consequent clause. In a self-explanatory matter, their truth conditions provide reasons for known facts expressed by the utterance that have to be logically compatible with what was implied by their respective antecedent clauses. Example (iii) is a scenario likely to be judged as neither obviously true nor blatantly false. On one extreme, if one holds the conviction that Shakespeare cannot claim the authorship of Macbeth for lack of concrete evidence in the 1605 Globe Theater records, then automatically the antecedent clause will be contextually rendered false. On the other extreme, the antecedent clause maybe true if people are certain about Macbeth's authorship, given that the sentence in (iii) does not clearly state whether Shakespeare is Macbeth's author, one is left speculating whether the antecedent clause is indeed true or false. Seemingly, the speaker is uncertain whether Shakespeare really wrote Macbeth. In this context, we witness the role of contextual factors in determining truth conditions of the *if* subjunctive conditional. It cannot be overemphasized that this is characteristic of Gricean particularized implicatures.

As regards to presuppositions behaving like generalized implicatures, Karttunen & Peters consider examples in (71a-b) from Charles Fillmore.

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(71a) John criticized Harry for writing the letter.

     presupposes

(71b) Harry is responsible for writing the letter.

Presuppositions just like conversational implicatures are cancelable. In saying *John did not criticize Harry for writing the letter, since the letter was actually written by Mary*, it would be unfair for Harry to be subjected to any criticisms since Mary wrote the letter. The generalized implicature emerges from the fact *to criticize* is an expressive. It marks a speaker's disapproval towards an issue while banking on tonality. The cited example has a generalized preparatory condition, with Harry engaged in a letter writing venture, prior to his being criticized for performing the said action. This act is normally guided by the convention of truthfulness prevailing among speakers. If one reports John's speech act by saying *John criticized Harry for writing a letter,* it means that the preparatory condition for Harry having written a letter, precedes John's criticism. In this case, we are not dealing with a context-dependent construction like the subjunctive conditional *if,* but rather the utterance has a nondetachability feature. In simple terms, even if one says *John did not criticize Harry for writing the letter* then Harry cannot be delinked from partaking in the letter writing activity. Atlas & Levinson (1981) opine that there is some level of conventionality in generalized conversational implicatures. Their suggestion calls for treatment of presuppositions as generalized conversational implicatures and not as particularized conversational implicatures. Carston' (2002b) reports that some pragmatists have queried the existence of a viable distinction between particularized implicatures and generalized implicatures and have dismissed the entire process as futile. Her contribution towards this contentious debate is that although the general assumption is that generalized conversational implicatures are more context independent than particularized ones, both categories of implicatures are actually context dependent. In a way, we are not out of the woods yet and Carston's insights are bound to fuel more confusion. In our view, the question coined around context dependency of generalized implicatures and particularized implicatures is perhaps the epicenter of all controversies surrounding the differences between the two categories of implicatures.

Nonetheless, Simons (2001) introduces another twist into the presupposition debate, she actually concurs with Karttunen & Peters (1979) on cancelability and non-detachability of presuppositions. Besides this issue, Simons (2001) further stipulates that even though in some contexts presuppositions

are predisposed to behave as conventional implicatures[48], it is possible to offer a presuppositional account from a conversationally generated inference viewpoint. For example, if one says *Jane failed the test again* it becomes evident that Jane must have previously written her exams and failed to obtain an academically desirable grade. Moreover, at some point in time, two or more persons must have been engaged in a discussion regarding her initial performance in the said examination. Then, based on their previous communicative context on the said topic, they revisit Jane's performance for the second time, which unfortunately is dismal for she has once again registered a failure. In this sense, we see conversationally generated inferences accompanying the conventional implicature associated with adverbial particle *again*.

Alongside such cases where presuppositions sometimes behave either like particularized implicatures or generalized ones. Karttunen & Peters (1979) argue particles like*, either, too*, *even* or factive verbs like *realize* and *forget* implicit verbs like *managed, win*, and cleft or their pseudo-cleft counterparts are typical cases of conventional implicatures. Other scholars like Levinson (1983), Bertucelli (1997), Simons (2001, 2006) and Abbott (2006) consider similar cases inclusive of proper nouns, and implicatives as presuppositional triggers. In fact, Abbott's thesis for the distinction between conventional implicatures and presuppositions is premised on the entailment of presuppositions. By contrast, conventional implicatures are hardly entailed by what is said. Given that presuppositions are bedevilled with controversies, Wilson & Sperber (1979: 301) are not entirely convinced by the prospects of regarding presuppositions as conventional implicatures. Their school of thought is that such a view is tantamount to renaming presuppositions without clearly defining their status. Their concerns are when the Gricean extensive literature on conversational implicatures is juxtaposed with the conventional implicatures literature. Seemingly, Grice gave a lip-service to the latter since it was not exhaustively addressed. Moreover, this is typical of contentious issues raised in presuppositional debates. On one hand, it becomes difficult to accord a semantic approach to conventional implicatures owing to their non-truth conditional nature. On the other hand, even though they are pragmatically inferred, their operational functions are not maxim-driven like conversational implicatures.

To account for the operational mechanisms underlying conventional implicatures sketchily described

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48 Simons argument on conventionality of presuppositions contends that truth conditions of certain lexical items in collaboration with specialized contents, are key factors which cannot be overlooked when dealing with this particular kind of presuppositions.

by Grice (cf. Wilson & Sperber, 1979: 301), Karttunen & Peters (1979) modify Montague's componential semantics theory designed for the Proper Treatment of Quantification (PTQ). Merging syntactic, semantic and pragmatic aspects, PTQ provides an explanation for the occurrence of conventional implicatures. Their approach is actually an attempt to shade more light on the Gricean notion of conventional implicature. Karttunen's & Peter's idea is that any single syntactic category, be it a noun phase or verb phrase is either enlisted in the lexicon or derived by syntactical rules. Therefore, a semantic component is assigned to any lexical category. Concurrently, any syntactical derivation is accompanied by a semantic rule (otherwise known as a translation rule). In PTQ, the representation of meaning is in terms of logical expressions, with each phrase having a translation, corresponding to the expression's intensional logic. The basic components of Montague's intensional logic comprises both semantic and pragmatic interfaces within its extensional component (symbolized as α^e) and an implicature component (symbolized as α^i) respectively. On one extreme, the phrase's truth conditions, meaning, sense or denotations are contained within the semantic component. On the other extreme, the implicature component sole preoccupation are implicit assumptions arising from the expression. Therefore, within the lexicon, both extensions and implicit expressions work in unison. A demonstration using the expression *Bill likes Mary.* The sketch of the sentence's syntactic rule is structured in *Figure 20*

(72) Bill likes Mary

Figure 20: Karttunen`s and Peter's conventional implicature model

Source: Karttunen & Peters (1979: 17)

the translation rule first works by having entries from the extension category and implicature category as follows like-Mary^e and like-Mary^i, from like^e, like^i, Mary^{i,}. The extension category will have a set

such as like-Mary^e (Mary^e), the Mary^e denotes the intension of Mary^e. The implicature component is generated by the verb *to like,* which supposes Tom's level of acquaintance with his object of affection namely Mary. Included in the list of possible implicit assumptions are: Bill is male, is an acquiantance of Mary and Mary is feminine. Therefore the verb *like* relates Bill to the extension of the object's noun phrase (like Mary) represented as like^i (Mary^e), a third expression[49] (like^h) is needed to act on the verb meaning, prior to its generation of implicatures. The two are conjoined with a variable x in an expression in (73)

(73) x ̂ (like^i (x ̂, Mary^e) $\wedge$ like^h (x, ̂Mary^i)

Therefore, a re-write of translation rules is more of what is in (73a-b)

(73a) Bill-likes- Mary^e= Bill^e (̂like^e (̂ Mary^e))

(73b) Bill-likes-Mary^i= [Bill^i (̂like^e(̂Mary^e)) Λ

    Bill^h (x^ (like^i (x, ̂Mary^e) Λ like^h (x, ̂Mary$^{i)}$)]>]   (Kartunnen & Peters, 1979)

From the above translation rules, what is clear is that in (73a-b), the subject's noun phrase semantically predicates the verb phrase's extensional component. In the second conjunct, conventional implicatures associated with the verb phrase are inherited or integrated into the extensional component of the predicate under the variable (Bill^h) (cf. Levinson, 1983). In spite of such an elaborate account on conventional implicatures, Bach (1999) and Carston (2002b) dismiss the term conventional implicature as a nonexistent entity in pragmatics. For Bach, some conventional implicatures behave like implicitures by contributing to what is said, and this becomes evident in cases where indirect quotations[50] are used, so that a sentence such as *Shaq is huge but agile,* will have its indirect quotation

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49 Karttunen's & Peter's reason for having this variable is because at times one of the several phrases which combines to form a larger one, functions semantically as a predicator or a meaning operator to other phrases. This is likened to how the transitive verb operates with its object or how a sentence-embedding verb relates with its complement. Therefore, conventional implicatures associated with other phrases stand to be inherited by the derived phrase under a transformation determined by the operator. Their arguments take extensions and implicature expressions of the predicate or operator phrase α to yield the value h (α^e, α^i) (cf. Karttunen & Peters, 1979: 19)

50 Bach (1999) gives the following definition in explaining the role of indirect quotations or the IQ test: " An element of a sentence contributes to what is said in an utterance of that sentence if and only if there can be an accurate and complete indirect quotation of the utterance (which includes) that element or a corresponding element in the "that" clause that specifies what is said". Some utterance modifiers will fail this test, for instance *Moreover,* as in *Moreover, Bill is honest* is grammatically incorrect in a construction like *John said that Bill is moreover honest.* Bach says there are several factors that make conventional implicatures intuitive, for instance contextual variability, common ground, the question

as *Mary says that Shaq is huge but agile or Mary says that Shaq is huge and agile.* From these examples, Bach questions the Gricean notion of detachability in conventional implicatures, given that the contrastive element of the connective *but* will contribute to what is said in the following manner, (i) *Shaq is huge* (ii) *Shaq is agile* and (iii) *there is a certain contrast.* These notions mysteriously disappear whenever the conjunction *and* is used in the same context, hence proving that sentences do not necessarily mean the same thing under the detachability notion.

So far, we have seen presuppositions having inferential mannerisms of generalized implicatures, particularized implicatures, conventional implicatures and impliciters. To this list Simons (2006), adds presuppositions as conversationally generated inference, and presuppositions behaving like implicit assumptions or implicit premises. In Simons (2001, 2006) perspective, it is possible to talk of presuppositions within the conversationally generated inference view based on Stalnaker's logic of presuppositions framed within the context of ordinary conversations which demand logical reasoning. Here, interlocutors capitalize on inferential strategies in the derivation of conversational implicatures. Likewise, similar inferential strategies are required for presuppositions. Considering Simons (2006: 3) example where Sarah has the intention of excusing herself from a high-level meeting, she might say *I have to take my cat to the vet*. The utterance automatically guides her addressees towards the presuppositional inference that *Sarah has a cat*. Alongside such a presupposition, the possibility of computing implicit premises and conclusions in (74 and 75) which in Simons terms invites one to make several connections related to Sarah's absence from the meeting, her sick cat and Sarah's medical visit to the veterinary doctor. The adhesive logic holding these pieces of information is the principle of cooperativeness or rationality during ongoing discourse. Sarah's utterance might be judged uncooperative, normally people do not talk about visiting a veterinary doctor during meetings. Nonetheless, the relevance of Sarah's utterance is realized once her addressees make the connection between the underlying reason of her absentia from the meeting, her ailing cat and her visit to the veterinary doctor as in (74)

(74) *I have to take my cat to the vet.*

(74a) Sarah's comment does not conform to our agenda.

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of forced choices for instance in a sentence like *Shaq is huge but he is rich*, lacks the contrastive element, and despite this fact we cannot really dismiss the utterance as riddled with falsity, the same goes for an utterance like *Ann's computer, which she bought in 1992, crashes frequently* where in actual reality Anne's computer was bought in 1993, here the sentence stands to be neither true nor false as speakers are forced to come up with a choice.

(74b) The addressee will presume that the statement is relevant.

(74c) Sarah is presupposing that she has a sick cat.

(74d) Sarah's comment implies that she needs to take her sick cat to the veterinary for examination and that explains her absence from the meeting.

(74e) Conclusion: Sarah has to leave immediately.

Obtaining similar results is possible using the relevance comprehension procedure articulated in (75)

(75) Sarah: I have to take my cat to the vet.

(75a) Higher level explicature: Sarah is saying she has to take her cat to the vet.

(75b) Implicit premises: A cat is only taken to the vet when it is sick. Therefore, Sarah has to take her sick cat to the veterinary for examination.

(75c) Implicit conclusion: Sarah will have to leave the meeting halfway to attend to her sick cat.

Against such a background of implicated assumptions and conclusions, Simons narrows down on implicated premises in capturing their points of convergence with conversationally generated presuppositions. First and foremost, background assumptions as well as presuppositions (See discussions on non-controversiality by Atlas, 2004 and Stalnaker, 2008 in section 3.5.1) are non controversial, the background assumption in Sarah's case already signals the cat's presence, which undeniably has been her pet for quite sometime. It would be a subject of controversy, if one would say, *Cats are not pets to be taken to vets!* Because of its inconsistency with the background assumption. Second, both are taken for granted and somehow inferential mechanisms enable addressees to either compute presuppositions or implicit premises. And third, both background assumptions and presuppositions contain background information on an issue and give prominence to an utterance's main idea. Taking Sarah's case, both presuppositions and implicit assumptions are within the background, like in Simons example in (76)

(76) Ann: Did George get in to a good school?

   Bob: His father is a very rich man.   (adapted from Simons, 2006: 17)

In this case, both the presupposition (*George got into a good school*), and implicit assumptions

(*George can always buy anything including education because of his family's wealth*) bolster the idea that George's family financial stability is advantageous for George in securing admission at whichever school he so desires. Finally, implicit assumptions like their presuppositional counterparts inhibit embedding under entailment, and therefore cancel operators as in our famous example of Sarah going to the vet. Supposing she said *I have a sick cat but I am not taking her to the vet*, then the presupposition that *Sarah has a cat* is still retained by the sentence.

Another issue convincing Simons on the conversationally inferred angle of presuppositions is their cancelability, nondetachability[51] and defeasibility, which characterize conversational implicatures. We have already given examples of cancelability and apart from cancellation of presuppositions, they can equally be neutralized or suspended contextually. Abbott (2006) uses the example in (77) having an illogical construction whereby there is a possibility that Mary did not slice some carrots yet she did so carefully.

(77) # Possibly Mary didn't slice the carrots but she did so carefully.

Cases of non-detachability of presuppositions have been explained and what remains is the notion of defeasibility. Presuppositions are cancelable just like conversational implicatures. However, this is not a universal rule since there are cases where presuppositions fail to project leading to their cancellation. This could also mean that a non-presuppositional reading will emerge, while an actual presuppositional reading gets suspended. Such like phenomenon is prevalent in contexts labelled "explicit ignorance contexts" by Simons (2001). It is a scenario where one asserts something without having sufficient knowledge on his subject as in (78a).

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51 Simons (2005:7) with reference to the Gricean definition of non-detachability of implicatures contends that it is a phenomenon that arises due to the expression of a particular content in a particular conversational circumstance regardless of the form of expression used. Simons gives the examples below in demonstating non detachability in presuppostions when the example in (i) still presupposes (ii)
(i) Jane didn't stop/quit/cease laughing.
(ii) Jane didn't discontinue her laughter.

(78) *In a casual conversation taking place between two people meeting for the first time, and one remarks*

(78a) I notice that you keep chewing your pencil. Have you recently stopped smoking.

<div style="text-align: right">(adapted from Simons, 2001: 2)</div>

In this context, the speaker is obviously ignorant of his addressee's smoking record and therefore clueless about his smoking habits. As a result of one's limited knowledge, the sentence will have a non-presuppositional reading within the lines of: *have you now undergone the transition from a chain smoker to a non-smoker* instead of entertaining the presuppositional reading *Are you currently a non-smoker* or *you have recently stopped smoking.* Now in a much clearer perspective, the Levinsonian approach on the defeasibility question of pragmatic inferences be they scalar implicatures, entailments or generalized conversational implicatures (GCI) seem to adhere to some order of incremented information on the common ground level. Although, his notion has loopholes, Levinson (2000: 50-51) argues that within common background, pragmatic inferences adhere to the hierarchy below:

(79) (a) Entailments.
(b) Q-principle GCI's
(i) Clausal implicatures.
(ii) Scalar implicatures.
(c) M-principle GCIs.
(d) I-principle GCIs.

Therefore, suspension of inferences occurs in various ways, First, if there are inconsistencies between what is said and what is inferred as in (80). There is bound to be cancellation of scalar implicatures for lack of harmonization with what A says:

(80) A: Saudi prince has just brought Harrods.
B: Some Saudi princes must be pretty wealthy.
Scalar implicature: Not all Saudi princes are pretty wealthy.

The second case would be when there is a mismatch between an entailment with its implicature like in (81)

(81) Some Saudi princes, and in fact all of them, are pretty wealthy.
　　　Entailment: All Saudi princes are pretty wealthy.
　　　Scalar implicature: Not all Saudi princes are pretty wealthy.

Or third, where there are inconsistencies within implicatures, an implicature as a consequent of a conditional is explicitly mentioned leading to its suspension as in (82). Respecting the hierarchical structure in (82), clausal implicatures will be suspended before scalar ones, however the addition of scalar implicatures are constrained by consistency rules that will predict their suspension.

(82) Some, if not all, Saudi princes are wealthy.
　　　Scalar implicature: Not all Saudi princes are wealthy.
　　　Clausal implicature (due to conditional): Possibly all Saudi princes are wealthy.

Based on these cases, Levinson posits that cancellations or suspensions can occur without necessarily having inconsistencies as in (83).

(83) Some Saudi princes are pretty wealthy...Indeed there is indubitable evidence that they are billionaires.
Implicature of first sentence: Not all Saudi princes are pretty wealthy.
Entailment of second sentence: All Saudi princes are wealthy (billionaires).

                          (Examples (80) to (83) are adapted from Levinson, 2000: 50-51)

From the presented examples, Levinson suggests a two-way solution out of this quagmire. One alternative is to abandon the incrementation process with common ground. And another alternative, for cases of mismatched assumptions, the consistency filter should be modified in such a way that later entailments have the potential of cancelling earlier implicatures. In the light of the prevailing situation, Levinson's position on defeasibility question is that we should resort to the Gricean maxim of relevance, with specific reference to the notion of plan generation and recognition for the generation of

implicatures. Based on a communicator's goal, limiting pragmatic inferences of a syntactic constructions is a normal function in utterances.

Our conclusive remarks in this section are based on our observation on presuppositions, which are in line with the examined arguments of them behaving like conversational implicatures, generalized conversational implicatures, entailments, conventional implicatures and implicit assumptions. Our position on the matter at hand, is that this scenario can be equated to the concept of resemblance in categorization. If we consider implicatures and their subcategories, then they all belong to the family of pragmatic inferences. Under this umbrella, the possibility of sharing certain features is unsurprising. It is a phenomenon being replicated even within human species. Two or more siblings though non-identical and possessing unique features, can have similar eye color like their mother, or have fingernails resembling those of their grandparents. Contrastively, their hair colours might differ or they might have uneven heights (cf. Taylor,1989; Kövecses, 2006). The same can be said of pragmatic inferences inasmuch as they have their unique features, in certain aspects they are not exempted from the dynamic ability to resemble another subcategory of implicatures. The interrelationships of pragmatic inferences are captured in *Figure 21*

What is communicated

What is linguistically encoded

Entailment   Presupposition

SEMANTICS

Entailment as: Entailed presuppositions, entailed implicatures and entailed metaphors

Presuppositions as: conventional implicatures, conversational implicatures, generalized implicatures and particularized implicatures

What is inferred

Explicature   Implicature/

What is implicated

Implicit premise

Implicit conclusion

Basic   Higher Order

Conventionally Non-conventionally

Propositional   Illocutionary

attitude   force

Conversationally   Non conversationally

Generalized   Particularized

conversational implicature   conversational implicatures

PRAGMATICS

Figure 21: A Modified version of Moeschler's schema on pragmatic inferences

Source: Moeschler (2011) website: http://fermi.univr.it/live/events/Moeschler/cours2_verona.pdf

3.6 Conclusion

To wind up this lengthy chapter, we have examined works of Grice, Levinson, Horn, Bach and Carston with the goal of understanding major arguments on the conceptualizations of implicatures and explicatures. Different viewpoints have been suggested and by the end of this chapter, we have witnessed the interwoven relations between various categories of pragmatic inferences with special attention to presupposition, drawing insights from Abbott, Karttunen & Peters, Cohen, Atlas, Stalnaker and Gazdar among others. In conclusion, data analysis in chapters 5 and 6 will espouse notions from

the above pragmatic scholars in the analysis of lexico-pragmatic processes and pragmatic inferences in Kenyan AIDS posters. Up to this point, we still have not reviewed literature on the cognitivist perspective figurativeness, and this is an issue to be critically examined in the fourth chapter.

CHAPTER 4: FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE-THE CASE OF METAPHORS, SIMILES, METONYMY, METAPHONYMY, IRONY AND OTHER TROPES

4.0 INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter, we made a brief introduction on metaphoricity with reference to Gricean and Levinsonian literature. Discussions in the current chapter are an assessment of various schools of thought on metaphors, irony, metonymy, proverbs, analogies, similes, idiomatic expressions and slang metaphors. The literature on the abovementioned tropes is in synchrony with our fourth research objective seeking to study ethno-specific conceptualizations of AIDS in Kenya, while concurrently identifying predominant types of non-literal language featuring in Kenyan AIDS posters. For an effective data analysis in chapters 5 and 6, some contentious issues in figurative language need highlighting. More particularly, in its provision of a relevant roadmap on cross-cultural conceptualizations of tropes and their respective categorizations in cognitive linguistics. In adherence to this, we will review literature by Max Black, John Searle, Andrew Ortony, George Lakoff, Sam Glucksberg, Raymond Gibbs, George Lakoff, Zoltán Kövecses and relevance theorists such as Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson. This list of scholars is not exhaustive, nonetheless we will integrate in our discussions any other relevant insights on metaphoricity.

4.1 BACKGROUND ON THE METAPHOR

According to Ortony (1979) and Gibbs (1994), the philosophy surrounding the receptiveness of scholars towards engaging in any scientific research on metaphors is a journey characterized by skepticism and unreceptivity synonymous with the logical positivism school of thought. Its puristic tendencies perceived literal language as a rational linguistic form, devoid of obscurity, ambiguity and illogical constructions, hence qualifying as an effective thought processing tool. As a matter fact as contextualized by Sperber & Wilson (2006: 171), most classical rhetoricians and even more recently in Grice's works, metaphors as opposed to literal language, have been perceived as linguistic deviants that blatantly defy language norms, hence rendering them unworthy of any serious scholarly investigation. With the passage of time, this mentality has since been challenged as pertinent questions surrounding the pervasiness and creativity of non-literal language could not be wished away. This is because several unanswered questions consistently bothered scholaristic minds pitched under two schools of thought namely: constructivism (or appreciators of metaphors in Black's (1979) terms and non-constructivism (depreciators of metaphors). The constructivist approach acknowledged both the pivotal role and

ubiquitous nature of figurative language in language and cognition. With creativeness occupying center stage in figurative expressions unlike their literal counterparts. Non-constructivists logics downplayed metaphoricity by assigning it derogative terms as insignificant, a deviant form of language that is ornamental and unworthy of any serious scientific attention. But surprisingly, an oratorical tool reserved for poets and politicians. Unperturbed by non-constructivists logic, and for a period stretching over 2000 years (cf. Ortony, 1975, 1987 and Evans & Green, 2006), under the umbrella of constructivism, rhetoricians synonymous with Aristotelian works in *Poetics*, recognized the key role played by metaphors in communication, and remained unswayed by non-constructivist ideologies (cf. Gibbs, 1994). It is important to note that in Aristotelian era, the term *metaphor* englobed all manner of tropes. According to Gibbs (1994: 210), while citing Aristotle's definition of a metaphor in *Poetics*, the Aristotelian definition of a metaphor entailed assigning one thing the name of another entity, with transference options either being from genus to species or from species to genus or from species to species or even from an analogical viewpoint. All these transfers are commissioned by some level of similarity or resemblance. Gibbs expounds further on some metaphorical transference options. An illustration of genus to species transfer is a statement like *Indeed ten thousand noble things Odysseus did,* where in place of the generic term *many,* a specific term *ten thousand noble things* is employed. Transference by analogy as signalled in the proposition *old age is a life as evening is today,* is actually a comparison of two dissimilar notions notably; *old age* and *the evening,* realized in a linguistic expression *he is in the sunset stage of his years.* Apart from transference issues, some of Aristotle's main ideas on the metaphor in Gibbs perspective were:

–Metaphor is a matter of words and not sentences.

–Metaphors are construed as a deviant use of language from their literal counterparts, for they involve the transfer of a name to some object which it does not belong.

–Metaphors are based on similarities between two things of which metaphors are implied analogies or ellipted/condensed similes. It means metaphors are more powerful or are more impactful than similes. (cf. Evans & Green, 2006: 292)

–Analogy is a subcategory of metaphors.

From Aristotle's line of thinking on metaphors and not forgetting contributions of other rhetoricians, even within the post-Aristotelian era to contemporary times, the unquenched thirst for comprehending

intricacies surrounding non-literal language, has continued to retain the attention of various scholars, just to mention a few, translators, cognitive scientists and psychologists, who have developed divergent viewpoints on the metaphor and its close relatives. In this chapter, we build up on certain unexplained issues raised in both Gricean and Levinsonian works in chapter 3 by turning towards a cognitivist conceptualization of metaphoricity.

4.2. MAX BLACK

As stated in the previous chapter, we cannot overemphasize that metaphors are manifestations of implicit communication and are also discussed within the intriguing riddle behind speaker's meaning and utterer's meaning. Going by Gibbs (1994), in the first half of the twentieth century around the 1930s, Ian Richards, also known as Black's (1979) predecessor in matters regarding the metaphorical architecture, argued that there is a quadripartite dimension in the comprehension of metaphors. Simply put, there are four paradigms that cannot go unmentioned within metaphorical contexts. These are the tenor or topic, the vehicle, the ground and tension. To comprehend the relations between the four metaphorical components, let us use Gibbs's (1994) example of *The question of federal aid to parochial schools is a bramble patch.* And to proceed logically, first, the topic is the *federal aid to parochial schools*. Second, the vehicle is the *bramble patch*. Third, the ground is the relationship between the topic and the vehicle. And fourth, the tension addresses incompatibility issues between two dissimilar conceptual domains, signalled by the topic (*the federal aid*) and its vehicle (*the bramble patch*). However, Gibb's opines that it is erroneous to think that singling out the topic, vehicle, ground and tension as done above is an easy task.

Now proceeding with Black's thesis on metaphors, he subscribes to the views that "falsity" of metaphors is what grants them their metaphoricity. This is in contrast with literal language, where sentence meaning and utterance meaning are harmonized. It is noteworthy to state at this point, that Black unlike Grice, talks of "falsity" and not "categorical falsity" of metaphors. Against the traditional view which branded metaphors as "problematic", while giving preferential treatment to literal language because of its "less problematic status", Levinson (1983), Gibbs (1994), Pilkington (2000), Atlas (2004) and Cohen (2006) concur with Black (1979), on the lack of an overt distinction between literal and non-literal language. Black's urgent plea is against treating metaphors as riddles, but rather as conventional means exploited by speakers using syntactic and semantic resources creatively in flouting

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linguistic rules. Now, regarding the specific rule violation, Black leaves us speculating on what exactly the violated rule is and says in passing that there is no predefined rule for creative violation of non-literal language. Apparently, this is uncharacteristic of Grice who overtly says that metaphoricity is an indicator of maxim violation, with the maxim of quality being affected because of saying what is untrue. The Gricean statement on the maxim of quality violation contradicts Black's statement, who does not overtly align himself to any particular maxim. And like Carston (2002b), who contends that there is no one particular proposition specifically assigned to an explicature, Black transposes a similar ideology in metaphorical contexts. His reasoning is that conventional, linguistic and conceptual mechanisms design metaphorical comprehension procedures and will always be a potential source of numerous readings or metaphorical ambiguity.

Another area where Black differs with Grice, is in his development of several metaphorical clusters, for instance, dead metaphors, active metaphors, emphatic metaphors and resonance metaphors. First and foremost, dead metaphors operate minus any iota of metaphoricity (cf. Taverniers, 2002: 11). This has of course been challenged by Ortony (1979), Gibbs (1994, 1997), Lakoff (2003), Gibbs, Lima & Franconzo (2004) and Kövecses (2006: 185). For Gibbs, even idiomatic expressions assumed to be dead metaphors portray some level of metaphoricity, for apparently conventional metaphors frame their interpretation. Taking the case of ANGER IS A HEATED FLUID IN A CONTAINER. Respondents were asked on the basis of both their embodied experience to briefly account for what transpires when a fluid is in a heated container. Questions posed touched on causation, intentionality and manner. The series of questions included: what would cause a container to explode?, would the container explode voluntarily or involuntarily? and does the explosion occur gently or violently? The respondents answers to the posed questions were that first, the explosion of the sealed container was caused by internal pressure within the container. Second, the action was unintentional since fluids have no intentional agency. And third, the explosion occurred in a violent manner. Having this background in mind and given that ANGER IS A HEATED FLUID IN A CONTAINER, works in collaboration with THE MIND IS A CONTAINER metaphor, Gibbs (1997) and Gibbs, Lima & Franconzo (2004) argue that idiomatic expressions such as *blow your stack* and *hit the ceiling*, erroneously classified as dead metaphors, were contextually understood in situations where the causative agent for anger was due to internal pressure, and was both involuntary and violent, under the guidance of the conventional metaphor ANGER IS A HEATED FLUID IN A CONTAINER. These entailments and image schemas were apparently inapplicable when a literal counterpart of the same metaphor like *get very angry* was

used. This is because respondents used their intuitions in gauging the appropriate source domains that could be mapped onto their respective target domains with regard to anger. Moreover, Gibbs (1994) confirms that respondents were able to attribute mental images to idiomatic expressions examples being *blow your stack* or *flip your lid.* The respondents affirmed that they were able to visualize scenarios where stacks were blown off or lids being flipped as a result of the intense internal pressure. In another example different from idioms, Kövecses (2006) further insists that whether dead or alive, metaphors will always engage the services of our cognitive faculties in processing them. In fact, using evidence from a psychological experiment, Kövecses cites Lera Boroditsky & Michael Ramscar's (2002) research on how passengers in a train use conceptual metaphors in their comprehension of dead metaphors, with specific reference to the conceptualization of TIME AS A MOVING OBJECT and TIME AS A MOVING OBSERVER conventional metaphors, using a dead metaphor in the expression *to move forward a meeting*. In this particular experiment, what Boroditsky & Ramscar wanted to investigate is whether people used conceptual metaphors in the understanding of a dead metaphor in the mentioned expression, and whether they were in anyway influenced by their embodied experience as passengers in a train in comprehending the trope. In the exercise, the passengers were told that a particular meeting scheduled to be held on the next Wednesday, had been re-scheduled and moved *forward* by two days. They were then asked to state the exact date of the meeting, following its re-scheduling. The experiment results revealed that a large number of passengers on the moving train used TIME AS A MOVING OBSERVER metaphor and said that the meeting was scheduled for Friday. Meaning that the time metaphor was implied by the *moving forward* dead metaphor.

Moreover, under the guidance of their travelling frame or embodied experiences as passengers in a moving train, and as moving observers they were bound to reach further destinations or stations in the course of their journey. It goes without saying that from their perspective, the re-scheduling of the meeting by two days would mean that the meeting was then set for Friday. Conversely, the remaining few respondents used the TIME AS A MOVING OBJECT conceptual metaphor and argued that the meeting was now scheduled for Monday meaning it had moved forward by two days. In the light of what has been previously discussed, Boroditsky's & Ramscar's research successfully demonstrated that the embodied experience of a train ride greatly influenced the passengers conceptualization of time from a contextual viewpoint. These results further showed that claiming dead metaphors are devoid of metaphoricity is untrue for their conceptualization is through conceptual metaphors.

Second, going back to Black's classification of active metaphors, he contends that they are readily used and are dichotomized into emphatic and resonant metaphors. Emphatic metaphors neither allow variations nor sentential word paraphrases. They have unstable implications and their production demands some level of cooperation between hearers and speakers. Resonant metaphors require a high degree of implicative elaboration (both emphasis and resonance is a matter of degree). The higher a metaphor is emphatic, the higher the chances it is resonant. Therefore, for the metaphor to be considered strong both features are essential. Contrastively, weak metaphors lack these characteristics. In addition to this, Black comments on the substitution and interaction views of the metaphor. The substitution view considers the entire sentence as being metaphorical and serves as a replacement for some literal sentences. Comparison view as discussed by Levinson (1983) in our previous chapter, is still practical for Black.

Being the brainchild of the interactional view of the metaphor, Black gives his input of the cognitive domains designed for non-literal language as comprising a primary subject and a subsidiary subject or secondary subject. Illustrating this notion with the aid of a metaphorical expression like *Society is a sea*. First, the primary subject hosts the noun a *society*, whereas the secondary subject retains *sea* as the implicative complex[52] or implicit assumption of the entire sentence. Second, the speaker selectively organizes features of primary subject that should be in tune with features articulated by the secondary subject's implicative complex. Third, the interaction of subjects in metaphorical utterances gives the primary subject the mandate to select a sub-section of similar features from the secondary subject in the construction of the implicative complex.

Black gives a practical demonstration of interaction theory, using the expression *Marriage is a zero-sum game* (Black, 1979: 29)

G1 A game is a contest.
G2 Between two opponents.
G3 In which a player can win at the expense of another.

The primary system marriage depends on culture-specific interpretations of contest.

M1 Marriage is a sustained struggle.

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52 Implicative systems are associated with common places and are dependent on contextual factors inclusive of shared assumptions among members of a speech community. It entails metaphorical coupling using aspects related to analogy, similarity, identity and extension.

M2 Between two opponents.
M3 In which rewards such as money, power, satisfaction of one contestant regained only at the other's expense.

Therefore, interaction between the primary subject and the secondary implicative yields an expression like "Marriage is a competitive game of skill and calculation" as a by-product of the metaphorical mapping.

In relation to comparison theory, Black shares similar thoughts with Levinson (1983) and Carston (2002b), in his confirmation that there is some sense of loss in metaphoricity whenever a metaphor is perceived as a simile. In his own words, such an endeavour is tantamount to crucifying the distinctive power of a good metaphor. Moreover, the occurrence of metaphors is guided by their conceptual domains which defy conceptual boundaries in sustaining metaphorical constructions. Seemingly, this does not necessarily require the mediation of a simile, knowing that even paraphrases are incapable of faithfully serving as true representatives of metaphorical discourse. The best they can do is to give a vague truth conditional account, since paraphrases are incapable of depicting the "absurdity" metaphors demonstrate. If we revisit Levinson's (1983), famous expression *Frege lived here* as shown in the third chapter, that in actual real life Frege physically lived in the designated area or his ideas were applicable posthumously in the same location, then Black believes in the metaphorical ability to present true information as in a sentence such as *He does live in a glass house*, while in actual reality the said person resides in a house made of glass. Surprisingly, the same expression in a different context assumes a metaphorical form such as *people who live in glass houses should not throw stone*s. As a matter of precision, it is a proverb which according to Gricean literature, proverbs are close relatives to metaphors. The expression entertains the thought that people should not criticize others for weaknesses, they equally possess. Building up on the question of truth and falsity in metaphorical discourse, Black seems to adopt two stands on the matter, the metaphor in its paradoxical falsity triggered by rule violation, has the capacity of conveying certain truisms. In the expression, *Nixon is an image surrounding a vacuum*, represents certain truths about Nixon of him probably being an introvert and rarely in the company of friends. A similar stand on metaphors has been adopted by Bergmann (1982), who opines that metaphors oxymorally convey true and false information. Further, Black introduces the notion of representations captured in metaphoricity as a way of representing "how things are". Likewise, photos and charts are representative of some factual truisms, without necessarily being actual entities. And, metaphor recognition depends on first our general knowledge or judgment of what

entails a metaphor. Second, the decisive reason for interpreting non-literal discourse may be due to falsity. In short, metaphors thrive on resemblances and analogies, and while concurring with constructivism ideologies, Black argues that in adverse ways, metaphors are a creative way of presenting reality.

4.3. JOHN SEARLE

> The expressive power that we feel is part of good metaphors is largely a matter of two features. The hearer has to figure out what the speaker means he has to contribute more to the communication than just passive uptake and he has to do that by going through another and real semantic content from the one which is communicated. (Searle, 1982: 538)

Searle's (1982) approach christened by Gibbs (1994) as the speech-act account for metaphors, advances the thesis that metaphors are regarded as a type of speech act similar to directives, assertives or commissives and armed with an illocutionary force. In relation to the speech act view, other dissenting voices have argued that even though metaphors have illocutionary aspects, they undeserve the speech acts label. Also incorporated into this account, Searle, uses the Gricean line of argument in questioning how is it possible for someone to say *S* is *P* while meaning *S* is *R*[53] in metaphorical constructions, meaning that sentence meaning and utterer's meaning are syntactically unreconciled. When a non-literal expression is juxtaposed with its literal counterpart, Searle argues the latter adheres to truth conditions representing certain factual truisms against the context of some background assumptions. In normal circumstances, it is expected to have *a cat on a mat* but not a counterintuitive scenario of *a cat comfortably seated or sleeping on the ceiling*. He also stresses on the notion of similarity in literal utterances for instance, in saying *This room is hot*, the supposedly *hot room* will by extension be true for all rooms known to be hot (cf. Davidson[54], 1978). In respect to metaphors and while subscribing to Black's and Levinson's previous arguments on the comparison theory, Searle and even more recently Pilkington (2000) stress that even a paraphrase cannot serve as a suitable replacement for a metaphorical discourse. Take for instance the construction *The ship ploughed the sea.* The reason why paraphrasing cannot be on the same pedestal as metaphors is because in Searle's opinion:

> We do more than state S is R...we state that S is R by way of going through the meaning of S is P. It is in this sense

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53 Searle's definition of *S* is *P* to mean *S* is *R* simply means that *S* is representative of the subject's expression and object, *P* stands for the predicate's expression, the predicate's truth conditions and the predication's literal meaning. *R* represents the speaker's utterance meaning and its respective truth conditions.

54 Davidson (1978) gives the example of when one talks about roses, two roses are similar by virtue of the fact they share the property of being roses.

that we feel that metaphors somehow are intrinsically not paraphrasable because without using the metaphorical expression, we will not reproduce the semantic content which occurred in the hearer's comprehension of the utterance. The best we can do in the paraphrase is reproduce the truth conditions of the metaphorical utterance, but the metaphorical utterance does more than convey truth conditions. It conveys truth conditions by way of another semantic content, whose truth conditions are not part of the truth conditions of the utterance. (Searle, 1982: 538)

The only favor paraphrases can do as brought to our attention by Black, is roughly present a metaphor's truth conditions but not with the semantic exactitude of a metaphorical utterance. In fact, Sperber & Wilson (1986b: 542) inject the fact that even romantic critics and classical rhetoricians were conscious of the effects of figurative language, also referred to as implicatures by relevance theorists, are unparaphrasable. Apparently, the same view is held by Pilkington's (2000) relevance-theoretic account, who adds that the unparaphrasibility of metaphors is pegged on the indeterminacy of weak implicatures that inhibits metaphorical paraphrases. In accordance with Black, Searle talks of an unnamed speech act violation or defaultness behind the realizations of metaphors. Said differently, when the expression *The ship ploughed the sea* is taken literally, we cannot insist that the ship's ploughing action occurred as alleged. For it is an impossibility in real life, and this happens to be the source of "absurdity" metaphors are accused of. It therefore serves as an open invitation to unearth its literal meaning in finding suitable values for *R*. However, unlike Grice (1989) who talks of categorical falsity in metaphorical discourse, Searle is in accordance with Black by retaining the term *falsity*. He argues that computing values of *R* requires extensive knowledge of the said language (we are talking of linguistic, extralinguistic, contextual applications of language and background assumptions existing within socio-cultural settings). Apparently, the cited points have equally been raised by Grice. We had previously mentioned the notion of similarity in literal language, Searle is in disagreement with Black who talks of metaphors are representations of "how things are", Searle feels that they adhere to similarity, since in order for a hearer to comprehend a metaphor, he has to bank on similarity to aid in his comprehension of such non-literal forms. In the spirit of embracing a simplistic form of interpretive use of language, but with the exception of thought unlike relevance theorists, who accommodate thoughts and utterances in notions of resemblance, Searle (1982: 523) affirms that "an utterance of an expression with its literal meaning and corresponding truth condition can in various ways 'call to mind' another meaning and corresponding set of truth conditions," no wonder the example in (84) contains a paraphrase roughly representing the truth conditions articulated by the metaphorical utterance.

(84) (MET) Richard is a gorilla.

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(PAR) Richard is fierce, nasty and prone to violence.   (adapted from Searle, 1982: 525)

In Searle's viewpoint, it is not entirely true that Richard is a gorilla, or rather he shares some but not all features with a gorilla. One puzzling issue at this point is Searle's adamance that the construction is not about gorillas, but concerns Richard. Put differently, the term gorilla serves as an entry point for a semantic content required to give the expression a metaphorical reading. If this is the case, then one would question the relevance of mentioning the term *gorilla* in such a context, unless one upheld the conviction that Richard possesses certain behaviour-traits compatible with some of a gorilla's. Alternatively, maybe by saying that the utterance is about Richard's personality, which to a certain extent is comparable to a gorilla's personality, would prevent a conflict of ideas. Bergmann (1982) concurs with us on the cited point and goes further to give an elaborate description of what Searle overlooked in respect to gorillas also being part and parcel of metaphorical construction. Bergmann stipulates that the secondary subject[55] has salient characteristics[56] which are partially a function of common places and stereotypes, these two features are responsible for defining a concept's distinctive features. As already outlined by Searle, some of a gorilla's salient features include: aggressiveness, wild behaviour and stubbornness. Similarly, in Bergmann's (1982: 488) own words:

> Salient characteristics associated with the name "Einstein" include the properties of being a scientist and of being brilliant. In virtue of these characteristics, I may use "John is an Einstein" to say that John is a brilliant scientist. The proposition, I have asserted is then a function of the literal meaning of `John´ and of salient characteristics associated with `Einstein.´ I may also use Einstein to *refer* to John, if he is a brilliant scientist: Einstein is on his lunch break.

As mentioned in Black's metaphorical classification and with specific reference to dead metaphors, contrary to Black, Searle insists that we should desist from talking about dead metaphors, for their continual usage still satisfies a semantic need. Apart from this and in contrast to Black (1979) who deals exclusively with metaphors, Searle comments on irony, similes, metonymy, synecdoche, indirect speech acts and hyperboles. Like Grice, he argues that metaphors are hyperbolic and similes have some level of metaphoricity and not the other way round. In regard to irony, one deals with a converse of actual affairs, with sometimes tone guiding one in detecting ironical expressions. He treats metonymy

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55 The primary subject and secondary subject have already been discussed in Black's (1979) conceptualization of metaphors.
56 Salient characteristics has many facets for example a transitive verb like *cook* has to have relations with the term *prepare.* For common nouns or intransitive verbs, entail properties of possible things and the actual noun or verb. What is salient for one person might not be necessarily salient for another person.

and synecdoche as special cases of metaphors. On the basis of the principle of association of two semantic contents namely *P* and *R*. Searle (1982: 533-535) suggests that there are pragmatic principles that rationally guide one in understanding metaphorical utterances, and a way of solving the riddle around the question why a speaker says *S* is *P* to mean *S* is *R*.

Principle 1: Things which are *P* are by definition *R* as such (MET) Sam is a giant and (PAR) Sam is big.

Principle 2: Things which are *P* are contingently *R*, should be salient (MET) Sam is a pig, (PAR) Sam is filthy, gluttonous, sloppy and so on.

Principle 3: *P* is said or believed to be *R*. Even though the speaker and hearer know *R* is false of *P* (MET) Richard is a gorilla, means (PAR) Richard is mean, nasty and prone to violence, even if it is known that gorillas are shy, timid and sensitive. The metaphor employs the principle of association assuring it of its validity regardless of contemporary ethological beliefs about gorillas.

Principle 4: Things which are *P* are not *R*, nor are they like *R* things, nor they are believed to be *R*. It is a fact about our sensibilities whether cultural or naturally determined utterance of *P* is associated in our minds with *R* properties. The metaphoric expression *Sally is a block of ice* is construed to mean Sally is unemotional without necessarily having any overt similarities between a block of ice and Sally's emotional state.

Principle 5: *P* things are not like *R* things, and are not believed like *R* things. Nonetheless, the condition of being *P* is like the condition of being *R*. By saying to another person *You are an aristocrat* is not construed to mean that one is an aristocrat, but his newly acquired status presents him in the light of an aristocrat.

Principle 6: There are cases where *P* and *R* are similar in meaning, but usually *P* is restricted in application and not applicable to *R*. Thus addled is only said literally of eggs, but metaphorically it is not possible to say *This soufflé is addled* or *That parliament was addled*.

Principle 7: Relational metaphors, following syntactical forms of non-literal constructions, for instance *The ship ploughed the sea.* Here, there is a literal utterance having two Noun Phrases (NPs) surrounding a metaphorical utterance. The transitive verb *ploughed the sea*, tasks the addressee to move from S P-relation to S R-relation. Said differently, *ploughing* when contextualized within the farming semantic domain denotes the side to side movement of the plough during crop cultivation. The act of ploughing in the metaphorical construction has some relational features or is likened to the side to side movement of ship navigating the ocean.

Principle 8 : This caters for metonymy, synecdoche as special cases of metaphors, which respect the part-whole relation dictated by the principle of association that uses *R's* semantic content in establishment of part-whole relations.

Searle's condensed version of the above principles is as follows:

- Whenever a hearer encounters any variety of non-literal language inclusive of metaphors, it should be a sign of "defectiveness" or some linguistic violation. This is marked by the pragmatic mismatch between a speaker's meaning and utterance meaning.
- The linguistic defect automatically brings to the hearer's attention that there is need to search for appropriate values of *R*, by looking for correspondences between *S* and *P*.
- Metaphors being open-ended (translated as weak implicatures by relevance theorists), require the confinement of values of *R* within an acceptable conceptual range.

In short, Searle argues that the principle of expressibility somehow gives a language the green light to translate a metaphorical thought using any available literal expressions, even if they have some slight similarities with metaphorical expressions. For purposes of clarification, some languages are incapable of finding semantic equivalence for their metaphorical expressions in other languages. This is a pointer that sometimes finding a literal interpretation for non-literal expressions especially in translation is a Herculean task.

So far we have seen attempts by Grice, Levinson, Black and now Searle at coming up with metaphor comprehension procedures. Nonetheless, Davidson (1978), Gibbs (1994) and Pilkington (2000) remain

unseduced especially by Searle's principles of metaphor comprehension, Davidson opines that metaphorical discourse banks on creative imagination and its comprehension is a combined effort of both its author and the addressee. In his modest opinion, it is rather challenging to devise an arithmetic manual dictating the meanings of metaphors, together with an inflexible outline of their comprehension procedures. Gibbs's modest proposal is that metaphors adhere to much simplistic modes of understanding which entail; comprehension, recognition, interpretation and appreciation.

To begin with comprehension, one unconsciously engages in a linguistic analysis of aspects related to syntax, semantics or lexemes within a metaphorical expression. Included in this package are contextual factors and encyclopaedic knowledge of lexical items to aid in the comprehension of metaphorical expressions. The next step is the recognition stage which is all about figuring out the construction's meaning. For example, in an expression such as *My marriage is an icebox,* one would unconsciously deduce in less than four seconds that the said marriage lacks affection. At the recognition stage, one consciously recognizes the construction as non-literal. Nonetheless, Gibbs cautions that addressees do not consciously resort to label different tropes as ironic, idiomatic, literal or hyperbolic for comprehension purposes. And what proceeds after the recognition stage, is the interpretation stage where the meaning of the metaphorical construction is decoded. Re-examining, the case of *My marriage is an icebox,* several assumptions or metaphoric entailments in line with this assertion, naturally emerge as in *iceboxes are cold, iceboxes are small* and *confining just like in some marriages.* Such entailments act as guidelines on how metaphors should be interpreted. Finally, the level of appreciation is a matter of ascribing an aesthetic value to the metaphorical construction by acknowledging its utility. Gibbs suggests that the appreciation stage is not imperative, since the comprehensibility of a trope is achievable at the interpretation stage without an aesthetic component. In short, Gibbs model completely dismisses Searle's principle-based metaphorical comprehension model, which Pilkington (2000: 88) has otherwise described as "psychologically implausible" for it complicates a rather simple on-line metaphorical processing.

In respect to the ambiguous nature of metaphors raised by Searle, Davidson strives to clear the air on this issue. He states categorically that metaphorical ambiguity should not be construed as plurality in meaning. Alternatively, ambiguity emerges because of the numerous meanings generated by metaphoric expressions. Using his example of *Tolstoy is an infant* when we know that he is a mature

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adult, Davidson says it is a matter of using similarity in the identification of properties Tolstoy shares with infants. It involves asking ourselves what special features do the two categories have in common for Tolstoy to be considered an infant. In the long run, we will come up with implicit assumptions expressing the range of similarities, maybe Tolstoy behaves like a spoilt brat, he is innocent and humble. He describes this phenomenon as a "garden variety of similarity" that goes in hand with a "garden variety of meaning". In his approach premised on Fregean[57] thesis on metaphoricity, Davidson suggests that when dealing with metaphors, we should embrace the motto that although words have their literal meaning, they are capable of having specialized meaning or portray some level of semantic extensions in non-literal contexts. Both literal and non-literal contexts have to be linked by some rule. Interesting enough, the rule's name is something Davidson remains elusive about. In a way, this registers some level of double standardness, especially when talking of metaphorical discourse as working without any manual for creativeness, then at a later stage Davidson inserts a clause on some linking rule in metaphor comprehension.

Regarding paraphrasibility of metaphors, Davidson is in accordance with Searle and stresses that metaphors use normal linguistic resources just like their literal counterparts. They therefore have no specialized status. By virtue of their acquisition of the label "absurd", and their expression of true falsehoods, they are unparaphrasable to some extent. Moreover, as stated by Black, the loss of metaphoricity whenever a figurative expression is paraphrased is inevitable. Davidson argues that the most appropriate term for this phenomenon is loss in cognitive content as opposed to metaphoricity. We want to underscore the fact that Davidson (1978) (as cited in Davis (1979: 501) cautions us that *most metaphors are false, but not all.* To give credence to his statement, he gives the example of a news report on the Hemingway's plane had been sighted wrecked in Africa. *The New York* had the heading saying :"Hemingway Lost in Africa"- in this context the word *lost* was metaphorically used to presuppose that Hemingway was *dead*. Surprisingly, when Hemingway resurfaced and it became obvious that he was alive and not dead, the *Mirror* retained the headline with its literal interpretation of Hemingway having a wrong sense of direction, while nullifying the metaphorical one.

Now in respect to the metaphor-simile relationship, both invite addressees to engage in some kind of

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57 Frege's basic idea was that referring terms in modal sentence and propositions expressing beliefs, desires and attitudes, would have two meanings. One would have a referent in ordinary contexts and the other in specialized contexts sustained by modal operators and psychological verbs. There is a connecting rule linking the ordinary context with the other specialized ones.

comparison of concepts. The only distinguishing fact being that with similes, the comparison is more explicit as opposed to metaphors where it remains implicit. In Davidson's perspective, metaphors are patently false, while similes are trivially true. Using convincing illustrations, Davidson argues whenever we encounter expressions such as *the earth is like a floor* as a simile*, juxtaposed with *the earth is like a floor but not a floor,* its falsity or "absurdness" is immediately registered. At this stage we want to stress that Davidson's position is synonymous to both Searle's (1982) and Carston (2002b). He further rejects the comparison view or the metaphor as an elliptical simile for its failure to convincingly establish differences between similes and metaphors, a point equally observed by Black (1979) and Levinson (1983). Therefore, in line with other constructivists, Davidson recognizes the metaphor's legitimate power not only as a literal tool but in other scientific domains. He calls for treatment of metaphors as a communicative tool that captures our audio-visual perception within a backdrop of cognitive analogies and comparison.

4.4. ANDREW ORTONY

Taking cue from Davidson who reserves metaphors for the communication domain, Ortony (1975) begins his arguments by stating that etymologically the term metaphor is rooted in Greek with *meta* meaning (trans) or "beyond" and *phora* a derivative of *pherein* (to carry) (cf. Glucksberg, 2001, Taverniers, 2002: 25). Metaphors are known to engage both their authors and respective addressees in a series of cognitive comparisons either between animate beings and inanimate concepts or inanimate concepts and inanimate concepts, all structured depending on what point one wants to express, by affecting another person's cognitive faculties like perception, be it sensory, emotive or perceptual abilities. Ortony boldly aligns himself to the constructivism school of thought in his appreciation of non-literal language using a quadripartite paradigm. The paradigm demonstrates the core functions of metaphors in human communication under the following theses notably: the pedagogical thesis, the vividness thesis, the inexpressibility thesis and the compact thesis.

A breakdown of ideas advanced by each of these theses are the following. The pedagogical thesis recognizes the educative role of metaphors under the proverbial camouflage and packaged with relevant moral truisms of life. Traditionally, human beings have extensively used metaphors in both written texts for instance in Plato's philosophical texts like *The Republic*, sacred scriptures like the

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Bible, Vedas or Koran, or even in verbal discourse of many World languages (cf. Ortony, 1975). The major challenge faced by educative functions of metaphors rests with miscomprehension as previously noted down by Searle among other pragmatists. Ortony brings in the aspect of underestimating an addressee's cognitive environment with respect to a certain topic can lead to misinformation. His recommendation is that the speaker should have a rough idea of his addressee's level of exposure to the said metaphor. This is also a point Bergmann (1982) raised on the role of a metaphor's author in guiding addressees towards the right interpretation of a non-literal discourse. Failure to have this prior knowledge means that addressees not conversant with the metaphorical discourse might fail to produce the necessary distinctive set, by not adhering to the required elimination procedures designed for eliminating irrelevant implicit assumptions. In a summarized form, Ortony's (1975) piece of advice is that using metaphors can be insightful, however when unsuccessfully used they are potential sources of confusion and despair.

The vividness thesis is the domain dealing with emotive experiences captured by mental representations. They become attention-arresting since they work on either our perception or sensory or cognitive faculties. Ortony suggests that metaphorical discourse is closer to our perception or emotive aspects than literal language. The inexpressibility thesis explores the "life-saving" nature of metaphors by filling in linguistic gaps in instances whereby there is a lexical deficit of appropriate words to effectively express a given notion, or where some words seem literally indescribable or culturally obscene. To illustrate this, Ortony uses an example in Krio *ush ya* which is a warm and friendly term known to morally uplift a disappointed person. Finding a suitable English translation for *ush ya* is next to impossible. Connecting this notion to our work touching on AIDS, sexuality and death, which in many societies are taboo topics. Metaphorical discourse therefore euphemistically addressess culturally sensitive topics such as sexuality. Contrastively, the compact thesis involves reconstructing our experiences under the guidance of our mental faculties. It entails enriching syntactical structures of utterances using one's world knowledge. In saying, *A man swam the English Channel in winter*, a speaker invites his addressee to come up with appropriate mental images of an excellent male swimmer, the English Channel's locality, something about the seasonal calendar with special attention on the coldest season or the weather of the material day. These and another imageries accompanying the expression is what Ortony calls particularization, and is an essential component for understanding metaphoricity. Like the vividness thesis, it involves using of emotive, cognitive and perceptual abilities.

To Ortony's list of the metaphor functions, Gibbs (1994) adds that first metaphors reinforce intimacy between speakers, which is not only purely linguistic, but the end result of sharing common experiences and interests. This is the logical explanation accounting for the lack homogeneity in understanding metaphorical constructions, unless one identifies with culture-specific beliefs or attitudes. Example (85) illustrates this issue.

(85) David: Does Gladys have a good memory?

    Mary: Gladys is just like an elephant. (adapted from Gibbs, 1994: 135)

In the construction above, Mary via the metaphorical assertion[58] invites David to access his encyclopaedic knowledge on elephants as gigantic animals endowed with superb memories. And this happens to be the implicature Mary intends David to derive from such a construction. Alternatively, Mary could have saved David a lot of time by using a literal proposition such as *Gladys has a very good memory*. Instead, by using a metaphorical option, Gibbs argues that it is a way of cultivating intimacy between herself and David in her usage of a non-literal description of Gladys's memory. This is because it is a psychological process of figuring out a speaker's attitudes and beliefs, of which the two are key components for metaphor comprehension. Intimacy also englobes aspects related to group membership, more specifically, the use of slang, which Gibbs considers metaphorical, for instance, medics have developed slang metaphors as an outlet for venting out emotions, in their categorizations of patients under the following labels; *crooks* for malingerers, *hypochondriacs* for patients fabricating fictitious ailments and *complainers* (or *screamers*) for those fussing about their medical conditions. For the purposes of our study, in chapter 6 we will examine metaphorical aspects of the Kenyan slang *(Sheng)* used in sensitizing urban youths on HIV and AIDS.

Regarding other tropes, Ortony compares metaphors, similes and analogies. As we recall in Black's interactional theory, there was a stage of metaphorical coupling which involved processes such as analogies and comparisons, linking the primary subject with its secondary counterpart when processing metaphorical discourse. In a different approach from Black, Ortony treats similes as a kind of metaphor. On one hand, he dismisses the traditional metaphorical distinction of them being implicit comparisons and to some extent regarded as ''indirect speech acts''. On the other hand, he construes

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58 Gibbs (1994) regards this example as a metaphorical assertion or metaphorical description of Gladys's memory, as Croft & Cruse' (2004) argue that less prototypical similes can have "metaphorical traits."

similes as being explicit comparisons. In his perspective, metaphors involve the transfer of characteristics between concepts, a feature lacking in similes. In metaphors, we are conscious of differences between conceptual domains, while striving to look for similarities between concerned domains. Contrastively, similes overlook these differences by having a restricted focus on similarities existing between X and Y. In Ortony's (1975) example *He dived into the icy water like a fearless warrior,* a hearer will have to come up with a list of characteristics such as aggressiveness, immense strength, bravery, powerful and strong-willed personalities associated with warriors. Some peripheral attributes such as being muscular or a horse riding knight are not necessarily essential at this point. Stereotypical characteristics driven by a salience-based criteria are actually transferable characteristics in similes. Now, when determining the distinctive criteria, elimination of unwanted features capable of causing unnecessary confusion occurs. For example, one would eliminate a horse-riding knight with an armour as a nontransferable characteristic. We then remain with what Ortony calls an appropriate distinctive set. In Ortony's own words, the metaphorical angle of this simile is a matter of "taking all those aspects you know are peculiar to fearless warriors which could be applied to a diving swimmer." Ortony opines that metaphors and similes respect truth conditions.

In the case of analogy and metaphors, in analogies one focuses more on transfers between relations. There are neither distinctive sets nor intension expected in analogies. Conversely, in metaphors the said processes are compulsory. Metaphors subscribe to the concept of salience imbalance with high salient attributes for the vehicle and low salient attributes for the topic. In general, Ortony's (1979) classification of metaphors accommodates both similes and analogies by having a definition of a metaphor as a non-literal comparison either between objects or between relations between objects. The former case deals with similes, while the latter leans towards analogies. According to Ortony, it is therefore possible to talk of reversed similes or anomalous constructions as in (86a) and metaphorical analogies in (86b)

(86a) Sermons are like sleeping pills. (Its reversed form as a simile is *Sleeping pills are like sermons*, to mean boring sermons, which are likely to induce sleep. Inducing sleep is a high salient feature of sleeping pills and not sermons. Consequently, the salience imbalance offers ground for metaphoricity. (Ortony, 1979: 165)

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(86b) Putting William Miller in Charge of the Federal Reserve Board would be like putting Rudolph Nureyev in the ring against Leon Spinks for the heavyweight title. (There is some level of salience imbalance whereby there are no high-salient attributes associated with the second term that are comparably high salient features for the first term)   (Adapted from Ortony, 1979: 175)

In an attempt to solve the metaphor-simile quagmire, Croft & Cruse (2004) have espoused the following line of thinking premised on three schools of thought in accounting for similes. The first one views metaphors as implicit similes, the second one argues that similes are implicit metaphors, while the last one holds that the two cited tropes are distinct. In a general way, the metaphor as implicit similes thesis has its origin in the classical view positing that metaphor comprehension is only via their transformation into similes. Conversely, similes are implicit metaphors thesis adopts Glucksberg's (2001) arguments on dual reference (See section 4.6 where the notion of class inclusion is an integral component of metaphoricity). In saying *John is a lion*, means that he meets the qualification for category membership of which lions belong, meaning that he has certain prototypical features of lions such as bravery and immense strength, in the superordinate position. In the same vein, a proposed equation for this thesis is that there exists a literal term X and its superordinate category X'. The simile adopts the structure of A is like X. Hence, translating it into a metaphor, is tantamount to alluding that X is X'. This calls for structuring of the superordinate category to facilitate mapping of its features onto A. The final thesis on similes and metaphors as distinct categories, uses three features in demonstrating differences between the two tropes for instance the propositional structure, restricted mapping or open mapping and blending. On one hand, a simile's propositional structure operates under overt resemblance between two concepts and is illustrated by its logical construction of *A* is like *B*. Alternatively, metaphors adhere to the format *A* is *B*, where *B*'s properties are transposed onto *A*.

At this point, Croft & Cruse insist that some less prototypical similes portray open-mapping features especially when they depict "metaphor-like" traits that generate numerous weak implicatures. However, this does not insinuate that they convert into metaphors. A typical example being *She was gone in a flash of red, like a vengeful queen on her way to order armies to march on us.* Here, we can have numerous implicit assumptions as in *she was extremely mad, she was full of vengeance* and *there is no way we will be able to calm her down in such anger.* Further, on one hand, metaphors have open mapping features serving numerous implicit assumptions all derived from a single construction. On the

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other hand, restricted mapping[59] is prevalent among similes since the construction has to adhere to overt resemblance based on specific features. In terms of blending, Croft & Cruse (2004) stipulate that metaphorical constructions encourage conceptual blending of two domains, but similes are somehow unable to sustain such a process because their two domains are treated as distint domains[60]. Here again, there are also cases of restricted mapping in metaphors, where less prototypical metaphors have simile-like features in a sentence such as *Her breath smoking out* (*came out like smoke, because it was cold today and it condensed*). Croft & Cruse (2004) are convinced that some expressions like *Containers lined up at the loading docks look like animals feeding from troughs* and its metaphorical counterpart *The containers were animals feeding from troughs,* make a clear distinction between the two tropes. In a nutshell, there are basically four types of simile-metaphor based relations having the shown features:

	Mapping	Blending
Prototypical metaphors	Open	Yes
Simile metaphors	Restricted	Yes
Prototypical similes	Restricted	No
Metaphorical similes	Open	No

Source: Croft & Cruse (2004: 215)

Matters on the simile-metaphor question become more complex, when Croft & Cruse give examples of metaphor-simile combinations. Put differently, it is possible to have a metaphor within a simile and vice versa.

(87) She was standing there, her eyes fastened to me like steel rivets. (metaphor within a simile)

(88) He looked tired, as if life had pushed him too far. (simile within a metaphor)

(adapted from Croft & Cruse, 2004: 215)

On one extreme in (87), the simile captured by the expression *like steel rivets,* metaphorically zeros in on the fastening aspect of rivets based on the common knowledge that they are excellent fasteners and

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59 To clearly explain restricted mapping, Croft & Cruse (2004) employ the example such as *Marino was <u>breathing hard like a wounded bear</u>* to denote the fact that the hearer of this construction will strictly compare Marino's hard breathing with that of a wounded bear.

60 Here, Croft & Cruse, (2004: 214) use a construction such as *The elevator has a mind of its own,* would have a simile such as *The elevator behaves like a being with its own mind,* where there are two distint domains that is the elevator and a being with its own mind.

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via interpretive resemblance are comparable to a steady gaze under the FIXED ATTENTION IS A FASTENED OBJECT conventional metaphor. Such a scenario constitutes an example of a metaphorical component included within a simile. On the other extreme, in (88) the expression *as if life had pushed him too far,* we have a simile within the conceptual metaphor STRUGGLES IN LIFE ARE A PHYSICAL FORCE, with its linguistic metaphor *life had pushed him too far.* Following our lengthy discussions on similes and metaphors, we choose not to digress from "the similes are metaphors but the converse is false" thesis. The reason for subscribing to this line of thought is premised on the notion that metaphoricity of similes is what permits cross-domain combinations seen above, and this does not mean that the two are entirely indistinguishable. It is possible to dissociate what entails a simile and what is metaphorical, no matter how interlaced they might seem on the surface.

4.5. GEORGE LAKOFF

The Lakoffian view on the metaphor is an outright dissociation from the Western Philosophical school of thought premised on objectivism. Objectivism argued for rationality, absolute truth, scientific-oriented logic, literalness, rigidity of conceptual boundaries, with concepts subscribing to the notion of necessary and sufficient conditions for category membership amongst other objectivist principles. Objectivist notions have been re-examined under Lakoff's experientialist viewpoint of the metaphor in chapter 1. By embracing experientialism, Lakoff's perception of metaphors assigns many "nots" to objectivism. In short, metaphors are not nonsensical, not riddled with falsity as previously recorded in Gricean literature, not irrational, not a nonlinguistic phenomenon, metaphors are not constrained by the traditional logic of "necessary and sufficient" conditionalities to access category membership. Contrastively, metaphors exhibit rationality in their acknowledgment of human creativity in imagination when expressing our interactive experiences with the environment. Moreover, they have elastic boundaries to accommodate dissimilar concepts by singling out some of their similarities in metaphorical contexts. These experiences may be emotional, spatial or social as in the following examples *Harry is in the kitchen (spatial metaphor), He is in the Elks (social metaphor, whereby social groups are construed as containers),* and *Harry is in love* (*in this case, love as an emotional state, is cognitively perceived as a contained object*).

In Lakoff's (2003) perspective, metaphors govern our conceptual system, more specifically our

perceptual, conceptual and motor abilities. There are numerous examples of metaphoricity in statements mostly unconsciously uttered in our daily discourse. Cases in point are PEOPLE ARE PLANTS metaphor captured in expressions like *he is in the budding stage of his career,* LIFE IS A JOURNEY as in *we have travelled this far.* THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS like in the expression, *your theories are based on a shaky foundation.* DEATH IS SLEEP, *he is finally resting in the Lord.* LIFE IS A PLAY examples being *she is my leading lady* and *she always wants to be in the spotlight* (cf. Johnson, 1987, Lakoff & Turner 1989: 20). The cited metaphors asymmetrically or unidirectionally have their respective source domains mapped onto their target domains as some features of people are mapped onto plants, journeys onto life, buildings onto theories, sleep onto death, and finally a play onto life. For Taverniers (2002: 6) and Croft & Cruse (2004: 196-197), the conceptual mapping entails ontological and epistemic correspondences which highlight or hide certain features at the expense of others during cross domain mappings. Ontological correspondences give more direct and one to one correspondence between elements of source domain with those of the target domain, whereas, epistemic correspondences focus on relations holding between elements of the source domain and the target domain, as shown in examples derived from Lakoff (1987) as cited in Croft & Cruse (2004: 197)

Ontological correspondences

Source: HEAT OF FLUID.	Target: ANGER.
Container	Body
Heat of fluid	Anger
Heat of scale	Anger scale
Pressure in a container	Experienced pressure
Agitation of boiling fluid	Experienced agitation
Limit of container's resistance	Limit of a person's ability to suppress anger
Explosion	Loss of control

Epistemic correspondences

-When fluid in a container is heated beyond a certain limit, pressure increases to a point at which the container explodes.

-An explosion is damaging to a container and dangerous

-When anger increases beyond a certain limit, "pressure" increases to a point at which a person loses control.

-Loss of control is damaging to

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to bystanders.	a person.
-Explosion can be prevented by applying sufficient force and counter pressure.	-Anger can be suppressed by forced will.
-Controlled release of pressure may occur which reduces danger of explosion.	-Anger can be released in a controlled way or vented harmlessly, thus reducing the level.

Alongside ontological and epistemic correspondences, there is an issue mentioned by Gibbs (2004: 1197-1198), which sheds more light on the selection preferences of certain features at the expense of others or rather explain the unlikelihood of certain mappings occurring. Taking, for example, the THEORIES ARE BUILDING conceptual metaphor, it is unheard of to say * *That theory has no windows*. One reason Gibbs gives for this phenomenon is espoused from Lakoff. In that, cross domain mapping is partially done to bar undesirable mappings by hiding some features while simultaneously highlighting others. Another reason is that there are primary metaphors[61] or primitive metaphors that provide evidence on metaphor comprehension and embodied experience. Said in another way, primitive metaphors lay the foundation for more complex metaphors. From this perspective, primary metaphors have an independent and direct experiential basis. Contrastively, complex metaphors are formed by several primitive metaphors making them have complex conceptual domains. It simply means that the THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS complex metaphor is made up of a primitive metaphor such as: PERSISTING IS REMAINING ERECT like in the expression *Sarah still stands by her position with regard to this matter.* Under such a frame, there is virtually no room for cross-domain mappings such a linguistic metaphor such as *That theory has no windows.* Another aspect closely related to this issue is raised by Evans & Green (2006: 302) who stipulate that there is an invariance hypothesis proposed by Lakoffians which prohibits incompatibility in cross-domain mappings. It states that "metaphorical mappings preserve the cognitive topology (that is, the image schema structure) of the source domain, in a way consistent with the inherent structure of the target domain" (as quoted by Lakoff, 1993: 215 in Evans & Green (2006), thus death is construed as a REAPER, DEVOURER or DESTROYER and not a TEACHER or a BABYSITTER. This is thanks to the input of the generic-level metaphor: EVENTS

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61 Joseph Grady is the brainchild of the notion of primary metaphors and complex metaphors, with primary metaphors being foundational, and complex metaphors resulting from a combination of several primary metaphors. For Grady, it is the degree of intersubjectivity determining the abstraction of a concept. Some examples of primary metaphors include SIMILARITY IS NEARNESS, IMPORTANCE IS SIZE, CAUSES ARE FORCES, CHANGE IS MOTION, and DESIRE IS HUNGER. Primary target concepts are a reflection of subjective responses to sensory perception for target concepts such as SIMILARITY, IMPORTANCE, CAUSES, DESIRE and CHANGE lack the perceptual basis which characterize the source concepts for instance DESIRE is an affective state, while HUNGER is a physical sensation, Evans & Green (2006) give an in depth discussion on primary and complex metaphors.

ARE ACTIONS (or INANIMATE PHENOMENON ARE HUMAN AGENTS) compatibility with death as a reaper, devourer and destroyer and not any other unsuitable agent.

Lakoff classifies metaphors under the following labels: structural metaphors, orientational metaphors and ontological metaphors. For starters, a structural metaphor like ARGUMENT IS WAR conceptualizes arguments in terms of war as in the construction *He shot down all her points*. Orientational metaphors bank on spatial orientation in accounting for our physical experience with objects or substances using parameters like up-down, front-back and deep-shallow. Examples include HEALTH AND LIFE ARE UP and SICKNESS AND DEATH ARE DOWN conventional metaphors, in expressions such as *He's at the peak of his health, Lazarus rose up from the dead, he is in top shape, He fell ill* and *his health is deteriorating.* In real life situations when one is in good health one is up and about. Unfortunately, when one is ill, one is mostly confined to the bed or assumes a lying posture. There are ontological metaphors which account for our experience with substances and objects. Through such metaphors, imposing human boundaries on entities bounded by the surface is possible. A case in point being, INFLATION IS AN ENTITY is physically realized in expressions like *inflation is lowering our living standards, we need to combat inflation* and *inflation is taking a toll on us*. Included under ontological metaphors are container metaphors where objects, substances or entities are have both internal and external boundaries. A substance such as a large water mass is perceived as a container in the construction such as *she is swimming in the lake.* Our visual field also depicts evidence of container metaphors as one is said to be *in sight*, while disappearance from one's visual field is explained as *being out of sight*. At this juncture, what needs underscoring following both arguments of Taverniers (2002) and Croft & Cruse (2004), is that there is no standardized classification for metaphors, scholars seem to subscribe to different modes of metaphorical classification. To get practical examples, we will examine Taverniers (2002) and Kövecses (2006) as cases in point.

Contrary to the Lakoffian metaphor classification, Taverniers (2002) adopts a multi-dimensional approach for metaphorical classifications which broadly touches on aspects related to degree of conventionality, degree of tension and contradictoriness, type of semantic relation between the donor and recipient, type of construction, lexico-grammatical perspectives, and degree of marking as shown in *Figure 22*. Beginning with the degree of conventionality, just like Ortony's discourse on dead and active metaphors, Taverniers examines the same notion but uses dead and live metaphors. His thesis as

other cognitive linguists is that dead metaphors have become conventionalized in language and are devoid of their metaphoricity. On the other side, live metaphors are created "online" and are context dependent. Then on the degree of tension and degree of contradictoriness, focus is on the degree of resemblance and dissimilarities in metaphors. Here, two metaphorical categories are distinguished namely epiphors and diaphors, the former is capable of identifying similarity cases between the target domain and their corresponding source domain, whereas, the latter creates similarity patterns within metaphors. Examples include constructions such as *Tears fell from the sky* or *The sky was crying* (cf Indurkhya, 1992, as cited in Taverniers, 2002: 13) are considered less tensional metaphors on grounds that they give a straightforward perception of similarity (epiphors). On the contrary, a construction like (89)

(89) Observe,

the *jasmine lightness*

of the moon

(From WC, Williams, "To a solitary discipline", in Lakoff & Turner, 1989: 140-59, cited in Taverniers, 2002: 13)

The example in (89) is a diaphor and is tensional because of the covert similarity between the moon's colour and that of jasmine. Regarding the type of semantic relationship between donor and recipient, which is sub-divided into contradiction, multimodality, contiguity, part-whole relationship and classification between donor and recipient. At the level of contradiction, we have cases of paradoxes and oxymorons. On one extreme, a paradox is metaphorical, by virtue of the fact that both donor and recipient domains are converse lexemes originating from a similar semantic field, as in the expression *The child is the father of man*[62]. Here, both child and father belong to the same semantic field of family, where naturally a child is unqualified to assume his father's parental duties. On the other extreme, oxymoron is a type of paradox where the semantic relationship of the opposition is skewed towards one nominal expression rather than a predication. A case in point is where two contrasting adjectives modify the same noun as in *bitter sweet experience,* under the EXPERIENCE IS TASTE metaphor. On the multimodality question, Taverniers draws examples from synesthesia, where both donor and recipient concepts belong to two different modes of sensory perception, examples being HEARING IS

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[62] This metaphorical expression is adapted from William Wordsworth , it means that our childhood experiences have a way of moulding or shaping our adulthood.

TASTE and VISION IS TOUCH conceptual metaphors in constructions such as *the violin gave a sour sound* and *humid green.* On the issue of contiguity, Taverniers, addressees metonymy, as a semantic relationship between the source domain and the recipient domain is one of contiguity. At this point we want to stress that his understanding of metonymy is not any different from Lakoff's. On the part-whole relationship, Taverniers like Gibbs (1994) and Lakoff (2003), treats synecdoche as both metaphorical and a special type of metonymy. On the classification notion according to donor and recipient, where metaphors are sub-divided on the basis of their donor domain or recipient domain, there is the personification issue which is addressed from a Lakoffian perspective.

Another criteria for metaphor distinction proposed by Taverniers is the construction type, dichotomized into semantic perspectives and lexico-grammatical dimensions. Semantic perspectives handle aspects related to intensional versus extensional metaphors. For example, using Eco Umberto's examples of *The girl is a birch,* there is a defining property *human*, which is part of the intension for *girl.* There is also a contrasting *non-human* property premised in the intension for the term *birch.* Extensional metaphors are mostly derived from the extension of the donor term as in the expression *The emperor has arrived,* used in reference to an office manager. Just to mention in passing, proverbs, parables and allegory are treated as examples of extended metaphors by Taverniers.

Taverniers also cites lexico-grammatical dimensions either by focusing on the linguistic realization of the donor concept at an elementary level, or at the constructional level handling the linguistic realization of the donor-recipient relationship. On one extreme, the lexico-grammatical realization of the donor concept, focuses on the grammatical category of a lexical word, or a verbial phrase, or even an adjectival phrase, like in expressions such as *I hate that pig for what she put you through (a nominal used referentially), the sun was smiling in the sky, (a verbial signalled by was smiling)* and *he provided a strong argument for market led software development (an adjectival signalled by the adjective strong, that premodifies the noun "argument")*. On the other extreme, the lexico-grammatical realization of the donor-recipient relationship of the donor and recipient is much complex and generally looks at the grammatico-syntactic aspects which encode the donor and recipient relationship as in the case of the verbal clause. It also caters for grammatico-semantic relationships within the constituent structure, in its treatment of predication and attribution (cf. Taverniers, 2002: 21). The other issue Taverniers suggests for metaphorical classifications is the degree of marking whereby the signalling of

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metaphoricity is possible via metalinguistic adjuncts either at the clausal or phrasal level. Some explicit markers include *literally* or *metaphorically speaking*, or even expressions having metalinguistic terms such as *meaning* and *sense*. And added to this list are various types of expressions of degree of marking such as (90a) to (90e)

(90a) *Metaphorically speaking,* the journey goes on until you meet yourself.
(90b) The situation was especially grim in England where industrialization was *literally* the country's youth.
(90c) Being in that community sheltered him and, *in a sense,* cut him off from the wider world.
(90d) As day two of the decisive contest wore on, he had *virtually* drawn the tourists to their knees.
(90e) She was, *in a way,* burnt out**.**

From the foregoing, apart from Taverniers integrating cognitive, grammatical, semantic and syntactic aspects in the classification of metaphors. What still remains unexplored though conspicuously present in *Figure 22* are cognitive-cultural aspects of metaphorical classifications, which for some unknown reasons were left unexplained by Taverniers. Nonetheless, Kövecses as we will see shortly discusses this issue to great lengths.

Conventional metaphor　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Novel metaphor.

conventionality

Signalling of metaphor

Degree of markedness

Structural aspects　　　　special type : *simile*

Type of construction

LINGUISTIC ASPECTS

degree of tension　　　　contradiction esp oxymoron

semantic relationship　　multimodality esp synthetic metaphor

Semantic aspects　　donor type　　　　part-whole esp synecdoche

recipient type　　　　contiguity esp metonymy

Donor-recipient relationship

Scope of the metaphor

structural extension

special type: proverb, gnomic,

utterance and allegory.

COGNITIVE CULTURAL ASPECTS

breadth of application

Semantic conceptual breadth

Conceptual features

of the donor domain

large scope metaphor　　　　narrow-scope metaphor

SEMANTICS　　　　　　STRUCTURAL LEXICO-GRAMMATICAL

CONCEPTUAL ASPECTS　　TEXTUAL ASPECTS

Figure 22:. Tavernier's classification of metaphors derived from Goatly (1997)　　　Source: Taverniers (2002: 10)

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Kövecses (2006) classifies metaphors differently using four dimensions namely; conventionality (also seen in Tavernier's work), cognitive function, nature and generality. With regard to conventionality, Kövecses focuses on the entrenched usage of metaphors in the sense that there are some more conventional metaphors than others. A case in point being the LIFE IS A PLAY metaphor realized in linguistic metaphors such as *steal the show* or *be in the spotlight.* The two are more conventional than the renown Shakespearean poetic expression *All the world is a stage/ All men and women are merely players/they have exits and entrances.* In an implicit way, it is a replication of Taverniers's dead and alive metaphorical distinction. Under cognitive function, Kövecses has the Lakoffian categorization comprising structural, ontological and orientational metaphors, where metaphors can either structure or depict spatial-temporal orientations or even show conceptual boundaries with physical events, substances and objects. On the nature of metaphors, Kövecses is more keen on propositional forms of metaphors and also their image-schematic aspects which structure our embodied experience with phenomenon using cognitive frames. Propositional forms deal with linguistic metaphors, for instance an expression *A computer has a hardware and a software* forms the basis of the MIND IS A COMPUTER metaphor. While image-schemas adopt certain cognitive frames such as STATES ARE CONTAINERS or ACTIONS ARE MOVEMENTS. And finally, on the generality angle, some metaphors are specific while others are generic. Taking the example of BIRTH IS ARRIVAL and DEATH IS DEPARTURE. Kövecses argument is that both birth and death are specific events, as arrival and departure are generic actions. However, whenever we encounter a metaphor such as EVENTS ARE ACTIONS, the metaphor is generic owing to the fact that there is no specification of the exact events or actions as in the case of BIRTH IS ARRIVAL and DEATH IS DEPARTURE. Having looked at Lakoff's, Taverniers's and Kövecses metaphorical classification, it is deducible that there is no standard procedure for classifying metaphors. It all depends on what one uses as paradigms in his metaphor classification. This argument is in accordance with Taverniers (2002) and Croft & Cruse (2004) thoughts on metaphor classifications.

Apart from the Lakoffian metaphorical categorizations, metaphors have an internal structure that partly enables one to conceptualize one abstract thing as another concrete thing by hiding, highlighting and foregrounding correlated or even similar aspects of two unrelated conceptual domains, a typical example being the ontological metaphor TIME IS MONEY. Here, the concept of TIME is construed as a valuable resource, sharing certain corresponding features with the concept of MONEY from another

conceptual domain. In that they can be both spent wisely, wasted, used sparingly and are limited resources, these highlighted features obviously eclipse or hide uncorrelated features such as money is stored in banks, or knowing time needs constant consultation with one's watch, and so on. It therefore means that highlighted features of the source domain MONEY are mapped onto the target domain of TIME (cf. Lakoff & Turner, 1989, Lakoff, 2003 and Kövecses, 2006). Physical expressions coined around TIME IS MONEY metaphor include: *you don't use your time profitably, he is living on borrowed time* and *use your time wisely.* Lakoff equally adds that there exists metaphorical entailments where the TIME IS MONEY metaphor, entails TIME IS A VALUABLE RESOURCE and TIME IS A LIMITED RESOURCE, as evidenced by expressions focusing on time's preciousness or its limitations. Regarding the notion of similarity and embodied aspects of metaphors, Kövecses is in agreement with Lakoff, and further fine tunes the embodiment notion with a neuroscientific view holding that during the processing of conceptual metaphors, two groups of neurons are involved. Some neurons are located in the brain's sensory-motor region and are affiliated with the source domain in handling concrete concepts. While the other neurons premised in the cortical region, process abstract concepts (cf. Gibbs, 1994). Using evidence from neuroscientific experiments, Kövecses argument is suppose one is thinking about skyrocketting prices under the guidance of the MORE IS UP conventional metaphor, the price's neurons corresponding to amount and equally those corresponding to verticality (up and down) are coactivated in the brain, therefore, the physical neural circuit between the mentioned neurons is what coordinates cross-domain mappings.

Apart from having an internal metaphoric structure, metaphors have complex dimensions known as experiential gestalt, consisting of sub-parts that form a whole metaphorical body. Let us consider the ARGUMENT AS WAR as a case study. According to Lakoff (2003), whenever arguments occur, they are partly construed as war, this means that there are certain foregrounded or highlighted features cutting across both domains. Arguments seem to adhere to a structure of one person being viewed as the opponent of the other in a verbal war of words. Naturally, certain demands arise as it becomes compulsory to establish a strong defence for one's points, have counter-attacking mechanisms in place, strategize on one's way of talking. In cases where one senses defeat because of the convincing points outlined by his opponent, conceding defeat is quite appropriate, whereas in doubtful scenarios or unconvincing points, a stalemate is always inevitable.

Regarding the contentious question around truth in metaphors or non-literal language, if we recall, Grice's verdict on the matter was that metaphors are riddled with falsity, for it is false to say *Richard is a pig,* because of its inconsistency with reality since *Richard* is a human being. Therefore, it is humanly impossible to transform Richard into a pig. Lakoff's (2003: 164) counter thesis towards the Gricean school of thought is summarizingly put out as "...truth is a matter of understanding a situation, so long as it fits our understanding of the sentence in a particular situation or context...". To support his arguments, Lakoff argues that human reasoning is creative. Whenever we talk about concepts with regard to categorization, restricting concepts to the traditional school of thought of "necessary and sufficient conditions" is not only baseless but irrelevant. This immediately calls for the adaptation of a Wittgensteinian viewpoint of elastic conceptual boundaries as in the renown example of the GAME concept. Supposing we take the Wittgensteinian analysis of GAME as a concept, then there are no pre-defined conditions accurately describing the concept. Some games are merely for entertainment purposes like video games, some demand wit like chess, while others like wrestling demand physical strength. It means that having a standardized definition for GAME as a concept appears elusive to the human mind. Given that we are dealing with metaphorical concepts, Lakoff argues that truth is context dependent. Good examples are sentences such as *France is hexagonal* or *Missouri is a parallelogram.* The two sentences qualify as being true to a school boy drawing a rough map. However, in the context of cartography, an expert cartographer will dismiss the two sentences on grounds of their falsity. Lakoff's reasoning towards this matter is that truth is dependent on categorization, specifically our interactional abilities with concepts. Drawing still our example from Wittgenstein, family resemblances within concepts are bound to exist. Commonsense dictates that in reality France is not hexagonal. Nonetheless, France's map roughly assumes a hexagon's shape on the basis of shared similarities existing between France's geographical features and a hexagon's features. No wonder most relevance theorists, as will be seen shortly, capitalize on resemblance in their conceptualization of metaphoricity. In Lakoff's (2003) paraphrased words, truth will always be relative, for categories are never fixed, they can be narrowed, expanded, adjusted relative to our purposes (p. 164). This line of thought makes allusion to Barsalou's notion of ad hoc concept and has since been echoed by Glucksberg (2001).

In relation to other tropes, Lakoff focuses on personification and metonymy. On one hand, he treats personification as an extension of ontological metaphors, endowed with the ability of perceiving non-human entities as humans. An example being *It was a beautiful day, as the sun smiled on the heavenly*

landscape of the Alps. Here the sun being inanimate is assigned human emotions such as warmth and joy. Metonymic expressions on the other hand, behave very much like metaphors in that they conventionally capture our experiences within our physical or cultural world (cf. Kövecses, 2006). The only dissimilarity being the choice of using one conceptual domain instead of two like in metaphors. Cases in point are expressions such as *We need a couple of strong bodies for our team* (strong people) where the PART-WHOLE metonymies are treated as synecdoche. Then metonymies, like metaphors are well structured and coherent. They came under numerous labels such as THE PRODUCER FOR THE PRODUCT as in expressions such as *He bought a Ford* or *He got a Picasso.* PLACE FOR THE INSTITUTION*, Paris is introducing longer skirts* and CONTROLLER FOR THE CONTROLLED, *Napoleon lost at Water Loo.* Metonymy as discussed by Lakoff has been refined by Kövecses (2006) who is in accordance with Lakoff on conceptual and cultural roles metonymic constructions play in capturing our embodied experiences. The only reinforcement on Lakoffian literature which Kövecses injects is the role of Idealized Cognitive Models (ICMs) or frames into the conceptualization of metonymies. Given that "knowledge of the world comes from structured frames".

In a practical illustration of frames in metonymy, Kövecses (2006: 98) uses the examples in (91a) and (91b)

(91a) Ham Sandwich has spilled beer all over himself.
(91b) Washington denied the charges.

In (91a) there is a RESTAURANT frame, comprising elements such as waiters, waitresses and cooks. In addition to this, various meals are always being served in restaurants to several customers. The *ham sandwich* in this context serves as the vehicle. The ham sandwich stands for the person (target) eating the sandwich within the restaurant frame. Put differently, the RESTAURANT frame directs our attention towards the mental access of a conceptual element, the ham sandwich consumer (target) via the conceptual element *ham sandwich* (vehicle). Likewise, for the case of (91b) Washington falls under a GOVERNMENTAL frame, having numerous institutions and departments in the United States (US). This metonymic process is instigated by the GOVERNMENTAL frame that grants mental access to the target, the US government by means of its vehicle, Washington. In short, Lakoff is not so far from what Kövecses had in mind, they are in agreement in matters pertaining to idealized cognitive models, frames, experientialism, the cultural input of metonymies in art and religious circles and even on

metaphoricity in proverbs. Although Lakoff and Kövecses do not dwell so much on proverbs, Gibbs (1994) provides the generic-level metaphors as an operational framework for proverbs. The single generic level conceptual metaphor GENERIC IS SPECIFIC normally maps knowledge from specific domains to general domains. An elaboration of this is in a scandal scenario where a student is warned against exposing a cheating scandal in her class using the proverb *It is better to let the sleeping dogs lie.* The specific metaphor will specify features used in the cheating scandal, compatible with those related to leaving a sleeping dog lie. The generic level for the source domain hosting the proverb *it is better to let the sleeping dogs lie* will be characterized as follows:

–There is an animal that is not active.

–Animals can sometimes act fierce if provoked.

–Therefore it is better to let the animal remain, as it is, rather than risk disturbing it and having to deal with its potential ferocity.

The generic level can be instantiated

–There is an unpleasant situation that is dormant, such situations can prove difficult to handle if brought to people's attention.

–It is better to let the situation remain dormant than to risk having to deal with negative consequences of revealing it.

From these we deduce the following at the specific level.

–Dormant animal corresponds to unpleasant situation.

–Disturbing the dog corresponds to bringing the cheating scandal to people's attention.

–It is better to leave a cheating scandal unnoticed, just as sometimes it is better to let sleeping dogs remain sleeping.   (adapted from Gibbs, 1994: 313-314)

From the foregoing, *let the sleeping dogs lie* proverb has a conceptual mapping from one specific level schema from the source domain transposed onto the generic level schema of the target domain. What needs underlining is the fact that not all proverbs are motivated by conceptual metaphors, like the case of *absence makes the heart grow fonder.*

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
There are many ways in which metaphors and metonymies coexist. In an examination of the working operations of metaphors and metonymies in advertising, Ungerer (2003) widens the scope of the applicability of metaphors and metonymies sourced from the British National Sunday newspaper published between 13th March and 30th April 1997. He posits that in advertisements, the advertiser's main goal is to convincingly sell a product or an idea to a customer. Advertisements are guided by the Attention-Interest-Desire-Action (AIDA) formula. Put simply, pictorial images accompanying advertised products should be attention-arresting. They should automatically arouse some level of interest from their potential consumers while simultaneously instilling the desire to acquire the product or subscribe to the advertised idea. At this level, once the desire for a particular object has been manifested in the customer, it triggers some action on the consumer's part either by adopting the new idea or by taking the initiative of buying the advertised object. According to Ungerer, advertisements capitalize mostly on pictorial metaphors, and metonymies alongside verbalized constructions. In most cases there is an underlying GRABBING metonymy. To elaborate on this particular metonymy, we have to revisit the concept of DESIRE. Ungerer posits that the driving force behind the GRABBING metonymy is DESIRE because it normally pushes one towards the intended action proposed by an advertisement. Hence, DESIRE is categorized under a class of emotions such as ANGER, JOY and FEAR, and is regarded as a semi-volitional[63] bodily movement working under the guidance of the AIDA formula and under Lakoff's and Kövecses metonymic umbrella of PHYSIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF EMOTIONS STAND FOR EMOTION.

On one extreme, the VALUE metaphor is motivated by the GRABBING metonymy, owing to positive attributes of the advertized object meant to entice consumers towards possessing it at all costs. Such qualities can either be verbalized using attributive adjectives like exquisite, exemplary or wonderful. Alternatively, certain conceptual representations or pictorial metaphors can be utilized in selling the same idea. For example, the image of lions could signify bravery or a picture of a raging storm could sell the image of calamity or destructiveness. Under the guidance of THE DESIRED OBJECT IS A VALUABLE OBJECT, the advertiser's goal is only to sell positive values associated with object, while concurrently filtering negativity that could be linked with the concept, via a process known as muting[64].

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63 Ungerer (2003) provides numerous examples of physiological metonymies using three broad categories. There are nonvolitional metonymies for example the release of sweat or moist hands, metonymically standing for FEAR, changes in skin colour- as in turning red for ANGER. The semi-volitional ones that are characteristic of movements such as jumping up and down, to stand for JOY, hugging and kissing would stand for LOVE. And borderline cases for instance interference with one's abilities for instance inability to speak would stand in for LOVE.

64 Ungerer (2003: 329) defines muting as the imposition of artificial mapping constraints on an innovative metaphor.

A simplified framework on which the VALUE metaphor and the GRABBING metonymy work as shown in the following diagram.

Metaphor: THE DESIRED OBJECT IS A VALUABLE OBJECT

motivates   activates

Metonymy: GRABBING THE DESIRED OBJECT STANDS FOR DESIRE

Source: Ungerer (2003: 325)

On the other extreme, the INTEREST metaphor hosts a continuum of VALUE metaphors and SHOCK metaphors sketched in *Figure 23*. They are geared towards using linguistic tools to captivate the consumer's attention guided by the conceptual metaphor THE DESIRED OBJECT IS AN INTERESTING OBJECT and is worth grabbing.

VALUE metaphors   THE DESIRED OBJECT IS A GOOD OBJECT
                  THE DESIRED OBJECT IS BEAUTIFUL
                  THE DESIRED OBJECT IS A FAMOUS OBJECT
                  THE DESIRED OBJECT IS A FAST OBJECT
                  THE DESIRED OBJECT IS A NEW OBJECT

SHOCK metaphors

                  THE DESIRED OBJECT IS STRANGE
                  THE DESIRED OBJECT IS EXOTIC
                  THE DESIRED OBJECT IS MYSTIFYING
                  THE DESIRED OBJECT IS SHOCKING
                  THE DESIRED OBJECT IS REVOLTING

Figure 23: Types of INTEREST metaphors used in advertising   Source: Ungerer (2003: 326)

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Ungerer notes that most advertisers have taken the advertising notch higher by resorting to using shocking and even revolting images when marketing their products. He gives the example of an advertisement of a cleaning detergent, that uses the picture of a hurricane against the background of a verbal message : *No chance for dirt. Our new CLEANER has the strength of a hurricane,* as a shocking pictorial metaphor, to market the aforementioned product. Ungerer (2003: 327) clearly asserts that

The difficulty is that strange, mystifying and revolting source domains, may provide more powerful metaphors in terms of attention-grabbing but this does not automatically raise the potential to activate the GRABBING metonymy. As we travel along the scale of innocuous VALUE metaphor towards more powerful but also less acceptable variants of INTEREST metaphor, it becomes increasingly clear that we are less and less inclined to grab the object quickly supported by these metaphors.

To remedy this situation muting takes place as a measure for downtoning shocking aspects of the advertisement. Ungerer practically demonstrates the working operations of the GRABBING metonymy, the VALUE and INTEREST metaphors, in collaboration with other conceptual metaphors and metonymies in the Volkswagen (VW) Passat advertisement in *Figure 24*.

Figure 24: VW Passat advertisement
Source: Ungerer (2003: 330-331)

In this advertisement, on the right hand side we have the picture of the VW Passat being scrutinized by four men and a woman in laboratory coats. This image clearly suggests that the Passat is an object of scientific investigation, within the source domain of a LABORATORY CHECK. In Ungerer's opinion, the source domain is a variant of the INTEREST metaphor, by advocating that THE DESIRED OBJECT IS A STRANGE OBJECT. When such an image is juxtaposed with a simplistic one having a car minus people in lab-coats, the latter lacks the potential of being attention-grabbing as the former. Given that some people might have preference for simplistic images of manageable cars and would be uncomfortable with the LABORATORY CHECK or complex scientific procedures, muting strategies are applicable in the advertisement to filter out unwanted scientific connotations. This is signalled by the presence of the label Obsession (given prominence by a larger font size), that serves as a renown brand for a Volkswagen company, to correspond to the PRODUCER FOR THE PRODUCT metonymy. The potentially rich source domain of the scientific investigation metaphor is muted and reduced to positive aspects of undivided attention and care channelled towards the car's production. Supporting comments for these attributive adjectives written in small print as in *attention* (Volkswagen's designers gave the Passat seven years of undivided attention) *and reliability* (eleven year warranty), further the VALUE metaphor in this case THE CAR IS PEOPLE AND FAMILY, that supports the target domain, is explicitly captured by verbal expressions such as "...Passat. For man and a woman. And the kids, if they have got any...So it was probably the finest family car in the world. In employing constructions such as... *the look of it* ... and... *the feel of it*... further downtones the scientificness of the INTEREST metaphor. A closer examination of the metonymic use of Obsession and laboratories reveals that Obsession is a brand name for a reputable perfume, while laboratories also stand for the Garnier Laboratories known for dealing with a range of designer perfumes. The two brands therefore serve as potential sources for the VALUE metaphor that will automatically activate the GRABBING metonymy, given that reputable brand names add credibility in the marketing of the Passat. Ungerer captures the intricate web of muted metaphors and metonymies in the Passat advertisement, as shown in *Figure 25*.

Metaphor

PASSAT IS A STRANGE OBJECT
THE PASSAT IS AN OBJECT OF SCIENTIFIC
INVESTIGATION
by Volkswagen laboratories

⎡ Muting
  Obsession
⎣ Attention ⎦

THE PASSAT IS A POSITIVE OBJECT

Additional

Metaphor:

LABORATORIES

STAND FOR

GARNIER

THE PASSAT
IS PEOPLE
AND FAMILY

⎡ GARNIER
  OBSESSION ⎦

STAND FOR

PERFUME

the look   **motivates**   **activates**   STAND FOR

the feel (of the car)

PERFUME IS A GOOD OBJECT

additional activation

Metonymy: GRABBING THE VW PASSAT STANDS FOR DESIRE

Figure 25: Metaphors and metonymies of the VW Passat advertisement
Source: Ungerer (2003: 338)

What Ungerer (2003) has demonstrated in the role on metaphors and metonymy in advertising is not strange (cf. Kövecses, 2006). In fact, Croft & Cruse (2004: 218) and Evans & Green (2006) have otherwise christened the metaphor and metonymy association as metaphonymy. This means both tropes are recruited in the construal of an interpretation of phenomenon and at times depict indeterminacies. As the two tropes work concurrently in advertisements, scholars have been engaged in heated debates with some arguing that metonymy is more fundamental than the metaphor in human cognition. Others have remained adamant and supported metaphors as the basis of human cognition. To understand metaphonymy, Evans & Green (2006: 319) suggest that there are two ways for looking at the phenomenon, the first one could be the case of a metaphor emerging from metonymy. Consider the expression *closed-lipped,* Evans & Green (*ibid*) argue that being *closed-lipped*, *tight lipped* or *silent* is

metonymic-based with regards to one's lips being sealed and the inability to talk about an issue, metonymically stands for silence. Likewise, the same expression metaphorically suggests that "one is economical with information" with the mouth's closure being construed as a sealed container containing words that ideally should be expressed, thus the absence of information is equated to being silent. The second way of explaining metaphonymy is by having metonymy within a metaphor as in (92)

(92) She caught the Prime Minister's ear and persuaded him to accept her plan.

(adapted from Evans & Green, 2006: 320)

In (92), the underlying conceptual metaphor is ATTENTION IS A MOVING PHYSICAL ENTITY, as it has to be "caught" by the minister's ear. Also integrated within this metaphor is the metonymy EAR FOR ATTENTION, where the ear constitutes a human body part, functioning as the base of the target domain for ATTENTION. The examples demonstrate the overlapping roles of metaphors and metonymies. On the strength of the analysis done on metaphors and metonymy in advertising, such an analysis will be pertinent to our study which focuses on how behaviour change communicators sell or market valuable ideas on HIV and AIDS to various target audiences. An examination of varied reactions by addressees towards shocking AIDS posters in terms of explicit imageries alongside muting strategies adopted by advertisers muting strategies will be presented in sections 5.7.8 and 5.7.8.1 in chapter 5.

In general, Lakoff demonstrates the vital role metaphors play in conceptualization and understanding of both physical and cultural phenomenon as registered in our cultural expressions and reflected in our cognitivist categorization of phenomenon. He acknowledges that although we talk of the universality of metaphors, they are not devoid of cultural differences. Let us take Lakoff's hypothetical example of a ball positioned between us and a rock. English speakers would claim that the ball is in front of the rock, which is inapplicable among the Hausa whose spatial orientation has the rock behind the ball and not in front of the rock (cf. Lakoff, 2003). As Lakoff talks about metaphorical variation in passing, Kövecses, discusses the cultural perspective of metaphorical variations by arguing that it is an indicator of cultural diversity. The reasons for their occurrence are varied, nonetheless we will sample a few so as to present a rough idea of the causative agents of metaphorical variation. The reasons given by Kövecses are the

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following: one most metaphors are generic and some languages can have metaphors at the specific level which might be inapplicable to other languages. For instance, Chinese has the expression HAPPINESS IS HAVING FLOWERS IN THE HEART, alongside generic metaphors HAPPINESS IS UP or HAPPINESS IS LIGHT, whereas, English lacks the specific counterpart of HAPPINESS IS HAVING FLOWERS IN THE HEART. Two, there are languages having culture-specific metaphors and therefore exercise ownership over them. Three, there could be metaphoric expressions which appear similar, yet they communicate different target domains or literal senses. Four, social issues such as gender can influence usage of metaphors, taking the case of endearment terms, women are referred to as chick, cookie and bunny, under the guidance of the following conventional metaphors WOMEN ARE BIRDS, WOMEN ARE SWEET FOOD or WOMEN ARE FURRY ANIMALS respectively, while the French use a gender neutral expression *mon lapin* (my bunny) as an endearment term for both the female and male gender. Surprisingly, it is extremely rare to find men being referred by the above terms. Five, historical reasons and also personal history can influence the kind of metaphors writers use in their writings. Kövecses quotes work done by his student on some American and Hungarian metaphors. Among Hungarians, life is conceptualized in terms of war which stems from their war-related historical past, hence to Hungarians, life construed as a continuous struggle for survival. Attempts at finding a similar metaphor in American English will be fruitless. Even aspects related to migration influence metaphorical variations in language, Kövecses quotes Dirven (1994) who pointed out that the Dutch spoken in South Africa (Afrikaans) has acquired metaphors coined around the environment and animals, which is uncharacteristic of the Dutch spoken in Europe. Six, intercultural variations in metaphors can be caused by sub-cultures where a particular group coins metaphors to describe their in-group situation. An example is the case of depressed persons as opposed to undepressed persons, would view their status using metaphors like DEPRESSION IS DARKNESS, DEPRESSION IS HEAVY or DEPRESSION IS DESCENT, in the following linguistic metaphors *Life is so unbearable, there is no light at the end of this tunnel*, *she is burdened by many thoughts* and *Sandra has been down following Tom's death, I wonder whether she will come out of it*. From our lengthy discussion, we have just sketched a general picture of what causes metaphoric variation from Kövecses perspective. Generally in this section, we have tried to buttress Lakoff's input on metaphors by complementing his views with Kövecses.

4.6. SAM GLUCKSBERG

Glucksberg (2001) contends that numerous definitions have been assigned to metaphors from various fields starting from literature, cognitive linguistics and rhetorics. Despite these definitions, it is possible to have an area of convergence supporting two schools of metaphorical thought. The first definition, construes the metaphor as a figure of speech which a name or a descriptive word or a phrase is transferred to an object or an action different from but analogous to that which is literally applicable. In the second definition, a metaphor is perceived as a conceptual representation of an abstract concept or thing. The latter happens to be a view espoused by relevance theorists such as Dan Sperber, Deirdre Wilson and Robyn Carston. More so, Glucksberg summarizes functions of metaphors as expressions having a communicative function and for registering conceptual representations.

Glucksberg raises various issues touching on the substitution theory of metaphors, the atrocities surrounding the literal and figurative distinctions, Ortony's notion of reversed metaphors, the pitfalls of Lakoffian Conceptual Metaphor Theory, and the correlation between idioms and metaphors. Going systematically in highlighting the major tenets of the mentioned issues beginning with the substitution theory, Glucksberg revisits the quadripartite Aristotelian categorization of metaphors using the genus for genus, genus for species or species for genus and analogy. The genus for genus is dichotomized into nominal metaphors and predicative metaphors. The nominal metaphors are designed to employ nouns compounds, whereas predicative ones opt for verbs, like in the case of constructions such as *Some lawyers are sharks* and *The guard dog flew across the backyard* respectively. Here, the vehicles *sharks* and *flew*, serve as substitutes for an unknown concept. This according to Glucksberg is unsatisfactorily explained by the substitution theory. Put differently, it is unclear what both *sharks* and the verb *flew* are substituting in their respective contexts. The only way out of this quagmire is to embrace Rosch (1978) principle of categorization in accounting for metaphor comprehension. Taking the allegation that *my lawyer is a shark* example, it automatically engages one's mental capacities in accessing the literal notion of a *shark* as a marine creature having the following features: vicious, predatory, aggressive, tenacious, can swim, has fins, has sharp teeth, has leathery skin and has gills. Alongside this understanding, the metaphorical shark has relatively fewer features notably; vicious, predatory, aggressive and tenacious, sliced from its literal or primary meaning. (We have added this line for Glucksberg hardly mentions the fact that the metaphorical shark's features are a sub-set of category of

an abstract category *shark*). Moreover, there is some hierarchical structure behind the abstract concept shark abiding to the following parameters: the tiger shark being more specific occupies the subordinate level, shark is assigned the basic level, while at the superordinate level we have features like predatory, vicious, tenacious among others. Therefore, likening my lawyer to sharks places the topic (lawyer) on the same basic level as sharks. However, in uttering the construction above, focus is shifted to the superordinate level where a shark's attributes such as ferocious and predatory are defined. The same applies to the verb *fly*[65], as creation of abstract categories is on the fly, or online as relevance theorists would argue. Glucksberg's notion of species for genus or genus for species is the domain accounting for either specification, generalization or even metonymy. Specifications or generalizations are inevitable since the speaker is adhering to the Gricean principle of cooperativeness while striving to be informative, specific and relevant. Glucksberg (2001: 5) argues when requesting for change for a bottle of soda, specificity will be evident if one requests for a 1989 quarter. Alternatively, asking for a coin is a generalization. One will only be specific by stating whether a nickel or a dime will be sufficient for the machine. Metonymies are categorized behind such substitutions which is possible only through the principle of association between one concept and an intended referent within a specific conceptual domain. Glucksberg opines that metonymies are culturally established characterizations of concepts.

The second issue raised by Glucksberg revolves around the contentious issue of non-literal and literal distinction. His concern is that the traditional definition of literal language is suspect, in the thesis that literal meanings are unambiguous, rational and context independent. To set the record straight, Glucksberg uses the case of the connective *and* and the adjective *good* as cases in point on how literal meanings cannot be tied to such definitions. Let us consider examples in (93) and (94)

(93a) Do that one time and I'll smack you. (if- then relation)
(93b) Mark is a genius and there are twenty inches in a foot. (a sarcastic denial of Mark's genius status)

For the adjective *good.*

(94a) He got a good whipping for being late. (Here *good* conveys the sense of painful).

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65 The hierarchy of the verb *flying* could adhere to the following pattern, *fast flying* or *slow flying* could be at the subordinate level, the basic level will be occupied by the verb *flying*, then the superordinate category, will have the attributive category of fast moving objects, agility just to mention a few.

(94b) Harry Truman was a good president. (Here *good* expresses positive values of Harry Truman as being efficient, honest and so forth).

(94c) Hannibal Lecter was more than just a good villain. (In this case, senses conveyed by *good* are ruthlessness, viciousness and terrifying)

<div align="center">(adapted from Glucksberg, 2001: 13-14)</div>

As Glucksberg demonstrates the context dependent nature of literal language, he equally adds that the literal-figurative distinction is not an easy nut to crack. And taking cue from Wittgenstein's game theory notion where the concept GAME lacks rigid boundaries and cannot be tied to the thesis of necessary and sufficient conditions to meet the qualifications of a game. Glucksberg (2001: 15) treats the literal-metaphor distinction case as analogous to that of natural concepts, using the expression *He is literally glued to his TV set*. From a figurative perspective, the said person is not literally glued to the TV set, but rather he is so much engrossed with the TV program, to assume a state of immobility. Intuitively, we are tempted to treat this expression as literal regardless of its metaphorical structure. This is typical of the intricate relationship between literal and figurative language. At this stage, what is demanded is keenness in the justification of how one treats an utterance as a figurative expression or literal expression.

On the third issue touching on Ortony's (1979) modest proposal on reversed metaphors, Glucksberg blatantly dismisses this line of thought, by arguing that class-inclusion cannot sustain reversibility of metaphors. To bring the point closer at home, he even tests the applicability of reversed metaphors using reversed literal expressions as in the case of *trees are plants* versus *plants are trees*. The former expression is logical given that trees as a superordinate category includes plants. It is not only absurd but ridiculous to have a construction alluding that plants are trees. Likewise, the same is applicable to non-literal expressions like *some sermons are like sleeping pills* versus *some sleeping pills are like sermons*. It is in extremely rare cases that reversibility is tolerable but with some dose of anomality. A case in point is the expression *my surgeon is a butcher* (to suggest incompetence and irresponsibility) while *My butcher is a surgeon* (advocates for competence).

The fourth issue addressed by Glucksberg, points a finger at the pitfalls of Lakoffian Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT), more specifically, in his acknowledgement that CMT has laid the solid

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foundation on the conceptualization on abstract concepts, through cross-domain mapping. The bone of contention here is that Glucksberg accuses Lakoff of having eclipsed literal aspects of language in his skewed focus on non-literal language. In our opinion, the Lakoffian approach was to serve as an input on the role of metaphors in our daily discourse by capturing our embodied experiences creatively manifested in language. Moreover, what Lakoff strived to do was to concentrate on an unventured area by linguists.

The last issue, Glucksberg dwells on regards idioms and metaphors, he outlines similarities between the two tropes as culturally fixed expressions. Naturally, the tropes are bound to trigger cases of miscomprehension especially if one is ignorant of cultural aspects. In his own terminology, "...idioms, metaphors and many fixed expressions reflect social norms and beliefs. To learn a culture's idioms and other fixed expressions is to immense oneself in that culture (p. 89)...". The four categories of idioms outlined by Glucksberg are namely: non compositional idioms, compositional transparent idioms, compositional opaque idioms and quasi-metaphorical idioms. For starters, non-compositional idioms have meanings which at face value are underivable from their constituents. For example, an idiomatic expression like *by and large*. Second, there are compositional transparent idioms as in the case of *spill the beans*, whereby the outright display of beans, previously hidden in some unspecified locality is overtly done. Thus relating this scenario to an act of disclosing someone's treasured secrets. Third, there are compositional opaque idioms like *kick the bucket*. At the surface level, one has no problem with the verb *kick* and the noun *bucket*. Problems emerge when the two components combined in an idiomatic expression, *kick the bucket*. In such a context, it can be challenging for a second language learner of English to understand its idiomatic meaning of *dying*. And fourth, the case of quasi-metaphorical idioms an expression such as *you are skating on thin ice*, is prototypical of risky situations, which to a great extent are metaphorical. Glucksberg has made provision for an extensive literature on idioms, which extends beyond the scope of our work. By including an idiomatic component, we are mainly interested in illuminating the points of convergence and divergence between idioms and metaphors, which is in line with what we have so far observed with similes, analogies and metonymy.

4.7 THE RELEVANCE THEORETICAL APPROACH TO METAPHOR AND IRONY

In chapter one, we discussed the relevance theoretical framework in subsection *1.6.3.2* and equally in the schema in *Figure 6*. In that section, we presented the relevance theoretical approach to the comprehension of metaphors, ironies, hyperboles and similes. To avoid unnecessary duplication of material, we will briefly revisit the question of metaphors and equally reinforce the literature on irony which has been neglected in our reviewed literature.

In matters relating to figurative and literal usage of language, relevance theorists maintain that there is no much difference between literal and non-literal language. Put differently, they are essentially understood the same way. Literal sentences and their non-literal counterparts normally commit their addressees to some level of truths whenever uttered. Utterances such as in (95) and (96)

(95) Mary speaking to Paul: The car is in the garage.
(96a) From mother to child: You are a piglet.   (adapted from Sperber & Wilson, 1986b: 540-541)

On the literal expression in (95), Mary wants to share her true beliefs with Paul regarding the car's locality, which is currently packed in the garage. Under the guidance of the maxim of truthfulness, the utterance comprises a proposition and propositional attitude that Mary intends to share with Paul. Based on Mary's linguistic evidence or uttered expression, Paul will then automatically adopt the propositional attitude expressed by Mary's utterance, which is Mary's intention. On the non-literal expression in (96a), the mother by labelling her child a piglet using a metaphorical construction, is also expressing some truth, not immediately realized in the literal expression. What this means in simpler terms, is that the utterance interpretively resembles another similar literal expression on the basis of sharing similar logical and analytic implications as in (96b)

(96b) You are a dirty child.   (adapted from Sperber & Wilson, 1986b: 541)

The simple logic behind the metaphorical utterance (96a), and its interpretation in (96b), is that they are two public representations having the same propositional content. This spills over to the fact that they are sharing the same analytic and contextual implicatures. What is specifically meant here is that it is

all a matter of the child identifying a subset of logical implications or features that he faithfully shares with a piglet, which in this case happens to be dirtiness. Other features such as playfulness, staying in a pigsty or assumptions that the child's parent is a pig, must be ignored at this stage. Further the cognitive expenditure in processing such a creative metaphor, will be costly in terms of additional processing efforts in the derivation of its contextual implicatures. In brief, both literal and non-literal expressions subscribe to truth-conditional semantics as some level of truth is maintained in utterances. Seemingly, this is the reason why relevance theorists, do not regard non-literal constructions as defying the maxim of quality as proposed by Grice. This is because it is possible to argue that even in the supposedly literal constructions such as in (97) where the concept of truth is partially respected.

(97) *Mary lives in Issy-les-Moulineaux, a block away from the city limits of Paris. At a party in London she meets Peter. He asks her where she lives and she answers,* I live in Paris.
(adapted from Sperber & Wilson, 1986b: 545)

At a literal level, Mary's answer stands to be termed as false for Mary's actual residence is in Issy-les-Moulineaux and not in Paris. However, thanks to approximation or the proximity between the two areas, Peter is able to infer some amount of information as Mary is conversant with the Parisian environs or Mary is an urbanite. The utterance's relevance is unquestionable for Peter's assumptions captures Mary's intention as conveyed by the utterance in (97). The logic behind loose talk characteristic of many tropes is similar to the Wittgenstein concept of GAME where inasmuch as we are conscious of predefined conceptual boundaries, we still look outside the box to accommodate concepts outside these rigid boundaries to classify dissimilar concepts within a single category.

On the issue of irony, relevance theorists unlike Grice subscribe to the view that irony do not arise as a result of the breaching of the maxim of quality, which says "Do not say what you believe to be false" But rather, they are about respecting the maxim of truthfulness, where an utterance can be used to represent or metarepresent another utterance or thought as in the case of irony. According to Sperber & Wilson (1981) and Wilson & Sperber (1992), the traditional conceptualization of irony erroneously construed in its assertation that irony is the opposite of what is said. In traditional accounts of verbal irony, more particularly within the field of rhetoric, irony was classified as a trope having a figurative meaning that is converse of the literal meaning. This line of argument has been found wanting by

relevance theorists who have otherwise recommended for its revision. Moreover, Wilson & Sperber (1992) and Wilson (2006b) remain unconvinced with the Gricean definition of irony arguing that irony can only be understood within cooperative principle, with it being treated as a case of maxim violation. The particular maxim being violated is the quality maxim, as a speaker is accused of falsely uttering a statement contradicting the actual state of affairs. For instance, in a situation where there is a heavydown pour, asserting *what a lovely weather* in lieu of *what an awful weather* is misleading. Sperber & Wilson (1981) feel that there is need to incorporate a semantic account in the irony debate. The reason being it remains unclear as to how irony emerges? how they seem to be converse of what is said? and what parameters are used by one to move from its literal meaning to conversational implicatures in ironical constructions? Apart from these questions, ironic understatements are regarded by Grice as false, Wilson & Sperber (1992) and Wilson's (2006) answer to Grice is that they are not false but underinformative constructions as in the case in (98a, b)

(98a) Where there is a customer complaining in a shop, blind with rage and making a public exhibition of himself. I turn to you and say.
(98b) You can tell he is upset.

These statements unlike traditional ironical accounts will not be taken to state the converse of what is said. For they fail to communicate neither *You can't tell he's upset* nor *You can tell he's not upset.* A similar trail of problems is witnessed in ironical quotations and ironical interjections (cf. Wilson & Sperber, 1992: 54-56). In the light of these unresolved issues, Wilson (2006: 1723-1724) briefly summarizes the Gricean account of tropes as "simply a modern-dress variant of classical account and shares many of the same weaknesses". Apart from Grice's pragmatic account on irony, Wilson (2006b) remains unsatisfied with the Pretense Allusion Theory on irony (Coulson, 2000), which uses the Gricean "say as if or make as if" assertation as a backbone for arguments advancing irony as pretense. The theory holds that a speaker makes as if to say something, in the presence of an audience that will judge his utterance as pretense, guided by the pre-existing incongruency between the actual situation and the actual reality. Wilson's antithesis is that whenever one "makes as if" to assert a speech act, one is not in anyway liable for any maxim violation. As a matter of fact, it is inconceivable to claim that something has been uttered in such a speculative scenario. This stems from the uncertainty as to whether a speaker actually asserted something. In short, Wilson insists that pretense is not the way

forward in irony comprehension, but rather echoic allusion has more weight in explaining irony. Given that the relevance theoretical framework is within the conceptual framework of our theory, we will specifically limit our arguments to those advanced by relevance theorists in this section.

Having seen pitfalls of the Gricean account on irony, the relevance theoretical account is logically packaged with the argument that irony consists of discrepancies between an ironical situation and real life situation. Further, it involves echoic allusion of an attributed thought, which interpretively represents the meaning or content of the same thought under the use and mention paradigm. To make matters clear regarding the use-mention distinction, according to Sperber & Wilson (1981) on one hand, *use* is reference to what the expression refers to. On the other hand, *mention* involves the actual reference to an expression itself or as Wilson & Sperber (1992: 57) put it " The self-referential use of words or linguistic expressions". A case of *use* is in (99a) and mention is in (99b)

(99a) These examples are rare and marginal.
(99b) Who had the nerve to call my examples marginal?

In (99a) the term *marginal* is used in expressing doubts about the examples. Contrastively, in (99b) *marginal* had been previously mentioned by someone to dismiss one's example and now the speaker refers to this notion once again. In Sperber's & Wilson's (1981) perspective, in numerous ways, irony capitalizes on mention which is manifested in several patterns. First and foremost, there are cases where a mentioned statement is the preceding statement and indicates that an utterance has been understood as in (100a,b)

(100a) I have got a toothache.
(100b) Oh you've got a toothache. Open your mouth, and let's have a look.

There are times a mentioned statement assumes the status of a pragmatic implication and is more or less similar to the uttered statement as in (100c,d)

(100c) I am a reasonable man.
(100d) Whereas, I am not (is what you're implying).

Another case of echoic mentioning in irony can occur when the mentioned construction had been previously uttered as in (100e)

(100e) It absolutely poured. I know, it was going to rain (you told me so). I should listen to you more often.

There are times the mentioning can be located in the distant past as in (100f) where the mentioned component has a biblical reference.

(100f) Jack elbowed Bill, and Bill punched him on the nose. *He should have turned on the other cheek* (as it says in the Bible). Maybe that would have been the best thing to do.

Also, some anticipatory cases can also be a fertile ground for an echoic mention as in (100g)

(100g) You 're going to do something silly. You're free to do what you want (you'll tell me). Maybe so . But you still ought to listen to me.

In (100g) what is to be echoed is yet to be realized as signalled by the parenthesis. In brief, the above cases cover various manifestations of echoic mention. And to get a practical understanding on the working operation of irony, let us consider the utterance in (101)

(101) Mary: (After a difficult meeting) That went well. (adapted from Wilson, 2006b: 1723)

Mary is registering her disappointment that the said meeting did not go well. This is the manifestation of her true reaction or attitude towards the situation and a blatant attempt to dissociate herself from the actual scenario, where the said meeting was supposed to be productive. Mary resorts to the above utterance as an echo of previous comments mentioned by her friends prior to the said meeting. Probably, their comments must have suggested that the meeting would go on well without any hitches. Paradoxically, those positive assurances are now being echoed in a similar construction in Mary's utterance, with a mockery overtone being registered as an attitude behind such a construction. In short, Mary dissociates herself from her friends' previous statements. As an ironical statement, it is a case of

interpretive resemblance, in the sense that echoic utterances are treated as echoic interpretations of an attributed thought with specific attention on the propositional content where logical and contextual implicatures are shared by two propositions. An illustration of this is presented in the following example in (102a, b)

(102) *Mary says to Peter:*

(102a) I met an agent last night.
(102b) He can make me rich and famous.

Two possible interpretations deduced from (102a) and (102b) are (102c,d)

(102c) He can make me rich and famous, I believe. (Used descriptively in describing the state of affairs)
(102d) He can make me rich and famous he says. (An indirect speech act and an interpretive representation)

Supposing the agent actually said what is in (102e)

(102e) I can make you rich and famous.   (adapted from Wilson & Sperber, 1988: 138)

From the above examples in (102a) to (102e) it is evident that Mary's utterance to a great extent, resembles that of the agent, by virtue of sharing same contextual implications with the agent's original utterance. It is treated as a case of mention of the agent's proposition via an indirect speech act, the latter faithfully represents the agent's initial statement. (cf. Wilson, 2006b)

4.8 Conclusion

This chapter began with an outline of scholaristic thinking of metaphor in classical times with a presentation of divergent views on whether it is a linguistic reject undeserving any experimental research to positive views which embraced its significant role in human cognition as a creative

cognitive tool for tapping our embodied experiences. From our observation, a wealth of literature in cognitive linguistics, psychology and pragmatics has been dedicated towards acknowledging the role of metaphors in language and cognition. Different scholars be it linguists, or philosophers, such as Searle, Lakoff, Taverniers and Kövecses, have valid reasons for their divergent metaphor classification. Their converging points are first, they are both creative and inevitable in daily discourse. Second, they are laced with some level of truth to which some scholars have oxymorally labelled "true falsehoods". Third, they demand some level of cross domain comparisons or similarities a factor sustained by elastic conceptual boundaries. This observation has its rather primitive genesis in Aristotelian works where "one thing is given the name of another", and metaphors being "analogical comparisons," Searle reformulates Aristotle's words by confirming an utterance can "call into mind" another utterance. And to clarify Searle's statement, relevance theorists inject that it is not only utterances that can be "called into mind" but also thoughts and even objects are employed interpretively in representing another utterances, thoughts or objects. This is only possible if propositions share similar analytical and contextual implications. At this point, we would like to inject that elastic conceptual boundaries is what sustains comparability between concepts. By virtue of this fact and based on the presented evidence in this chapter, sometimes even demarcating clear cut boundaries between different tropes is a Herculean task, with metaphors at times behaving like similes, metonymy, proverbs and idioms. Fourth, distinguishing literal language from non-literal language as traditionally assumed is not easy. Furthermore, in comparison to non-literal language, there is no much difference in how a literal language is interpreted, which means there is an emerging consensus from the reviewed literature that non-literal language, just like its literal counterpart are processed in a similar way. Neither specialized mechanisms like Searle's principle-based procedures are required for metaphor comprehension, nor do metaphors flout the maxim of quality as alleged by Grice. And finally, from numerous reasons outlined by Searle, Pilkington, Sperber, Gibbs and many others, there is an unanimous agreement that metaphors remain unparaphrasable.

CHAPTER FIVE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DATA ANALYSIS FOR ELDORET TOWN RESPONDENTS AND MASENO DIVISION RESPONDENTS

5.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, DATA ANALYSIS, DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS

5.1 INTRODUCTION

This section logically examines four core areas of our research under the following headings: research design, research methodology, data collection techniques and analysis of data collected from Eldoret town respondents of Uasin Gishu County[66] in the Rift Valley Province of Kenya and Maseno Division of Kisumu County in Kenya. First and foremost, the research design adopted for our study was a cross-sectional survey of HIV negative respondents and HIV positive respondents from different Kenyan ethnic communities and of diverse socio-economic backgrounds. The cross-sectional survey enabled us undertake a comparative analysis of data drawn from respondents residing in a high prevalence region of 28% within Nyanza province[67] in Maseno Division of Kisumu County. Maseno respondents were compared with those from a relatively lower prevalence region of 12%, specifically within Eldoret town of Uasin Gishu County, in Rift Valley Province. The same research design was employed in the analysis of Kenyan AIDS posters in section 6.1. Second, the research methodology outlines data collection techniques comprising primary data and secondary data. Primary data was obtained from self-administered questionnaires to both seropositive and HIV negative respondents. Secondary data entailed an internet-based research on past and current Kenyan AIDS campaign posters designed by Kenyan Non-Governmental Organizations engaged in sensitizing Kenyans on HIV/AIDS. Sampling frames adopted for both posters and respondents are also discussed in this section. Third, as pertaining the research methodology, the research adopted a mixed methodology technique skewed towards qualitative research with quantitative techniques playing a complementary role in the analysis. Descriptive statistics and inferential with the assistance of MS Excel computerized package are used in data analysis.

5.2 Research Design

Creswell (2009) construes a research design as a research procedure that spans decisions from broad

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66 In the current Kenyan constitution, Kenya is administratively divided into 47 Counties which is a term used in place of districts.

67 The Republic of Kenya is administratively divided into 8 provinces notably: Nairobi province, Rift Valley province, Eastern province, Central province, North Eastern province, Coastal Province, and Western province. The provinces are subdivided into Counties and the latter are divided into divisions.

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
assumptions to detailed methods of data collection and analysis. As mentioned earlier in our introduction, a cross-sectional survey was used during both the administration of questionnaires and selection of Kenyan AIDS posters. Prior to the administration of our questionnaires, it was imperative for the researcher to process for a research permit (see *Appendix 22*) in early January 2010 from the Ministry of Higher Education and Technology in Nairobi. This step was necessary in obtaining official authorization from the Ministry of Higher Education and Technology, because health related issues and even more HIV and AIDS are highly sensitive in Kenya. A permit was issued in early February 2010 and photocopied versions of the same permit were sent to Uasin Gishu District Educational Officer and equally to the Kisumu District Educational Officer. The purpose was to officially inform both educational officers of our research activities in their respective Counties. This enabled us embark on data collection between the 1st February 2010 and 30th May 2010. Our respondents sample comprised married heterosexual couples and single persons who were either HIV negative or HIV positive from a high prevalence region within Maseno division in Kisumu County within Nyanza province in Kenya and compared to similar respondents in a low prevalence region in Eldoret Town of Uasin Gishu County in Rift Valley province in Kenya. The relevant sampling frames outlining selection procedures of both respondents and AIDS posters are outlined in section 5.4.

In analyzing AIDS posters, a cross-sectional survey was employed since undertaking a longitudinal survey was impractical owing to the fact that the national Kenyan body dealing with HIV and AIDS, named the National AIDS Control Council (NACC) has no archives of past Kenyan AIDS campaign posters. This unforeseen setback compelled the researcher to undertake an internet-based research by visiting websites such as the Media/Materials Clearinghouse website and other Kenyan Non Governmental Organizations' (NGOs) websites, sponsoring various AIDS campaigns, in an effort to study some of their past and ongoing AIDS campaigns. We however did not strictly limit ourselves to the number of campaigns each NGO had in their respective websites. Nonetheless, working on an assurance from the communication officer at NACC that most Kenyan AIDS campaigns are under the sponsorship of numerous partners for instance the Ministry of Health in Kenya, the Family Health International (FHI), the Population Services International (PSI), and the NACC, we were convinced that our AIDS posters sample was representative of past Kenyan AIDS posters. (see section 6.1)

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5.3.STUDY AREA

5.3.1 Eldoret Town

Map 3: Eldoret Municipality

Source: Musyoka (2007)

Geographically speaking Eldoret town is about 300 kilometers North West of Nairobi along the Trans African highway connecting Kenya to Uganda (cf. Musyoka, 2009). Eldoret is the administrative center of Uasin Gishu County found in Rift Valley province. On the administrative front, Eldoret municipality comprises 3 constituencies and has 13 wards (cf. *Map 3*). The constituencies are Eldoret North, Eldoret South and Eldoret East. Eldoret North comprises six wards notably; Eldoret North, Huruma, Kamkunji, Kapymetic, Kidiwa/Kapsuswa and Stadium/Industria estates. Eldoret East has three wards namely; Hospital, Kapsoya and Kimumu/Sergoit whereas Eldoret South hosts four wards such as Kipkenyo, Langas, Pioneer/Elgon view and Race Course. In total, the constituencies demographically host a

population of around 300,000 persons from various ethnic communities like the Kikuyu, the Kalenjin, the Kisii, the Luhyia, the Luo and inclusive of a minority of Kenyan Indians who settled in the town as early as 1908 during the precolonial construction of the Kenya-Uganda railway.

Given that our research deals with HIV and AIDS, the prevalence rate of Uasin Gishu County stands at 12% with the high risk group in Eldoret town being truck drivers. According to statistics provided by the National Coordinating Agency for Population and Development (2005a: 9-10), some pressing issues related to HIV/AIDS in the region include slow behavioral change due to strong cultural beliefs, low condom use due to ignorance of their usage with only 5% of women and 23% of men adequately using the method and low motivational of actors in addressing the HIV/AIDS pandemic.

For purposes of our study, we concentrated on a simple random sample of 28 respondents drawn from all the wards in order to have diversity in responses, with 2 respondents coming from each ward. Nonetheless, we got 4 respondents from Elgon view ward and another 4 from Kapsoya region because of proximity and respondents willingness to participate in the research which was regarded highly sensitive because AIDS is still stigmatized in several areas in Kenya. Cases of intermarriages also narrowed our chances of finding seropositive couples from the same community. Following the aftermath of the 2007 post election violence, many families separated on the basis of ethnicity. This however did not deter us from collecting data given that data was obtained from both HIV negative and HIV positive persons. *Appendix 2* shows Eldoret town respondents' sample comprising 6 single seropositive respondents each from the following communities: Kikuyu, Kisii, Luhyia, Kalenjin[68] and Luo communities; 5 single HIV negative respondents from the Kikuyu, Kalenjin, Luo, Kisii and the Luhyia communities; 7 HIV negative couples from the Luhyia, Kikuyu, Meru, Turkana, Luo, Kisii and Kalenjin communities. For seropositive married persons, we had 1 married Kikuyu respondent and 1 Luhyia couple. We centered on Eldoret town because it is predominantly a low prevalence region. This was in accordance with our research problem designed to undertake a comparative analysis of respondents from a low prevalence region *vis à vis* those from a high prevalence region to identify points of convergence or divergence in their cultural conceptualizations of AIDS and highlight cases of miscomprehension in AIDS posters.

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68 Two respondents were obtained from the Kalenjin community.

5.3.2 Maseno Division

Maseno division is located along the Kisumu-Busia highway connecting Kenya to Uganda. It is approximately 20 kilometers from Kisumu town, with the latter being the headquarters of Nyanza province in Kenya. Maseno together with other three divisions namely: Winam, Kombewa and Kadipo constitute Kisumu County (See *Map 4*). The estimated human population in Maseno division stands at approximately 69,000, with the predominant linguistic groups being the Luo and Luhyia speakers. For the purposes of this study, we specifically collected data around Maseno University, because it is not only a center of academic excellence but a melting pot of linguistic diversity of which the Luo, Luhyia, Kikuyu, Kisii and Kalenjin communities were pertinent to our study. The presence of the Turkana and Maasai speakers within Maseno division, also drew our attention and data was equally collected from respondents affiliated with the cited communities. According to Sigot (2001) and the National Coordination Agency for Population for Development (2005b) Nyanza province which hosts Kisumu County and its respective divisions is the epicenter of heightened prevalence rates in Kenya. To present an explicit picture of the magnitude of the situation, the National Coordination Agency for Population (2005b: 6) reports

All the four divisions of the district are seriously plagued by HIV/AIDS and this has had negative effects on the socio-economic development. In both rural and urban areas HIV/AIDS has caused tremendous suffering and resulted to a high number of widows and orphans and placed a heavy burden on the health care system. The prevalence rate currently stands at 28% which is one of the highest in the country.

In comparison to the prevalence rate of 12% in Uasin Gishu County covering Eldoret town, Kisumu County and its divisions is more than twice the prevalence rate of Eldoret town. Furthermore, the National Coordination Agency for Population and Development (2005b) chronicles that 35% of Kisumu County's population is HIV positive and heightened mortality rates in the region impact negatively on production. The underlying reasons for the alarming prevalence rates include: a slow-pace in behaviour change because of cultural practices like wife inheritance, low condom use due to limited information on their usage and inaccessibility of antiretrovirals to most seropositive persons. As a matter of fact, facing challenges in Maseno was inevitable owing to the stigmatization of AIDS. Some respondents outrightly refused to participate because of an erroneous assumption that we had the intention of subjecting them to an HIV test upon completion of their questionnaires. Surprisingly, such a scenario was not witnessed in Eldoret town. In summary, the significant difference in prevalence rates

is articulated in both our statement problem and in the second objective seeking to investigate whether Kenyans from different communities and in dissimilar HIV prevalence regions homogeneously comprehend AIDS posters.

Map 4: Kisumu County map (Maseno Division)

Source: http//www. Ochaoline.un.org/OchaLinkClick.aspx?link=ocha8dochd=1131494.

5.4 Sampling procedures

5.4.1 Kenyan AIDS posters sampling frame

Neuendorf (2002), Lewis-Beck, Bryman & Futing (2004), Kothari (2004) and Flick (2007a, b) construe a sample as either elements or members of a population selected for a scientific study. For Lewis-Beck, Bryman & Futing (2004), samples enable one amass a substantial amount of data, in such a way that the resulting information is representative of the population. There are several sampling frames at the researcher's disposal, our study adopted three kinds of sampling frames, notably: purposive sampling, snowball sampling and stratified sampling. First and foremost, according to Kothari (2004) and Agresti & Finlay (2009) purposive sampling otherwise known as convenience sampling or judgmental

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sampling entails deliberate selection of a representative sample from a particular population based on the researcher's personal judgment of a population. This sampling technique was applied in the selection of AIDS posters from the internet because the National AIDS Control Council has no archives of past Kenyan AIDS campaigns. We resorted to doing an internet-based research and obtained twenty one (21) AIDS posters from various websites. Most posters were obtained from the Media/Materials Clearinghouse website having a database of health communication materials and AIDS posters from numerous countries. The simple random sample entailed Kenya AIDS campaigns between 1989 and 2010, using the following criteria: four (4) Kiswahili posters were obtained from the following sources: a World AIDS campaign -Kenyan chapter poster (year unknown), a 1993 AIDS poster by the Ministry of Health and National AIDS Control Council (NACC), a 2003 Population Services International (PSI) poster on Trust condoms and a 2006 NACC AIDS poster. Eleven (11) English posters were obtained from: a 1990 Ministry of Health and NACC poster, a Kenya Red Cross AIDS poster (year unknown), two 1989 posters from Family Planning Association of Kenya, a 1989 AIDS poster by the Ministry of Health and CARE Kenya, three (3) posters with one being of 1999 and two (2) of 2000 from the Confederation of East and Central Africa football Association, a 2003 *Pamoja Tuangamize Ukimwi* campaign (Together we can defeat AIDS), a 2005 *Alive and Kicking AIDS* campaign poster, a 2009-2010 PSI *Spare Wheel* AIDS campaign poster. Three (3) posters using English and Kiswahili languages were from the 1997 *Jisimamie* campaign by the Ministry of Health, Jisimamie, Belgian Administration for Development and NASCOP. Two (2) posters written in *Sheng*' for instance the 2004-2005 PSI *Nimechill* campaign and the 2010 *G-pange* campaign supported by Partnership for an HIV Free Generation and other stakeholders. And finally, one (1) 2010 poster using English, Kiswahili and *Sheng*' designed by LVCT Care and Treatment, Ministry of Public Health and Sanitation and the National AIDS and STI Control Programme (NASCOP).

5.4.2 Respondents sampling frame

For HIV negative respondents and HIV positive respondents, two different sampling frames were adopted. First, a stratified sampling frame was exclusively used for HIV negative respondents, predominantly drawn from the Kikuyu, Luo, Kisii, Kalenjin, and Luhyia communities. We also considered other communities such as the Meru, Turkana and Maasai communities to have a sample of 61 respondents. In section 5.3.1, we have already outlined the composition of Eldoret Town's

respondents 28 respondents, besides the Eldoret Town respondents, another 33 respondents drawn from Maseno division comprised 7 HIV negative single persons from the Luhyia, Kisii, Maasai, Luo, Meru, Kikuyu, and Kalenjin communities, 6 HIV negative couples from the Turkana, Kikuyu, Kisii, Kalenjin, Luo and Luhyia communities, 3 HIV positive single persons from the Kalenjin, Kikuyu and Luhyia communities (2 female and 1 male respondents) and 11 HIV positive married persons from the following communities; 1 Luo couple, 1 married Luo lady, 1 Kikuyu couple, 1 Kalenjin couple and 2 Luhyia couples.

Second, for HIV positive respondents, we were compelled to use a third type of sampling known as snowball sampling, where a respondent introduced the researcher to another seropositive respondent. The necessity of a snowball sampling frame was because of the AIDS-related stigma. Therefore, the snowball sampling frame made data collection easier among seropositive persons following the introduction by another seropositive.

5.5 Research Instruments
5.5.1 Primary Sources- Questionnaires

In the present research, two research instruments were relevant for data collection of primary data and secondary data. Primary data was obtained through mixed open-ended and close-ended questionnaires as in *Appendix 1*. Lewis-Beck, Bryman & Futing (2004) contend that questionnaires are instruments used in measuring a phenomenon. When dealing with such a questionnaire, Creswell (2009) argues that qualitative and quantitative techniques complement each other. We nonetheless want to stress that our research is skewed towards qualitative research as opposed to quantitative research.

5.5.2 Secondary data on AIDS posters

Lewis-Beck, Bryman & Futing (2004), perceive secondary data as a re-examination of one or more existing qualitative data for instance documented literature, newspapers and previous research articles. In this study, a re-examination of previous and current Kenyan AIDS campaigns posters was necessary. The analysis was done using insights from our conceptual framework of the Relevance Theory, Idealized Cognitive Models and the Blending Theory. We also employed Ungerer's (2003)

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metaphorical and metonymic analysis of advertisements in section 4.5. For the headline messages in AIDS posters, we used the relevance theoretical approach in establishing which speech act does the message subscribe to, for instance, the asking whether, telling and saying that speech acts. Aspects related to the poster's implicitness and explicitness using lexico-pragmatic processes and pragmatic inferences were also used in enriching incomplete propositional radicals.

5.6 Data Analysis

Our study was premised on a mixed method[69] approach, which according to Creswell (2009) combines qualitative[70] and quantitative techniques, which complement one another. It simply means that the first phase entailed qualitative data collection and analysis, and then proceeded by a quantitative analysis to complement the qualitative analysis. In Creswell's (2009) perspective some merits of this technique are its utility in explaining and interpreting relationships within a phenomenon and also research findings from such a technique can be generalized. At this point, we want to stress that for quantitative aspects of our study, using descriptive statistics and inferential statistics using MS Excel was essential in the analysis.

5.7 Research Findings from Eldoret Town respondents and Maseno Division respondents

This section presents research findings emerging from the analysis of questionnaires (see *Appendix 1*) distributed among Eldoret town respondents and Maseno division respondents, with the aim of identifying consistencies and inconsistencies in our research findings.

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69 Creswell (2009) stipulates that mixed methods began as early as in 1959 when two scholars used the methodology in studying validity of psychological traits. And taking cue from their studies other scholars subsequently borrowed the methodology.

70 Qualitative research is a naturalistic approach to phenomenon, and is a means of exploring and understanding man's experiences. The process involves emerging questions and procedures; collecting data in the participants setting, analyzing data inductively, building from particular themes to general ones, and making interpretations of the meaning of the data by writing a report. Quantitative techniques entail using statistical methods in testing objective theories by examining relationships between variables. The variables can be measured using instruments such as questionnaires to be subjected to statistical analysis. (Creswell, 2009)

5.7.1 Language acquisition order, level of education, AIDS awareness and recallability of AIDS messages

This section is based on research findings emerging from the first five questions posed to both Eldoret Town and Maseno division respondents. To begin with, they were asked to state their respective order of acquisition of the English and Kiswahili languages (see *Appendicies 3* and *15*). Then, they were to state whether they had previously heard of AIDS. Further, the respondents were to cite sources from which they learnt about AIDS. Besides this, respondents were to state whether they were conversant with any AIDS slogans. And lastly, respondents were expected to list at least three Kenyan AIDS posters. In asking the series of outlined questions, there were several issues under investigation, for example what is the correlation between order of languages acquired and miscomprehension of AIDS messages? or what types of AIDS messages did respondents easily recall? and is there any pragmatic explanation for their miscomprehension of AIDS messages and their recallability of AIDS messages?. The findings related to the outlined questions and using data in *Appendicies 4*, *11 and 12*, yielded the following results shown in *Tables 4* and *5*.

Table 4: Sources of information on AIDS and AIDS awareness among Eldoret Town respondents and Maseno Division respondents

INFORMATION	No. OF RESPONDENTS	PERCENTAGE
1. Eldoret Town respondents		
(A) AIDS AWARENESS	28	100%
(B) SOURCES OF AIDS MESSAGES		
(i) Media	25	89%
(ii) Posters	24	86%
(iii) Health Institutions	14	50%
(iv) Others	4	14%
(C) KNOWLEDGE OF AIDS POSTERS	28	100%
2. Maseno Division respondents		
(A) AIDS AWARENESS	33	100%
(B) SOURCES OF AIDS MESSAGES		
(i) Media	27	82%
(ii) Posters	22	67%
(iii) Health Institutions	18	55%
(iv) Other sources	6	18%
(C) KNOWLEDGE OF AIDS POSTERS	33	100%

From the data outlined in *Table 4* obtained from a sample of 28 Eldoret town respondents, the following issues can be deduced; first and foremost, sources from which AIDS is largely heard from is the media with 89% of respondents mentioning it, closely followed by 86% who stated that they acquired information on AIDS from posters. 50% said that they learnt of AIDS from health institutions. Another category representing 14% cited talks on AIDS with their peers or an educative AIDS forum as potential sources for learning about AIDS. From these sources of information, one hundred percent (100%) of the respondents said that they were aware of AIDS as shown in both *Table 4* and *Appendix 2* data. This means that for respondents, AIDS awareness is predominantly propagated by the media and AIDS posters, while health institutions and other channels such as peer education on AIDS are secondary ways of propagating AIDS messages. Apparently, a similar trend was observed among Maseno division respondents, whereby 100% of the respondents were knowledgeable about AIDS. The

sources from which respondents obtain information on AIDS include: the media (82%), posters (67%), health institutions (55%), another (18%) mentioned personal experience as an informative source on AIDS. These results correspond with those obtained from Eldoret town respondents, where most respondents chronologically cited the media, posters, health institutions and other sources as potential sources of relevant information on HIV and AIDS. It cannot be overemphasized that the media and posters as ecological factors are overshadowing health institutions in propagating informative aspects on HIV and AIDS. It is a pointer that respondents heavily rely on the media and AIDS posters as ecological factors (cf. Sperber, 1996, section 1.6.3.3) that propagate informative aspects on AIDS and HIV, as opposed to health institutions and peer groups.

5.7.2 Recallability of AIDS messages and pragmatic ellipsis of recalled messages

Having taken note of the fact that all respondents in *Table 4*, affirmed that they were conversant with AIDS posters, the data in this sub-section presents the average number of AIDS slogans recalled by respondents given that they were expected to mention at least three slogans. It further shows frequencies of the most recalled AIDS message in posters. The section also provides a logical explanation for the occurrence of pragmatic ellipsis in recalled AIDS posters by respondents.

On memorability of AIDS slogans, *Table 5* outlines the frequency distribution of recalled posters by Eldoret town respondents who were expected to cite atleast 3 Kenyan AIDS posters. It was observed that some messages mentioned by respondents were either paraphrases or one message was split into two, for instance one unmarried female Kikuyu respondent, who was HIV positive, cited *Pamoja tuangamize ukimwi* in Poster IV (Together we can defeat AIDS slogan) in section 5.7.4 and its variant *Tunaweza pamoja kuangamiza ukimwi* (We can all defeat AIDS), and also *Ukimwi unauwa* (AIDS kills) as three messages. In our perspective, we regarded the first two as one AIDS slogan. In a different case, an unmarried male Luo respondent, who was HIV positive split one message namely; *Do not be fooled. AIDS is witchcraft. AIDS is real. Avoid sex before marriage. Stick to one partner or use a condom,* into *stick to one partner* and *use a condom* (see *Appendix 21*). In such a scenario, we still treated the same message as a single message. Generally, 100% of the respondents gave an overwhelming yes on being knowledgeable about Kenyan posters. However, contrary to our expectation that they would atleast mention three Kenyan AIDS posters, the results in *Table 5* give

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insights on frequencies of recalled posters among Eldoret Town respondents and Maseno division respondents respectively.

Table 5: Frequency distribution of recalled posters among Eldoret Town respondents and Maseno Division respondents

RESPONDENTS	NO POSTER RECALLED	ONE POSTER RECALLED	TWO POSTERS RECALLED	THREE POSTERS RECALLED	TOTAL RECALLED POSTERS
1.Eldoret Town respondents	2	9	12	5	28
2. Maseno Division respondents	3	11	15	4	33
Total					**61**

X^2=1.079, df=3 ,p>0.05

To begin with the data on *Table 5*, what is surprising is that although most Eldoret town respondents had a 100% awareness of AIDS posters in Kenya, 2 respondents were unable to recall an AIDS poster, 9 respondents recalled one AIDS poster, 12 recalled at least two AIDS posters, while 5 were capable of recalling three messages. A closer look at data obtained from Maseno division respondents equally reveals that 3 respondents were unable to recall an AIDS poster, 11 respondents recalled one AIDS poster, 15 respondents recalled two posters while 4 respondents recalled the required three AIDS posters. From the data, it is crystal clear that most respondents from both regions were able to recall an average of two posters. This is rather surprising considering that many AIDS posters have been used in past AIDS campaigns and respondents are only able to retain two posters instead of three. Moreover, it is even shocking that some respondents found in both a high prevalence region (Maseno division) and a low prevalence region (Eldoret Town) were unable to recall any AIDS poster. This is an indicator that there exists a certain percentage of the Kenyan population that is indifferent towards AIDS campaigns and are unmotivated to retain informative aspects of AIDS messages. Based on our chi-test analysis of the data that revealed χ^2 =1.079, df=3 and p>0.05, enable us affirm that there was no statistically significant results from the two regions that could sustain the hypothesis that the regional differences played a role in determining the number of posters recalled by the respondents.To be able to account for the recallability of AIDS posters, there is need to examine the data and discussions on *Table 6*,

which focus on identifying the most recalled message and equally give reasons for its memorability from a pragmatic viewpoint as presented in *Tables 6* and *7*.

Table 6: Frequency distribution of the most memorable AIDS messages among Eldoret Town respondents

MOST MEMORABLE MESSAGES	FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF 57 RECALLED SLOGANS AND %	
1. AIDS kills plus its variants such as AIDS is a killer disease or its Kiswahili variant Ukimwi inauwa (The message's explicit form is, *AIDS kills. There is still no cure*) See *Poster 11* in section 6.2)	14	26%
2. Pamoja tujiunge kuangamiza ukimwi (*Together we can defeat AIDS*, see the campaign logo of posters III and IV in section 5.7.4)	6	11%
3. Tumechill (The explicit form of the message is *Sex? Not now, tume-chill. We know what the consequences are. Ni poa ku chill.* (English Translation: Sex? Not now, we are abstaining, we know what the consequences are. It is good to abstain) (see Poster II and *Poster 24* in sections 5.7.4 and 6.2.1.4 respectively)	5	9%
4. A real man waits (The explicit form of the message is *A real man wont be pushed by his friends to engage in sex. A real man waits,* see *Poster 1* in section 1.6.3.4)	2	3.05%

In our comprehension of data presented in *Table 6*, Eldoret town respondents easily recalled certain posters than others. They also had a tendency of recalling propositional radicals of AIDS posters instead of their explicit forms, seemingly the AIDS kills campaign, whose original form is *AIDS kills. There is still no cure*[71] occurred fourteen times (14) in the respondents answers and percentage-wise it had a 26% representation. This was followed by *Pamoja tujiunge kuangamiza ukimwi* (Together we can defeat AIDS) mentioned by 6 respondents and had an 11% representation, here respondents retained the message's authentic form without any paraphrases or its propositional radical. This could be due to the fact that it was recently launched in 2003 and is still memorable to some respondents. The *Tume-chill*

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71 The main message is AIDS KILLS which appears at the headline, whereas, *There is still no cure* appears at the bottom position of the poster. We considered AIDS KILLS as the prominent component or foregrounded component of the message.

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poster (whose original form is *Sex? Not now, tume-chill. We know what the consequences. Ni poa ku chill*) was mentioned 5 times or had a 9% representation and *A real man waits* was cited twice and while having a 3% representation. It was equally interesting to note that Maseno division respondents easily recalled propositional radicals of certain posters than others as outlined in *Table 7*.

Table 7: Frequency distribution of the most memorable AIDS messages among Maseno Division respondents

MOST MEMORABLE MESSAGES	FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OUT OF 57
1. AIDS Kills. There is still no cure. (Together with variants such as *Beware, AIDS kills* and its Kiswahili equivalent *ukimwi unauwa)*-(See *Poster 11* in section 6.2)	17
2. AIDS has no cure (variant of *AIDS Kills. There is no cure* poster) (See *Poster 11* in section 6.2)	8
3. AIDS is not witchcraft. (Together with its propositional radicals such as AIDS is real or AIDS is a reality, for the *Do not be fooled, AIDS is not witchcraft. AIDS is real. Avoid sex before marriage. Stick to one partner or use a condom*) (See *Appendix 21*)	9
4 Ni poa kuchill (together with its propositional radicals such as *Tume-chill,* for the *Sex? Not now, tume-chill. We know what the consequences are. Ni poa ku chill*) (See *Poster 24* in section 6.2.1.4)	4
5. ABC (for A-abstinence, B- be faithful, C-use a condom and D-diagnosis know your status) (See *Poster* IV in section 5.7.4)	3
6. Do not turn your back on AIDS. STOP AIDS, keep the promise. (Its propositional radical was *Do not turn your back on AIDS. Keep the promise*)	2

In *Table 7,* the most frequent AIDS message recalled by respondents was *AIDS kills* (whose original form is *AIDS kills. There is still no cure*) and was cited 17 times. Then the second clause of the same poster reading *There is still no cure,* repeatedly mentioned as *AIDS has no cure,* was recalled 8 times.

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This shows that the poster's shortest version captured by the first clause was readily recalled 17 times than the second clause of the same poster recalled 8 times. Also recalled 9 times were propositional radicals such as *AIDS is not witchcraft* or *AIDS is real* derived for the message *Do not be fooled, AIDS is not witchcraft. AIDS is real. Avoid sex before marriage. Stick to one partner or use a condom*, respondents also mentioned the slogan *AIDS has no cure* 8 times, then followed by propositional radicals *Ni poa ku chill (it is good to wait, whose authentic propositional form is Sex? Not now, tume-chill. We know what the consequences are. Ni poa ku chill).* And finally, there were two occurrences of the same AIDS slogan *Do not turn your back on AIDS. Keep the promise,* which was presented either as *Do not turn your back on AIDS* or *STOP AIDS keep the promise.* What remains fascinating in this case, is the fact that Maseno division respondents like their Eldoret town counterparts recalled one of the shortest AIDS message notably; *AIDS kills* (whose explicit form is *AIDS kills. There is still no cure*). Thus this serves as evidence of pragmatic ellipsis among Maseno division respondents and Eldoret town respondents. As a matter of fact, in most cases, respondents gave propositional radicals rather than explicit propositions of AIDS messages.

The fact that respondents easily recalled a propositional radical of one of briefest AIDS message called *AIDS Kills* for (*AIDS kills. There is still no cure*), is because the communicator strictly adhered to the Gricean conversational maxims of manner (holding that one should be perspicuous) by adhering particularly to the sub-maxim of brevity. Levinson (2000) construes it as a case of I-principle in operation or rather the maxim of minimization holding that "say as little as necessary to produce the minimal linguistic information sufficient to achieve your communication bearing in mind Q", for speakers and more particularly communicators are expected to be economical with their lexical choices. Furthermore, communicators are guided by informativeness in using simplistic expressions as opposed to complex constructions, as stipulated by Horn's (2004) R-based speaker oriented principle. This stems from the communicators' estimations of their addressees cognitive capacities to enrich their propositional radicals. The shortened syntactic form seemingly facilitates easier memorability. As noted throughout the data on memorability of AIDS slogans, respondents easily recalled propositional radicals of AIDS slogans rather than their explicit forms like those originally used by communicators. It simply means that they were processing cognitively simpler versions of AIDS messages which are indisputable cases of pragmatic ellipsis. A case in point is the *A real man waits* slogan having its

syntactically complete version or eternal[72] (cf. Carston, 2002b) as *A real man won't be pushed by his friends to have sex. A real man waits.* Before proceeding with the data analysis, there is need to be emphatic on pragmatic ellipsis or sub-sentential constituents. Elugardo & Stainton (2005: 1-8) confirm the existence of a tripartite paradigm in ellipsis notably, pragmatic ellipsis, semantic ellipsis and syntactic ellipsis. For purposes of our analysis, focus is on pragmatic ellipsis. Pragmatic ellipsis like in cases of linguistic underdeterminancy (see Carston 2002b in section 3.5.2) is manifested in various ways, one form entails a speaker's omission of information necessary for the hearer's comprehension of a speaker's utterance. It therefore demands that contextual information guides the hearer in utterance comprehension. The other form of pragmatic ellipsis is usage of an abbreviated speech instead of an explicit one or eternal construction, a good example is by saying *Pass the book* one remains covert regarding the particular book to be passed and to whom it deserves to be passed to. In the entire thesis, we are keen on pragmatic ellipsis based on Carston's (2002b) views accounting for the occurrence of propositional radicals under the convenient abbreviation view and the essentialist view.

The convenient abbreviation view holds that propositional radicals occur because a speaker is striving to be economical in cognitive effort terms. Moreover, for any brief construction, there is always a more complex or eternal construction serving as its replacement. The essentialist view, argues that unarticulated constituents are a necessary evil and an ubiquitous phenomenon in language. The essentialist view is dichotomized into a weaker version and a stronger version, with the stronger view holding that underdeterminancy is widespread with only a small fraction of constructions qualifying as explicit constructions. The weak view dismisses the explicitness notion in its thesis that underdeterminancy or pragmatic ellipsis is a universal feature of linguistic expressions. Now, using the convenient line of argument, we have reasons to believe that respondents presented propositional radicals of AIDS slogans as opposed to their explicit forms to sustain a cognitive need requiring minimal expenditure of cognitive efforts, which is divorced from Carston's essentialist view shown in *Table 8*.

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72 Under the linguistic underdeterminancy thesis, Carston (2002b: 29) argues that there are two kinds of constructions eternal sentences are complex in structure and generally strive to be explicit, there are also non eternal sentences which are shorter, therefore a sentence like *He went to the bank* is non-eternal, while its eternal form is manifested in a construction such as *Simon Lewis went to a financial institution situated at 32 Tottenham Court Road in London between 2.00 and 2.30 on 18th May 1999.*

Table 8: Cases of pragmatic ellipsis in AIDS posters among Eldoret Town respondents

EXPLICIT FORM OF THE AIDS POSTER	PROPOSITIONAL RADICALS OF AIDS POSTER BY RESPONDENTS	NUMBER OF CASES
1. Do not be fooled, AIDS is not witchcraft AIDS is real. Avoid sex before marriage. Stick to one partner or use a condom.	AIDS is real	1
	Stick to one partner	1
	AIDS is not a curse	1
	AIDS is not witchcraft, anyone can get it	1
2. A-Abstinence, B-be faithful to one partner. C-use condoms, D-diagnosis-know you status.	Use a condom	3
	If not married, abstain	1
	ABC	1
	Be faithful to your spouse, AIDS kills	1
4. Chukua control ya maisha yako mwenyewe.	Chukua control	1
5. Do not turn your back on AIDS. Keep the promise.	Do not turn your back on AIDS	1
6. A real man won't be pushed by his friends to have sex. A real man waits.	A real man waits	2
7. Sex? Not now, tume-chill. We know what the consequences are. Ni poa ku-chill.	Ni poa ku chill	1
	Ku chill	1
	Ni chill	1
8. "Onyesha mapenzi yako. I am a loving father because I know my status" Chanukeni pamoja. (Show you love, I am a loving father because I know my status" Get smart know your status.	Go for VCT	1
	If unwell, go for VCT	1
9. AIDS kills. There is still no cure.	AIDS kills.	9

Table 9: Pragmatic ellipsis of propositional radicals of AIDS posters among Maseno Division respondents

EXPLICIT FORM OF AN AIDS POSTER	RESPONDENTS PROPOSITIONAL RADICAL OF THE POSTER
1. Do not be fooled, AIDS is not witchcraft AIDS is real. Avoid sex before marriage. Stick to one partner or use a condom (See *Appendix 21*)	(I) AIDS is real (II) AIDS is not witchcraft
2. Sex? Not now, tume-chill. We know what the consequences are. Ni poa ku chill (See *poster 24* in section 6.2.1.4)	(I) Tume-chill (II) Ni poa ku chill
3. AIDS kills. There is still no cure (cf. *Poster 11* in section 6.2)	(I) AIDS kills
4. STOP AIDS! Keep the Promise Eliminate the stigma	(I) Stop AIDS
5. Take leadership! Know your status (See *poster 8* for a Kiswahili version of the poster)	Know your status

From the foregoing, it is not coincidental that both Eldoret town and Maseno division respondents easily recall syntactically shorter messages such as *AIDS kills*, this undeniably typifies the cognitive efficiency thesis advanced by relevance theorists. As respondents adhered to cognitive efficiency by recalling propositional radicals of more complex messages, instead of recalling an entire slogan or its explicit propositional form like *Do not be fooled, AIDS is not witchcraft AIDS is real. Avoid sex before marriage. Stick to one partner or use a condom*, respondents seem to remember *stick to one partner, AIDS is real* or *use a condom*. This suggests that there is need for behaviour change communicators to adopt less complex syntactic constructions. To put it differently, the memorability of their messages by their addressees is pegged on decreasing the cognitive load of the addressees' mental faculties. The logic behind such a statement as advanced by Barsalou (2009) and Sutton (2009) is simply because the human mind is known for recalling fragments or incomplete propositions. Therefore, it is incapable of faithfully recalling authentic forms of experiences or explicit forms of sentences. Barsalou (2009: 238) gives the example of what transpires on conjunctive neurons, especially when one is asked to recall an action performed on a dog by the veterinary doctor. Normally, conjunctive neurons will partially reactivate relevant motor states for a re-enactment of the veterinary's actions on the dog. Unfortunately, it is virtually impossible to have a complete re-enactment of the original experience. Likewise, the same is applicable to the respondents inability to recall explicit AIDS messages, but gave propositional

radicals of AIDS posters, because of the partial reactivation of their conjunctive neurons.

5.7.2.1 Respondents reasons for memorizing AIDS posters

In the previous section, we provided a pragmatic account of the respondents memorability of AIDS posters and mentioned aspects related to pragmatic ellipsis. We also stressed on the need to uphold cognitive efficiency on the addressee's standpoint. Nonetheless, the following reasons in *Pie-chart 1*, and *Table 10* were provided by both Eldoret Town respondents and Maseno division respondents for adhering to AIDS posters.

REASONS FOR RECALLING AIDS POSTERS

Legend:
- Educative
- A sibling's death
- Repeated use in the media
- Use of Sheng'
- No reason
- Use of a paragon

Values shown: 4%, 7%, 11%, 38%, 17%, 24%

Pie Chart 1: Respondents reasons for recalling AIDS posters by Eldoret Town respondents

As outlined in *Pie-chart 1* based on the data derived from Eldoret town respondents, there were a myriad of reasons provided by respondents on what enhances their memorability of AIDS posters, most respondents (38%, n=11) agreed that AIDS posters were educative and hence the reason for subscribing to their valuable pieces of advice. For others, approximately (24%, n=6) argued that following a sibling's death, or a relative's death, or the need to safeguard ones' life was reason enough for adhering to AIDS posters. Another (17%, n=5) cited the consistent occurrence of posters in the media, constantly reminded them of harsh realities of HIV and AIDS. Meaning repetition is effective in enabling one register AIDS messages, use of sheng was also mentioned by (12.5%, n= 3) of the respondents, then (7%, n=2) had no reason for adhering to AIDS posters and finally one respondent (4%) argued that the

use of a paragon and gave reference to the Kenyan president, His Excellency Mwai Kibaki in the *Pamoja Tuangamize Ukimwi* campaign, inspired the respondent to adhere to AIDS posters. Based on our discussions upto this point, the highlighted issues provide necessary feedback to behaviour change communicators that their addressees recognize informative and relevant aspects of their messages. Besides this, it is a truism that AIDS-related deaths continue to haunt addressees following the loss of a friend, a colleague or a family member, consequently people remain fearful of AIDS. In a way, the fear of death not only drives them to keep the disease at bay by striving to protect their sexual health, but also contributes to stigmatization of AIDS. Addressees equally appreciate consistency and recurrence of AIDS slogans in the media, thus acting as a constant reminder of the harsh realities of HIV and AIDS. However, with regard to language used in AIDS messages, a few respondents appreciate the communicator's use of *Sheng*' in addressing the youth on AIDS. Moreover, very few addressees appreciate the use of paragons or icons in AIDS posters and could be an indicator that some national or urban celebrities remain unknown to them. At this stage, we will not give an elaborate account on the question of paragons and icons, but we will revisit it in sections *5.7.4, 5.7.4.1.1* and *5.7.4.1.2* by demonstrating how icons in AIDS posters are misunderstood by addressees.

In comparison to Eldoret Town respondents found in a low prevalence region, Maseno division respondents premised in a high prevalence region, provided the reasons in *Table 10* that make AIDS messages memorable.

Table 10: Reasons for memorability of AIDS posters and their frequency distribution in Maseno Division

REASONS FOR MEMORABILIY OF AIDS POSTERS	FREQUENCY AND PERCENTAGE	
-Harsh reality of AIDS	8	31%
-Presence in the media, posters and TV	6	23%
-Informativeness of AIDS posters	5	19%
-To protect one's self	3	12%
-Their brevity	2	8%
-Easy to memorize	1	4%
-Death of a sibling	1	4%
Total	**26**	**100%**

Respondents reasons for recalling AIDS messages were the following: according to 31% of respondents, it was mainly the harsh reality of HIV and AIDS, 23% claimed that the presence of AIDS messages in the media enhanced their memorability, another 19% cited informativeness of AIDS messages encouraged their memorability, 12% argued that AIDS messages were memorable because they wanted to protect themselves from AIDS, while 8% mentioned brevity of AIDS messages enhanced their memorability as another 4% stated that posters were easily memorized, other respondents constituting 4% held the thesis that it was a sibling's demise that constantly made them recall AIDS messages. In brief, for Maseno division respondents who are in a high prevalence region of 28% where high mortality rates of HIV and AIDS are recorded, it is not peculiar for them to easily register the harsh realities of AIDS within their cognitive faculties as a primary factor. Seemingly, this is a good reason why respondents memorize informative aspects of AIDS-related messages on the basis of their first hand experiences with HIV and AIDS. Whereas, the repetitiveness of AIDS messages in the media or the need to protect one's self from the disease take secondary positions. In connection to the respondents' reasons for memorizing AIDS messages, and given that we were keen on unearthing the reasons Maseno division respondents gave for adhering to AIDS messages, *Graph 1* provides relevant data on the issue.

Graph 1. Respondents reasons for adherence to AIDS messages

Data in *Graph 1*, shows that around 84% of respondents said that they adhered to advice offered by AIDS messages, another 9% of the respondents argued that they sometimes adhered to AIDS posters, while another 6% of the respondent affirmed that they did not follow the advice offered by AIDS poster**.** Reasons for adhering to the above choices were varied as outlined in *Table 11,* using data from 32 respondents since one respondent failed to give any response.

Table 11: Reasons for adhering to AIDS posters by Maseno Division respondents

Yes responses	Number	No responses	Number	Sometimes	Number
Guidance and informativeness	11	The messages are false	1	No reason	1
Protection against AIDS	9	Difficulties in using condoms in the ABC message	1	Inexperienced with the disease	1
Incurability of AIDS	4			Inapplicability of some information on AIDS	1
Death or consequences from AIDS	3				
Total	**27**		**2**		**3**

From *Table 11*, we can deduce that 27 respondents as opposed to 32, gave an affirmative response regarding their adherance to AIDS messages. Their varied reasons for this particular choice is that 41%

(n=11) argued that AIDS messages were informative and offered necessary guidance on HIV and AIDS, 33% (n=9) gave their reason for adhering to AIDS messages was because they wanted to protect themselves from the killer disease, 15% (n=4) mentioned AIDS incurability as a reason, while (11%, n=3) said that the loss of a sibling or relative made them follow the advice offered by AIDS posters. Alternatively, for persons against following advice on AIDS messages, they presented the following reasons: (50%, n=1) dismissed the messages as riddled with falsity. The other (50%, n=1), termed the C-use condoms component of the A-abstinence, B-Be faithful, C-use protection message (ABC message) illogical and impractical in his perspective, either because he was against using condoms consistently or using them altogether. Respondents who sometimes found AIDS messages relevant had the following reasons: one (33%) gave no particular reason, another (33%) alleged that not all AIDS slogans were relevant or applicable to everyone, as one respondent (33%) argued that he had no experience with AIDS.

In short, there are varied reasons why some people adhere to AIDS posters, some people find AIDS messages relevant and informative while others fear its incurability thus the need to safeguard their lives. Nonetheless, there is still some percentage of the population ignorant of informative aspects of some posters because they disagreed with certain components of the messages, as in the case condom use in the ABC poster. It simply means that whenever such addressees come across posters advocating for condom use, they are bound to dismiss the AIDS poster as irrelevant. This confirms Sperber's & Wilson's (1998) thesis that relevance in human communication is not 100% guaranteed, and what is relevant to another person might be irrelevant to another person and even informative aspects on AIDS are not exempted from the varying degrees of relevance. What is noteworthy at this point is that the contentious issue with the ABC poster had been earlier raised in chapter one in section 2.2.1, specifically on how respondents might misconstrue the ABC poster.

5.7.3 Correlation between comprehension of AIDS posters and respondents level of education

As mentioned in our research methodology, our sample comprised persons of diverse cultures and socio-economic backgrounds. We ensured that collected data was from both educated persons having a university degree or a college diploma and also persons who did not go beyond primary school[73]. This

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73 In Kenya, under the 844 system, after spending two to three years in nursery school or kindergarten, children are
    expected to enroll for an (eight) year program in primary school, prior to their admission to high school for another four

was in accordance with our research problem seeking to confirm whether there exists a homogeneous comprehension pattern of AIDS posters amongst Kenyans from both different socioeconomic backgrounds and linguistic communities. Going by our findings from Eldoret Town respondents, 81% of respondents who had attained sufficient exposure in terms of education such as college or university graduates did not seem to have any comprehension problems with AIDS messages. This was especially among those who acquired English as a first, second or third language and learned Kiswahili either as a second, or third language. Nonetheless, 19% of the respondents having a lower level of education like those who neither completed their primary school education nor are conversant with English but learned Kiswahili as a second language, were incapable of recalling AIDS slogans as shown in *Table 12*, see *Appendicies 15* and *16* for similar data obtained from Maseno Division respondents.

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years of education. They later join university for degree programs, which can be between 4 years for arts-based degrees to 6 years for disciplines such medicine.

Table 12: Recalled messages by respondents with insufficient level of education and without knowledge of English but have Kiswahili as their Second Language (L₂)

Respondents (See data on level of education and profession in *Appendix 2*)	Inability to recall AIDS slogans
1. Kisii, Single (HIV+) Female respondent Level of Education: Class 4 in Primary school Languages acquired: English, L₃, Swahili, L₂.	1. *AIDS is a natural disaster.* (This is not found in a Kenyan poster but is likely to be a variant of *AIDS kills. There is still no cure* poster)
Luhyia, HIV (+) couple (1) Male respondent: Level of Education: Class 2 (Primary School) Languages acquired: No knowledge of English, Swahili, L₂. (2) Female respondent: Level of Education: Class 5 (Primary School) Languages acquired, No knowledge of English, Swahili, L₃.	2. The respondent was unable to recall any slogan but gave a paraphrase of a VCT slogan-*If unwell, go for VCT.* 3. The respondent was unable to recall any AIDS slogan in posters but said "To prevent oneself from AIDS."
A (HIV-) married male Turkana respondent Languages acquired, No knowledge of English, Kiswahili L₂.	4. The respondent recalled one poster: *AIDS kills*, with other two posters which did not correspond to any known Kenyan poster, instead they were a generalized summary of most posters captured in statements such as *Vile unaweza kujikinga (the way you can protect yourself) and *Chenye inazidisha ukimwi (what fuels the spread of AIDS).

From what we have observed in *Table 12*, it is clear that there is need to coin simplified messages in Kiswahili, purposely designed for addressees who are not conversant with the English language. This is in line with Sperber's & Wilson's (1995) thesis that human communication achieves relevance by modifying an addressee's cognitive environment. It is unlikely that the communicators' informative intentions articulated exclusively in English to less educated persons having either basic or no knowledge of English, will be anywhere near succeeding in modifying these addressees' cognitive environments because of the highlighted linguistic constrains. In the long run, less educated addressees will end up considering messages in English AIDS posters irrelevant because of the linguistic barrier.

Nonetheless, for the case of Maseno division respondents as shown in *Appendix 16*, we deduce that there were no serious comprehension problems of AIDS messages because inasmuch as respondents

had only a primary school level of education, their knowledge of English enabled them interpret AIDS posters. The only exception was a Maasai respondent who was not conversant with English but had acquired Kiswahili as his second language and only gave a vague interpretation of the *Abstinence is not a life sentence AIDS is poster* as "Having AIDS is like being in prison", and totally misinterpreted the *Champions play safe, and wewe ndiwe uhai wao* poster by asserting *"Winners are people who protect themselves from AIDS, like football today you win and tomorrow you loose"* and "God is the giver of life he has provided for children" respectively. This is unsurprising for similar miscomprehension cases were noted among Eldoret town respondents who were neither conversant with the English language nor had sufficient exposure to formal education. The other issue relating to this category of persons is that they seemed to make no reference to icons featuring in AIDS posters. Cases in point being, the former archbishop of Nairobi diocese, Bishop Ndingi Mwana wa Nzeki in the *Abstinence is not a life sentence, AIDS is* poster (poster III), and the Kenyan safari rally driver Patrick Njiru and the news anchor, Pauline Shegu in the *Together we can defeat AIDS* slogan (poster IV), and even in the *Champions play safe* poster (poster V) where the Kenyan football team together with the former minister of sports, Honarable Najib Balala and the Kenyan football coach Jacob Mulee featured. This echoes our comments in section 5.7.4 that there is need to use localized paragons or icons in representing persons who are known within certain regions, villages or centers, instead of assuming that everyone knows national figures or celebrities.

5.7.4 Miscomprehension of AIDS posters

In section 5.7.3, we partly established the relation between recallability of AIDS messages and level of education among respondents. This section further explores cases of miscomprehension of Kenyan AIDS messages. The results presented in the current section are essentially the respondents interpretations of six posters based on dissimilar conventional metaphors for instance, ABSTAINING IS WAITING metaphor for posters I and II, CONTRACTING AIDS IS A LIFE SENTENCE metaphor in poster III, FIGHTING AIDS IS A COLLABORATIVE EFFORT metaphor in poster IV, WINNING THE WAR AGAINST AIDS BY USING CONDOMS IS PLAYING SAFE metaphor in poster V and BEING CAUTIOUS WITH ONES SEXUALITY IS SECURING THE YOUNG GENERATION'S FUTURE metaphor in poster VI.

(I)

(II)

(III)

(IV)

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
(V)   (VI)

Respondents were expected to give their interpretations of the posters outlined. Additionally, they were to state which posters they easily understand, alongside those they encounter comprehension difficulties. *Appendicies 6* and *17*, show the respondents' choices of easily understood posters and difficult posters with results presented in *Table 13*.

Table 13: Easy and difficult AIDS posters for Eldoret Town respondents and Maseno Division respondents

Easy posters for Eldoret Town respondents	No of respondents out of 28 and percentages		Difficult posters for Eldoret Town respondents	No of respondents out of 28 and percentages	
Poster I	24	86%	Poster V	20	71%
Poster II	26	93%	Poster VI	13	44%
Poster III	19	68%			
Poster IV	23	82%			
Easy posters for Maseno Division respondents	No of respondents out of 30		Difficult posters for Maseno Division respondents	No of respondents out of 27	
Poster I	25	83%	Poster V	18	67%
Poster II	28	93%	Poster VI	12	44%
Poster III	21	70%			
Poster IV	30	100%			
Poster VI	17	56%			

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Based on data in *Table 13*, our observation is that more than 65% of Eldoret town respondents found the AIDS posters I, II, III, and IV easier to understand than posters V and VI. Majority of respondents constituting 71% regardless of their HIV status and linguistic community found poster V extremely difficult to understand and another 44% experienced difficulties in comprehending poster VI. In comparision to Maseno Division's data on easily understood posters and difficult ones for Maseno Division respondents reveals that the percentage distribution of easily understood posters by respondents were as follows: poster I by 83% , poster II by 93%, poster III by 70% and poster IV by 100%, while poster VI was found easy by 56% of respondents. The posters which were considered difficult to understand by respondents were: 67% found poster V difficult to comprehend, while another 44% found poster VI difficult to understand. The results are not surprising because Eldoret town respondents equally classified posters V and VI as difficult to understand as opposed to posters I, II, III and IV. Moreover, for poster VI, some single persons were unable to construct counterfactuals like their married counterparts. Interestingly, single or unmarried persons experienced comprehension difficulties with poster VI as discussed under section (B). The explanation behind the comprehension difficulty for poster V can be well explained within the Occam's razor principle where communicators are expected to desist from unnecessary multiplication of senses in syntactic constructions (cf. Horn, 2006: 22). Taking the case of poster V saying *Champions play safe!*, and its detailed yet illegible disclaimer stating the following words: *To qualify for the African Cup of Nations, we played hard but we also played safe. And in life, like football you have to play safe, to stay safe from AIDS. So remember (1) Don't have sex. The best way to avoid AIDS. (2) Be faithful to your partner and make sure your partner is faithful to you (3) Always use a condom, if you decide to take the risk and have sex (4) Know your HIV status and that of your partner.*

POSTER V: 2003 PAMOJA TUANGAMIZE UKIMWI campaign on CHAMPIONS PLAY SAFE!

Source: NACC (2010) Website: http://www.nacc.or.ke/2007/index.php

Ignoring all explicit details of Poster V's disclaimer already mentioned, we focused on the foregrounded message or the poster's heading reading *Champions play safe!*, which was ambiguous in two levels. One interpretation is that playing sex is like a game, and the selected game for this figurative expression happens to be football (cf. Section 6.2.1.1 on other examples of SEX IS A GAME metaphor in Kenyan AIDS posters). Moreover, even in the English language according to Fernàndez (2008: 107), the SEX IS A GAME metaphor is pronounced in expressions such as *play away*[74] meaning "commit adultery" or *score* meaning to "copulate" and *play the field* denoting "to be sexually promiscuous." It naturally follows that in the contemporary AIDS era, the playing field has become risky hence it is now imperative to use protection in fighting AIDS. The second interpretation that was supposed to act as an ostensive stimulus for addressees, is the image of the Kenyan football team, inclusive of their renown Kenyan football coach Jacob "Ghost" Mulee (positioned on the right hand side of the poster), together with the former Minister for sports, Honorable Najib Balala, (positioned on the left hand side of the poster). These are good examples or paragons in the Kenyan society, representing a category of prominent personalities. In Lakoffian perspective, they are cognitive models having prototype effects, given that they are taking necessary precautions in their sexual life in fighting AIDS. Likewise, addressees are also encouraged to emulate such respectable members of society to be

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74 The construction used by Fernàndez (2008: 107) is an extract from the British National Corpus (BNC, G_2V 1087) which reads *Experts have exploded the old wives' myth that, if he decided to <u>play away</u>, **there must have been something wrong with the relationship in the first place.*** In this sentence *play away means to commit adultery.*

champions in fighting AIDS in Kenya. *Table 14* samples Eldoret town respondents of different linguistic groups and their interpretations of Poster V.

(A) Poster V INTERPRETATIONS

Table 14: Interpretations of Poster V by Eldoret Town respondents

RESPONDENT, ETHNIC COMMUNITY, HIV STATUS OCCUPATION	RESPONDENT INTERPRETATION
Kikuyu, single, HIV+, female respondent (university student)	The footballers advocate for the utilization of condoms. (for what?, it remains unclear how the footballers emerge as champions by using condoms)
Kisii, single, HIV+ single, female respondent (housewife)	To use condoms helps one to be a winner. (Again the respondent fails to clarify how one is a winner and wins against what exactly)
Luhyia, HIV+, single, female, respondent (business lady)	Champions are those who use protection (The question one would ask for what ? and why?)
Kalenjin, HIV-, single, male respondent (college graduate)	The message is difficult to understand
Luhyia, HIV-, married female respondent (a clerk)	(No mentioning of the image schema, WINNING THE AIDS FIGHT IS USING PROTECTION (CONDOMS), but says, "Champions take care of themselves " (how?- from this response we deduce the message has been partly understood)
Luhyia, HIV-, single, male, respondent (University student)	People who care about their lives protect it from bad things (This is a rather generalized understanding of the message. One wonders what are some of the" bad things" people should protect themselves from within this message's context)
Luhyia, HIV+, married, male respondent (jobless)	Use protection (why? the message is partly understood).
Luhyia, HIV+, married, female respondent (housewife)	No response, message is difficult to understand
Meru, HIV-, married, male respondent (taxi operator)	The message is difficult, this is a message telling the youths to be a champion you must have one partner (here again it is not explicitly mentioned a champion against what?, the respondent fails to recognize the underlying conceptual metaphor- WINNING THE AIDS FIGHT IS USING PROTECTION)

On the strength of the data outlined in *Table 14*, we affirm Ortony's (1975) observation that whenever a

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communicator underestimates his addressees cognitive capacity for metaphorical interpretation, misunderstanding the metaphor is inevitable. In this case, the communicator could have overestimated his addressees cognitive capacities to interpret the SEX IS A GAME metaphor which was pointed out by addressees as the most difficult poster.

(B) Poster VI interpretations

Source: NACC (2010) Website: http://www.nacc.or.ke/2007/index.php

(B) POSTER VI interpretations by Eldoret Town respondents

Poster VI, presents images of two children, a boy and a girl and accompanied by the Kiswahili message reading *Wewe ndiwe uhai wao* (*Their future lies in your hands*). The poster was presented to married and unmarried persons from various communities. *Table 15* and *Appendix 18* respectively present data on comprehension difficulties Eldoret town respondents and Maseno division respondents experienced with Poster VI.

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Table 15: Interpretations of poster VI by Eldoret Town respondents

RESPONDENT, ETHNIC COMMUNITY, HIV STATUS OCCUPATION	RESPONDENTS INTERPRETATION OF POSTER VI
Kikuyu, single, HIV+ female respondent (University student)	Mothers protect son against AIDS (a total miscomprehension of the message, since the poster portrays images of children)
Luhyia, single, (HIV+) female respondent (Business lady)	As a woman, I am the life of my children (how?)
Kalenjin, single, (HIV+) male respondent. (Athlete)	Be well and lead a good life (why?-partly understood)
Kalenjin, single (HIV-) female respondent. (Tailor)	The message stresses on the future of the young generation (on what exactly about the future of the young generation?)
Luo, single, (HIV-) female respondent. (University student)	You are your life. What you choose to do will affect your life (and who else's life?)
Luhyia, married, (HIV+) female respondent. (Housewife)	A mother as a guardian (of what? And why?)
Meru, married, (HIV-) male, respondent. (Taxi driver)	The message is difficult to understand.
Meru, married, (HIV-) female respondent. (Housewife)	The message is difficult to understand.

Based on our own pragmatic diagnosis of Poster VI on the comprehension difficulties encountered by respondents, our argument is that the poster was particularly difficult to interpret for single persons as opposed to married persons having a family, because it appeared as a counterfactual blend to the former category. Fauconnier & Turner (2002: 31) define counterfactual blends as representing imaginative scenarios divorced from real facts. For instance, a conditional statement such as *if this water had been heated at one hundred degrees Celsius, it would have boiled.* The construction naturally calls for the creation of a counterfactual blend where in one input, we have an imaginary scenario where water has been subjected to temperatures of a hundred degrees centigrade to reach the desired boiling point. On the other input space, we have under-heated water below 100^0 centigrade. Nonetheless, in the conceptual blend, the emergent structure has boiled water at a 100^0 centigrade and depicts disanalogy with the current situation of under-heated water below its normal boiling point. An issue stressed by

both Fauconnier (1997) and even more recently by Fauconnier & Turner (2002) is against the underestimation of complexity behind counterfactual blends, whose processing is erroneously assumed to be easy.

Contrary to Fauconnier's & Turner's (2002) example of the under-heated water, Poster VI was not dealing with a conditional, but an imaginative scenario where unmarried respondents as opposed to married ones were supposed to assume the status of being married (single "married" persons) plus raising a family, whereby their decisions in sexuality matters, play a vital role in determining their children's future under the conventional metaphor BEING CAUTIOUS WITH ONE'S SEXUALITY IS SECURING THE YOUNG GENERATION'S FUTURE. It simply means that if for whatever reason a parent decides to be unfaithful then he increases his chances of contracting AIDS. Sadly such an unfortunate scenario is tantamount to jeopardizing his children's future. It goes without saying that the vital relations of change are operating in the counterfactual blend and endorses the change in marital status from single to married. Another change is from being childless to having children. In addition to this, time had to be compressed to accommodate a future event. In normal circumstances single persons have the intention of getting married in the near future. Our hypothesis is that forming such an imaginary scenario seemed more difficult for single respondents than married persons. In reality, the latter had families and more particularly young children, and were exempted from constructing such a complex blend in *Figure 26*, unlike the former category who had to construct the imaginary scenario to comprehend the message.

Generic Space

MARITAL STATUS
FAMILY RESPONSIBILITES
SEXUALITY AND AIDS

Input 1

SINGLE PERSONS
NO FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES
TAKING PRECAUTIONS IN
SEXUALITY MATTERS

Input 2

MARRIED PERSONS
WITH FAMILY OBLIGATIONS
BECAUSE OF CHILDREN
TAKING PRECAUTIONS IN
SEXUALITY MATTERS.

Blend

SINGLE "MARRIED" PERSONS
WITH FAMILY OBLIGATIONS BECAUSE OF
CHILDREN
TAKING PRECAUTIONS IN
SEXUALITY MATTERS

Figure 26: Counterfactual blend for single persons on the WEWE NDIWE UHAI WAO (THEIR FUTURE LIES IN YOUR HANDS)- (POSTER VI)

In a nutshell, what is deducible at this stage is that addressees assume that AIDS messages are easily understood, whereas the opposite is true especially when metaphors defy the Occam's razor principle by encouraging multiplicity of senses. Besides this, even using counterfactuals does not make matters any easier on unmarried addressees who have to invest additional cognitive efforts in coming up with a creative blend where their marital status has changed and they now have a family to seriously think about in whatever decisions they make in life. From our observation, addressees provided weak

implicatures in their metaphorical interpretations of their posters, some gave very generalized statements (see *Tables 14, 15* and *16* but given that metaphors cannot be ascribed one single interpretation, the respondents' interpretations were accepted). Moreover, respondents failed to recognize key personalities or icons in the posters cases in point being Poster III, having the picture of the former Catholic Arch-bishop of Nairobi diocese, called Bishop Ndingi Mwana wa Nzeki, Poster IV has images of Pauline Shegu, a Kenyan news anchor and the former Kenyan safari rally driver Patrick Njiru, and finally in Poster V, having the Kenyan football team, with the coach Jacob "Ghost" Mulee (on the right hand side of the poster) and the former Minister of sports, Honorable Najib Balala (on the left hand side of the poster). Surprisingly, respondents hardly mentioned the icons but were more interested in giving their interpretation of the messages, rather than use or acknowledge the posters' icons. In our perspective, there is need to use more localized icons such as a renown village personality, as opposed to a national celebrity or urban celebrities. This would ensure that the local community and specifically illiterate persons will be more conversant with localized icons used as ostensive stimulus in AIDS posters. Moreover, even as shown in *pie-chart 1*, it is only 4% of the respondents who mentioned the use of paragons in AIDS posters as a reason for recalling the posters. By not prioritizing use of icons coupled with the fact that respondents did not make any reference to them, is an indicator of the non-recognition of prototype effects emerging from such paragons used by communicator in such posters as role models as presented in *Table 16*. (See *Appendix 21,* on the evolution of Kenyan AIDS posters)

Table 16: Generalized or partially understood AIDS posters (See *Appendix 7* for more examples)

RESPONDENTS	POSTER 1	POSTER II	POSTER III	POSTER IV	POSTER V	POSTER VI
Kisii, single, HIV positive, female respondent (University student)	(Respondent does not mention characters in the poster) but says "One has to abstain" (why?)	"They are youth and are willing to abstain". (abstain from what?)	(Respondent does not recognize the icon in the message but says "AIDS is a life sentence (how?)	No reference to the poster's icon however reference is made to the conceptual metaphor FIGHTING AIDS IS A JOINT EFFORT in saying "to prevent AIDS by being faithful."	No reference to the poster's icons, the respondent says "To use condoms, helps one to be a winner" (how?)	"As a parent, I am my children's guardian and I have to protect myself from contracting AIDS".
Luhyia, Single, HIV+, Female respondent (Class Three primary school education)	(No reference to characters in the image), but says It is good to wait.	No reference to the images of the youth) but says "It is good to wait."	No reference to the poster's icon.	No mentioning of the poster's icons) but says "To prevent AIDS by being faithful."	No mentioning of the poster's icons but says "Champions are those who use protection" (which protection and against what exactly are we protecting ourselves from?)	"As a woman, I am the life of my children." (how?)
Kalenjin, HIV+, male respondent, primary school level education, athlete	The message is difficult to interpret.	No mentioning of the image but respondent says "waiting and not to engage in those things" (which ones?)	The message is difficult to understand.	No reference to image schemas and the poster's icons but respondent says " if one knows their status, we have to be faithful to avoid AIDS."	No mentioning of the poster's icons but the respondent says "If one does that (what?) better use condoms to prevent AIDS".	No mentioning of the poster's images but says, "be well and lead a good life" (why?)

5.7.4.1 Cases of miscomprehension of AIDS posters

5.7.4.1.1 Miscomprehension of AIDS posters by Eldoret Town respondents

In chapter one, reference was made to Johnny & Michell's (2006) research on a textual analysis of 2000-2003 World AIDS poster on *Live and Let Live campaign* (cf. *Poster 2*), where they raised concerns that there is need to undertake further research on whether respondents from diverse cultural

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backgrounds subscribe to a homogeneous pattern in their interpretation of AIDS posters to fill the scientific lacuna in such studies. Moreover, Sperber & Wilson (1986a: 158) thesis on the second or communicative principle of relevance stipulating that "every act of ostensive communication communicates the utterance presumption of its own optimal relevance," inclusive of Wilson's & Sperber's (1998) point that the surest way of achieving optimal relevance is by ostensive-inferential communication manifested through, speaking, writing or gesturing in an effort to heighten expectations of relevance by making one's informative intention mutually manifest in an overt way. In many ways, using pictures to enhance the comprehension of AIDS messages are manifestations of ostensive stimulus, since communicators are simply striving to uphold relevance in their messages. And true to Sperber's & Wilson's (1986a) predictions there is neither a hundred percent guarantee that messages will be relevant to addressees nor there will be no communication failures. In our analysis, we highlighted cases of miscomprehension of AIDS posters regardless of the ostensive stimulus (images) used in guiding addressees towards accurate interpretations of AIDS posters as presented in *Table 17*.

Table 17: Miscomprehension of AIDS posters by Eldoret Town respondents

Respondents	AIDS poster	Respondent's interpretation
1. Married, HIV-, Kikuyu, female respondent.	POSTER I: A REAL MAN WONT BE PUSHED BY HIS FRIENDS TO HAVE SEX. A REAL MAN WAITS.	I think this one there is a warning to those who want sex by force (rape) or the youth to wait until marriage.
2. Married, HIV+ Luhyia, male respondent	POSTER II: SEX ? NOT NOW, TUME-CHILL. WE KNOW WHAT THE CONSEQUENCES ARE. NI POA KU CHILL.	A woman should not get married early.
3. Married, HIV-Kikuyu female respondent	POSTER III: ABSTINENCE IS NOT A LIFE SENTENCE. AIDS IS.	This shows that not only AIDS kills ungodly even a pastor.
4. Married, HIV-, Meru, male respondent	POSTER IV: TOGETHER WE CAN DEFEAT AIDS.	As a family you can defeat AIDS through trust.
5. Single, HIV-, Luhyia male respondent	POSTER V: CHAMPIONS PLAY SAFE!	People who care about their lives protect it from bad things.
6 (a) Married, HIV-, Turkana female respondent (b) A single, HIV-, Kikuyu female respondent	POSTER VI: WEWE NDIWE UHAI WAO. (THEIR LIFE DEPENDS ON YOU)	(a) Do not be selfish to your children. (b) Mothers protect son against AIDS.

Data outlined in *Table 17* exhibits cases of addressees inability to grasp the communicator's informative intention in AIDS posters. They are real cases of miscomprehension of images used as ostensive stimulus in AIDS posters by addressees. To proceed systematically, in the case of poster I: A REAL MAN WON'T BE PUSHED TO HAVE SEX BY HIS FRIENDS. A REAL MAN WAITS, here the respondent introduced the notion of rape, which is as a result of misinterpreting the poster's image where some people are trying to force one of their peers into engaging in sex. In our perspective, rape is far-fetched and outside the message's scope, for the latter is preaching abstinence by discouraging youths from yielding to peer pressure to engage in sex. In poster II: SEX? NOT NOW, TUME-CHILL. WE KNOW WHAT THE CONSEQUENCES ARE. NI POA KU CHILL under the conventional metaphor ABSTAINING IS WAITING, in this case the respondent alluded to the fact that a woman should not get married early, maybe because he was misguided by the presence of young ladies in the poster. Hence, the generalization that the message was exclusively applicable to young women. Poster II's message however contradicts the respondent's response, in advocating for abstinence among youths and hardly insinuates anything close to early marriages. In poster III: ABSTINENCE IS NOT A LIFE SENTENCE. AIDS IS under the conceptual metaphor CONTRACTING AIDS IS A LIFE SENTENCE, the respondent's erroneous interpretation was that "AIDS does not only kill the ungodly, even a pastor". In our opinion, it is indisputable that Bishop Ndingi Mwana wa Nzeki's image in the poster is both representative of the clergy and their firm position on abstinence as an effective way of curbing AIDS among unmarried persons. The message is skewed towards abstinence as advanced by the conceptual metaphor and thus disconnected with "AIDS killing ungodly persons and even a pastor". Here, the communicator communicative intention is for the addressee to establish the analogy between a life sentence and AIDS. Thereafter, infer any pragmatic inference synonymous with once one contracts AIDS, he is a prisoner of opportunistic infections.

Another case is poster IV reading TOGETHER WE CAN DEFEAT AIDS, under the conceptual metaphor FIGHTING AIDS IS A JOINT EFFORT, where the respondent stipulated that "As a family you can defeat AIDS through Trust". In this case, the respondent recognized the conceptual metaphor FIGHTING AIDS IS A JOINT EFFORT, however it becomes unclear where the notion of trust emerged from in the poster's interpretation, because you can unknowingly trust an unfaithful person. In poster V: CHAMPIONS PLAY SAFE under FIGHTING AIDS USING PROTECTION IS PLAYING SAFE conventional metaphor, the respondent argued that "people who care about their lives protect it from

bad things". Our opinion is that this is a generalized interpretation of the poster, specifically advocating for condom use in fighting AIDS, and not simply a matter of protecting "one's life from bad things". Finally, poster VI: WEWE NDIWE UHAI WAO (Their future lies in your hands), one respondent argued that the message states "Do not be selfish to your children". Once again we are uncomfortable with such an interpretation since it remains unaccommodated by the weak implicatures of the conceptual metaphor BEING CAUTIOUS WITH ONES SEXUALITY IS SAFEGUARDING THE YOUNG GENERATION'S FUTURE. Even an interpretation offered by a Kikuyu respondent of "a mother protecting his son against AIDS", misinterprets images used in poster VI, having images of a young girl embracing a young boy, and not images a mother embracing her son. From the foregoing, our example is in synchrony with Johnny's & Michelle's (2006) observation in their analysis *Poster 2* on the LIVE AND LET LIVE WORLD AIDS campaign in chapter one, where addressees misinterpreted images used in the poster against stigmatization of AIDS.

5.7.4.1.2 Miscomprehension of AIDS posters by Maseno Division respondents

Sperber & Wilson (1986a) and Moeschler (2007) contend that miscomprehension is an inevitable occurrence in communication. Indeed cases of miscomprehesion of AIDS posters were noted among Maseno divison respondents and samples are presented in *Table 18*.

Table 18: Miscomprehension of AIDS posters among Maseno Division respondents

Poster	Miscomprehension
1. Sex? Not now, tume-chill. We know what the consequences are. Ni poa kuchill. (See poster II and poster 24 in section 5.7.4 and 6.2.1.4)	Single, Meru respondent: "It displays some strong willed ladies who have the power to make decisions and stand by them, they are assertive and a No means exactly that."
2. Champions play safe. (See poster V in section 5.7.4)	In this case 13 respondents outrightly stated that the poster was difficult to understand. A Maasai respondent said that "Winners are people who protect themselves from AIDS, like football today we win and tomorrow we loose." A married Kikuyu, HIV- respondent said: "You lead by example."
3. Abstinence is not a life sentence, AIDS is. (See poster III in section 5.7.4)	A single Meru, HIV- respondent: "The catholic priest/father has abstained for long, he always looked old enough (60s) but he is happy and content with his decision."
4 Wewe ndiwe uhai wao (Their future lies in your hands) (See poster VI) in section 5.7.4)	(a) A single Maasai HIV- negative respondent: "God is the giver of life, he has provided for children." (b) A single Kikuyu, HIV+ respondent: "Don't know who they are HIV orphans or normal children hugging."

To expound on certain issues in the above cases of miscomprehension, for the poster *Sex? Not now, tume-chill. We know what the consequences are. Ni poa kuchill,* the respondent's interpretation of the poster was that "It displays some strong willed ladies who have the power to make decisions and stand by them, they are assertive and a No means exactly that". In this case, at one level, the respondent is right in saying that the ladies are advocating for abstinence by saying no to sex (derived by enrichment). On another level, we are convinced that the respondent failed to recognize that the youthful ladies are used interpretively in representing the youth and not simply ladies *per se*, with the former being the communicator's target group by encouraging the youth to uphold abstinence using *Sheng'* the language of urban youths (See Kang'ethe, 2004).

For the second poster, *champions play safe* a HIV negative Maasai respondent claimed that "Winners are people who protect themselves from AIDS, like football today we win and tomorrow we loose". Our standpoint on such an interpretation is that it was partially understood, because the respondent

partly unearthed the communicator's communicative intention that using protection is equated to winning the fight against AIDS. This is captured by the respondent's vague comment that winners are people protecting themselves from AIDS. Our argument that the addressee's interpretation was vague because he did not overtly state how people were supposed to protect themselves from AIDS. Besides the vague interpretation, the pictorial metaphor having the Kenyan football team, together with the former minister of sports, Honorable Najib Balala, confused the respondent, as he added that *like football today we win and tomorrow we loose*. This is because the communicator's intention was skewed towards winning the AIDS war by adhering to the game's rules using the SEX IS A GAME conceptual metaphor in reference to condom usage and not loosing a mere game, as partly suggested by his addressee. Therefore, the second component of the addressee's inference is an erroneous interpretation of the poster. On the third message reading, *abstinence is not a life sentence, AIDS is,* the paragon or icon used in the poster confuses the addressee in his assertion that "The catholic priest/father has been abstaining for long, he always looked old enough in his 60s, but he is happy and content with his decision". As stated in the previous chapters, the former Archbishop of the Nairobi diocese, Bishop Ndingi Mwana wa Nzeki, is used interpretively in representing other members of the clergy, who uphold abstinence as a preventive measure against HIV and AIDS, for the latter is a killer disease that subjects one's healthy lifestyle to a series of opportunistic infections. This is analogically compared to the imprisonment of one's health by opportunistic infections. Unfortunately, the addressee seemed engrossed in the pictorial metaphor, hence he was unable to pragmatically infer the communicator's intention outlined above. This again confirms miscomprehension fears proposed by relevance theorists as well as Johnny & Michelle's (2006) research on the *Live and Let Live AIDS* 2000-2003 AIDS campaign posters.

Another confusion caused by the misinterpretation of a pictorial metaphor by an addressee was observed in a HIV negative respondent's interpretation of the *Wewe ndiwe uhai wao* (*Their future lies in your hands*). Here, the respondent was incapable of constructing the counterfactual in *Figure 26*, where he supposedly assumes a parental role of a father who has to be cautious with his sex life, least he ends up contracting AIDS that will jeopardize his children's future. For some unknown reason, the respondent was unable to construct the counterfactual. Instead, he gave an erroneous interpretation of the AIDS poster, as "God is the giver of life and he protects children". Apparently, a similar case was noted in a Kikuyu respondent who was incapable of relating the ostensive stimulus (marked by the

children in the picture) to the written slogan, *Wewe ndiwe uhai wao* (*Their future lies in your hands*), from the addressee's response of *I don't know who they are HIV orphans or normal children.* We conclude he failed to comprehend the communicator's informative intention regardless of ostensive stimulus signalled by images of AIDS orphans or normal children left without guardians because of HIV and AIDS. The first three cases of miscomprehension of AIDS messages at the level of a pictorial ostensive stimulus misguided the addressee and coupled with the fact that the foregrounded message was metaphorical. In a way, such messages confirm the inevitability of misunderstandings within communicative situations as advanced by relevance theorists as well as Johnny's & Michelle's (2006) research on the *Live and Let Live* 2000-2003 AIDS campaign.

5.7 5 AIDS posters and culturally sensitive assumptions

In relation to sensitivity towards AIDS posters, we were keen on finding out whether both Eldoret Town respondents and Maseno division respondents had any issues they considered sensitive or culturally embarrassing in AIDS posters. We were also interested in finding out whether such reasons were personal or shared by other members of their respective communities, our findings are presented in *Table 19.*

Table 19: Sensitive issues on AIDS posters outlined by Eldoret Town addressees

SENSITIVITY TO AIDS MESSAGES	No OF RESPONDENTS	REASONS FOR YES AND PERCENTAGES	
YES	14	-Images of condoms and skinny	57% (n=8)
NO	14	seropositive persons	
		-AIDS stigma	14% (n=2)
		-Reminds one about a deceased relative	7% (n=1)
		-AIDS is a racist disease	7% (n=1)
		-AIDS is a myth	7% (n=1)
		-Question misunderstood	7% (n=1)
TOTAL	28		

Data presented in *Table 19* shows that half of the respondents (50%) said that they did not find AIDS posters sensitive, while the other half (50%) argued that they considered certain matters sensitive in AIDS posters. A further analysis of some issues respondents termed sensitive are chronologically presented as follows: 57% found images of condoms and skinny seropositive persons inappropriate,

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14% were against stigmatization of AIDS, 7% said posters reminded her of a deceased relative, 7% argued that AIDS is a racist disease and wondered why Africans are the only ones dying, 7% mentioned the AIDS is a myth cognitive model and 7% misunderstood the question. In few words, respondents found images of condoms and skinny persons in AIDS posters either disturbing or indecent. This is an indicator that even in contemporary times despite numerous AIDS campaigns on prevention, people are still embarrassed about images of condoms in AIDS messages and this explains their low usage in various regions in Kenya as attested in sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 by the National Coordination Agency for Population and Development (2005a: 9-10) and National Coordination Agency for Population and Development (2005b) reports. For the case of images of skinny seropositive persons in AIDS posters, the images are disturbing because generally within the East African region AIDS is referred to as the *Slim disease*, where slimness is metonymically used in reference to AIDS, a highly stigmatized ailment, hence explaining why skinny images used in reference to seropositive persons is still disturbing for some respondents (cf. Sabatier, 1988; Adagazi, 1989; Montagnier, 1989; Farmer, 1992 and Poku, 2005 in sections 2.3, 2.3.1 and also 5.7.6.1.5). Other less sensitive issues include like an AIDS-related death of a relative or the AIDS is a myth cognitive model.

In comparison to responses given by Eldoret town respondents, Maseno division respondents were equally asked to identify some sensitive issues that they were uncomfortable about appearing in AIDS posters. Respondents were supposed to state whether their reasons were personal or were shared by other members of their community. They were further requested to state whether a community's perception of AIDS could hinder the implementation of informative aspects in the AIDS posters. The respondents responses have been tabulated in *Table 20*.

Table 20: Maseno Division respondents' responses on sensitive issues in AIDS posters

Respondents responses on sensitivity towards AIDS messages	No of Respondents	Reasons for Yes, number (N=17) and percentages		
Yes	17	-Harsh reality of AIDS, fightening images of thin HIV positive persons in AIDS posters.	6	35%
No	13			
		-Images of condoms in AIDS posters	5	29%
		-AIDS posters on extramarital affairs for instance the *Acha mpango wa kando* AIDS advertisement aired during meal times when children are awake.	3	18%
		-Educative	1	6%
		-Use of vernacular language in AIDS posters	1	6%
		-No comment	1	6%
Total 30			**17**	**100%**

Here, 56%, (n=17) of respondents as opposed to 43%, (n=13), affirmed that there were issues they considered sensitive in AIDS posters. *Table 20* presents some issues 17 respondents from Maseno division labelled sensitive in AIDS posters in the following order: 35% were uncomfortable with frightening images of thin seropositive persons in AIDS posters and the harsh realities of AIDS, 29% were uneasy about condoms featuring in AIDS posters, 18% were uncomfortable with a most recent AIDS campaign on extramarital affairs being aired during meal times especially in the presence of children. The campaign dubbed *Epuka Ukimwi, wacha mpango wa kando* (*Avoid AIDS, and desist from having extramarital affairs,* see poster 9). The campaign was particularly cited by married persons having families and who were uncomfortable about discussing extra-marital affairs infront of children, 6% agreed that posters were educative. In respect to the latter, the response failed to qualify as a sensitive issue and was treated as a miscomprehension of the question. Another 6% were uncomfortable about use of vernacular languages in AIDS posters because they linguistically excluded addressees from other ethnic communities. One respondent, representing 6% of the population failed to mention any sensitive issue in AIDS posters. In short, respondents are more scared of AIDS-related repercussions, images of thin seropositive persons, images of condoms in AIDS posters and AIDS messages on extra-marital affairs being aired in the presence of children, as opposed to use of vernacular languages in AIDS posters. This could be an indicator that despite the overwhelming AIDS awareness in the region, people are still in denial about AIDS and its stigmatization is still real, these

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issues still need addressing in AIDS campaigns as they were also raised issue among Eldoret town respondents.

5.7.5.1. Cultural or mental representations rendering AIDS messages irrelevant

In connection with the analysis in section 5.7.5, both Eldoret town respondents and Maseno division respondents were asked two questions geared towards finding out whether some members of their ethnic communities had any implicit assumptions rendering AIDS messages irrelevant. This was in line with Sperber & Wilson (1996) epidemiology of beliefs mentioned in section 1.6.3.3 in chapter one, where certain beliefs are culturally contagious, and being culturally owned, they stand to render AIDS messages irrelevant, *Table 21* outlines the findings.

Table 21: Cultural assumptions rendering AIDS messages irrelevant among Eldoret Town respondents

NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS FOR COMMUNITY'S PERCEPTION OF HIV AND AIDS			REASONS FOR YES	NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS AND PERCENTAGES	
YES	**NO**	**NO RESPONSE**	1. AIDS stigma	50%	(N=10)
			2. AIDS is witchcraft	20%	(N=4)
20	7	1	3. Cultural practices such as wife inheritance and circumcision	20%	(N=4)
71%	25%	4%	4. AIDS is a myth	10%	(N=2)

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Table 22: Cultural assumptions rendering AIDS messages irrelevant among Maseno Division respondents

NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS FOR COMMUNITY'S PERCEPTION OF HIV AND AIDS			NEGATIVE CULTURAL ASSUMPTIONS ON AIDS	NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS AND PERCENTAGES	
YES	NO	NO COMMENT	1.Cultural practices such as circumcision and wife inheritance.	26%	(N=7)
20 (66%)	9 (30%)	1 (3%)	2. AIDS is a myth/witchcraft.	22%	(N=6)
			3. Stigmatization of AIDS and scary images of seropositive persons.	22%	(N=6)
			4. No comment	19%	(N=5)
			5. Ignorance about AIDS	7%	(N=2)
			6. AIDS is a disaster	4%	(N=1)
Total				**100%**	**27**

From the above answers articulated in *Tables 21* and *22*, it is clear that respondents were conscious of culture-specific implicit assumptions hindering the fight against AIDS. In fact going by *Table 21's* data, on Eldoret Town respondents, 71% confirmed the existence of such societal beliefs or cultural assumptions. Some 25% dismissed the presence of such assumptions, while 4% remained uncertain of the existence of such assumptions. Regarding the most persistent assumption, there was the stigmatization of AIDS mentioned by 50% of the respondents, then AIDS was witchcraft cited by 20%, cultural practices for instance wife inheritance and male circumcision using unsterilized tools was cited by 20% of the respondents, and then followed by AIDS is a myth mentioned by 10%. The stigmatization of AIDS in Eldoret Town can be attributed to the fact that it is a low prevalence region as compared to Maseno Division, where for the latter cases of HIV and AIDS are high and is less stigmatized because it almost seems like a "normal" disease as seen in Maseno Division's data. On the basis of what we observed in AIDS as a radical category in *Figure 15*, we acknowledge that there exists widespread cultural assumptions such as AIDS is a myth, AIDS is witchcraft, stigmatization of seropositive persons and AIDS-friendly cultural practices such as wife inheritance, these assumptions or mental representations are sustained by a cognitive causal chain via communication and imitation, hence they become widespread with the capacity of rendering AIDS-related messages irrelevant (cf. section 1.6.3.3). Sperber & Wilson (1986a) also mention that there are some idiosyncrasies in people's cognitive environment rendering messages irrelevant, for instance if there is an AIDS message on the

destigmatization of HIV, it will not be shocking to find people at this day and age still running away from seropositive persons, simply because stigmatization of AIDS is enshrined within implicit assumptions or mental representations synonymous to HIV and AIDS.

Conversely and in line with *Table 22* highlighting data on Maseno division respondents' perception of AIDS messages and their pre-existing cultural assumptions on AIDS, capable of hindering the implementation of AIDS messages. An outline of the results drawn from 30 respondents who either gave affirmative or non-affirmative responses and further, out of 30 respondents, it is only 27 respondents who gave examples of cultural assumptions capable of rendering AIDS messages irrelevant for instance 26% argued that cultural practices such as wife inheritance and using unsterilized knives during male circumcision are cultural practices fueling the spread of AIDS, 22% either entertained AIDS is a myth or AIDS is witchcraft cognitive model, which counter scientific truisms on HIV and AIDS, 22% mentioned AIDS stigma and remained fearful of scary images of seropositive persons used in AIDS posters, 19% failed to comment on the question, 7% mentioned ignorance about AIDS as a probable factor frustrating implementation of the advice offered by AIDS message and 4% construed AIDS as a disaster. Generally, it can be said that Maseno division respondents largely gave cultural reasons fuelling the spread of AIDS, more particularly wife inheritance, practised extensively within Nyanza province among the Luo and Luhyia communities. This confirms Sperber's (1996) thesis that cognition, environment and culture are intertwined, as retrogressive cultural practices such as wife inheritance in the AIDS era are culturally sustained by a wide network of cognitive causal chains as mental and public representations, encouraging the spread of AIDS, at the expense of its detrimental effects. This serves as a pointer that there is need for more aggressive campaigns to discourage wife inheritance and any other AIDS-friendly cultural practices. The same can be said about AIDS IS A MYTH or AIDS IS WITCHCRAFT, cognitive models since the two mental representations are incompatible with the AIDS scientific model and are bound to belittle AIDS as fiction or a harmless ailment.

5.7.6 Mental representations of AIDS in some Kenyan communities

In this section and in accordance with our third research objective investigating Kenyan mental representations of AIDS and whether there is any correlation between the mental representations and

the AIDS stigma, we analyzed mental conceptualizations of AIDS from nine Kenyan communities drawn from four provinces notably; Nyanza province, Western Province, Rift Valley province and Central province of which are regions that have been gravely affected by HIV and AIDS in Kenya. From Nyanza province, we examined lexical terms for AIDS in the Luo and Kisii communities. In Western province, we concentrated on lexical terms from the Teso and Luhyia communities. Within the Rift Valley province, we focused on Kalenjin, Maasai and Turkana expressions. And finally, in Central province, data was collected from the Kikuyu and Meru communities. Collected data was obtained from a series of questions that involved asking respondents from the mentioned communities to describe words or explain mental images associated with AIDS in their respective ethnic groups. The reason for undertaking this task as previously mentioned was to unearth typical Kenyan mental representations of AIDS, while striving to establish their correlation with the stigmatization of HIV and AIDS. In short, we wanted to examine instances of resemblance within the mental images associated with HIV and AIDS and how such representations contribute to stigmatization of AIDS as outlined in *Table 23*.

Table 23: Terms used in reference to AIDS in some Kenyan communities

Ethnic Tribe	Destruction caused by natural forces	Destruction caused by insects/pests/parasites	Destruction by supernatural forces	Death personified	Pejorative adjectives and negative metonymic references
Luo	*Ayaki Matieka* *Ayaki*-AIDS *Matieka*-To destroy completely (That which devours or destroys you completely)	*Kudni* (maggots)	*Chira* (A curse)	*Gach Elijah* *Gach*-car, chariot *Elijah*-Prophet Elijah (Elijah's chariot) *Kaw na ringo to iwena* Chogo. (Take the flesh and leave me the bones- a skeleton)	*Tuo marach*. (*Tuo*-disease, *marach*-bad (The bad disease)
Kikuyu	*Gacogoro*-(disaster)	*Kigunyo* (A caterpillar)			*Mŭginyigi*-(Spinal cord to denote thinness as an AIDS related symptom) *Murĩmu munene*-(*murĩmu*-disease, *munene*-big (The big disease) *Mŭkingo*-(long necked)
Meru	*Kigutha* (A storm) *Naite* (A burnt person)			*Naetaiwa waya*- *Naetaiwa*-someone stepping on something *Waya*- a live wire (Someone who has stepped on a live wire)	
Kisii	*Enyamorero* (fire)	*Embongi* (A weevil)		*Enyakweumia* (An owl)	*Enyamorero*-(Something that makes you slim) *Enyanorea*-(the terrible disease)

Ethnic Tribe	Destruction caused by natural forces	Destruction caused by insects/pests/ parasites	Destruction by supernatural forces	Death personified	Pejorative adjectives and negative metonymic references
Luhyia	*Embeo-* (A violent wind-Bukusu dialect) *Omuyaka Muhongo-*(The sweeping wind -Samia dialect)	*Igui-* (A small destructive insect-Maragoli dialect)	*Chira-* (Witchcraft/ Curse)	*Muhunzi* (The living dead/ zombie) *Ahupiwena sitima-* *Ahupiwena*-someone stepping on something *sitima-* an electric wire/ electricity (Someone who has stepped on a live wire) *Evaka-*(A python -Samia dialect)	*Silimu* (The wasting disease) *Oluwaya-*(As thin as a wire-Nyore dialect) *Lumbe-*(A dangerous disease-Idaho dialet) *Obwamani* (The deadly one- Samia dialect) *Ovulwae vwa Ovulwae-*disease *vwa-new* (The new disease-Maragoli dialect)
Maasai	*Maepoi-* (A sweeping wave)			*Biitia-*(A disease that leads to the body's decomposition)	*Imbaka-* (The bad disease) *Enamoratoni-* (A slimming disease having symptoms like AIDS but is curable)
Kalenjin	*Sinet-*(Disaster-Kipsigis dialect) *Goris-*(A sweeping wind)	*Karibresiet-* (A tick) *Tiondo-* A blood sucking worm- (Nandi dialect of the Kalenjin community)		*Pchulul-*(Something that kills, -Kipsigis dialect) *Kimaltel-*(The beast) *Wendi-*(One who is dying) *Gigotietch Match Gigotietch-* to step on something *Match-*live wire, fire (One who has stepped on a live wire) *Kipkendabor-*"he" who slowly eats away the body.	*Ptar sumeg-* (Something that causes loss of hair)

Ethnic Tribe	Destruction caused by natural forces	Destruction caused by insects/pests/ parasites	Destruction by supernatural forces	Death personified	Pejorative adjectives and negative metonymic references
Turkana					*Lokwake*- one whose teeth are exposed *Lodiim*- one who is skinny *Lokoyo*- one who is bonny

5.7.6.1 Findings

From *Table 23,* we deduce that some of the pre-existing mental representations of AIDS within eight Kenyan communities notably: Luo, Kisii, Luhyia, Kikuyu, Turkana, Kikuyu, Meru, Maasai and Kalenjin, broadly fall into five categories namely; destruction caused by natural forces, destruction caused by insects or pests, destruction caused by supernatural forces, death personified and finally pejorative adjectives and negative metonymic references. An in-depth analysis of mental Kenyan mental representations of AIDS using the mentioned categories is discussed in the following sub-sections.

5.7.6.1.1 Destruction caused by nature

According to *The Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary* (2006: 398), the verb *destroy* has two meanings; the first one means 'to damage something so badly that it no longer exists or works'. The second meaning is 'to kill an animal deliberately, usually because it is sick or not wanted'. Whereas the noun *destruction* denotes 'the act of destroying something'. With these notions in mind, if we consider AIDS from the social-economic front, then it is viewed as destructive in terms of reversing gains of numerous nations, loss of manpower and so on. Various cultures represent destructiveness using numerous concepts. The Kisii term *enyamorero* (fire) and used in reference to AIDS, together with its close relative *naite* (a burnt person) from the Meru community, the cited terms present a scenario where

it is common knowledge that fire destroys property and leads to loss of lives. In the same vein, AIDS's incurability leads to loss of life, making AIDS as destructive as fire. The destruction concept is echoed in the Teso word *eseny* (destruction) and the Luo term *ayaki matieka* (something that devours you or destroys you completely). Whereby, *ayaki matieka* is a true representation of the first meaning of the verb *to destroy* as previously stated. Apart from a fire's destructiveness, there is another form of destruction caused by wind as expressed by the Bukusu word e*mbeo* (a violent wind), together with the Samia term *omuyaka muhongo* (the sweeping wind) both from the Luhyia community, the Kalenjin term *goris* (a sweeping wind) and equally a close variant of a destructive wind found in the Maasai term *maepoi* (a sweeping wave). Having assessed the destructive effects of AIDS, some communities like the Kalenjin use the term *sinet* (disaster) in reference to AIDS. *The Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary* (2006: 414) provides three meanings for the term *disaster*, however we will retain the most suitable meaning related to this work, whereby a disaster is construed as 'an unexpected event, such as a bad accident, a flood or a fire, that kills many people˙. It therefore goes without saying that AIDS has led to numerous deaths in Africa and as such it is a disaster. Put differently, AIDS has erased a large number of the African population and is comparable to a destructive wind sweeping anything along its path by leaving a trail of destruction. Its effects are similar to a raging flame as in the Kisii term *enyamorero* (a fire) or a storm as articulated by the Meru term *kigutha.* In fact, in relation to the latter, Ungerer (2003) in section 4.5 has argued that the picture of raging storm metaphorically represents a destruction or a calamity.

5.7.6.1.2 Destruction caused by insects or pests

Insects have positive and negative values, for instance bees are good honey producers and can revert to merciless killing machines, when one attempts to disturb a swarm of bees. In this section, our focus is on the destructive aspects of insects, pests or parasites and how such mental imageries roughly represent the manner in which HIV harmfully affects the human body. The Luo term for AIDS *kudni* (maggots), which according to *The New Shorter Oxford Dictionary on Historical Perspectives* (1993: 1661), maggots are soft-bodied limbless larva of flies or butterflies found in decaying organic matter. Apparently, the term *kudni* (maggots) interpretively represents the slow manner in which the AIDS virus slowly "consumes" a healthy human being and eventually leads to an individual's death. Given that maggots are found in carcasses, the image of death is invoked by the Luo expression *kudni* and is

representative of AIDS as a killer disease. Other terms expressing destructiveness of the virus using pests or parasites include: the Kikuyu term *kigunyo* (caterpillar), the Kisii term *embongi* (weevils), the Luhyia term *igui* (from the Maragoli dialect meaning a small destructive insect) and the Kalenjin terms *karibresiet* (a tick) together with its counterpart *tiondo* (a blood sucking worm) in the Nandi dialect. Taking the case of caterpillars, weevils or any other destructive insect for that matter, they naturally fall under the semantic domain of pests notorious for damaging crops and grains. On one hand, caterpillars eat up leaves, stems, seeds and sometimes consume an entire plant. On the other hand, weevils are known to destroy maize, rice, fruits such as strawberries, cash crops such as cotton among others crops. For cases of ticks and any blood sucking worm, they are known to suck blood from animals leaving them malnourished after robbing them off essential nutrients. Ticks also transmit diseases such as the red water fever in cattle or cause paralysis in man (cf. Halsey & Friedman, 1980).

5.7.6.1.3 Destruction caused by supernatural phenomenon

There are some communities such as the Luo where AIDS is associated with a curse caused by floating societal mores. One begins to loose weight like a seropositive person, however it remains unclear what causes weight loss in *chira* one can simply speculate that weight loss occurs supernaturally. Contrastively, in the case of AIDS, it is clear that weight loss is a consequence of an immuno-suppressed body. Nyore speakers of the Luhyia community have borrowed the Luo term *chira* but associate it with witchcraft. Taking a close look at symptoms of *chira* or the Tswana concept of *isidliso* (cf. Ashforth, 2001)*,* there are striking similarities with the wasting nature of these concepts and with weight loss being attributed to witchcraft or a curse. (See discussion by Farmer, 1992 in chapter one, on the image of AIDS as a curse in Haiti)

5.7.6.1.4 Death personified

There are numerous ways of representing death using eerie images like skeletons, beasts or venomous creatures like snakes or scorpions. Certain animal categories are culturally regarded as an omen or variants of death personified. A case in point is the Kisii lexical term *enyakweumia* (owl). Furthermore, closely related to the concept of death and graveyards, as discussed by Fauconnier & Turner (2002: 205) who perceive cemeteries and tombs as material anchors for the "living dead" conceptual blend,

because a living person's body is mapped onto the corpse. Cemeteries or tombs are places where the dead are laid to rest and basically home to the "living dead" as in the case of zombies, hence it is where the dead body is mapped onto the grave hosting a corpse. Now banking on this intricate relationship between graves and corpses, there is a Luhyia lexical term, *muhunzi* (the living dead/zombie) used in reference to AIDS. *Muhunzi* corresponds to what Niehaus[75] (2005) explored in the concept of domination or enslavement within the context of witchcraft and zombie-keeping in Lowveld, South Africa. Likewise, HIV dominates the human body by making it a slave of numerous opportunistic infections as explained by *Poster 6* in section 2.3. It is the same concept of lifelessness that is echoed in the Teso term *ekutut* (a dry trunk). As stated in chapter two, especially in reference to the Zairean tree infested metaphor used in sensitizing Zaireans against HIV and AIDS, and also in *Figure 13*, the tree symbolizes life, and a trunk being a part of the tree metonymically stands in for the whole tree. Therefore, a dry trunk metaphorically denotes lifelessness. In the same vein, using the same mental representation of AIDS, one is declared lifeless because of AIDS's incurability is being equated to a death sentence as echoed by *Poster 6* or poster III. Moreover, since AIDS is a wasting disease, the Luo evoke the image of the skeleton in the expression, *Kaw na ringo to iwena chogo* (take the flesh and leave me the bones), resonates a similar idea echoed by the Tugen community among the Kalenjin, where AIDS is referred to as *kipkendabor* which denotes 'he who eats the body slowly to capture the wasting nature of the disease.'

Also incorporated with the death personified category are ideas of Lakoff & Turner (1989: 17) who argue that a beast trying to devour someone or images of death as a coachman are manifestations of death personified. These facts are captured by the Kalenjin term *kimaltel* (beast), the Samia term *evaka* (python) and the Luo word *gach Elijah*[76] (Prophet Elijah's chariot). To expound a little on this notion, a beast is always after devouring its prey. Similarly, HIV holds the human body hostage as its "prey", and consumes the body by weakening its immune system through opportunistic infections. Regarding the python (*evaka* in the Samia dialect of the Luhyia community), here the slow manner in which a python digests its food interpretively represents the asymptomatic nature in which HIV manifests itself within the human body for a couple of years, prior to subjecting the body to numerous infections. The Luo

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75 Niehaus (2005) anthropological work in Lowveld South Africa took note of witchcraft beliefs among the natives who argued that witches via supernatural means were capable of transforming sane persons into zombies, by exploiting them as unpaid workers either in their houses or farms. For more details see Magonya and Matu (2010)

76 Prophet Elijah is one prophet who never experienced natural death, rather his ascent into heaven was by a chariot sent by God.

word *gach Elijah* (Prophet Elijah's chariot) captures the notion of death as coachman since AIDS is a killer disease. Also included in the variants of death is the notion of electrocution in the Luhyia community evident in expressions like *ahupiwena sitima* (he has stepped on a live wire), with a similar expression having the same meaning in the Meru expression *naetaiwa waya* (meaning someone who has stepped on a live wire), and even the Kalenjin term *pchulul* (from the Kipsigis dialect, denoting something that kills). In brief, when one steps on a live wire, electrocution and instant death are inevitable. A live wire is therefore something capable of killing as expressed by the Kalenjin term *pchulul* (something that kills). In the same way, the incurability of AIDS is culturally represented in the Luhyia and Meru communities as a form of 'electrocution'.

5.7.6.1.5. Pejorative terms and negative metonymic terms

Finally, pejorative terms such as *tuo marach* (the bad disease) among the Luo, *imbaka* (the bad disease) in Maasai and *enyanorea* (the terrible disease) among the Kisii, *obwamani* (the deadly one from the Samia dialect of the Luhyia community) and *lumbe* (the dangerous one)- from the Maragoli dialect of the Luhyia community), each have a definite article *the*, accompanied by negative adjectives premodifying AIDS such as *bad* (*marach* in Luo and *imbaka* in Maasai communities respectively)*, terrible* (*enyanorea* in Kisii community), *deadly* (*obwamani*) and *dangerous* (*lumbe*) in the Luhyia community. The definite article according to Levinson (2000) grants AIDS specificity, suggesting that it is a known disease thus it is pointless mentioning it overtly. In terms of negative metonymic expressions, various words focused on an AIDS-related symptom to metonymically represent the disease. Examples include weight loss, thinness, hair loss or a long protruding neck, captured in following terms: the Kalenjin term *ptar sumeg*-something that causes hair loss, *silimu* (a Swahili loanword used by Luhyia speakers and equally all *Sheng'* speakers, *silimu* is a slang term for AIDS that denotes slimness). Other variants of slimness are found in these two Kikuyu terms *mũginyigi* (as thin as a spinal cord), together with the term *mũkingo*[77] (long necked caused by weight loss). For the Nyore speakers of the Luhyia community, the same slimness concept is represented by the word *oluwaya* (as thin as a wire). A similar expression is found among the Maasai community in the term *enamoratoni* (a wasting disease) synonymous to AIDS though the former is curable. The Turkana too have metonymic

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77 The term *mũkingo* (long necked) was derived from pictures of skinny AIDS patients in AIDS campaign posters. It is a case of metonymy whereby a symptom of the disease (weight loss leading to an elongated collar bone or neck) stands in for the disease (AIDS).

expressions used in reference to AIDS like "the one with exposed teeth", "the bonny one" or "the skinny nature" where ones physique metonymically stands in for the disease in Turkana lexical terms such as *lokwake, lokoyo* and *lodiim* respectively. Generally, these terms are used in reference to the wasting nature of AIDS and serve to reinforce the negative charge associated with AIDS, leading to its stigmatization. The schema in *Figure 27* presents a clear picture on the cross-cultural conceptualization of AIDS.

Figure 27: Cultural conceptualizations of AIDS in some Kenyan communities

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The schema in *Figure 27* abides to Rosch's (1978) principles of categorization in terms of the hierarchical structures that concepts normally adhere to, commencing from the superordinate level, basic level and subordinate level, religiously subscribe to principles of inclusiveness and exclusiveness. In this case, we have a superordinate category of AIDS that is generalized at the abstract level. Then the basic level hosting disaster, death personified, pejorative adjectives and metonymic expressions categories. Under the disasters' category and based on the speakers' conceptual expertize or rather as Kövecses (2006) christens it the overutilization of cognitive abilities, some Kenyan ethnic communities have subdivided the disaster category under the following labels: destruction by nature, destruction by insects or pests and destruction by supernatural phenomenon. At the subordinate level, there is specification of concepts, take for example under the basic level hosting the disasters subcategory, at its subordinate level, there is a more specific concept of disasters for instance a destructive wind (*embeo* in Luhyia) or destruction by pests such as maggots (*kudni* in Luo). Alternatively, the basic level hosting negative metonymic expressions for example the term *enamoratoni* (Maasai word for the slimming disease) is a more specific concept. As far as inclusiveness is concerned what is included in the subordinate level (*embeo*-destructive wind in Luhyia), is equally included in the category of disasters (basic level), which is also included in AIDS (the superordinate level). Likewise, we cannot overlook the inter-categorical exclusiveness for instance the disasters category excludes the category of death or negative metonymic expressions or concepts found under destruction by nature, excluding destruction by pests or insects.

From the foregoing discussion, we have illustrated how different Kenyan communities cognitively register their embodied experiences with AIDS, based on their visual perception of the disease and its manifestation within the human body. Indeed our data confirms Sperber's (2006) arguments on mental representations acting as an interface between cognition and culture. It cannot be overstressed that AIDS springs from man's environment, and with its internationally renown record of heightened mortality rates and reduced life expectancies in sub-Saharan Africa, the African culture has a way of registering such experiences based on our conceptualization of death and destruction as portrayed in *Figure 27*. If we are to contextualize all this information within Causal Cognitive Chains proposed by Sperber (2006), where perception, inference, memory and motor abilities complete the whole cognitive package, then we will be in a more favorable position as cognitive linguists to explain aspects related to stigmatization of HIV and AIDS. Taking the example of lexical term *enyakweumia* (owl) among the

Kisii and many African communities, the owl is a bad omen synonymous to death. Whenever, an owl is sighted on a roof top or perched on a tree in a specific compound, it automatically translates that someone is about to die. This is based on the cultural perception of what the concept owl means in such a community. From such a cultural perception, the concept of death is recorded within the Kisii mental faculties and given that AIDS is incurable, it becomes cognitively relevant to access death as an inference prior to thinking of the period one has to survive with AIDS. It therefore means, among the Kisii, the numerous AIDS-related deaths share certain similarities with the concept of *enyakweumia* (owl) within the domain of death, and is retrievable as an encyclopaedic entry of *enyakweumia* (owl) among the Kisii. It goes without saying that no one wants to die, given a chance most people would flee from any life-threatening scenario. It is in this perspective that mental representations such as the living dead, destructions, zombies or *enyakweumia* (owl), when evoked whenever one declares his seropositive status to some people, it is unsurprising that other people will flee as dictated by their motor abilities because of fear of death and contagion.

5.7.7 Disease related implicit assumptions and conceptualization of AIDS

5.7.7.1 Disease-related implicatures by Eldoret Town respondents

A discussion on implicit assumptions associated with various ailments will constitute the backbone of arguments in the current section that provides an examination of implicit assumptions associated with several ailments. And going by discussions in the third chapter advanced by Horn (1988), Grice (1989) and Levinson (1993), that implicatures are syntactically elusive but can be pragmatically inferred, in this section we first examine implicatures associated with seven ailments namely, headache, AIDS, syphilis, malaria, cholera, herpes and ebola by confirming whether they subscribe to the scientific models associated with the diseases in both Eldoret Town and Maseno division. Second, respondents from both regions were further asked to rank the ailments from the most feared to the least feared ones. Third, it was within our research interest to investigate how Kenyans categorized seropositive persons and also identify which specific category of persons depicted prototypical effects of spreading AIDS in Kenya. Research findings on disease-related pragmatic inferences are presented in *Table 24.*

Table 24: Implicit assumptions associated with diseases by Eldoret Town respondents

Headache	No of respondents and percentages		AIDS	No of respondents and percentages		Syphilis	No of respondents and percentages	
Stress	8	29%	Advice and counsel the person (by seropositive persons	7	27%	Unfaithful/ promiscuous	17	61%
A normal disease	7	25%				Seek medical attention	6	21%
Symptom of another disease	5	18%	Death	7	27%	Sadness	2	7%
Need for painkillers	4	14%	Shock	4	15%	Advice the person	2	7%
Other (unwell, tiredness)	4	14%	Promiscuity	4	15%	Take precaution	1	3%
			Other (go to hospital, maybe infected, take ARVS	4 .	15%			
Total	**28**			**26**			**28**	

Malaria	No of respondents and percentages		Cholera	No of respondents and percentages		Herpes	No of respondents and percentages		Ebola	No of respondents and percentages	
Normal disease associated with mosquito bites	13	46%	Poor sanitation/ hygienic conditions	19	68%	Promiscuity	12	43%	Flee because of fear of contagion	16	64%
						Symptom of AIDS	7	25%			
Seek medical attention/testing	9	32%	Seek medical attention	7	25%	Medical attention	5	18%	Death	3	12%
									Bad disease	2	8%
Normal disease	6	21%	Normal disease	1	4%	No knowledge of herpes	4	14%			
			Has AIDS	1	4%				A disease from the Congo region	2	8%
									Other	2	8%
Total	**28**			**28**			**28**			**25**	

The approach designed for *Table 24's* data analysis entails presenting implicit assumptions associated

with each disease. In *Table 1* found in chapter one, we attempted to use our own intuitions regarding possible assumptions on similar diseases. In the current section, we want to confirm whether we share similar pragmatic inferences as with our respondents, the percentages of their responses were as follows:

(i) Headache was mainly associated with stress-related implicit assumption by 29% of the respondents, closely followed by 25% who considered it a normal disease, 18% argued the presence of headache could be a symptom of another ailment, 14% stated that there was need for one to take painkillers to be relieved from the headache, whereas another 14% claimed that probably their friend was either tired or simply unwell. In brief, for Eldoret town respondents, headache is mostly stress related and for some cases treated as a normal disease.

(ii) Implicit assumptions associated with AIDS caused by HIV depended on ones HIV status, for seropositive persons 27% (n=7) they would first advice and counsel the person on living positively with AIDS, and also recommend that the person visits a Voluntary Counselling and Testing (VCT) center. This pragmatic inference stems from counselling sessions organized for seropositive persons in various Kenyan health facilities in form of support groups. 27% who were HIV negative assessed death as an implicature when a friend told them that he was suffering from AIDS, 15% said they would be shocked if a friend confided in them about their HIV status, another 15% will be judgmental and pragmatically infer that their friend must be promiscuous to have contracted AIDS. Then another 15% would suggest that their seropositive friend seeks medical attention. In summary, for the AIDS case, the two main pragmatic inferences: on one hand out of sympathy, seropositive persons would infer that their seropositive friend needs counselling. On the other hand, HIV negative respondents would be shocked by their friend's seropositive status. No respondent gave a scientific based assumption that their friend contracted AIDS caused by HIV maybe through sexual intercourse or blood transfusion.

(iii) Assumptions associated with syphilis caused by the treponema bacteria were as follows: 61% attributed the disease to unfaithfulness or promiscuity, 21% would advise that the person should seek medical attention, 7% would empathize with their friend by either feeling sorry or sad, 7% will immediately advise their friend to seek treatment, while 3% will pragmatically deduce that their friend was careless in his sex life hence the reason for contracting syphilis. In general, the common two

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implicit assumptions associated with syphilis are promiscuity and the need to seek medical attention to be cured of syphilis. Here again just like the assumptions associated with AIDS, no respondent gave a scientific-based assumption that maybe their friend was exposed to the treponema bacteria through unprotected sexual intercourse with an infected partner.

(iv) Assumptions associated with malaria caused by the plasmodium protozoa from an infected female anopheles mosquito were: 46% attributed it to mosquito bites, 32% advised the person to seek medical attention, and 21% pragmatically inferred that malaria is a normal disease. It therefore means that the two common implicit assumptions associated with malaria is that one has been bitten by a mosquito, thus the need to seek treatment, for if untreated malaria kills. Here again, a scientific based assumption was lacking in the sense that no respondent mentioned that his friend could have contracted malaria because of being bitten by mosquitoes having the plasmodium protozoa.

(v) Implicit assumptions associated with cholera caused by the vibrio cholerae bacteria were as follows; 68% claimed exposure to unhygienic conditions while 25% said that the person should seek medical attention, while 4% will pragmatically conclude that their friend has AIDS. From what has been discussed so far, cases of cholera are likely to generate implicit assumptions skewed towards primarily exposure to unhygienic conditions, then the need to seek medical attention. As noted that no respondent gave a scientific based assumption that their friend must have been exposed to the vibrio cholerae bacteria after ingesting unhygienic substances or contaminated food.

(vi) Herpes is a sexually transmitted disease caused by the herpes simplex virus and had several implicit assumptions: the predominant assumption mentioned by 43% of the respondents was associated with promiscuity, whereas 25% said it was a symptom of HIV and AIDS, 18% inferred that their friend needed to seek medical attention and another 14% were unfamiliar with herpes and were therefore unable to formulate any implicit assumption associated with the disease. Once again, no respondent gave a scientific-based assumption that his friend contracted herpes because it is a sexually transmitted infection caused by the herpes simplex virus.

(vii) Ebola is a hemorrhagic fever caused by a filovirus, its implicit assumptions were as follows: 64% of the respondents would flee from the victim because of fear of contagion, 12% of the respondents

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inferred death as an implicature, 8% of the respondents inferred that ebola was a bad disease, another 8% of the respondents inferred that it is a Congolese disease, based on its initial origins from Congo and 8% of the respondents gave diverse reasons. Again, no respondent gave a scientific based assumption that their friend contracted ebola because it is caused by a filovirus. Our results correlate with what we outlined in *Table 1* on perception of diseases, we however did not test the respondents implicit assumptions associated with cancer, gonorrhea or flu. On a pragmatic angle, the results echo Sperber's & Wilson's (1995) notion on strength and accessibility of implicatures being predetermined by man's perception of phenomenon or reinforced by pre-existing public representations or utterances regarding a particular assumption. Eldoret town respondents have disease-related implicatures based on their experiences with the ailments and also from what other persons have previously said about the disease for instance in most AIDS literature a disease such as syphilis is associated with promiscuity and not the treponema bacteria (cf. Sontag, 1988 and Doka, 1997 in section 2.2.1). The fact that respondents failed to give scientific-based assumptions about the disease serves as a confirmation of Banks & Thompson's (1996) research in chapter one, where lay people subscribe to simplistic cognitive models on ailments as opposed to a medic's perception of a similar ailment. For example, Banks & Thompson's respondents gave simplistic explanations for an ailment like blood pressure is caused by a large consumption of salt or lack of exercises that makes one's arteries clog. However, as explained by Banks & Thompson, the scientific account stipulates that blood pressure is caused as a result of a homeostatic imbalance due to high salt consumption thus compelling the body to retain water to regulate the imbalance, which triggers the high blood pressure (cf. section 2.2.1). The outlined data serves as a confirmation that the lay models of the cited ailments are inconsistent with the scientific models of the ailments.

5.7.7.2 Disease-related implicatures by Maseno Division respondents

Replicating the task in section 5.7.7.1, the task in this section was to present Maseno division respondents with the seven ailments such as headache, AIDS, syphilis, malaria, cholera, herpes and Ebola, with the intention of deriving their pragmatic inferences as presented in *Table 25*. Our goal was to establish whether disease-related implicit assumptions of Maseno division respondents were consistent with those of Eldoret town respondents.

Table 25: Implicit assumptions associated with diseases by Maseno Division respondents

Headache	No of respondents and percentages		Syphilis	No of respondents and percentages		Malaria	No of respondents and percentages	
Malaria	11	33%	Promiscuity	14	47%	Mosquito infested area/mosquito bites	7	28%
Stress	10	30%	Seek medical attention.	7	23%			
Normal disease	6	18%						
Sickness	2	6%	Symptoms of AIDS	3	10%	Normal disease	7	28%
Seek medical attention	2	6%	Shocked/concerned	3	10%	Seek medical attention	5	20%
Stress+malaria	1	3%	Had unprotected sex	2	7%	No assumptions	4	16%
Concerned	1	3%				Symptoms of another disease	1	4%
			Contact with an infected person	1	3%	Change of environment	1	4%
Total	**33**			**30**			**25**	
AIDS	No of respondents and percentages		Cholera	No of respondents and percentages		Herpes	No of respondents and percentages	
Encourage the persons	9	28%	Contagion	20	65%	Symptoms of AIDS	9	30%
Death	7	22%	Seek medical attention	5	16%	Promiscuity	9	30%
Concerned/ shocked	6	19%	Normal disease	4	13%	Seek medical attention	5	17%
Immoral/unfaithful	4	13%	Shock	1	3%	A sexually transmitted disease	3	10%
Medical attention	3	9%	Symptoms of AIDS	1	3%	Normal disease	3	10%
Sick	1	3%				Sympathize with the victim	1	3%
Total	**32**			**31**			**30**	

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Table 25 (Continuation) Implicit assumptions associated with diseases by Maseno Division respondents

Ebola	No of respondents and percentages	
1. Airborne/fear of contagion	9	30%
2. No assumption for lack of experience with the disease	6	20%
3. Seek medical attention	4	13%
4. Death	4	13%
5. Was in Uganda	2	7%
6. Shock	2	6%
7. Consume monkey meat	2	6%
8. Curable disease	1	3%
Total	**30**	

From the data presented in *Table 25*, it is deducible that :

(i) Whenever someone talks of having a headache within Maseno division, based on data from 33 respondents, there are high chances respondents (33%, n=11) will infer that he has malaria. This is because Maseno as well as the greater part of Nyanza province are prone to recording heightened malarial infections in Kenya. Some symptoms synonymous with malaria include: fever, headache and in extreme cases vomiting. Therefore based on the respondents experiences with malaria, they naturally associated it with headache. It is noteworthy to mention that associating headache with malaria was not noticed among Eldoret town respondents. Other respondents gave other inferences on headache, for instance 30% inferred that it was stress-related, 18% inferred that headache was a normal disease. Then 6% said it was a symptom of an undisclosed ailment, while another 6% recommended medical attention for someone having a headache. Contrastively, another 3% would be concerned about having a headache

(ii) For the case of syphilis caused by treponema bacteria, the following were its implicit assumptions drawn from 30 respondents; 47% argued that when a friend says he has syphilis, they would infer that he or she is promiscuous, 23% would recommend that that their friend seeks medical attention, 10% would infer that syphilis is associated with AIDS and therefore suspect that their friend is likely to be HIV positive, 10% were likely to be shocked, 7% would infer that their friend had unprotected sex, while 3% cognitively entertained the assumption that their friend had sexual intercourse with an infected partner. There was no respondent who gave a scientific-based assumption that syphilis was

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caused by the treponema bacteria from an infected partner and transmitted through sexual intercourse, but instead focus was on promiscuity.

(iii) For a disease like malaria caused by a plasmodium protozoa from an infected female anopheles mosquito, based on data from 25 respondents, people are likely to deduce that one was either bitten by a female anopheles mosquito or has been in a malaria prone region or can be treated as a case of one forgetting to sleep under a mosquito net as registered among 28%, 28% claimed that it was a normal disease, 20% recommended that there is need to seek medical attention, 16% had the assumption that their friend was suffering from malaria, 4% inferred that it was a symptom of another disease, while another 4% inferred that it could be due to change of environment. In the case of malaria, attempts were made to mention the causative agent of malaria as being a female anopheles mosquito, but there was no citation stating that a plasmodium causes malaria.

(iv) For the case of AIDS caused by HIV, the following inferences were generated by 32 respondents, 28% (n=9), would encourage and advice the person on living positively with the virus, it is noteworthy to mention, 7 out of the 9 respondents constituting (77%) of respondents who made this choice were HIV positive and only two were HIV negative. Therefore, HIV positive respondents would not condemn someone for having AIDS, but recommend counselling for a seropositive person. Normally, seropositive persons are inclined to advice others because most of them are members of support groups, where counselling sessions focus on living positively with AIDS, 22%, (n=7) inferred that death is inevitable for their friends, 19%, (n=6) would be shocked and concern about their friends, 13%, (n=4) would infer that their friend is immoral or promiscuous, 9%, (n=3) inferred that their friend should seek medical attention and 6%, (n=2) pragmatically inferred that AIDS is a normal disease. Here again, there was no mentioning of the scientific-based assumption that AIDS is caused by HIV and is transmitted through mother to child transmission, blood transfusion or sexual intercourse.

(v) For an ailment like cholera caused by vibro-cholerae bacteria due to exposure to unhygienic conditions, its pragmatic inferences by 31 Maseno division respondents were; 65% inferred that their friend's hygienic conditions were suspect, either he or she had consumed dirty food or drank unboiled water, 16% inferred that his friend should seek medical attention, 13% inferred that it is a normal disease, 3% said that they would be shocked to learn that their friend is suffering from cholera, while

another 3% said it was an AIDS related symptom. Again no respondent overtly used the scientific jargon that their friend must have been exposed to the vibrio-cholerae bacteria as a result of injesting contagious foods or substances.

(vi) Using data from 30 respondents in establishing some of their pragmatic inferences on herpes caused by the herpes simplex virus, the following were their inferences; 30% inferred that herpes was a manifestation of HIV and AIDS, another 30% inferred that their friend was promiscuous, 17% inferred that their friend should seek medical attention to be treated, 10% pragmatically inferred that it was a sexually transmitted disease, and other 10% inferred that it was a normal ailment, and finally another 3% sympathized with their friend for contracting herpes. Here again, even though 10% of the respondents acknowledged the fact that herpes was a sexually transmitted disease, there was no mentioning of the herpes simplex virus that causes herpes as known in the medical field.

(vii) Ebola is medically caused by the filovirus and is highly contagious thus the following were some of the salient inferences of the ailment, 30% inferred that ebola was an airborne disease and would fear having any close contact with their infected friends, 20% were unable to generate any inferences on the disease for they were not conversant with the disease, apparently a similar occurrence was noticed among Eldoret town respondents. 13% inferred that there is urgent need for their friend to seek medical attention, 13% accessed death as an implicit assumption once their friend claimed to be suffering from Ebola, 7% claimed that their friend might have been in Uganda, a region associated with the Ebola virus, while 6% would be shocked, and another 6% inferred that their friend consumed some monkey meat. The least accessible assumption is that Ebola is a curable disease. Thus ebola's most salient implicit assumption was predominantly associated with fear of death or contagion.

So far, we have presented pragmatic inferences associated with headache, AIDS, syphilis, malaria, cholera, herpes and Ebola, of which Maseno division respondents pragmatically inferred the following salient inferences: that headache is likely to be symptom of malaria, syphilis is synonymous with one being promiscuous or immoral. For someone diagonized with malaria, the likely inference is that he was from bitten by a mosquito or was from a malaria-prone region. In the case of HIV and AIDS, inferences computed depend on one's HIV status. On one hand, seropositive persons are likely to infer that a seropositive person needs counselling to live positively with HIV and AIDS. On the other hand,

for HIV negative persons, their inference is skewed towards the inevitability of death at this point in time. In the context of cholera, the immediate inference is that one's hygienic conditions are substandard or one has ingested some unhygienic substances. Contrastively, for someone suffering from ebola, most respondents inferred fear of contagion and would flee their friends having Ebola for it is highly contagious. According to Sperber & Wilson (1995: 77) implicatures have a belief fixation component[78] that humans firmly hold so long as they are confident about entertaining a particular implicature. The latter is normally accessible by virtue of its strength or what people consider as true about the particular implicature. It therefore goes without saying that some implicatures are more accessible than others as witnessed in the above-mentioned ailments. The strength or confidence for upholding a particular implicature is sustained by either perceptual experience with the disease or pre-existing assumptions or public representations of the disease, expressed orally by speakers of a linguistic community. To be brief, and on the basis of data presented on implicatures associated the cited ailments, we concur with Sperber & Wilson (1995) that assumptions associated with the above ailments are byproducts of both perception and public representations of the diseases among Maseno division respondents and Eldoret town respondents. Also as witnessed in section *5.7.7.1* and in accordance with Banks's & Thompson's (1996) research that people hardly subscribe to the laid down or complex scientific descriptions or models on ailments as stated within the medical field. It also explains why there was hardly any respondent who said the ebola was caused by the filovirus or cholera by the vibrio-cholerae bacteria

5.7.7.3 Ranking of ailments by Eldoret Town respondents

The section's discussions investigate whether HIV negative respondents and HIV positive respondents from both low prevalence region in Eldoret Town and high prevalence region in Maseno division subscribe to similar or dissimilar ranking systems of the outlined ailments in *Tables 24* and *25* starting from the most feared ailment to the least feared one as in *Table 26*. To begin with Eldoret Town respondents, the data presented in *Table 26* is from 25 respondents instead of 28 respondents from

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78 Sperber & Wilson (1995: 77) use the example that if Jane told someone that she likes caviar, the person would have no reason to doubt her word. This belief will be further reinforced when one actually observes Jane taking caviar while looking delighted. However, if one witnesses Jane declining an offer of eating caviar, then accessing the assumption of Jane liking caviar will be difficult. For Sperber & Wilson (1995: 75) what people hold as true about a particular implicature will guide their actions for instance one may want to buy petrol, while assuming that both petrol stations found up and down a particular street are both opened. If one entertains the assumption that the station premised down the street is likely to be open, then the person will go towards that particular station while ignoring the station found in the upper street.

Eldoret Town, because of the following two reasons. One, for HIV negative respondents, two respondents had no knowledge of herpes and therefore were unable to give a complete ranking system of the disease. Two, for HIV positive respondents, one failed to rank the ailments on grounds that he did not fear any disease.

Table 26: Ranking of ailments from the most feared to the least feared ones by Eldoret Town respondents and Maseno Division respondents

HIV NEGATIVE RESPONDENTS FROM ELDORET TOWN	FREQUENCY OUT OF 17	HIV POSITIVE RESPONDENTS FROM ELDORET TOWN	FREQUENCY OUT OF 8
1. Ebola 2. AIDS 3. Herpes 4. Syphilis 5. Cholera 6. Malaria 7. Headache	11 9 7 6 7 9 16	1. Ebola 2. AIDS 3. Syphilis 4. Herpes 5. Cholera 6. Malaria 7. Headache	4 3 3 4 4 4 6
HIV NEGATIVE RESPONDENTS FROM MASENO DIVISION	FREQUENCY OUT OF 18 RESPONDENTS	HIV POSITIVE RESPONDENTS FROM MASENO DIVISION	FREQUENCY OUT OF 13 RESPONDENTS
1. AIDS 2. Ebola 3. Herpes 4. Syphilis 5. Cholera 6. Malaria 7. Headache	11 6 6 8 6 11 18	1. Ebola 2. AIDS 3. Herpes 4. Syphilis 5. Cholera 6. Malaria 7. Headache	8 5 4 6 4 8 9

In total we had 25 respondents instead of 28, there were dissimilarities in the manner in which HIV negative persons and HIV positive respondents ranked ailments. HIV negative respondents ranked ebola, AIDS, herpes, syphilis, cholera, malaria and headache as their order from the most feared to the least feared ailments. Contrastively, HIV positive respondents adhered to ebola, AIDS, syphilis, herpes, cholera, malaria and headache. The difference here lies in the positioning of syphilis and herpes given the HIV negative respondents ranked it closer to AIDS because in most cases it is associated with HIV, while seropositive respondents ranked it in the fourth place hence treating it like any other sexually transmitted infection, that is less feared than syphilis. All in all, the ranking system adopted subscribed

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to the following continuum, contagious and killer diseases such as Ebola, incurable killer diseases such as AIDS, then curable sexually transmitted diseases, which depending on one's HIV status can be categorized differently, for HIV negative persons herpes is more feared than syphilis, while for HIV positive persons syphilis is more feared than herpes, then curable but potentially killer diseases like cholera, malaria are less feared, while the least feared ailment being headache.

5.7.7.3.1 Ranking of ailments by Maseno Division respondents

Following the presented data in *Table 26*, it was necessary to examine the ranking systems adopted by Maseno division respondents in categorizing ailments from the most feared ones to the least feared ones (see *Appendix 19*). The HIV positive respondents were 14 but only 12 ranked the diseases in the expected pattern. Since HIV negative respondents only 18 gave their ranking order for the cited diseases, with 1 respondent claiming that he feared all diseases and failed to give his category of diseases. As articulated by the data in *Table 26*, HIV negative respondents adapted the following ranking system; AIDS, Ebola, herpes, syphilis, cholera, malaria and headache. Whereas, HIV positive respondents subscribe to the following sequence: Ebola, AIDS, herpes, syphilis, cholera, malaria and headache in ranking the most feared ailments to the least feared ones. Apparently, these results were different from those obtained from Eldoret town respondents, where both HIV positive and HIV negative respondents had Ebola as the most feared ailment then followed by AIDS, divergences only emerged in the positioning of both herpes and syphilis. HIV negative respondents in Maseno placed herpes in the third position as in the case of both HIV negative respondents in Eldoret town and HIV positive respondents in Maseno Division. This contrasted the ranking system of HIV positive respondents in Eldoret town, who interchanged the positions of the two ailments by placing syphilis and herpes in the third and fourth position respectively, while cholera, malaria, and headache maintaining in their respective positions. The argument given by HIV positive respondents for placing AIDS in second position after Ebola is that inasmuch as AIDS is incurable, antiretrovirals lengthen one's lifespan, unlike Ebola which is highly contagious and kills in a matter of days. HIV negative respondents took a different standpoint, by arguing that AIDS is a killer disease and feared it more than ebola. Ironically, the latter kills in a matter of days as opposed to AIDS, which takes several years before its victim dies. To give a clearer picture *Table 27*, provides data on a comparative analysis of the ranking systems of the cited ailments by both Eldoret town respondents and their Maseno division

counterparts, to determine the most unique ranking system for the ailments that respondents are likely to choose.

Table 27: Ranking system for ailments among some Kenyan respondents

Respondents ranking system for ailments from the most feared to the least feared ailment
Maseno: HIV+ ranking system: Ebola, AIDS, herpes, syphilis, cholera, malaria, headache Maseno: HIV- ranking system: AIDS, Ebola, herpes, syphilis, cholera, malaria, headache Eldoret: HIV- ranking system: Ebola, AIDS, herpes, syphilis cholera, malaria, headache Eldoret: HIV+ ranking system: Ebola, AIDS, syphilis, herpes, cholera, malaria, headache

Based on the data on *Table 27*, there is logic in saying that respondents would have ranked the most feared ailment to the least feared one using the following model: Ebola, AIDS, herpes, syphilis, cholera, malaria and headache. This is because Ebola is highly contagious and kills in a matter of days, AIDS is a killer disease but takes a longer time to eventually kill its victims, herpes is a curable sexually transmitted disease, mostly associated with AIDS, syphilis is a curable sexually transmitted disease, then cholera, malaria and headache do not fall under sexually transmitted diseases but are all the same curable. It goes without saying that people fear highly contagious and incurable diseases, then followed by incurable sexually transmitted ailments, then curable sexually transmitted diseases such as herpes and syphilis and lastly less feared ailments are not necessarily sexually transmitted as in the case of cholera, malaria (these two are potentially killer diseases especially if diagnosed late) and headache. Just to mention in passing, malaria happens to be one of the leading killer diseases in sub-Saharan Africa, yet it was surprising to note that respondents classified it as one of the least feared ailments in both Maseno division and Eldoret Town.

5.7.7.4 Categorization of seropositive persons and categories of people blamed for spreading AIDS by Eldoret Town respondents

In section 5.7.7.1, we highlighted implicit assumptions associated with some ailments among Eldoret town respondents, we now proceed with our quest in understanding how seropositive persons are categorized and which persons depict prototypical effects of the most representative category of persons blamed for spreading HIV and AIDS in Kenya, our findings regarding this task is outlined in *Table 28.*

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Table 28: Categorization of seropositive persons by Eldoret Town respondents

Perception of seropositive persons	Number of respondents	Percentage
1. Stigmatized/Hated/Discriminated against 2. Promiscuous and Immoral 3. Other: Have no future, people understand they need caring	18 7 3	64% 25% 11%
Total	**28**	**100**
Categorization of people blamed for spreading AIDS	**Number of respondents**	**Percentage**
1. Commercial sex workers 2. Men/Sugar daddies/married men, wife inheritors 3. Other: Girls, single mothers, youth 4. Drunkards 5. Drug addicts 6. Homosexuals	11 5 5 4 2 1	39% 18% 18% 14% 7% 3.6%

Based on our analysis, it is increasingly clear that 64% (n=18) of the respondents concur that stigmatization of seropositive persons is evident, meaning that they are treated as outcasts and are discriminated against. Even when we cross-check with the conventional meanings of lexical terms used in reference to HIV among Kenyan communities in section *5.7.6*, it is impossible to deny their negative connotations towards HIV and AIDS. Likewise, the negative charge associated with the latter is applicable to seropositive persons perceived as immoral and promiscuous as stated by 25% of the respondents. Another 11% held that although some people perceive seropositive persons as having no future, some people stress that seropositive persons still need caring. In terms of categorization, more particularly the identification of categories portraying prototypical effects in matters related to propagation of HIV and AIDS, around 39% of the respondents stated that commercial sex workers are the category of persons liable for spreading AIDS in Kenya. To interpret it differently, they are the most representative category of high risk groups among addressees. The commercial sex workers' category was closely followed by men, either married, wife inheritors or sugar daddies mentioned by 18% of the respondents, the other category covering girls, women and youths cited 18% of respondents, 14% mentioned drunkards, with drug addicts and homosexuals cited by 7% and 3.6% of respondents respectively. Apparently, the last two categories were the less frequently mentioned, meaning that they are non-representative of a high risk group prototype. Rosch (1978: 36) clarifies that prototypes emerge

from people's judgments of how good an example is of a category or defining which members belong to a particular category. Relating Rosch's and Lakoff's notions to our discussion, with insights from Taylor (1989) who gives numerous reasons on why prototypes arise[79], and based on our experiences and also the traditional assumption that the initial AIDS cases were synonymous with commercial sex workers as a high risk group especially in Kenya, this category has been singled out as responsible for spreading AIDS among Eldoret town respondents because of their numerous sexual partners hence heightening their chances of infection.

5.7.7.4 1. Categorization of seropositive persons and categories of persons blamed for spreading AIDS in Kenya by Maseno Division respondents

In respect to the categorization of seropositive persons, 33 respondents of Maseno division were given the task of using their cognitive experiences in establishing their societal categorization of seropositive persons as presented in *Table 29*.

Table 29: Categorization of seropositive persons in Maseno Division

Categorization	No of respondents and percentages	
1. Stigmatized- treated as outcasts	15	45%
2. Promiscuous	10	30%
3. Need specialized attention	6	9%
4. Never had any interaction with an AIDS victim	2	6%

In Maseno division, 45% of the respondents pointed out that seropositive persons were still stigmatized for their seropositive status, 30% stated that seropositive persons were regarded as promiscuous and probably their sexual behaviour led them to contract AIDS, 9% recommended that AIDS victims needed specialized attention from the public, another 6% had never seen seropositive persons and were unaware of the treatment accorded to them. In short, almost 75% of respondents

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79 Taylor (1989) explores numerous schools of thought in accounting for prototypicality, one has to do with our inherent nature as human beings we tend to focus on perceptually salient categories as opposed to non salient ones. For instance in the case of spatial orientations, we will focus on vertical and horizontal dimensions rather than oblique shapes, or for color categories, focus will be on focal colors as opposed to non-focal colors. Furthermore, there is the issue of frequency of occurrence of certain categories, Rosch (1978) dismissed this point, but Taylor regards it not as a cause of prototypicality but a symptom of it. Then finally, societal conventions inclusive or cultural experiences have a way of determining prototypes.
  Lakoff (1999) contends stereotypes, cognitive models, paragons, sub-models, metonymy also convey prototypicality.

agreed that AIDS victims are perceived negatively, they are either blamed for contracting the disease because of their promiscuity, and thereby treated as pariahs by HIV negative persons (cf. Nzioka, 2000 in chapter two). The situation was worsened when only 6% of the respondents who advocated for specialized treatment and consideration for seropositive persons. The noted results concur with those found in Eldoret where 65% of the respondents reported that seropositive persons are stigmatized, while 25% of the respondents said that seropositive persons easily acquired labels such as immoral and promiscuous for having AIDS. On the contrary, a smaller percentage of respondents of about 11% claimed that seropositive respondents needed care because of their condition.

Regarding the question on whether a particular category of persons is entirely responsible for spreading AIDS as by Maseno Division respondents, *Table 30* provides some of their protoypical high risk groups as stipulated by Rosch (1978) principles of categorization within a continuum of best prototypical models to less representative members of a category of persons singled out as propagating AIDS within Maseno division.

Table 30: Categorization of persons responsible for spreading AIDS among Maseno Division respondents

Categorizations of persons responsible for spreading AIDS among Maseno Division respondents	No of respondents and percentage	
1. No category.	11	28%
2. Commercial Sex Workers	7	18%
3. Seropositive persons.	6	15%
4. The youth and sexually active persons.	5	13%
5. Sugar daddies/men.	4	10%
6. Drug addicts.	2	5%
7. Truck drivers.	1	3%
8. Widows.	1	3%
9. Circumcisors.	1	3%
10. Wife inheritors.	1	3%
11. Non-governmental workers.	1	3%
Total	**40**	**100**

Before proceeding with the data analysis outlined in *Table 30*, we want to state that we dealt with 33 respondents. However, some mentioned one or two categories of persons whom they thought were responsible for spreading AIDS in Kenya, hence explaining why we have a total of 40 and not 33

responses. Among Maseno division respondents, 28% could not blame any category of persons responsible for spreading AIDS in Kenya, 18% attributed the spread of AIDS to commercial sex workers, 15% claimed that seropositive persons who purposely spread the disease are to blame for its continual propagation. Other categories included youths and sexually active persons mentioned by 13%, sugar daddies or men cited by 10%, drug addicts mentioned by 5%, 3% cited truck drivers, 3% cited circumcisors, another 3% mentioned wife inheritors, and finally 3% cited non governmental organization workers as a less representative category of the AIDS high risk group. In general, the cited categories are high risk groups liable for spreading AIDS according to Maseno division respondents. Interestingly, their categorization system was slightly different from Eldoret town respondents who had the following categories with different percentage distribution, commercial sex workers (39%), men/sugar daddies, married men, wife inheritors (18%), girls, single mothers and youths (18%), drunkards (14%), drug addicts (7%) and homosexuals (3.6%). The differences in categorization are due to the differences in prevalence rates, for Maseno division is premised within a high prevalence region, where in many cases AIDS indiscriminately affects everyone for instance university staff, students, villagers and this explains why most Maseno division respondents were unable to come up with a most representative category of a high risk group in the region. Nonetheless, in both Maseno division and Eldoret town commercial sex workers received high ratings and can be taken to be representative of a high risk group as opposed to truck drivers, homosexuals or staff from non governmental organizations. What we found peculiar about Maseno division's classification of prototypical high risk groups is that Maseno division is located in Nyanza province, where wife inheritance has been predominantly blamed for the propagation of HIV and AIDS in the province, yet respondents classify wife inheritors among the least representative categories of high risk groups in Maseno division. Thus an indicator that wife inheritors are culturally not considered a high risk group within the region where wife inheritance is rife. This is in contrast to what behaviour change communicators know of this particular high risk group especially on their active role in propagating AIDS in Nyanza province in Kenya.

Furthermore, the mentioning of categories such as seropositive persons, widows and truck drivers as persons blamed for spreading AIDS by Maseno division respondents, such categories were however not cited by Eldoret town respondents. Therefore with the glaring differences in categorizations confirms what Banks & Thompson (1996) noted with different models people in their understanding of the underlying mechanisms of the cardiovascular system as discussed in chapter one. In simpler terms,

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even in the categorization of persons blamed for spreading AIDS, we have witnessed respondents having numerous models. This shows the cognitive diversity in the region-specific conceptualization of high risk groups as dictated by HIV prevalence rates and region- specific high risk groups.

5.7.8 Explicit AIDS messages and their acceptability by Eldoret Town respondents

The main task in this section was to show Eldoret Town respondents and Maseno division respondents (see section 5.7.8.1) two AIDS posters having a similar theme on using protection in fighting AIDS but with dissimilar pictorial images. To be more precise, we used the Australian Grim reaper campaign (Poster A), characteristic of the angel of death holding his scythe on the background. The poster's foregrounded message was *AIDS prevention is the only cure we have got.* In addition to POSTER A, we had the Swiss STOP AIDS campaign (Poster B) having images of two nude women engrossed in a game of fencing without any protective gear, the poster's message reads *No action without protection. 1. No intercourse without a condom. 2. Semen or blood-never in the mouth.* The aim was to determine whether respondents readily embraced the use of explicit pictorial metaphors in AIDS campaign posters. We further investigated which of the two posters would the respondents comfortably use in sensitizing youths on HIV and AIDS. *Table 31* shows reasons for the respondents poster preferences.

Poster A   **Poster B**

Table 31: Preference for explicit versus non-explicit AIDS posters by Eldoret Town respondents

POSTER PREFERENCE	No OF RESPONDENTS OUT OF 28	PERCENTAGES
(I) POSTER A (II) POSTER B (III) BOTH POSTERS (IV) NONE	20 5 1 2	71% 18% 4% 7%
TOTAL	**28**	**100%**
Reasons for choosing poster A (i) It is scary, instills fear or is strange (ii) It is obscene/ unafrican to use nudity in AIDS campaigns	 11 9	 55% 45%
TOTAL	**20**	**100**
Reason for choosing poster B -The message was chosen by 4 out of 5 (50%) HIV+ respondents (i) Respondents preferred poster B because they were not embarrassed of the sexually explicit messages, due to their status.	 5	 100%
TOTAL NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS FOR POSTER B	**5**	

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In reference to *Table 31's* data, it is deducible that on one extreme, 71% of Eldoret Town respondents preferred poster A to B in sensitizing their children on HIV and AIDS, however 18% of the respondents preferred poster B. The underlying reason for choosing poster A is because 55% of respondents primarily wanted their children to be scared of AIDS. On the other extreme, the reasons given by 45% of the respondents discrediting poster B was that the pictorial metaphor of nude people engaged in risky sports was considered both unafrican and obscene. Moreover, 80% of the seropositive respondents who constituted 50% of Eldoret Town's seropositive respondents preferred poster B. Their reasons for choosing poster B was determined by their HIV status since they affirmed that they were no longer embarrassed of sexuality issues. Therefore, they would gladly recommend poster B to be used in sensitizing their children on HIV and AIDS. Seemingly, seropositive persons in Eldoret town categorize sensitive AIDS related posters differently from HIV negative persons.

To aid us comprehend how respondents arrived at their understanding of posters A and B, we need to revisit Ungerer's (2003) works in chapter four. At this point, we are not going to comment much on poster A since we had given an in-depth discussion on the structure of conceptual blends and metonymic references emerging from the Grim Reaper Blend in *Poster 4* and *Figure 11*. Just to recall some metonymic aspects of the poster, there is an image of death personified emerging from the blend with his execution weapon, the scythe representing the manner in which Grim reaper "harvests" human souls. This is metaphorically transposed onto the manner in which HIV kills its victims. Contrastively, poster B uses the source domain of risky sports, more particularly fencing where participants are without their protective gears to interpretively represent people engaging in unprotected sex.

In Ungerer's (2003) perspective, understanding the two posters is normally guided by the Attention-Interest-Desire-Action formula, whereby pictorial images accompanying advertised products should have the following four effects on their addressees; they should arrest their attention, they should arouse some level of interest in addressees, they should create a desire in addressees towards accepting the product or idea and finally, this desire should lead the addressees to act by buying the product or accepting the idea being sold by the communicator. The two messages are selling the same idea to addressees oriented around using protection in AIDS prevention. The pictorial metaphors in the posters are the following: Grim the reaper and images of nude people engaging in risky sports without protective gear are meant via DESIRE to trigger the GRABBING metonymy owing to the benefits of

using protection in preventing AIDS transmission. Failure to use condoms would lead to death that is metonymically represented by Grim reaper or compared to people engaged in risky sports such as fencing without the appropriate attire and this is under the guidance of THE DESIRED IDEA IS A VALUABLE IDEA. However, at the level of the INTEREST metaphor, the two pictorial metaphors fall under SHOCK metaphors, where Grim reaper advocates for THE DESIRED IDEA IS SHOCKING/FRIGHTENING since the pictorial metaphor of death personified will automatically instill fear among addressees by virtue of its scary appearance and the scythe. On the contrary, images of nude people engaging in risky sports are skewed towards THE DESIRED IDEA IS REVOLTING, especially in cultures where sexuality is taboo and images of nude people are unacceptable. However, for some seropositive respondents in Eldoret Town, their perception of poster B is that THE DESIRED IDEA IS A GOOD IDEA THAT EDUCATES YOUNG ADULTS ON AIDS and therefore achieving relevance by producing positive cognitive effects by sensitizing the respondents or young adults on AIDS. To be more emphatic, Ungerer (2003: 327) has even cautioned us that even though strange or revolting source domains may provide more powerful metaphors as in the case of poster B, it does not necessarily mean they will activate the GRABBING metonymy. This explains why 71% of respondents rejected poster B, because of its sexually explicit images were unacceptable in the African culture. As a matter of fact, some respondents claimed one cannot show such sexually explicit images to the youths because they encourage premarital sex. Nonetheless, for seropositive persons who are no longer embarrassed about sexuality matters, the GRABBING metonymy facilitated their acceptance of Poster B's idea on using explicit pictures of nude persons engaged in risky sports minus their protective gears is both powerful and useful in sensitizing the youths on dangers of unprotected sex. In our perspective, poster A's muting strategies entail using of the construction AIDS. PREVENTION IS THE ONLY CURE WE HAVE GOT. This is meant to instill in the addressees mind that there is need to focus on prevention interventions to avoid AIDS-related deaths. The muting strategies associated with poster B involve the LOVE LIFE STOP AIDS disclaimer, alerting the communicator that the "obscene" poster has utility. In the sense that it is designed to convey an AIDS-related message on prevention. To wind up, metaphors and metonymy operating in both posters are represented in *Figures 28* and *29.*

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GRIM REAPER IS A SHOCKING/SCARY
THING

MUTING STRATEGY
(PREVENTION IS THE ONLY CURE)

USING PROTECTION IS A GOOD
IDEA

Metaphor

**Additional
metaphor**

HOODED SKELETON
OR ANGEL OF DEATH
STANDS FOR DEATH

GRIM REAPER
STANDS FOR AIDS

FIGHTING AIDS IS USING
CONDOMS

motivates

activates

**EMBRACING THE IDEA THAT USING PROTECTION IS
IS A GOOD IDEA**

Figure 28: Metaphors and metonymic expressions for "AIDS prevention is the only cure we have got".-GRIM REAPER campaign.

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                    ┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
                    │   NUDE PEOPLE ENGAGED IN FENCING         │
                    │         IS A REVOLTING IDEA              │
                    │                                          │
                    │        MUTING STRATEGIES                 │
                    │       LOVE LIFE, STOP AIDS               │
                    │                                          │
                    │   USING PROTECTION IS A GOOD IDEA        │
                    └─────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

Additional

metaphor

SEX WITHOUT   Fails to motivate   RISKY SPORTS

PROTECTION IS   HIV- respondents   activates (for only   WITHOUT PROTECTIVE

RISKY SPORTS   but motivates 80% of   seropositive respondents)   GEAR STANDS FOR

                            HIV+ respondents   UNPROTECTED SEX

EMBRACING USE OF NUDE PICTURES IN ADVOCATING FOR CONDOM USE

IS A GOOD IDEA

Figure 29: Metaphors and metonymic expressions for "No action without protection" campaign

5.7.8.1 Explicit AIDS messages and their acceptability by Maseno Division respondents

This section's task was to present to Maseno division respondents the Australian Grim reaper poster (Poster A) bearing the message *AIDS prevention is the only cure we have got*, which was juxtaposed with the explicit STOP AIDS Swiss AIDS campaign poster bearing the message *NO ACTION WITHOUT PROTECTION* (Poster B). The aim was to determine whether Maseno division respondents readily embraced sexually explicit pictorial metaphors in AIDS campaign posters and further establish whether there would be any differences from Eldoret town respondents. Results of this task have been tabulated in *Table 32.*

Table 32: Preference for explicit versus non-explicit AIDS posters by Maseno Division respondents

Picture Preference	Number of respondents and percentage	
Poster A: Grim reaper.	21	64%
Poster B: STOP AIDS, No action without protection.	7	21%
None of the posters.	5	15%
Total	**33**	**100**

The data in *Table 32*, shows that 64% of Maseno division respondents overwhelmingly chose poster A instead of poster B, which was chosen by only 21% of respondents. Another 15% of respondents rejected both posters. Some of the respondents reasons for choosing poster A were: one respondent said that "A is scary, B is indecent and unafrican". Another respondent said "If I choose B, the children will want to know why they are naked and it will encourage them to engage in sex". Respondents seemed uncomfortable with poster B's sexually explicit pictures, which was the same reaction noted among Eldoret town respondents. The latter found poster B shocking and respondents were reluctant to embrace its usage in sensitizing the youth on AIDS in Kenya. For respondents who settled for poster B they gave the following arguments, one respondent said it was because poster B depicted how AIDS should be fought vigorously. Another respondent claimed that poster A was more scary than poster B. Some respondents rejected both posters as one respondent dismissed poster A because it was scary and considered poster B vulgar. To be brief, the usage of sexually explicit as opposed to non-explicit AIDS posters in Maseno division was unwelcome and considered culturally alien. Maseno division respondents concurred with Eldoret town respondents that using scary images are more acceptable than sexually explicit pictorial metaphors. To avoid unnecessary duplication of material, the analysis done in *Figures 28* and *29* under Ungerer's (2003) argument of metaphors and metonymies in advertisements is applicable to Maseno division respondents. However, respondents who rejected posters A and B, was largerly because they remained unpersuaded by the GRABBING metonymy in both posters.

5.7.9 Categorization of gender and use of protection among Eldoret Town respondents

The analysis in this section is premised on our fifth objective that examines typical Kenyan stereotypes that could inhibit implementation of AIDS messages in Kenya, with specific reference to gender and the use of protection. In most literature on HIV and AIDS, one underlying ideology challenging the

fight against AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa is use of protection in a predominantly patriarchal society. This is because of gender-biased challenges women face in fighting AIDS with regard to using protection. In this perspective, we wanted to affirm whether there exists any preconceived notions among Eldoret town and Maseno division addressees especially where categorization of gender and use of protection are concerned. The task was to register whether there are similar reactions in terms of gender, supposing a respondent found condoms in his son's room and also in her daughter's purse. Our objective was to find out whether both genders will be categorized differently or be regarded in the same perspective. The results were tabulated in *Table 33*

Table 33: Categorization of gender and use of protection among Eldoret Town respondents

Female Gender	No of respondents	%	Male Gender	No of respondents	%
Taking precaution	10	38%	Taking precaution	18	69%
Guide and counsel her	5	19%	Guide and counsel him	2	8%
Surprised/shocked/annoyed but will guide and counsel her	4	15%	Angry/surprised/scared	2	8%
Angry/Spoilt/promiscuous	3	12%	Glad and will guide and counsel him	2	8%
Get mad at her and beat her	2	8%			
Proud/glad she is taking precaution and counsel her	1	4%	Interrogate him	1	4%
Interrogate her	1	4%	Getting information on sex from wrong sources	1	4%
TOTAL	**26**	**100**		**26**	**100**

In *Table 33,* there are conspicuous gender disparities pertaining to categorization of the female child (representing women) with regard to the presence condoms in her purse, *vis à vis* the categorization of the boy child (representing men) for having a pack of condoms in his room. A cursory glance at the data provides interesting insights as first and foremost 38% of respondents perceived the girl child as taking precaution by having protection in her purse. Interestingly 69% of respondents thought the same of the boy child. Meaning the boy child almost doubled the girl child by 1.8 in terms of implicit assumptions associated with the presence of protection in his room. Second, on one hand, the presence

of protection in girl's purse led 19% of respondents to recommend guiding and counselling for the girl child. On the other hand, 8% of respondents demanded the same for the boy child, which translates into a girl child will be twice as much be counselled for using protection as opposed to the boy child. Third, there were dissimilarities in terms of shock levels of respondents on their reactions on both genders for having protection, for instance, 15% of respondents would be shocked or surprised to find condoms in the girl child's purse, as opposed to 8% of the respondents for the boy child. Put differently, it will be twice shocking to find a girl child with protection as opposed to the boy child. Fourth, 12% of the respondents construed the presence of condoms in the girl child's purse as an indicator of promiscuity or immorality and would evoke anger in a person who found them in her purse. Comparatively, none of the mentioned labels or reactions were noted for the boy child. Fifth 4% of the respondents would be glad or proud that the girl child is using protection as opposed to 8% who would have the same sentiments for the boy child, which means that people will be twice as much happier with the boy child for using protection than the girl child. Sixth, 8% of the respondents suggested that they would be angry and beat up the girl child, contrastively, the same level of corporal punishment was not suggested for the boy child. Seventh, for both genders, an equal number of respondents that is 4% for the boy child and 4% for the girl child, said they would interrogate the two children for having found them with condoms.

From this analysis, it is undeniable that there is no homogeneous categorization for the female gender and male gender in terms of use of protection. On one hand, women's use of protection is not on an equal footing with that of men. From the data, the mere presence of condoms in a woman's purse is enough to warrant labels such as a promiscuous or spoilt person and in extreme cases she would be beaten up for having protection in her purse. Another issue related to this point, is that socio-cultural aspects have made using protection by African women sacrilegious as it will be twice as shocking for a woman to use protection as opposed to men. Further, even in terms of guiding and counselling on use of protection, women will be twice as much counselled as opposed to men. Indeed as attested by the plethora of literature on HIV and AIDS and also mentioned in chapter one, at this day and age, African women continue to be categorized differently in matters of using protection in fighting AIDS because of patriarchal societies upholding a gender-biased categorization of women, who paradoxically have higher chances of contracting AIDS.

5.7 9.1. Categorization of gender and use of protection among Maseno Division respondents

The central focus of this section's discussion is to confirm whether there were any gender disparities in the categorization of the female and male gender with respect to the use of protection within Maseno division. The task entailed asking respondents what would be their reactions or assumptions if they found a packet of condoms in their son's rooms and how would they react supposing they found condoms in their daughter's purse. The following results in *Table 34* will offer suitable answers to our questions.

Table 34: Categorization of gender and the use of protection among Maseno Division respondents

Male gender and protection use	Number and percentage		Female gender and protection use	Number and percentage	
Is informed /responsible	13	46%	She is taking precaution	12	34%
Is responsible/will advise him to abstain/will advise him on premarital sex	9	32%	Advice and counsel her to abstain	9	26%
			Disappointed/shocked	9	26%
Disappointed/surprised/ shocked for engaging in sex	4	14%	Promiscuous especially if unmarried	4	11%
Promiscuous but taking precaution	2	7%	Will be concerned	1	3%
Total	28			35	

The data in *Table 34* brings to the fore several issues pertaining to gender and use of protection. The first issue regarding whether the girl child or boy child is informed and taking precaution to avoid contracting AIDS, the presence of condoms in a boy's room was construed as a sign of being cautious and taking precaution by 46% of the respondents. Matters were slightly different for the girl child as 34% thought she was being responsible in matters of sexuality and AIDS. The second issue on responsible sexual behaviour, for the boy child 32% of the respondents would consider him responsible and even offer him advice on abstinence and premarital sex. This is in contrast to the girl child, where counselling and guidance on abstinence would be offered by 26% of respondents. Interestingly, no one

would be really concerned about the presence of condoms in their son's room. However, a respondent constituting 3% of the sample population argued that he found the presence of condoms in his daughter's purse disturbing. The third issue, 14 % of respondents would be disappointed or shocked supposing they found a packet of condoms in their son's room. For the girl child, the level of disappointment is slightly higher as 26% of respondents would be both shocked and disappointed at the sight of condoms in the girl's purse. The fourth issue touching on promiscuity, the male child was thought to be promiscuous but taking precaution by 7% of the respondents. For the girl child, the percentage was higher as 11% of the respondents thought that the presence of condoms in her purse was a sign of promiscuity. To give a conclusive summary, once again we are witnessing gender disparities in the categorization of the male child and the female child with respect to use of condoms in a patriarchal society in the following manner:

-Labeling of the girl child as promiscuous is twice higher than that of the boy child.
-The shock levels for finding a girl child with condoms is twice higher than that of the boy child.
-Although there is some slight uniformity in thinking that both the boy child and the girl child are responsible in using protection, there is small margin of 10%, with the boy child being considered more responsible than the girl child.
-Even when it comes to guiding and counselling for both sexes conspicuous differences emerge. For instance, the boy child will be thought as responsible. Whereas, the girl child will be construed as promiscuous.
-There is some level of concern about the presence of protection when it comes to the girl child, which is apparently inapplicable for the boy child.

In the light of what has been discussed, the results are in accordance with those of Eldoret town respondents, where the above categorizations disfavor the female gender from using protection because of the mentioned negative societal categorization of women. From our observation, there is need to challenge these negative assumptions towards African women because they are more susceptible to contact AIDS because of biological and cultural reasons.

5.8 Conclusion

The introductory part of this chapter delimited our study areas, research methodology, sampling techniques and data analysis of both Eldoret Town respondents and Maseno division respondents. The major findings emerging from the data analysis are presented in the following points;

-Respondents easily recall sub-sentential propositions of AIDS posters as opposed to their explicit forms. It is an indicator that cognitive efficiency is in operation as the most recalled message was *AIDS kills*. Meaning that if behaviour change communicators want their messages to be cognitively retained by their addressees, then minimizing their addressees' processing efforts by employing less complex constructions is recommended.

- On the level of miscomprehension of AIDS posters, several facts were noted: One, more Kiswahili AIDS posters are required for addressees not conversant with the English language but have acquired Kiswahili as their second language. Two, localized paragons should be used in posters instead of national celebrities since the latter are not known to everyone. Three, communicators should avoid contravening Occamist principles by having ambiguous AIDS messages, which are bound to be misunderstood by addressees. Four, communicators should be informed that some of the pictures used as ostensive stimulus in AIDS posters can be misunderstood, a case in point is the *Tumechill AIDS* poster where a communicator used images of young ladies to represent the youth, unfortunately a respondent mistook the poster's images as discouraging early marriages instead of encouraging abstinence.

-On issues making both Eldoret town and Maseno division respondents uncomfortable in AIDS posters were mainly images of skinny persons and condoms. Moreover, on implicit assumptions capable of rendering AIDS messages irrelevant are the following cognitive models; AIDS is a myth, AIDS is witchcraft and certain AIDS-friendly cultural practices such as wife inheritance practised in Western Kenya is known to fuel the spread of AIDS in the region. This therefore calls for communicators to coin messages countering the erroneous models or cultural assumptions on AIDS.

-On the ethno-specific mental representations of AIDS in Kenya which adhere to Rosch's (1978)

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principle of categorization while having a superordinate category (AIDS), a basic level of disasters category, category of death personified with its subordinate level having words like *evaka* (python in Luhyia), or *maepoi* (a destructive wind in Maasai), and *kigunyo* (caterpillar in Kikuyu), these terms reinforce the stigmatization of AIDS.

-There exists simplistic disease-related implicit assumptions for example headache is associated with stress, malaria with mosquito bites, herpes and syphilis with promiscuity, ebola with fear of contagion, AIDS with death for HIV negative respondents and for seropositive persons AIDS was associated with the need for guidance and counselling. Further, for example in Eldoret Town, HIV negative respondents' categorization of ailments from the most feared one to the least feared ailments is as follows: Ebola, AIDS, herpes, syphilis, cholera, malaria and headache. While, HIV positive respondents rank Ebola, AIDS, syphilis, herpes, cholera, malaria and headache. This means HIV negative respondents fear herpes more than syphilis because of its close association with AIDS, while HIV positive respondents were less fearful of herpes as opposed to syphilis.

-Despite the 100% awareness of AIDS, seropositive persons still face stigma and are treated as outcasts. Moreover, on the question of the most representative high risk group singled by respondents, Eldoret town respondents stated commercial sex workers ,while Maseno Division respondents had no specific category, however they ranked commercial sex workers in the second category among other categories (see *Tables 28 and 30).*

-On the issue of respondents' receptiveness towards the usage of explicit AIDS posters, most respondents were in favour of a scary AIDS poster exemplified by the Australian Grim the reaper *AIDS prevention is the only cure we have got* poster A, as opposed to the Swiss STOP AIDS campaign using pictures of nude persons engaged in risky sports with the message *No action without protection* in poster B.

-With regard to protection use, to this day and age, there exists cultural assumptions disfavouring African women from using protection, for instance they would be labelled as promiscuous or spoilt as opposed to men.

Generally, the findings from Maseno division largely concur with the analyzed data for Eldoret town respondents. Nonetheless, there are some notable differences in several aspects, in one aspect, 80% of Eldoret's town HIV positive respondents advocate for sexually explicit AIDS posters, while HIV positive respondents from Maseno are against use of explicit posters in sensitizing youths on HIV and AIDS. In the second aspect, due to geographical reasons and with respect to disease related-implicatures associated with headache, Maseno respondents mostly infer that one must be having malaria, as opposed to Eldoret town respondents who infer that having headache has a stress-related implicit assumption. The third aspect regards the categorization of high risk groups, Maseno respondents have the following model; no specific category 28%, commercial sex workers 18%, seropositive persons 15%, youth and sexually active persons 13%, sugar daddies 10%, drug addicts 5%, circumcisors 3%, wife inheritors 3%, non-governmental workers 3% and truck drivers 3%. This is unlike, Eldoret town respondents who subscribe to the following categories: commercial sex workers 39%, girls 18%, men and sugar daddies 18%, drunkards 14%, drug addicts 7% and homosexuals 3.6%. The fourth aspect is in respect to the manner in which Maseno respondents rank HIV and AIDS *vis à vis* other ailments from the most feared ailment to the least feared one, where diverging patterns also emerged. On one hand, Maseno division HIV positive respondents rank ailments as follows: ebola, AIDS, herpes, syphilis, cholera, malaria and headache and HIV negative respondents have: AIDS ebola, herpes, syphilis, cholera, malaria and headache. On the other hand, Eldoret HIV negative respondents rank as follows ebola, AIDS, syphilis, herpes, cholera, malaria and headache and HIV positive respondents have the following order: ebola, AIDS, herpes, syphilis, cholera, malaria and headache. The aforementioned cases are the few areas where data from Maseno division respondents differed from Eldoret town respondents.

CHAPTER SIX: ANALYSIS OF KENYAN AIDS POSTERS, SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.0 INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter, we undertook a comparative analysis of data obtained from a low prevalence region of 12% in Eldoret town, which was compared to data from a high prevalence region of 28% in Maseno division. In the present chapter, the main ideas discussed in the first section are based on a pragmatic analysis of Kenyan AIDS posters to determine whether they are skewed towards implicitness or explicitness. Alongside such a pragmatic analysis, the chapter examines the use of metaphors, similes and irony in Kenyan AIDS posters. The second section of this chapter summarizes our research findings and suggests recommendations for further studies.

6.1 ANALYSIS OF KENYAN AIDS POSTERS

The first objective of the current study was to establish whether Kenyan AIDS posters are skewed towards implicitness or explicitness, based on the analysis of twenty one (21) posters from various AIDS campaigns in Kenya between 1990 to 2010 sampled as follows: four (4) Kiswahili posters, eleven (11) English posters, three (3) posters using both English and Kiswahili languages, and two (2) posters written in *Sheng'* and one (1) poster written in English, Kiswahili and *Sheng'* languages. Our standpoint towards determining whether Kenyan AIDS messages are skewed towards implicitness or explicitness is that the two pragmatic processes are indissociable in AIDS posters. To give concrete examples in justifying our position, we present two cases, starting with a Kiswahili AIDS poster and then an English AIDS poster labelled *poster 8* and *poster 9* respectively.

Poster 8: A WORLD AIDS CAMPAIGN POSTER-KENYAN CHAPTER

Source: World AIDS campaign (2007)

For starters, the English translation provided by the World AIDS campaign (2007) for *poster 8* is that the communicator is using imperative statements in telling his addressees that it is desirable for them to STOP AIDS! KEEP THE PROMISE!, TAKE THE LEAD !!! (emphasized with three exclamation marks, with the rest of the message inscribed within the ballot box being) *Universal access to HIV and AIDS Prevention, Treatment care and support demands committed leadership. Leadership begins with you and me.* Then, to pragmatically enrich incomplete propositional radicals of the poster as in STOP AIDS (*How?*) (*By using protection*), KEEP THE PROMISE (*How?*) (*By actively fighting AIDS*), TAKE THE LEAD (*in what?*) (*In the AIDS fight*). *Universal access to HIV and AIDS Prevention, Treatment (of what?) (opportunistic infections) care and support (for who in particular?) (AIDS victims) demands committed leadership (in what?) (in the fight against AIDS). Leadership (in what?) (in the fight against AIDS) begins with you and me (at what time?) (right now).* Likewise, enriching the Kiswahili version of the poster to recover its propositional form will be as follows: KOMESHA UKIMWI[80]! (*kwa njia gani?*) (*kwa kuwa mstari wa mbele kwenye vita dhidi ya ukimwi*) TIMIZA AHADI (*aje?*) (*kwa kukumbatana na ukimwi*). Ungoza (*nani?*) (*wezako katika vita dhidi ya ukimwi*). *Kufikia waadhiriwa wote wa ukimwi kwa kinga (aina gani?) (kwa kutima mpira), tiba (ya nini?) (ya magonjwa yanayosababishwa na ukimwi) na huduma zingine (kama gani?) (za kuangalia masilahi na mahitaji ya*

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80 UKIMWI- This is the AIDS acronym in Kiswahili realised as Ukosefu wa Kinga mwilini.

wanaoadhiriwa na ukimwi), kunahitaji uongozi wa dhati. Uongozi (wa namna gani?) (wa vita dhidi ya ukimwi) huanzia mimi na wewe (lini?) (sasa).

Moreover, from a visual perspective and by capitalizing on hue as ostensive stimulus, *poster 8* uses the red colour to give prominence to the word AIDS (UKIMWI). In addition to this, some words are accompanied by imperatives having either one or three exclamation marks. Apparently, these communicative strategies raise expectations of relevance, as ostensive stimuli is overtly used in capturing the addressees' attention, a case in point being *Komesha UKIMWI! (STOP AIDS!) TIMIZA AHADI! (KEEP THE PROMISE!) ONGOZA!!! (TAKE THE LEAD !!!)* are in red and indicate that it is desirable for the communicator that his addressees subscribe to the cited directives in curbing AIDS in Kenya. Contrastively, other pieces of information are in black, while the website's reference is in green. Also incorporated in the posters are metaphoric and metonymic expressions such as the conventional metaphor AIDS IS A MOVING ENTITY captured by the *STOP AIDS!* linguistic expression. Another metaphor is BEING ENGAGED IN THE FIGHT AGAINST AIDS IS BY FIRST GUIDING OTHERS, captured by the imperative TAKE THE LEAD!!!. Additionally, the poster imports metaphors and metonymies from the semantic field of elections and the year is metaphorically represented by an unmarked calendar. In the same poster, there is a ballot box with a black hand casting the red ribbon[81], that metonymically is an AIDS awareness symbol for solidarity with people living with AIDS (PLWA). Furthermore, the black hand stands in for the whole body or by extension any person actively participating in fighting AIDS. Said differently, whenever one casts his vote, he is in support of someone's ideas or philosophies. Therefore, by casting the AIDS awareness symbol in the ballot box, one is affirming his support and solidarity for PLWA under the LEADING THE AIDS CAMPAIGN IS CASTING THE AIDS AWARENESS SYMBOL VOTE conceptual metaphor. The unmarked calender is used interpretively in representing the fact that so long as AIDS remains incurable, there is no time frame limiting the continuous fight against AIDS. In this analysis, we have witnessed the first interplay of explicatures and implicatures in a Kenyan AIDS poster. The second case is the English *poster 9*.

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81 According to Avert (2010), the red ribbon was invented in 1991 by the New York based Visual AIDS artists in Caucus. Their invention has since then become an international symbol for AIDS awareness such that by wearing a red ribbon one is affirming his or her support for AIDS victims .

Poster 9: PSI (2009-2010) Spare wheel AIDS campaign (Acha mpango wa kando, epuka ukimwi-shun extramarital affairs to avoid AIDS)

HIV NOW SPREADS FASTEST IN MARRIAGES.

HERE'S THE REASON WHY.

HIV is now spreading faster in marriages than in any other group of people. In fact, nearly half of all new HIV infections are happening in marriages.

Why? It's simple. Because many married men, and women too, have long-term girlfriends and boyfriends who they trust so much that they stop using condoms.

What they don't know is that many of these girlfriends and boyfriends also have other serious partners with whom they don't use condoms. This creates a huge network of trusting relationships, so when one person gets infected with HIV, everyone can get infected.

And with HIV being most contagious within the first three weeks of infection, it spreads through these networks like wildfire. So please think again before you relax the rules with a 'spare wheel'.

Do not let HIV destroy your marriage.

WACHA MPANGO WA KANDO EPUKA UKIMWI

Source: East African's society Drum magazine (2010: 93)

The "spare wheel campaign" also known in Kiswahili as *Wacha mpango wa kando, Epuka ukimwi* meaning *stop relationships on the side/extramarital affairs; avoid AIDS,* launched by Population Services International Kenya in partnership with the Kenyan Ministry of Health and the National AIDS

Control Council in 2009, to discourage extramarital affairs following heightened prevalent rates among married couples in Kenya. The poster is predominantly framed within an ironical context and has cases of incomplete propositional radicals requiring enrichment, metaphors, similes and metonymy. For starters, the poster's opening statement is *HIV NOW SPREADS FASTEST IN MARRIAGE,* where *now* by Levinsonian I-inference implicates *BUT NOT PREVIOUSLY.* From an ironical viewpoint signaled by the word *now* and *not previously* is an echoic allusion or mentions a past preconceived notion that AIDS was only prevalent among single persons in unstable relationships, whereas married couples in stable relationships were "immune" from AIDS. However, the message presents a paradoxical scenario where married persons who are supposedly in stable relationships are statistically leading in spreading AIDS. The second clause of the message reading *HERE IS THE REASON WHY,* needs to be enriched to recover part of its propositional form, as in *Here* (*in the text below*) *is the reason* (*for what?*) (*why AIDS is spreading fastest amongst married couples*). The communicator develops the irony further by accounting for heightened HIV infections among couples, *because many married men and women too have long-term girlfriends and boyfriends who they trust so much that they stop using condoms. What they do not know is that many of these girlfriends and boyfriends also have other serious partners with whom they do not use condoms. This creates a huge network of trusting relationships so when one person gets infected with HIV, everyone can get infected.* In other words, the existing oxymoron is of betrayed trust among unfaithful couples, the latter are paradoxically betrayed by their other "trustworthy" sexual partners, having unprotected sex with other serious "trustworthy" sexual partners. The end result is an increase in AIDS cases among unfaithful married persons where ideally infidelity cases should be unheard of if not non-existent.

Then again, going by Cruse's & Croft's (2004) arguments in chapter 5, the poster has a metaphor within a simile combination captured by the poster's expression "*...within the first three weeks of infection, it spreads through these networks like wildfire...*" where the propagation of AIDS under AIDS IS A MOVING ENTITY conceptual metaphor is likened to the manner in which wildfires spread. Furthermore, the same poster has numerous metaphors, for instance in the expression *So please think again before you relax the rules with a "spare wheel". Do not let HIV destroy your marriage.* Here the linguistic expression of *relaxing the rules with a spare wheel* uses the source domain of vehicles with a metonymic reference to the wheels, whereby a spare wheel ordinarily substitutes a punctured wheel. The expression acquires a lexically narrowed meaning when applied to the target domain of

extramarital affairs. Said differently, where one substitutes one's legally married wife with another sexual partner as a SPARE WHEEL*, it is construed within the conceptual metaphor of HAVING EXTRAMARITAL AFFAIRS IS USING THE SPARE WHEEL. Alongside the said metaphor, there is another metaphor of AIDS IS A MOVING ENTITY conveyed by the linguistic expression *HIV now spreads fastest in marriages* and also AIDS IS A DESTRUCTIVE FORCE, under the communicator's parting shot of *Do not let AIDS destroy your marriage.* It is noteworthy to state that the same poster uses metonymy whereby numerous heads of either men or women stand in for their entire bodies. More so, the lines interconnecting heads of both sexes stand in for the complex sexual network of extramarital affairs in which they are involved in.

From the analysis of *posters 8* and *9*, we confidently conclude that Kenyan AIDS posters entertain a blend of implicatures and explicatures which is typical of human communication. We concur with Sperber & Wilson (1986a), Glucksberg (2001) and Ungerer (2003) that dissociating implicatures and explicatures is a Herculean task especially when dealing with posters. We can ascertain that it is actually difficult to determine the degree of implicitness or explicitness of Kenyan AIDS campaign posters. A practical approach would be to argue that Kenya AIDS posters are essentially a complex pragmatic cocktail of pictorial metaphors, metonymy, pragmatic inferences, incomplete propositional radicals requiring strengthening and have lexico-pragmatic processes such as category extension, narrowing and broadening. In the next sub-sections, we will give a general analysis of English and Kiswahili posters by looking at samples of Kenyan AIDS posters employing any of the three universal speech acts as stipulated by relevance theorists. And then, we will analyze one of the most recurrent metaphor in Kenyan AIDS posters. Finally, a sample of other conceptual metaphors used in the same posters will be examined.

6.2. RELEVANCE THEORETICAL SPEECH ACTS

Sperber's & Wilson's (1986) relevance theory cites three universal speech acts namely asking whether, telling and saying that exemplified in (103a)-(103c)

(103a) You will finish your work before 6 pm. (This is a declarative statement and is a speech act of saying that the hearer to finish his work).

(103b) Will you finish the work before 6 pm. (The interrogative statement is a speech act asking whether the hearer will finish his work before 6pm)

(103c) Finish the work before 6 pm. (The imperative statement is a speech act telling the hearer to finish his work before 6pm).

<div align="right">(adapted from Sperber & Wilson (1986a: 246)</div>

From the outlined universal speech acts, we will examine their applicability in posters 10, 11 and 12.

Poster 10: 2003 PSI poster on Trust condoms

Source: AIDS Mark (2007)

Poster 11: (1990) Kenya Ministry of Health/NASCOP poster

Source: Media/Materials ClearingHouse (2010)

Poster 12: Jisimamie Campaign (1997)

Source (Media/ Materials ClearingHouse, 2010)

To begin with *poster 10*, the communicator uses Kenyan musicians called Kleptomaniax as paragons (cf. Lakoff, 1989), representing a brand of young Kenyan celebrities using Trust[82] condoms. The message reads in Kiswahili: *Kleptomaniax wana zao. Je unayako*? with its English equivalent translation being *Kleptomaniax have theirs. Do you have yours*?. The communicator's declarative statement is saying to his addressees that *Kleptomaniax have theirs* (*what?*) (*Trust condoms*), (which the Kleptomaniax are ostensively showing their addressees instead of overtly saying that they have Trust condoms, seemingly the unsaid proposition has been left for addressees to recover via pragmatic inferences. In the second part of the message, the communicator uses an interrogative in expressing his desirable thoughts by asking whether his addressees have theirs (*what? Trust condoms*). In *poster 11*, unlike in *poster 10,* we are dealing with a purely declarative statement having the saying speech act, whereby the communicator is describing a true state of affairs by saying that *AIDS kills. There is still no cure* with its impliciture being *AIDS kills and there is still no cure* (cf. Bach, 2001), with the *and* as a connective suggesting besides AIDS being a killer disease, it still remains incurable. Alternatively, there is the possibility of arguing that *but* can equally be used as an impliciture in the same construction

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82 Trust is a Kenyan brand for male condoms, and in this example can be treated as a case of categorical extension where Trust condoms can include other condom brands used in Kenya, for instance *Rough Rider*.

as in *AIDS kills but there is still no cure,* hence giving rise to the implicature *be careful in your sex life for AIDS is a killer disease.* And finally in *poster 13*, the communicator uses two pictograms of a boy and a girl in representing the youth, who are simultaneously using the asking whether and the telling speech acts in a single construction reading: SEX? NOT YET! WE HAVE OUR LIVES TO DEVELOP FIRST! If we enrich the explicature of this proposition then it would be something close a construction in (104)

(104) SHOULD WE ENGAGE IN PREMARITAL SEX NOW THAT WE ARE STILL STUDENTS? IT IS NOT YET THE TIME FOR US TO ENGAGE IN SEX! WE HAVE OUR LIVES TO DEVELOP FIRST BEFORE ENGAGING IN SEX!

In (104) the youth are using an interrogative in first asking whether *they should engage in sex now that they are still students?* They answer the question using imperative statements by telling their addressees that it is not yet the time for them to engage in sex, since they have their lives to develop first prior to engaging in sexual relations. In short, we have sampled a few cases depicting three universal speech acts coined by relevance theorists, the speech acts register certain cognitive effects on addressees by enabling them perform actions aimed at protecting them against AIDS as articulated in Kenyan AIDS posters.

6.2.1 OTHER METAPHORS IN KENYAN AIDS POSTERS
6.2.1.1 SEX IS A GAME metaphor

One of the major findings in sections 5.7.4 (see *Tables 15* and *16*), reveal that 71% of Eldoret town respondents and 67% of Maseno division respondents experienced difficulties in comprehending poster V's message reading *CHAMPIONS PLAY SAFE!* under the conventional metaphor of SEX IS A GAME metaphor. As a matter of precision, in some cases it is more of SEX IS A FOOTBALL GAME metaphor, surprisingly, the cited metaphor has been used recurrently in Kenyan AIDS posters for around twelve years from 1998 to 2010[83], without behaviour change communicators realizing that it is not cognitive-friendly to Kenyan addressees as attested by the research findings from both Eldoret town

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83 The information used here is obtained from Media/Material Clearinghouse website which gives examples of 1998 posters having the SEX IS A GAME metaphor in Kenyan AIDS posters, additional posters of subsequent years are provided and the final example is obtained from the most current *Jitambue Leo! Ingia kwa network .Know your status today! Join the network* (2010) AIDS campaign.

and Maseno division respondents. Below are samples of the SEX IS GAME/SEX IS A FOOTBALL GAME metaphor in past and current Kenyan AIDS campaigns.

Poster 13: (1998) Family Planning Association   **Poster 14: (1998) Family**

of Kenya   **Planning Association of Kenya**

Poster 15: (1999) Confederation of East and Central Africa Football Association[84] (CECAFA)

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
84 The poster was sponsored by John Hopkins University Population Communications Services (JHU/PCS), Help Crush AIDS, and the UNAIDS: Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS.

(2000) Confederation of East and Central Africa Football Association[85] (CECAFA) posters

Poster 16: Playing at home beats playing away poster   **Poster 17: Smart players always wear "socks"**

Poster 18: (2003) Pamoja Tuangamize ukimwi campaign -(Together we can defeat AIDS campaign)

Source : NACC (2010)

Poster 19: (2005) ALIVE AND KICKING AIDS CAMPAIGN

Source: Alive and Kicking AIDS (2010)

Poster 20: (2010) JITAMBUE LEO! INGIA KWA NETWORK

Be a real man
Know your status

Jitambue Leo! ingia kwa network

Be the referee of your life. Control game poa!

Source: LVCT Care and Treatment (2010)

A brief analysis of posters 13 to 20 is as follows:

-Poster 13's message is: *Avoid getting a red card. Think before you act. Prevent yourself from STD and HIV/AIDS. Use a condom*. According to *The New Oxford American Dictionary* (2005: 1418) red cards are normally issued in soccer and other games, by referees to defiant players for breaching a game's rules. Once issued, the player is expelled from the ongoing match. Bearing this notion in mind, the communicator's message to his addressees is that by dismissing any advice on AIDS, sexuality and use of protection, is tantamount to the disqualification of one as a member of the AIDS prevention team as portrayed by the football game pictorial metaphor. The message is interpretively represented by a pictorial metaphor of a defiant player being served with a red card, written AIDS KILLS for engaging in unprotected sex with his partners. Moreover, using the SEX IS A GAME metaphor and specifically in the AIDS era where AIDS is an incurable disease, the rules of the sexuality game have now changed and it is both wise and safer to use condoms in the prevention of AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases.

-Poster 14's message: *To win a good match defending is a must. For family planning and protection against STD/AIDS. Use a condom*. Here the communicator's informative intention is that winning the war against AIDS is a matter of staging a good defence by using condoms. This is interpretively represented by the football pictorial metaphor having footballers dressed up in condoms and are staging

a strong defence at the goalpost to prevent their opponents from scoring. Here under the SOCCER IS WAR conventional metaphor, where soccer is construed as a form of war whereby we have terms in football such as defenders, strikers or opponents which also convey the FIGHTING AIDS IS SOCCER metaphor. In this perspective, the conventional metaphor used is FIGHTING AIDS IS WAR, which shares a subset of logical features with a strong football defence system pitched at the goalpost and is interpretively similar to using protection in fighting AIDS as man's opponent.

-Poster 15's message: *Kick AIDS out of Africa. Talk to your teammates and fans about AIDS prevention. Break the silence*. The poster employs several metaphors with one being GETTING RID OF AIDS IS KEEPING IT OUT OF THE AFRICAN CONTINENT AS A CONTAINER[86], as articulated by the linguistic expression, *kick AIDS out of Africa,* furthermore the expression *Kick AIDS out of Africa* is an echoic allusion to the Danish author's memoir titled *Out of Africa* by Karen von Blixen-Finecke[87]. The other conceptual metaphor is the AIDS-RELATED DISCOURSE IS A BRITTLE OBJECT, whereby silence about AIDS needs to be broken by players being encouraged by behaviour change communicators to talk or openly discuss AIDS with other players and their fans.

-Poster 16's message: *Playing at home beats playing away. Join the AIDS team. Be faithful*. As previously stated in section 5.7.4, Fernàndez (2008: 107) says that *play the field* denotes *to be sexually active* or *promiscuous* whereas the term *play away* denotes *to commit adultery.* In the football context, there are added advantages of playing at home or on homeground because of familiarity with the football pitch or terrain and also the overwhelming presence of supportive football fans. However, the mentioned advantages might be absent when a team plays away from home. Nonetheless, in this context, the encoded meaning for the term HOME* undergoes lexical narrowing to denote having sexual relations with one's spouse or within matrimony which is relatively safer than PLAYING AWAY*. The latter's encoded meaning is narrowed to mean having an extramarital affair is risky for addressees. Hence, the communicator is telling his addressees *to join the AIDS team. By being faithful.*

-Poster 17's message reading: *Smart players always wear "socks". Join the AIDS prevention team. Use a condom*, the communicator is still advocating for smart players in the field of sexuality as explained

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86 Our assumption is that the African continent is construed as a container having AIDS-related cases within it and by getting rid of AIDS, we are keeping it outside the African continent.
87 Karen von Blixen-Finecke's pseudonym is Isak Dinesen

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in *poster 16's* analysis or those who are sexually active to use protection. The latter signalled by the ad hoc concept SOCKS* is lexically narrowed to interpretively denote how condoms protect one from contracting AIDS. Likewise, the protective functions of thick socks worn by footballers are meant to shield their legs from injuries and shares certain logical and analytic assumptions with the use of protection in fighting AIDS.

-Poster 18: (Refer to analysis of poster V, in chapter 5)

-Poster 19: which reads *HIV can be avoided by remaining faithful to your partner-provided neither of you were HIV positive when you first met. Unfair play in a relationship can cost you more than a red card*. The poster has the image of Carlin Alusa, a Kenyan referee holding a red card in his hand. The communicator's message like in other posters still focuses on the SEX IS A GAME metaphor, where addressees are advised to be faithful to their spouses, by avoiding unfair play such as engaging in extramarital affairs in the AIDS era, this would reduce chances of contracting AIDS, which has serious repercussions than that of a footballer getting a red card. Said differently, AIDS is a killer disease and cannot be taken lightly.

-Poster 20: *Jitambue leo*! *Ingia kwa network. Be a real man know your status. Be the referee of your life. Control game poa!* (*Know yourself today, join the network. Be a real man know your status. Be the referee of your life. Control a cool game*). Here, the communicator uses Kiswahili words like *Jitambue leo* and *Sheng'* words such as *Ingia kwa network* and *control game poa.* The message stresses on the need for addressees to know their status by joining those who already know their status, to be considered part of the NETWORK*. Further the message, states that one should be the REFEREE* *of his life, by controlling a cool game* as in *control game poa* in *Sheng'*. According to the New Oxford American Dictionary (2005: 1422), "a referee" is an official who watches a game or a match closely to ensure that players abide by the rules and he arbitrates on matters arising on the match. The encoded meaning of the term REFEREE* undergoes lexical narrowing to denote one has to be cautious by adhering to known facts about AIDS prevention and safe sex.

From the analysis of the above posters and with particular reference to poster V's miscomprehension in chapters 5, it is recommended that Kenyan behaviour change communicators should either teach

Kenyans on the possible meanings of the SEX IS A GAME metaphor or use another culturally familiar metaphor that Kenyans live by. This is because both Maseno division respondents and Eldoret town respondents found posters with the SEX IS A GAME metaphor difficult to comprehend for its processing demanded additional cognitive efforts. And as Ortony (1975) and Lakoff & Johnson (1982) have argued that whenever one is subjected to a metaphor she does not culturally live by then miscomprehension of the metaphor is inevitable.

6.2.1.2. AIDS IS A LETHAL KILLER/ AIDS IS DEATH PERSONIFIED metaphor

In reference to the Australian Grim reaper AIDS poster (*poster 4*) in chapter 1, Evans & Green (2006) posit that skeletons metonymically represent death. Referring to *Figure 14* in chapter 1, we stated that AIDS is construed as a killer disease with its logical form equating AIDS with the ability TO CAUSE DEATH. Further, in section 5.7.6, we sampled some Kenyan mental representations of AIDS, with the image of skeletons evoked by the Luo term (*kaw na ringo to iwena chogo*- take the flesh and leave me the bones) and the term *evaka* (a python in the Samia dialect of the Luhyia community in Kenya). Likewise, in some past AIDS posters acting as public representations of informative aspects on AIDS, the Kenyan posters have portrayed AIDS in pictorial metaphors as skeletons and snakes as shown in *posters 21* and *22*.

Poster 21: (1989) AIDS poster by the Ministry of Health and CARE Kenya

Poster 22: (1993) AIDS poster by the Ministry of Health and NACC

Source: Media Materials ClearingHouse (2010)

In *poster 21* reading *What you see is not what you get. AIDS kills*[88], from a far and under the cover of darkness is a man approaching a commercial sex worker dressed in red. Unsuspectingly, the man is both captivated and deceived by the lady's physique and remains ignorant of her seropositive status. Given that AIDS is a killer disease and the communicator consciously marks this fact by using the red colour as an ostensive stimulus in the words AIDS KILLS, further the communicator employs metonymy represented by the skeleton's image facing the addressees and not the approaching man, in conveying the message that in the AIDS era, appearances could be deceptive as captured in the expression *what you see is not what you get*. Contrastively, *poster 22* uses Kiswahili as a communicative tool and reads *Ikiwa UKIMWI haukutishi wewe, hebu fikiria vile UKIMWI unaweza kumdhuru mtoto wako, hebu fikiria (If AIDS does not scare you, just think about how AIDS can affect your child, just think about it)*. The message uses repetition or epizeuxis[89] (see Sperber & Wilson,

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88 The term AIDS KILLS is written in bold and in red and serves as ostensive stimulus by attracting the addressees' attention on the reality about AIDS.

89 Sperber & Wilson (1986a) argue that repetition or epizeuxis can be worked out differently, for instance the construction like *I shall never, never smoke again* denotes *I will definitely not smoke again* and is consistent with the fact that the speaker intends to quit smoking or *We went for a long, long walk* to suggest a *very long walk* and is consistent with the fact that the speaker wanted to indicate that the walk was unusually long.

1986a: 219) for emphatic purposes, in its repetition of the words *just think* in the statement *just think about how AIDS can affect your child, just think about it,* the repetition both implies and is consistent with *just give AIDS some serious thought.* Moreover, the message is accompanied by a pictorial metaphor of a strategically positioned python, with its fangs exposed in preparation to strike an innocent child that it has tightly encircled. Moreover, a python normally encircles and immobilizes its victim by breaking its bones and once its prey is weakened, the python slowly engulfs its victim. The python will remain immobile until it has fully digested its prey before freely moving to another location to hunt for another prey. Likewise, the manner in which the python engulfs its victim is interpretively used in reference to how AIDS as a killer disease remains asymptomatic in the human body, only to slowly weaken the body by opportunistic infections that eventually lead to death. As previously stated by Lakoff & Turner (1989: 17) with reference to the analysis of poster 5 in chapter one, the image of a beast trying to devour its victims as in *poster 22,* is the personification of death, since AIDS is a killer disease. Such scary images depicting AIDS as skeletons or snakes are bound to reinforce its stigmatization as attested by arguments in the previous chapters. (see section 5.7.6)

6.2.1.3 AIDS PREVENTION IS ABIDING BY RULES metaphor
Poster 23: National AIDS Control Poster as cited in FHI (2006)

Source: FHI (2006)

Poster 23 bearing a Kiswahili message reading: *KAA CHONJO. EPUKA UKIMWI (Be alert. Avoid*

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AIDS) was used in sensitizing East African truck drivers on AIDS. The poster uses the pictorial metaphor of a traffic light to convey the message of STOP[90] (*Kaa*, alongside the red traffic signal), BE PREPARED OR BE ON YOUR GUARD (*Chonjo*, beside the yellow traffic signal) and AVOID AIDS (*Epuka UKIMWI*, next to the green traffic signal with AIDS (*Ukimwi*) written in red as an ostensive stimulus indicating that AIDS is a dangerous ailment). Ordinarily, traffic lights belong to the road signs semantic domain which is now acting as the source domain for the conceptual metaphor AIDS PREVENTION IS ABIDING BY RULES, whereby the red sign denotes stop, the yellow light means proceed with caution and the green light means go. When used within the AIDS context, red light invites the addressee to think seriously before engaging in unprotected sex. The yellow light is interpretively used to mean always have protection as a protective measure and the green light means once an addressee is able to reflect and use protection at all times, then he has succeeded in preventing AIDS transmission, as articulated in the words *Beware, AIDS kills*.

6.2.1.4 ABSTINENCE IS WAITING metaphor
Poster 24: (PSI CAMPAIGN FROM SEPTEMBER 2004-APRIL 2005)

Source: PSI (2006)

The 2004 to 2005, *Nimechill* campaign by PSI primarily targeted urban youth groups aged between 10 to14 years to encourage delayed sexual debut among youths. *Poster 24* uses *Sheng'*, a language of the

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90 Kaa in this context can also mean do not move or remain stationary.

urban youth in its message reading *Sex? Not now, tume-chill. We know what the consequences are. Ni poa ku chill.* A standard English translation of the same message is *Sex? Not now we are are abstaining. We know what the consequences are. Abstinence is good.* A more explicit form of the message would be as in (105)

(105) Should the youth engage in Sex? Not now when we are still in school, we are abstaining. Abstinence is good as opposed to premarital sex. We know what the consequences of engaging in sex are. It is therefore good to abstain.

In *Sheng*', the term *chill* means *to wait* for example in the sentence like *Hebu chill for me* (meaning *just wait for me*). In the *Tume- chill* campaign the encoded meaning of CHILL* is narrowed to specifically mean to abstain, this notion is consistent with Gibbs (1994) arguments in chapter four that slang is a metaphoric language. In brief, the youth using the conceptual metaphor of ABSTINENCE IS WAITING are advocating for abstinence because of the repercussions of engaging in premarital sex.

6.2.1.5. FIGHTING AIDS IS BEING UP metaphor
(1997) AIDS posters by Ministry of Health Jisimamie, Belgium Administration for Development (BADC) and NASCOP

Poster 25: Jisimamie campaign 1   **Poster 26: Jisimamie campaign 2**

Source: Media/Materials ClearingHouse (2010)

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The 1997 Jisimamie[91] AIDS campaign in *posters 25* and *26,* is structured under the conceptual metaphor of FIGHTING AIDS IS BEING UP and is a variant of HEALTH IS BEING UP conceptual metaphor. On one hand, in *poster 25* reading *STAND UP FOR YOUR CHILDREN. DISCUSS HIV/AIDS WITHIN YOUR FAMILY. Jisimamie,* the message is telling parents to openly discuss AIDS with their children, which is construed as standing up in confronting AIDS rather than assuming a relaxed or laid back position in the AIDS war. On the other hand, the pictogram in *poster 26* reading JISIMAMIE. STAND UP AGAINST HIV/AIDS. ALWAYS USE A CONDOM, EACH TIME, EVERY TIME, has a picture of a man and a woman armed with protection in their sexual relations, are equally standing up against AIDS by embracing an AIDS-free sexual lifestyle.

6.2.1.6 MAKING INFORMED CHOICES ON AIDS IS ORGANIZING ONE'S SELF metaphor
Poster 27: 2010 G-Pange campaign.

Source: G-kinge! The G-Pange AIDS campaign (2010)

G-pange (a corrupted form of the Kiswahili term *jipange* (meaning either *sort yourself out* or *organize yourself)* is a campaign sponsored by the Partnership for an HIV-free generation with support of US President's Emergency Plan for AIDS (PEPFAR). It is designed to equip Kenyan youths with skills for leading a HIV-free life. In the poster, written *G-pange*, which in Levinsonian M-inference terms translates as what is written abnormally is not normal, and further stipulates that "indicate an abnormal, non-stereotypical situation using marked expressions that contrast with those used to describe the normal corresponding stereotypical expressions", in standard Kiswahili *sorting yourself* is grammatically written as *jipange* and not *G-pange* meaning that the latter is not the normal orthography of *jipange* in standard Kiswahili. The message further reads, *ma youth tu mind our future!!!* (*The youth*

91 *Jisimamie* is a Kiswahili word that means stand up for something

should think of their future). Said differently, the message under the conceptual metaphor of MAKING INFORMED CHOICES ON AIDS IS ORGANIZING ONE'S SELF, is consistent with Gibbs (1994) argument on slang and metaphoricity since the message, encourages youths to make wise decisions in matters of sexuality by avoiding risky sexual behaviour for their future lives is determined by their current actions.

6.2.2. THE CASE OF IRONY AND SIMILES IN KENYAN AIDS POSTERS

Besides using metaphors and metonymy in Kenyan AIDS campaigns, there are relatively few cases of irony and similes. For the former case, *poster 28* serves as an example, and for the latter case we will focus on *poster 18's* disclaimer reading "*...To qualify for the Africa Cup of Nations we played hard but we played safe. And in life, like in football, you have to play safe to stay safe from AIDS, so remember...*". Beginning with *poster 28's* ironical message reading *Your next lover, may be a special one, that gives you AIDS*. The message's ironical component is manifested through sarcastic undertones. Said in another way, ordinarily one's lover, who is regarded as a special person and who is close to one's heart should not be the one infecting you with AIDS. The message depicts the communicator's attitude forewarning addressees about exerting caution in their sexual lives for AIDS affects anyone including the "special persons" in our lives. Regarding the simile in *poster 18*, it is categorized as a simile within a metaphor, whereby addressees were required to make the comparision between playing safe within a football context and playing safe within the sexuality and AIDS domain, where safe sex is mandatory in the AIDS era.

Poster 28: Kenya Red Cross (Year: Unknown)

Source: Media Materials ClearingHouse (2010)

6.3 SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.3.1. SUMMARY

This study is based on a pragmatic analysis of figurative language used in Kenyan HIV discourse. Our research problem investigates whether Kenyans from different socio-economic backgrounds and linguistic groups homogeneously comprehend AIDS messages. More specifically, by identifying some cognitive strenuous AIDS messages for sixty one (61) Kenyan addressees. Besides this, miscomprehension of the communicators' informative intentions and explanations for their occurrence are also examined. The sampled respondents are of different HIV status, speech communities, educational backgrounds, marital status and prevalence regions. In relation to the latter, thirty three (33) respondents from a high prevalence region of 28% are drawn from Maseno division of Kisumu County in Nyanza province. The Maseno respondents are compared to twenty eight (28) respondents from a lower prevalence region of 12% in Eldoret town of Uasin Gishu County in Rift Valley Province. To investigate our research problem, the following objectives guide the study:

(1) To investigate whether Kenyan AIDS messages are skewed towards implicitness or explicitness.
(2) To assess the extent to which addressees comprehend AIDS messages and whether they incur comprehension difficulties.

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(3) To carry out a lexico-pragmatic analysis of processes involved in the comprehension of AIDS messages.

(4) To study the conceptualizations of AIDS from a figurative perspective, by identifying categories of figurative language employed in Kenyan HIV discourse. And also examine some ethno-specific mental representations of AIDS in Kenyan communities.

(5) To examine ethno-cultural stereotypes inhibiting the implementation of AIDS messages in Kenya.

The research findings from questionnaires and AIDS campaign posters generated the following key findings. First and foremost, with reference to our first objective investigating whether Kenyan AIDS messages are skewed towards implicitness or explicitness. In section 6.1, we have argued that when dealing with AIDS posters it is difficult to establish whether AIDS messages are skewed towards implicitness or explicitness because the two processes are concurrently used in the form of pictorial metaphors, or metaphoric linguistic expressions, or even incomplete radicals requiring enrichment. Most metaphorical messages have ad hoc concepts requiring the parallel mutual adjustment of implicatures and explicatures to sustain interpretations consistent with expectations of relevance. This observation is closely related to the third objective investigating lexico-pragmatic processes in AIDS messages. Here again, we want to confirm the existence of ad hoc concepts which require narrowing, broadening or even cases of category extension (see *Poster 10*). These pragmatically oriented processes are inevitable in most Kenyan AIDS posters or any other aspect of human communication.

Second, in respect to our second research objective assessing the extent to which addressees comprehend AIDS messages and establish whether they incur comprehension difficulties. Based on data analysis of both Maseno division respondents and Eldoret town respondents several issues emerged. One, respondents easily recalled AIDS posters having a simple syntax such as *AIDS kills* in *AIDS kills. There is still no cure* poster (see *Poster 11*), addressees from both regions cognitively retain the *AIDS Kills* component of the mentioned poster. It simply means that if communicators have the intention of capitalizing on memorability of their AIDS messages, then they should opt for simple syntactic constructions allied to Gricean sub-maxim of brevity or Horn's speaker oriented R principles, as opposed to using culturally unfamiliar metaphors that Kenyans do not live by. Two, and in relation to the latter, the SEX IS A GAME metaphor used in poster V and which apparently has a historical record in Kenya AIDS campaign posters stretching from 1998 to 2010 (see posters 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19

and 20) happens to be one of the most difficult conceptual metaphor impacting a cognitive strain on Kenyan addressees, with 71% and 67% of respondents from Eldoret town and Maseno town respectively, affirming that it was difficult to comprehend. The reason for its incomprehensibility stems from its incompatibility with the Occam's razor principle. The SEX IS A GAME metaphor has numerous senses, as seen in the analysis of poster V in section 5.7.4 thereby making its processing cognitively strenuous for Kenyan addressees. Another case is poster VI that equally demands extra processing efforts through the use of a counterfactual particularly for single persons as opposed to married persons, with 46% and 41% of Eldoret town respondents and Maseno town respondents respectively finding it difficult.

Other issues noted are for example less educated respondents unfamiliar with the English language but fluent in Kiswahili language seemed incapable of recalling AIDS messages, hence indicating that simpler Kiswahili messages as opposed to complex Kiswahili metaphors should be employed for less educated addressees. Then, on the pervasive usage of icons or paragons in AIDS posters, we argue that they are bound to be irrelevant especially when addressees fail to ostensively recognize them as cognitive models representing a wider category of influential persons in a society engaged in the fight against AIDS. To remedy the situation, we recommend the use of more localized models for instance a village elder, a renown farmer in a region or a virtuous lady, will greatly raise expectations of relevance not only among different urban dwellers but also in rural settings, since people are more likely to identify with familiar faces rather than unfamiliar persons (see *Appendix 21*). Another noted issue worth mentioning, is that Kenyans are unreceptive towards sexually explicit pictorial metaphors and instead prefer scary posters such as Grim reaper campaign in *Figure 11,* which was the preferred choice for 64% of Maseno respondents and 71% of Eldoret town respondents, rather than explicit posters like the Swiss LOVE LIFE STOP AIDS campaign touching on human sexuality like in poster B (see sections 5.7.8 and 5.7.8.1). This is an indicator that employing sexually explicit pictures in AIDS campaigns in Kenya, is still considered culturally sensitive, yet the primary mode of HIV transmission in Africa is predominantly through sexual intercourse.

Third, in connection with our fourth objective studying conceptualizations of AIDS from a figurative perspective by identifying types of tropes used in Kenyan AIDS posters, and further examine some ethno-specific mental representations of AIDS in Kenyan communities. The following can be said

about the fourth objective; One, on the ubiquitous usage of figurative language in AIDS discourse across the globe, confirm that these expressions operate within an AIDS cognitive model (cf. *Figure 14*). Furthermore, we have demonstrated how AIDS in figurative discourse behaves like a radical category having its central and peripheral categories (cf. *Figure 15*). Two, within the Kenyan context and with reference to AIDS posters, communicators extensively use metaphors and metonymies but rarely use irony and similes. Three, in response to the conceptualization of AIDS in Kenyan communities with reference to eight speech communities gravely affected by AIDS notably: the Luo, Kikuyu, Kalenjin, Luhyia, Turkana, Masaai, Meru and Kisii communities, we deduce that AIDS is construed negatively within five (5) categories such as destruction by natural forces in words such as *goris* (*a sweeping wind*) in Kalenjin, destruction caused by insects or pests in words like *kudni* (*maggots*) in Luo, destruction caused by supernatural forces in expressions such as *chira (curse/witchcraft)* used in Luo and Luhyia communities and finally pejorative adjectives and negative metonymic expressions in words such *imbaka (the bad disease*) in Maasai or *tuo marach* (*a bad disease*) in Luo. The mentioned categories naturally fit into a larger model of cultural categorization of AIDS that subscribes to principles of categorization comprising a superordinate category, a basic level category and a subordinate category. Based on culture-specific experiences of Kenyan communities with HIV and AIDS, they have fine-tuned or specialized in categorizing interpretively the basic level of destruction under three dimensions namely: destruction by natural forces, destruction by pests or insects and destruction by supernatural forces as shown in section 5.7.6 and *Figure 27*. Using Sperber's (1996) thesis of epidemiology of beliefs in analyzing Kenyan mental representations, the logical argument is that stigmatization of AIDS is sustained by a widespread causal cognitive chain of negative mental representations and public representations of lexical terms pejoratively used in reference to AIDS within Kenyan communities.

Another closely related issue to mental representations of AIDS are disease-specific assumptions synonymous with AIDS and other diseases. For instance, among Maseno division respondents AIDS is associated with encouraging a seropositive person, malaria with mosquito bites, headache with malaria, syphilis with promiscuity, herpes is an AIDS-related symptom, cholera with contact with unhygienic substances or contaminated food and Ebola with fear of contagion. Further, ranking systems adopted for the mentioned ailments from the most feared ailment to the least feared one depend on one's HIV status. For instance, HIV positive respondents adhere to the following schema: Ebola, AIDS, herpes,

syphilis, cholera, malaria and headache. While HIV negative persons adopt the following system: AIDS, ebola, herpes, syphilis cholera, malaria and headache. The conspicuous differences in the positioning of AIDS and Ebola within the ranking systems is based on the seropositive respondents argument that they neither consider AIDS life-threatening nor a death sentence for with antiretrovirals, one could live longer with AIDS. Contrastively, HIV negative respondents position AIDS immediately before ebola[92] because they fear contracting the killer disease. What is noteworthy at this point is that the AIDS stigma does not end at lexeme level but is transposed onto AIDS victims, who Eldoret and Maseno respondents affirm are discriminated against and regarded as promiscuous in the society. Moreover, respondents are able to give societal categorization of an ideal category representative of a high risk group to the least representative category of the same group. For example, Maseno division respondents subscribe to the following order: no specific category mentioned by 28%, commercial sex workers 18%, seropositive persons 15%, youth and sexually active persons 13%, sugar daddies 10%, drug addicts 5%, circumcisors 3%, wife inheritors 3%, widows 3%, non-governmental workers 3%, and truck drivers 3%. Apparently for a high prevalence region like Maseno division, AIDS indiscriminately affects anyone be it students, lecturers, cooks, accountants, therefore having a unique representative category of a high risk group can be challenging. Nonetheless, in both Eldoret town and Maseno division, commercial sex workers received higher ratings as opposed to other categories with 28% of Eldoret town respondents mentioning it and 18% of Maseno town respondents citing the group. This therefore makes commercial sex workers, the most representative category of a high risk group in both regions as opposed to less representative categories such as truck drivers or homosexuals.

In reference to our fifth objective investigating ethno-specific stereotypes bound to challenge the fight against AIDS, two issues are worth considering. One, concerns gender biased stereotypes against women in connection to use of protection. Two, are issues on cultural assumptions mentioned by respondents that need defusing. In connection to gender-biased stereotypes emerging from research findings from both Eldoret town and Maseno division respondents, show a clear-cut distinction in women's categorization as opposed men's in matters regarding protection use. Women have a higher chance of being labelled promiscuous or spoilt. A case in point is among Maseno division respondents where 11% label their daughters promiscuous as opposed to 6.7% of the respondents who think the

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92 The most surprising thing noticed among HIV negative respondents was that the fear of AIDS was so pronounced such that ebola, a highly contagious and killer disease with a shorter incubation period as compared to AIDS, was less feared than AIDS

same about their sons. And in extreme cases, as noted among Eldoret town respondents, a woman can be beaten up for having protection and surprisingly no such treatment is accorded to the male child. In short, we recommend that gender biased stereotypes need to be reversed because paradoxically it is women who have a higher chance of contracting AIDS due to biological and cultural reasons. Other issues requiring immediate attention are erroneous assumptions or image schemas such as AIDS is witchcraft, AIDS is a myth and cultural practices like wife inheritance which are AIDS-friendly. In a nutshell, we have presented a summary of the core areas and key findings of our research.

6.3.2 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

From the findings outlined, the following recommendations would be relevant to behaviour change communicators, pragmatists and cognitive linguists as well as non-governmental organizations dealing with HIV and AIDS campaigns.

(1) To enhance memorability of AIDS messages, behaviour change communicators should capitalize on the maxim of brevity by using shorter and simpler constructions rather than cognitively strenuous metaphorical constructions that their addressees do not live by.

(2) There is need for behaviour change communicators to pre-test their pictorial metaphors using different audiences and of dissimilar cultures such as educated and less educated persons, or people from different speech communities. Such pre-tests will easily detect miscomprehension of culturally unfamiliar metaphors in different audiences of dissimilar socio-economic backgrounds.

(3) Paragons used as icons in AIDS posters should be localized to heighten expectations of relevance to specific audiences or communities, or regions within Kenya.

(4) There is need for more campaigns to counter negative implicit assumptions on AIDS such as AIDS is witchcraft or AIDS is a myth. The same extends to gender-biased stereotypes against women who are gravely affected by HIV and AIDS. In addition to this, more campaigns should be used in sensitizing people on how their culture-specific conceptualizations of AIDS reinforce its stigmatization. On the same note, campaigns should equally sensitize addressees on their region-specific prototypes of high

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risk groups, especially with reference to Maseno division premised in Nyanza province of Kenya, where wife inheritance is rife and wife inheritors have been singled out by epidemiologists as one of the high risk groups in the region, yet the respondents within the same region least consider wife inheritors as a high risk category. (cf. Section *5.7.7.4.1* and *Table 30*)

(5) On the strength of our observation on region-specific implicit assumptions on ailments in Maseno division and Eldoret town, it is important for scientists and epidemiologists to collaborate with pragmatists in investigating region-specific implicit assumptions on ailments in terms of salient assumptions as opposed to non salient assumptions to be able to gauge their conformity with scientific models.

From our summary, there are several recommendations worth considering for future studies. For instance, cognitive linguists could investigate mental representations of other Kenyan communities to determine whether they fit into the cultural conceptualizations model outlined in chapter one. A replication of such a research in other regions is bound to generate relevant insights, especially in determining whether the existing mental representations of AIDS globally are universals or culture-specific. Another researchable area for pragmatists or cognitive linguists would be on other cognitive-strenuous metaphors in AIDS campaigns from countries. In addition to such studies, more comparative studies on the conceptualizations of AIDS *vis à vis* other ailments using seropositive and HIV negative respondents need to be undertaken since the research findings of such studies could influence policy on how the aforementioned groups conceptualize AIDS.

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
Appendix 1: Questionnaire

Kindly answer the following questions for a field research that I am undertaking. Your participation will be highly appreciated.

NAME (OPTIONAL)...

GENDER:..

PROFESSION..

ETHNIC COMMUNITY...

AGE...

HIV STATUS...

MARITAL STATUS..

LEVEL OF EDUCATION..

1. Kindly state whether you learnt English or Kiswahili as a first, second or third language.

(a) English: □ First language   □ Second language   □ Third language.

(b) Kiswahili   □ First language   □ Second language   □ Third language.

2. Have you ever heard of AIDS?   □ Yes   □ No

3. From which source do you get information on AIDS ?

□ In the media

□ In posters.

□ In health institutions.

□ If none of the above, write your source..

4(a) Do you know of any AIDS posters in Kenya? □ Yes   □ No

(b) If yes, kindly write down any three memorable messages on these AIDS posters.

(i)...

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(ii)...
(iii)..

5. Is there any particular reason why the three messages are memorable? Briefly give your reason.

....

....

....

....

6(a). Do you adhere to the advice offered by the posters on AIDS and HIV?

□ Yes □ No □ Sometimes

(b) For any of the above answers state the reasons for your choice

....

....

....

7. Generally, what is your opinion of Kenyan AIDS posters and slogans.

□ They are easy to understand.

□ They are difficult to understand.

(8a). Kindly give your understanding of the following AIDS posters.

(i)

....
....
....

(ii)

....
....
....

(iii)

....
....
....

(iv)

....
....
....

(v)

....
....
....

(vi)

....
....

(8b) After writing down your own understanding of the above posters, kindly note down the ones that were difficult to understand and those which were easily understood.

....
....
....

9. Are there issues that AIDS messages or AIDS posters touch on that make you uncomfortable?

□ Yes   □ No

10. If yes, briefly state some of the issues.

....
....
....

11. Do some of the above reasons apply only to you as an individual or include people from your community.

□ To other persons of my community.

□ The reasons are personal..

12. Can a community's perception of AIDS prevent one from following the advice proposed by an AIDS poster?

□ Yes.

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□ No

(b) If yes, briefly state how

....

....

....

13(a). In your ethnic community, what names or expressions are used in reference to AIDS? Give examples stating whether they have a negative or positive attribute and further give their English or Kiswahili translations using the schema below.

Term for AIDS in your mother tongue   **English or Kiswahili Equivalent**   **General perception**

(i) .... □ Positive   □ Negative

(ii)..............................   ....□ Positive   □ Negative.

(iii)..............................   ....□Positive   □ Negative.

(iv)...........................   ....□ Positive   □ Negative.

(13b) What comes into your mind when your friend utters the following sentences.

(i) I have a headache...

....

(ii) I have AIDS...

....

(iii) I have syphilis..

....

(iv) I have malaria...

....

(v) I have cholera..

....

(vi) I have herpes..

....

(vii) I have ebola...

13(c) Of the above diseases, kindly rank the diseases starting from the one you fear most to the one least feared.

....

....

....

....

14(a) Briefly, how do people generally perceive people suffering from HIV and AIDS.

....

....

....

....

14(b) In your opinion is there any category of persons responsible for spreading AIDS in Kenya?

....

....

15. In some cultures the following posters were used in sensitizing people on AIDS, which of the posters below would you comfortably use in sensitizing your daughter or son on AIDS.

(A)   **(B)**

(b) State the reason guiding your preference for poster A or B.

....

....

....

16. Supposing you found a packet of condoms in either your son's room or daughter's purse, what would you think of the following persons:

a) Your son...

....

....

b) Your daughter...

....

....

Appendix 2: Eldoret Town sample

Ethnic Community	Age	Gender	Marital Status	HIV status	Level of Education	Profession
1. Kikuyu	23	Female	Single	HIV (+)	University	Sociology student
2. Kisii	40	Female	Single (widow)	HIV (+)	Standard Four (Primary School)	House wife
3. Luhyia (Maragoli dialect)	44	Female	Single	HIV (+)	Standard Three (Primary School)	Business Lady
4. Kalenjin (Nandi dialect)	34	Male	Single	HIV (+)	Standard Eight (Primary School)	Athlete
5 Luo.	38	Male	Single	HIV (+)	Form Four (Secondary School)	Club Manager
6. Kalenjin Nandi dialect)	30	Female	Single	HIV (+)	Secondary School	Tailor
7. Kikuyu	26	Male	Single	HIV (-)	Diploma	Sales Executive
8. Kalenjin	25	Male	Single	HIV (-)	College	Accountant
9. Luo	22	Female	Single	HIV (-)	University	Public relations student.
10. Kisii	23	Female	Single	HIV (-)	University	Student
11. Luhyia	21	Male	Single	HIV (-)	University	Sociology Student
HIV negative couples						
12. Luhyia	27	Female	Married	HIV (-)	Polytechnic	Clerk
13. Luhyia	31	Male	Married	HIV (-)	High School	Driver
14. Kikuyu	24	Female	Married	HIV (-)	College	Sales
15. Kikuyu	24	Male	Married	HIV (-)	College	Businessman
16. Meru	31	Male	Married	HIV (-)	Form Three	Taxi operator
17. Meru	24	Female	Married	HIV (-)	Standard 8 Primary School	House Wife
18. Turkana	30	Female	Married	HIV (-)	Primary School	House Wife
19. Turkana	35	Male	Married	HIV (-)	Primary School	Taxi operator
20. Luo	32	Female	Married	HIV (-)	High School	House wife
21. Luo	32	Male	Married	HIV (-)	College	Sales Executive

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Ethnic community	Age	Gender	Marital Status	HIV status	Level of Education	Profession
22. Kisii	24	Male	Married	HIV (-)	University	Student
23. Kisii	22	Female	Married	HIV (-)	Form Four	Student
24. Kalenjin	26	Female	Married	HIV (-)	Masters	Masters Student
25. Kalenjin	27	Male	Married	HIV (-)	University	IT consultant
HIV POSITIVE -MARRIED PERSONS						
26. Kikuyu	35	Male	Married	HIV (+)	College	Veterinary assistant
27. Luhyia	61	Male	Married	HIV (+)	Standard 2	Jobless
28.Luhyia	48	Female	Married	HIV (+)	Standard 5	Jobless

Total number (N=28), Mean for Age=30.67 ~31 SD=8.87

Appendix 3: Order of acquired languages by Eldoret Town respondents

Respondent	Languages Acquired
1. Luhyia, single, HIV- male respondent	Eng L_2, Swa L_3
2. Kisii, single HIV- female respondent	Eng L_3, Swa L_2
3. Luo single HIV-female respondent	Eng L_2, Swa L_1
4. Kalenjin single, HIV-female respondent	Eng L_2, Swa L_2
5. Kikuyu single, HIV-male respondent	Eng L_2, Swa L_1
6. Nandi single, HIV+ female respondent	Eng L3, Swa L2
7. Luo single, HIV+ male respondent	Eng L2, Swa L3
8. Luhyia single HIV+ female respondent	No knowledge of English, Swa L3
9. Kalenjin single HIV+ male respondent	No knowledge of English, Swa L3
10. Kisii single HIV+ female respondent	Eng L3, Swa L2
11. Kikuyu single HIV+ female respondent	Eng L3, Swa L2
12. Luhyia married HIV+ female respondent	No knowledge of English, Swa L2
13. Luhyia married HIV+ male respondent	No knowledge of English, Swa L2
14. Kikuyu married HIV+ male respondent	Eng L3, Swa L2
15. Meru married HIV- male respondent	Eng L2, Swa L3
16. Meru married HIV-female respondent	Eng L2,Swa L1
17. Kikuyu married HIV- female respondent	Eng L2, Swa L1
18. Kikuyu married HIV- male respondent	Eng L2, Swa L1
19. Turkana married HIV-female respondent	Eng L3, Swa L2
20. Turkana married HIV- male respondent	No knowledge of English , Swa L2
21. Luo married HIV- male respondent	Eng L2, Swa L3
22. Luo married HIV- female respondent	Eng L1,Swa L3
23. Kisii married HIV- male respondent	Eng L3, Swa L2
24. Kisii married HIV- female respondent	Eng L3, Swa L1
25. Luhyia married HIV-female respondent	Eng L2, Swa L3
26. Luhyia married HIV- male respondent	Eng L2, Swa L3
27. Kalenjin married HIV-female respondent	Eng L2, Swa L3
28. Kalenjin married HIV- male respondent	Eng L1, Swa L2

Appendix 4: Data on questions 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 from Eldoret Town respondents

Ethnic Community and Language acquisition	Gender M/F	HIV status -/+ Single (S), Married (M)	Sources. 1. Media 2. Posters 3.Health Institutions. 4. Other	AIDS Awareness 1 Yes, 2. No	Knowledge of Kenyan AIDS Slogans. 1. Yes 2. No	Memorable slogans
Kikuyu Eng L_3 Swa L_2	F	HIV+ (S)	(1), (2)	(1)	(1)	1. Pamoja tuangamize ukimwi. 2. *[93]Ukimwi unauwa. (AIDS kills) 3. Tunaweza pamoja, kuangamiza ukimwi
Kisii Eng L_3, Swa L_2	F	HIV+ (S)	(1), (2)	(1)	(1)	No poster recalled
Luhyia No Eng, Swa L_2	F	HIV+(S)	(1), (2), (3)	(1)	(1)	1.*AIDS is dangerous, it kills. 2.*We have to prevent transmission.
Kalenjin No Eng, Swa L_3	M	HIV+ (S)	Other	(1)	(1)	1. *AIDS is bad.
Luo Eng L_2, Swa L_2	M	HIV+ (S)	(1)	(1)	(1)	1.*Stick to one partner. 2. *Use condom.
Kalenjin (Nandi dialect) Eng L_3, Swa L_2	F	HIV+S)	(1),(2), (3)	(1)	(1)	1. *Don't you turn your back to AIDS. 2. *Tujihadhari na ukimwi. (Beware of AIDS)
Kikuyu Eng L_2, Swa L_1	M	HIV-(S)	(3)	(1)	(1)	1. *Ni chill 2.*A real man waits 3. *Chukua control (Take control of your life)

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93 * the asterix acts as a signal that the AIDS slogan is either an incomplete version of the poster or a paraphrase of the message.

Ethnic Community and Language acquisition	Gender M/F	HIV status -/+ Single (S), Married (M)	Sources. 1. Media 2. Posters 3.Health Institutions. 4.Other	AIDS Awareness 1 Yes, 2. No	Knowledge of Kenyan AIDS Slogans. 1. Yes 2. No	Memorable slogans
Kalenjin Eng (L$_3$), Swa (L$_2$)	M	HIV-(S)	(1) (2), (3)	(1)	(1)	1. *Ni poa kuchill. 2. *AIDS kills.
Luo Eng (L$_2$), Swa (L$_1$)	F	HIV-(S)	(2)	(1)	(1)	1. *AIDS kills. 2. Uamuzi bora, maisha bora. (A wise decision, a better life)
Kisii, Eng L$_3$, Swa L$_2$	F	HIV-(S)	(1), (2)	(1)	(1)	1.*AIDS is a killer disease. 2. *AIDS is real.
Luhyia Eng L$_2$ Swa ,L$_3$	M	HIV- (S)	(1), (2)	(1)	(1)	1. *AIDS is a natural disaster. 2. STOP AIDS keep the promise. 3. *AIDS is real.
HIV NEGATIVE COUPLES						
Luhyia Eng L$_2$, Swa L$_3$	F	HIV(-) M	(1), (2), (3)	(1)	(1)	1. *AIDS kills and ravishes. 2. *Beware of AIDS 3. AIDS has no cure.
Luhyia Eng L$_2$, Swa L$_3$	M	HIV(-) M	(1) (2) (3)	(1)	(1)	1. *Beware of AIDS. 2. *AIDS is not a curse. 3: *AIDS is real
Kikuyu Eng,L$_2$ Swa, L$_1$	F	HIV(-) M	(1)	(1)	(1)	1. *Ukimwi unauwa (AIDS kills) 2. Pamoja tuangamize ukimwi (Together we can defeat AIDS)
Kikuyu Eng L$_2$, Swa L$_1$	M	HIV(-) M	(1) (2)	(1)	(1)	1. *AIDS kills. 2. *Ku chill. 3. ABC (For Abstinence, Be-Faithful, C- use Condom)

Ethnic Community and Language acquisition	Gender M/F	HIV status -/+ Single (S), Married (M)	Sources. 1. Media 2. Posters 3.Health Institutions. 4. Other	AIDS Awareness 1 Yes, 2. No	Knowledge of Kenyan AIDS Slogans. 1. Yes 2. No	Memorable slogans
Meru Eng L$_2$, Swa L$_3$	M	HIV(-) M	(1), (2), (3)	(1)	(1)	1. Pamoja tuangamize Ukimwi. (Together we can defeat AIDS. 2. *AIDS kills
Meru, EngL$_2$, Swa, L$_3$	M	HIV(-) M	(1), (2) (3)	(1)	(1)	1. Pamoja tuangamize Ukimwi. (Together we can defeat AIDS)
Turkana Eng L$_3$, Swa L$_2$	F	HIV(-) M	(1) (2) (3)	(1)	(1)	1. *AIDS kills. 2.Ukimwi haina dawa. (AIDS has no cure)
Turkana No Eng, Swa L$_2$	M	HIV(-) M	(1), (2) (3)	(1)	(1)	1. *Ukimwi unauwa (AIDS kills) 2.*Vileunaweza kujikinga (How one can protect oneself) 3. *Chenye inazidisha Ukimwi) (What propagates AIDS)
Luo Eng L$_2$, Swa L$_3$	M	HIV(-) M	(1), (2), (3)	(1)	(1)	1. *AIDS kills. 2. *Use condoms. 3.*AIDS is not a curse.
Luo Eng L$_1$, Swa, L$_3$	F	HIV(-) M	(1) (2) (3)	(1)	(1)	1. Pamoja tuangamize ukimwi.(Together we can defeat AIDS)
Kisii EngL$_1$, Swa, L$_3$	M	HIV (-) M	(1), (2), (3)	(1)	(1)	1. Pamoja tuangamize ukimwi (Together we can defeat AIDS) 2. *Ni poa kuchill. 3. *A real man waits.
Kisii Eng L$_3$, Swa L$_1$	F	HIV(-) M	(1), (2), (3)	(1)	(1)	1.*If not married, abstain
Kalenjin EngL$_2$, Swa L$_3$	F	HIV(-) M	(1), (2) (3)	(1)	(1)	1. * Be faithful to your spouse. AIDS kills. 2. *Ni poa kuchill.

Ethnic Community and Language acquisition	Gender M/F	HIV status -/+ Single (S), Married (M)	Sources. 1. Media 2. Posters 3. Health Institutions. 4. Other	AIDS Awareness 1 Yes, 2. No	Knowledge of Kenyan AIDS Slogans. 1. Yes 2. No	Memorable slogan
Kalenjin EngL$_1$, Swa L$_2$	M	HIV(-) M	(1) (2)	(1)	(1)	1. *It is important to know your status. 2. *It is important to stick to one partner 3. Use condoms to reduce risks
HIV POSITIVE MARRIED PERSONS.						
Kikuyu, Eng L$_3$, Swa L$_2$	M	HIV (+) M	(1), (2), (4)	(1)	(1)	1.*AIDS is not witchcraft, anyone can get. 2. *Go for VCT.
Luhyia No Eng, Swa L$_2$	M	HIV+ (M)	(1), (2) (4)	(1)	(1)	1.*If one is unwell, go for VCT.
Luhyia, No Eng, Swa, L$_3$	F	HIV(+) M	(1), (2), (4)	(1)	(1)	No poster recalled but said "To prevent oneself from AIDS"

Appendix 5: Reasons for memorability of AIDS messages by Eldoret Town respondents

ETHNIC COMMUNITY	HIV STATUS/ MARITAL STATUS/ SEX F/M	REASON	ETHNIC COMMUNITY	HIV STATUS/ MARITAL STATUS	REASON
1. Kikuyu	HIV+, Single (F)	Repeated by the media	16. Kikuyu	HIV-, married F	-
2. Kisii	HIV+, Single (F)	To live longer and protect my children	17. Kikuyu	HIV-, married M	The language is appealing to the youth (*Sheng'*)
3. Luyhia	HIV+, Single, F	Repeated by the radio, to prevent transmission	18. Turkana	HIV-, married M,	The death of a sibling
4. Kalenjin	HIV+, Single (Mi	Consistent broadcasting by the media	19. Turkana	HIV-,married, M	The death of a friend
5. Luo	HIV+, Single M	Because of the media	20 Luo	HIV-, married F	A cousin died from AIDS and some neighbors are affected
6. Kikuyu	HIV-, Single, M	Educative for people pretending to be ignorant of HIV	21. Luo	HIV-, married, M	Fighting AIDS is a joint initiative
7. Kalenjin,	HIV-, single, M	Educative and reality of AIDS	22 Kisii	HIV- married M	A killer disease and a threat to human kind
8. Luo	HIV,- single F	Fear of death	23. Kisii	HIV-, married F	The media and posters all over the streets
9. Kisii	HIV- single F	Educative	24. Luyhia	HIV+, married M	Killer disease one has to recall the issue
10. Luyhia	HIV, single, M	Educative	25- Luyhia	HIV+, married,	
11. Kikuyu	HIV,- married, M	Educative	26. Kalenjin	HIV-, married F	The slang is appealing to the youth

ETHNIC COMMUNITY	HIV STATUS/ MARITAL STATUS/ SEX F/M	REASON	ETHNIC COMMUNITY	HIV STATUS/ MARITAL STATUS	REASON
12. Luyhia	HIV,- married, M	Educative	27. Kalenjin	HIV-, married M	Educative
13. Luyhia	HIV,- married, F	Educative			
14. Meru	HIV-, married M	Because of president Kibaki's image in the poster			
15. Meru	HIV-, married F	Simplicity of expression			

Appendix 6: Posters which Eldoret Town respondents found easy and difficult to understand

EASY POSTERS	DIFFICULT ONES	EASY POSTERS	DIFFICULT POSTERS
1. I,II, III	(V), (VI)	20. I, II, IV, V, VI	III
2. (I), II,III, IV, V,VI	-	21. I, II, III	IV, V, VI,
3. I,II,III,IV,V	-	22. I, II, III, IV	V
4. II,IV,V, VI	I, III	23. I,II,III, IV, VI	V
5. I, II, IV	III, V, VI	24. I, II, III, IV, V	VI
6. V, IV, II	I, III, VI	25. I, III, IV	II, V
7. I, II, III, IV, V, VI	-	26. I, II, III, IV, VI	V
8. I, II, III,	IV, V	27. II, III, IV	I, V, VI
9. II, III, IV, VI	I, V	28. I, II, VI, IV	V, III
10.I, II, III, IV	V, VI		
11. I, II, III, IV,	V, VI		
12. I, II, III, IV, VI	V		
13. I, II, III, IV	V,		
14.I, II, IV	III, V, VI		
15. I, II, IV, VI	V, III		
16. I, II,IV	III, V, VI		
17. I, II, III, IV	V, VI		
18. I, II, IV, V	III, VI		
19, I, II, III, IV	V, VI		

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Appendix 7: Generalizations or partially understoodAIDS posters by Eldoret Town respondents

RESPONDENTS	POSTER 1	POSTER II	POSTER III	POSTER IV	POSTER V	POSTER VI
Luhyia, HIV +, primary school level education-, jobless	No reference to either the poster's images or schema but says "Be principled." (why?)	Reference to the image but totally misunderstands the message in saying "A woman should not get married early" (why?)	No reference to the poster's icon or but says "Abstain." (why?)	No reference to either the poster's icon but says or image schema but says "be protective of AIDS"	No reference to the poster's icons but says "use protection." (why?)	As a parent one needs to see how to protect my children. (how exactly?)
Meru, Married, HIV negative, housewife standard 8	Reference to the images in the poster. "You have to control yourself, or your company will control you." (on what matters?)	No reference to the posters images but says "It is good to avoid sex, if you are not well learned or if it is not yet." (what?)	No reference to the paragon but says "be faithful." (why? And to whom?)	No reference to the poster's icons but says "To avoid it (what?) needs some efforts from your friends."	Message difficult to understand.	No reference to the poster's icons but says "If you know yourself, you have to know how to live or to do your work." (not well interpreted)
Kikuyu, female, HIV- , married	"I think this one there is a warning to those who want sex by force (rape) or the youth people to wait until marriage." (the message is partly understood)	"Requests people to be at least patient especially teens." (patient in what matters?)	Incorrect reference to the poster's icon and the message is completely misunderstood as respondent says "These shows not only AIDS AIDS kills ungodly alone even a pastor."	No reference to the schema but the respondent says "This may be giving ways of preventing" (what? And how)? message partly understood.	No reference made to the poster's icon but the respondent says "When you are healthy, you can do a lot when productive" message given a generalized interpretation.	The message is partly understood, "Children are left alone because their parents are dying of AIDS and are left helpless."

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Appendix 8: Ranking of diseases by Eldoret Town respondents

HIV- RESPONDENTS	ORDER OF RANKING DISEASES	HIV+ RESPONDENTS	ORDER OF RANKING DISEASES
1	7 2 3 5 4 6 1	1.	2 7 3 6 5 4 1
2	2 6 3 7 4 5 1	2	3 4 5 6 7 1 2
3.	1 2 3 4 5 6 8	3	3 2 4 6 5 7 1
4	2 7 6 3 4 5 1	4	7 2 3 4 6 5 1
5	7 4 2 3 5 6 1	5	7 3 6 2 5 4 1
6.	7 2 6 5 3 4 1	6	7 5 4 6 3 1 2
7.	7 2 6 5 3 4 1	7	2 7 6 3 5 4 1
*8.	2 3 5 6 4 1 -	8	7 6 3 5 2 4 1
9.	7 2 6 3 5 4 1		
*10.	7 2 3 5 4 1 -		
11.	7 2 3 6 5 4 1		
12	2 6 7 3 5 4 1		
13	7 6 5 2 3 6 1		
14	7 2 5 4 6 3 1		
15	2 3 6 7 5 4 1		
16	7 5 6 3 4 2 1		
17	7 2 5 6 3 4 1		
18	2 6 3 5 7 4 1		
19	7 2 6 3 5 4 1		

Key for diseases, 1 Headache, 2. AIDS, 3. Syphilis 4. Malaria 5. Cholera, 6. Herpes, 7. Ebola
* The asterix on 8, and 10 marks incomplete sets having six ailments instead of seven. Incomplete sets were ignored by the researchers.

Appendix 9, FOR QUESTIONS 14A, 14 B

Respondents	Perception of HIV persons	Categorization of persons spreading AIDS
1. KIKUYU SINGLE, HIV+ (FEMALE)	They are promiscuous and are going to die soon	Those engaging in premarital sex, prostitutes
2. KISII, SINGLE HIV+ (MALE)	Discrimination, stigmatized and one can't use same utensils	Men
3. LUYHIA, SINGLE, HIV+ (FEMALE)	People are discriminated upon and beaten	Women, seropositive women and prostitutes
4. KALENJIN, SINGLE HIV+ (MALE)	They are hated and despised	Drunkards
5. LUO, SINGLE, HIV+ (MALE)	Discriminated against and stigmatized	In the Luo community, wife inheritors, or in communities practising male circumcision using unsterilized instruments
6. KALENJIN, SINGLE, HIV+ (FEMALE)	Discriminated against, not wanted even if one has problems, people are not willing to help because they think you are soon dying and are useless	Girls and seropositive persons
7. KIKUYU, SINGLE, HIV- (MALE)	They are promiscuous, irresponsible and reckless	Everyone who is not responsible and who does not value life
MARRIED HIV RESPONDENTS		
8. LUHYIA, MARRIED HIV(+) MALE	They are feared	Drunkards and promiscuous people
9. LUHYIA, MARRIED HIV(+) FEMALE	They are despised for not having lead a decent life	Seropositive persons
10. KIKUYU, MARRIED ¨HIV(+) MAN	In urban areas they are accepted, in remote areas they are stigmatized	The youth, commercial sex workers, poor persons and wife inheritors.
HIV NEGATIVE COUPLES		
11. MERU, MARRIED HIV-, (MALE)	Fear of contagion	Male and female prostitutes
12. MERU, MARRIED HIV- (FEMALE)	They are not treated well like the ones who have good health	Prostitutes
13. TURKANA, MARRIED, HIV- (FEMALE)	They are treated like outcasts	Prostitutes
14. TURKANA, MARRIED, HIV+ (MALE)	You will fear them	Drunkards and prostitutes

RESPONDENTS	PERCEPTION OF HIV PERSONS	CATEGORIZATION OF PERSONS SPREADING AIDS
15. KIKUYU, MARRIED HIV-(FEMALE)	Some fear interacting with people	Prostitutes
16. KIKUYU, MARRIED HIV-, (MALE)	They understand these people need caring	Single mothers
17. KALENJIN, SINGLE, HIV-,(MALE)	Have no future	Promiscuous persons
18. LUO, SINGLE, HIV-(FEMALE)	People see them as dying the next minute. They fear them and a looked as promiscuous	Men, teachers and soldiers
19: KISII, SINGLE, HIV-	They are perceived to be careless especially with sex.	No
20. LUHYIA, SINGLE HIV-	They are looked as a immoral, irresponsible with their sexual life	Prostitutes
HIV NEGATIVE COUPLES		
21. LUHYIA, MARRIED, HIV-(FEMALE)	Like people who have no rights	Prostitutes, unfaithful persons and homosexuals
22. LUHYIA, MARRIED HIV- (MALE)	They tend to ignore them and treat them with fear and disgust	Promiscuous couples, drug addicts and prostitutes
23 LUO, MARRIED, HIV-(FEMALE)	Like outcasts, like plague	Unfaithful couples, prostitutes drunkards and drug addicts
24. LUO, MARRIED, HIV-(MALE)	Today's society is a bit accommodative though the stigma is still there	Everyone can be responsible.
25. KISII, MARRIED, HIV-	They are seen as immoral, they deserve the state in which they are on, they are feared and treated as outcasts	Not sure
26. KISII, MARRIED, HIV-	They are despised for people who understand them they are sympathetic	No category

RESPONDENTS	PERCEPTION OF HIV PERSONS	CATEGORIZATION OF PERSONS SPREADING AIDS
27. KALENJIN, MARRIED, HIV-(FEMALE)	Most people think they have been ignorant and not careful. It applies to adults. For children people pity and feel for the kids for it is not their fault	Yes married men
28. KALENJIN, MARRIED HIV- RESPONDENT	AIDS has started to be a normal disease, the stigma has gone down	Sugar daddies and prostitutes

Appendix 10: Maseno Division respondents' sample

Ethnic Community	Age	Gender F/M	Marital Status	HIV status	Level of Education
1. Luhyia (Samia dialect)	26	M	single	-	university
2. Kisii	18	F	single	-	university
3. Maasai	29	M	single	-	primary School
4. Luo	24	M	single	-	college-clerk
5. Meru	22	F	single	-	university
6. Kikuyu	24	F	single	-	college
7. Kalenjin	19	F	single	-	university
HIV NEGATIVE COUPLES					
Ethnic Community	Age	Gender F/M	Marital Status	HIV status	Level of Education
8. Turkana	31	F	married	-	university
9.Turkana	37	M	married	-	university
10. Kikuyu	35	M	married	-	doctorate
11. Kikuyu	32	F	married	-	university
12. Kisii	30	M	married	-	Primary school-class four
13. Kisii	20	F	married	-	college
14 Kalenjin (Kipsigis dialect)	24	F	married	-	university
15. Kalenjin	27	M	married	-	university
16. Luo	38	F	married	-	college
17. Luo	40	M	married	-	college
18. Luhyia	36	F	married	-	Form 4
19 Luhyia	53	M	married	-	College
HIV POSITIVE PERSONS					
20. Kalenjin (Nandi-dialect)	30	F	single	+	High school
21. Kikuyu	26	F	single	+	primary school
22. Luhyia	28	M	single	+	College

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Ethnic Community	Age	Gender F/M	Marital Status	HIV status	Level of Education
MARRIED HIV POSITIVE PERSONS					
23. Luo	32	F	married	+	college
24. Luo	31	F	married	+	high School
25. Luo	42	M	married	+	primary school
26. Kikuyu	32	F	married	+	high school
27. Kikuyu	37	M	married	+	college
28. Luhyia (nyore dialtect)	40	M	married	+	high school
29. Luhyia	29	F	married	+	primary school
30. Luhyia	28	F	married	+	primary school
31. Luhyia	30	M	married	+	college
32. Kalenjin	36	M	married	+	secondary school
33. Kalenjin	29	F	married	+	secondary school
TOTAL **MEAN** **SD**	**1015** **31.26** **7.32**				

Appendix 11: Data on questions 1,2,3 on Maseno Division respondents

Ethnic community	GENDER M/F	HIV +/-, Single (S), Married (M)	ENG-LI, L2, L3	KISWAHILI L1, L2, L3
Luhyia	M	HIV-, (S)	L3	L2
Kisii	F	HIV-, (S)	L2	L3
Maasai	M	HIV-(S)	NO ENG	L2
Luo	M	HIV- (S)	L2	L3
Meru	F	HIV- (S)	L2	L2
Kikuyu	F	HIV-(S)	L2	L2
Kalenjin	F	HIV-(S)	L2	L2
Luyhia (maragoli)	F	HIV-(M)	L2	L1
Luyhia (nyore)	M	HIV-(M)	L3	L2
Turkana	M	HIV-(M)	L3	L2
Turkana	F	HIV-(M)	L3	L2
Kikuyu	M	HIV-(M)	L2	L3
Kikuyu	F	HIV-(M)	L3	L2
Kisii	M	HIV-(M)	L2	L3
Kisii	F	HIV-(M)	L2	L2
Kalenjin	F	HIV-(M)	L3	L2
Kalenjin	M	HIV-(M)	L2	L3
Luo	F	HIV-(M)	L2	L3
Luo	M	HIV-(M)	L1	L2
Kalenjin	F	HIV+(S)	L3	L2
Kikuyu	F	HIV+(S)	L2	L1
Luhyia (Bunyore dialect)	M	HIV+ (S)	L3	L2
Luo	F	HIV+(M)	L1	L2
Luo	M	HIV+ (M)	L1	L2
Luo	F	HIV+(M)	L1	L1
Kikuyu	F	HIV+ (M)	L3	L2
Kikuyu	M	HIV+(M)	L3	L2
Luhyia (Bunyore)	M	HIV+(M)	L2	L3
Luhyia -Bunyore dialect	F	HIV+ (M)	L3	L2
Luhyia	F	HIV+ (M)	L3	L2
Luhyia	M	HIV+(M)	L3	L2

ETHNIC COMMUNITY	GENDER M/F	HIV +/-, Single (S), Married (M)	ENG-LI, L2, L3	KISWAHILI L1, L2, L3
Kalenjin	M	HIV+ (M)	L3	L2
Kalenjin	F	HIV+(M)	L3	L2

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Appendix 12: Memorable AIDS messages among Maseno Division respondents

RESPONDENT 1	NUMBER OF POSTERS
A) KNOW YOUR STATUS B) AIDS IS NOT WITCHCRAFT	1 POSTER SPLIT INTO TWO (1 POSTER)
RESPONDENT 2	
PAMOJA TUANGAMIZE UKIMWI	3 POSTERS WITH BEING SHORTER VERSIONS OF THEIR ORIGINAL POSTERS
TUMECHILL	
AIDS IS REAL	
RESPONDENT 3	
AIDS IS TRANSMITTED BY SEX	NO POSTER
AIDS IS TRANSMITTED BY SHAVING	
AIDS IS TRANSMITTED BY CIRCUMCISION	
RESPONDENT 4	
KNOW KNOW YOUR STATUS	1 INCOMPLETE POSTER
RESPONDENT 5	
AIDS IS NOT WITCHCRAFT BUT REALITY	2 INCOMPLETE POSTERS
IF ONE CARES ABOUT YOUR FAMILY AND LOVE THEM GET TESTED	
RESPONDENT 6	
ADHABU IMEINGIA DUNIANI	NOT A POSTER
DJ PINJE ANAYAKE, JE UNAYAKO?	
KLEPTOMANIAX WANA ZAO, JE UNA YAKO?	THESE ARE TWO POSTERS
RESPONDENT 7	
AIDS KILS	1 INCOMPLETE POSTER
AIDS HAS NO CURE, AIDS CAN BE CONTRACTED BY ANYONE	
RESPONDENT 8	
BE WARE OF AIDS	1 INCOMPLETE POSTER
AIDS HAS NO CURE	
RESPONDENT 9	
MESSAGES ON HOW TO PROTECT OURSELVES FROM CONTRACTING AIDS	NO POSTER
RESPONDENT 10	1 INCOMPLETE POSTER
AIDS HAS NO CURE	
AIDS KILLS	

RESPONDENT 11	NUMBER OF POSTERS
SOMEONE WHO IS SKINNY	2 POSTERS
AIDS KILLS	
AIDS DOES NOT CHOOSE	
RESPONDENT 12	
MEN WHO CARE PROTECT THEIR FAMILIES	1 COMPLETE POSTER
AIDS KILLS	2 INCOMPLETE POSTERS
ABC	(3 POSTERS)
RESPONDENT 13	
ABC	2 INCOMPLETE POSTERS
NO CURE FOR AIDS	
AIDS IS A KILLER DISEASE	
RESPONDENT 14	
AIDS IS NOT WITCHCRAFT, AIDS IS REAL	2 INCOMPLETE POSTERS
AIDS CAN BE PREVENTED THROUGH USING A CONDOM AND BEING FAITHFUL	
RESPONDENT 15	
UKIMWI SIO UCHAWI (AIDS IS NOT WITCHCRAFT)	1 INCOMPLETE POSTER
AIDS IS REAL	
RESPONDENT 16	
TUMECHILL	2 INCOMPLETE POSTERS
NAMELESS ANAYAKE WEWE JE?	
RESPONDENT 17	
BEWARE OF AIDS	1 INCOMPLETE POSTER
RESPONDENT 18	
AIDS KILLS (UKIMWI HUUWA)	1 INCOMPLETE POSTER
RESPONDENT 19	
DO NOT TURN YOUR BACK TO AIDS	2 INCOMPLETE POSTERS
JITAHADHARI UKIMWI (BEWARE OF AIDS)	
RESPONDENT 20	
NI POA KUCHILL	2 INCOMPLETE POSTERS, AND ONE COMPLETE ONE (3 'POSTERS)
PAMOJA TUANGAMIZE UKIMWI	
AIDS KILLS	
RESPONDENT 21	
Free counselling, free testing, better future	NOT A POSTER

RESPONDENT 22	NUMBER OF AIDS POSTERS
AIDS IS NOT REAL	1 COMPLETE POSTER, 1 INCOMPLETE POSTER, 1 NOT A POSTER (2 POSTERS)
STOP AIDS KEEP THE PROMISE	
HUMAN RIGHT	
RESPONDENT 23	
HIV/AIDS IS NOT A MYTH	1 POSTER
AIDS HAS NO CURE	1 POSTER SPLIT INTO TWO (2 POSTERS)
AIDS CAN INFECT ANYONE REGARDLESS OF THE AGE, SEX	
RESPONDENT 24	
AIDS IS REAL	I COMPLETE POSTER, 2 INCOMPLETE POSTERS (3 POSTERS)
EPUKA NA UKIMWI WACHA NA MPANGO WA KANDO	
PLAY SAFE SEX, USE A CONDOM, AIDS HAS NO CURE	
RESPONDENT 25	
DO YOU KNOW YOUR HIV STATUS	2 INCOMPLETE POSTERS
NI POA KUCHILL	
RESPONDENT 26	
HIV IS NOT CURABLE BUT PREVENTABLE	3 INCOMPLETE POSTERS
GO FOR TESTING NOW	
ABC	
RESPONDENT 27	
BEWARE OF AIDS KILLS	1 INCOMPLETE POSTER
RESPONDENT 28	
TUANGAMIZE UKIMWI	2 INCOMPLETE POSTERS
AIDS IS NOT WITCHCRAFT (UKIMWI SIO UCHAWI)	
RESPONDENT 29	
UKIMWI INAUWA	1 INCOMPLETE POSTER
RESPONDENT 30	
AIDS KILLS, IT HAS NO CURE	2 INCOMPLETE POSTERS
AIDS IS A NATURAL DISASTER	
TUWACHANE NA MPANGO WA KANDO, TUEPUKE UKIMWI	2 POSTERS

RESPONDENT 31	NUMBER OF AIDS POSTERS
TUWACHANE NA MPANGO WA KANDO TUEPUKE UKIMWI	2 INCOMPLETE POSTERS
AIDS KILLS	
RESPONDENT 32	
AIDS KILLS	1 INCOMPLETE POSTER
AIDS IS DANGEROUS	
RESPONDENT 33	
AIDS KILLS, IT HAS NO CURE	1 INCOMPLETE POSTER
WAMAMA WASI TRANSMIT KWA WATOTO	

Appendix 13: Reasons for recalling AIDS posters by Maseno Division respondents

REASONS FOR RECALLING AIDS POSTERS.
1. Harsh reality of AIDS
2. Harsh reality of AIDS
3. Harsh reality of AIDS, seen AIDS victims
4. Sensitization, to know one's status
5. A message from the poster wewe ndiwe uhai wao
6. Easy to memorize.
7. Messages are everywhere
8. Harsh reality of AIDS- socioeconomic
9. Harsh reality of AIDS, it kills
10. To protect oneself.
11. To protect oneself
12. Informative on abstinence, however the respondent was not happy about use of skeletons in AIDS messages.
13. Harsh reality of AIDS
14. Because they are short and clear
15 They are repeated or emphasized by the media.
16. They are informative
17. Their constant use in the media, and death of sibling.
18. They are educative
19 They are brief
20. The presence of AIDS posters
21 The harsh reality of AIDS
22. They improve lives of seropositive persons
23. People are ignorant and promiscuous
24. No reason
25 The respondent was seropositive and such messages were both informative and relevant
26. To be able to live longer
27. Because of constantly reading the messages
28. Because of the constant reminder of a sticker on one's car
29. The constant presence in the media, and presence of a sticker on one's car
30. The harsh reality of people suffering from AIDS
31. To prevent transmission

Appendix 14: Reasons for adhering to AIDS posters by Maseno Division respondents

REASON
1. Relevance to the youth
2. They offer guidance
3. No reason
4. Does not see the truth
5. Difficult to use condoms in ABC
6 Incurable nature of AIDS
7. Consequences of AIDS
8. Relevance of AIDS messages
9. AIDS is incurable and AIDS orphans
10. AIDS is incurable and AIDS orphans
11. AIDS is real
12. Loss of a relative
13. To avoid discrimination
14 .For a longer lifelessness
15. Doubt respondents for respondent has not experienced the disease
16. AIDS kills and need for long lifelessness
17. To avoid discrimination
18. For a longer life

Appendix 15: Language Acquisition Order by Maseno Division respondents and percentages

LANGUAGES ACQUIRED BY RESPONDENTS	NUMBER AND PERCENTAGES	
NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS HAVING KISWAHILI AS L_2, AND ENGLISH AS L_3	15	45%
NUMBER OF RESPONDENT HAVING ENGLISH AS L_2, AND KISWAHILI AS L_3	9	27%
NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS HAVING ENGLISH AND KISWAHILI AS L_2	4	12%
RESPONDENTS HAVING ENGLISH AS L_2 AND KISWAHILI AS L_1	2	6%
NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS HAVING NO KNOWLEDGE OF ENGLISH AND KISWAHILI AS L_2	1	3%
RESPONDENTS HAVING ENGLISH AND KISWAHILI AS THEIR L_1	1	3%
RESPONDENTS HAVING ENGLISH AS THEIR L_1 AND KISWAHILI AS L_2	1	3%
TOTAL	**33**	**100**

Appendix 16: Interpretations of AIDS posters by respondents having a low exposure to formal education by Maseno Division

RESPONDENTS	A REAL MAN AIDS POSTER	SEX, NOT NOW POSTER	ABSTINENCE POSTER	TOGETHER WE CAN POSTER	CHAMPIONS POSTER	WEWE NDIWE UHAI WAO POSTER
Maasai, single HIV- respondent (No English, Swahili, L₂)	It means that one should not accept someone's views at the expense of my own.	To have sex demands waiting for the right time.	(No reference to the picture's icon) Having AIDS is like being in prison.	(No reference to icons) Being faithful will enable one prevent AIDS.	No reference to the poster's icons) Winners are people who protect themselves from AIDS like football today you win tomorrow you loose.	God is the giver of life, he has provided for children.
Kisii, married Eng L₂, Swa L₃	A responsible man is not in a hurry, patience pays.	(No reference to the youth in the poster) It is good to wait until the right time.	The message is difficult to understand.	(No reference to the poster's icons) Being faithful will enable one prevent AIDS.	(No reference to the icon) The people who are careful are safe	Kids depend on me as a parent.
Kikuyu, HIV positive, single Eng L₂, L₃ Swa	One just wont have sex because others are doing it.	Sex is not for children.	(No reference to the icon), AIDS kills but abstinence is for a short time.	(No reference to the poster's icons) Together we can decide on the way to live your lives.	The message is difficult to understand, I don't understand which champions.	The children need the adult or rather their parents care.

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RESPONDENTS	A REAL MAN AIDS POSTER	SEX, NOT NOW POSTER	ABSTINENCE POSTER	TOGETHER WE CAN POSTER	CHAMPIONS POSTER	WEWE NDIWE UHAI WAO POSTER
Luo, married, HIV positive Eng L$_1$, Swa L$_2$	To wait and get a faithful partner, get sex during marriage and not abuse sex.	The message is for young fellows, youths should concentrate on their learning.	(No reference to the icon). The best way to keep from AIDS infection but not a crime.	(No reference to the icon in the poster) This is just a matter of knowing some of the copying mechanisms and concepts of positive living, know your status.	(No reference to icons in the poster) Keep off from newly infections and not to infect others too.	Still if one is HIV positive she or he can support his family.
Luhyia, male, HIV positive and married, primary school education. Eng L$_3$, L$_2$ Swa	It is better to protect ourselves and not be deceived by friends and family and end up contracting AIDS.	If not married abstain, for you get to a visit a VCT to know your status.	(No reference to the icon) If one has AIDS, not the end of life, take medication and do not give up.	(No reference to the icon) It is important both to know your status helps to organize lives in the family and seek to live by using protection.	(No reference to the poster's icons in the poster), when using protection, you live longer.	As a parent it programs us to use VCT for testing and to use medication to prevent mother to child transmission
Luhyia, female, HIV negative, Eng, L$_3$, Swa L$_2$	One has to make good judgments.	(No reference to youth), children should not have sex.	(No reference to picture's icons) priests should not have sex.	(No reference to the poster's icons) AIDS affects everybody and should be avoided at all costs.	(No reference to the poster's icons) I think it says sportsmen should also take care of themselves.	Your children believe and depend on you.

Appendix 17: Difficult and easy posters, sensitivity to AIDS posters among Maseno respondents

DIFFICULT AIDS POSTERS	EASY AIDS POSTERS	SENSITIVITY TO AIDS POSTERS, 1.YES 2. NO	REASON FOR CONSIDERING A POSTER SENSITIVE
I, III, III	IV, VI, V	2	1. Educative
VI	I, II, III, IV, V	2	2. Images of condoms
III	I, II, IV, V,VI	2	3. Images of condoms
V, VI	I, II, III, IV	1	4. Images of condoms
VI, ,V	I, II, III, IV	1	5. Using images of thin HIV+ persons in posters
VI, III	I, II, IV, V, VI	2	6.Use of vernacular language
III, V	I, II, III, IV, V, VI	2	7. Images of condoms
III, V	I, II, IV, V, VI	1	8. Mpango wa kando AIDS campaign being aired during meal times in front of children
I, V, VI	I, II, III, IV, V, VI	1	
VI, V	I, II, IV, VI	2	
V	II, III, IV	1	9. Using images of thin HIV+ persons
III, V	I, II, III, IV	2	
I, V	I, II, III, IV, V, VI	1	10. Scary messages such as AIDS does not discriminate
V	I, II, III, IV, VI	2	11. No comment
VI, V, IV	I, II, IV, VI	1	12. Using images of condoms in AIDS posters
V	II, III, IV, VI	2	
V	II, III, IV, VI	1	13. Mpango wa kando AIDS campaign being aired at meal times is embarrassing for parents
VI, I, III	I, II, III,IV,VI	2	
V	I, II, III,IV, VI	1	
VI	II,IV, V	2	
V, VI	I,II,III, IV, VI	1	14. Harsh reality of AIDS
VI	I,II, III, IV, V	2	15. Some posters are frightening
V	I,II, III, IV	2	
I, III	I,II, III, IV, V, VI	1	16. Mpango was Kando AIDS campaign being aired at meal times
V	I, II, III,IV, V	2	
I, III	I, II, III, IV, VI	2	
V	II, IV, V, VI	2	17. Using images of thin HIV+ persons
I, II, V, VI	I, II, III, IV, V, VI	2	
III, V	I, II, III, IV, VI	2	18. Using images of thin HIV+ persons
	III, IV	1	
	I, II, IV, VI	1	

Appendix 18: Interpretations of poster VI by single persons in Maseno Division

Poster VI	Interpretation
1. Luhyia, male, single HIV- respondent	There is need to guide and counsel the coming generation by guiding them on HIV and AIDS. The young generation depends on the youth.
2. Kisii, female, single HIV- respondent	No response on the poster.
3. Maasai, male, single. HIV- respondent	God is the giver of life and he provides for children.
4. Luo, male, single HIV- respondent	People need to value life.
5. Meru, female, single HIV- respondent	Kids are happy if both parents are alive and healthy hence able to provide the daily requirements both material and spiritual. Be faithful and avoid AIDS at least or the sake of your kids.
6. Kikuyu, female, single. HIV- respondent	For parents to be keen to avoid the increasing number of AIDS orphans in the country.
7. Nandi, female, single HIV- respondent	That my life is in my own hands, I can decide to mold it preserve it, or destroy it, through reckless behavior that could lead me to contract AIDS.
8. Kalenjin, male, single HIV+ respondent	The message is difficult to understand.
9. Luhyia, male, single HIV- respondent	Positive living to prevent mother to child transmission.

Appendix 19: Ranking of diseases by HIV negative and positive respondents by Maseno Division respondents

| DISEASES 1. HEADACHE, II AIDS, III SYPHILIS, IV MALARIA, V CHOLERA, VI HERPES, VII EBOLA	
HIV POSITIVE RESPONDENTS	HIV- RESPONDENTS
VII, V, IV, III, VI, I, II	II, III, VI, VII, IV, V, I
VII, II, VI, III, V, IV, I	II, VII, VI, III, IV, V, I
I DONT FEAR ANY DISEASE	RESPONDENT FEARED ALL DISEASES
VII, III, V, VI, IV, II, I	II, VII, VI, III, V, IV, I
VII, V, IV, III , VI, II, I	II, VII, III, V, VI, IV, I
VII, II, V, VI, III, IV, I	VII, VI, II, V, III, IV, I
II, VI, III, V, IV, I, VII	VII, II, III VI, V, IV, I
II, VII, VI, III, V, IV, I	VII, V, II, III, VI, IV, I
NOT FILLED	II, III, V, IV, VII, VI, I
VII, II, I, VI, III, IV, V	II, III, VII, VI, V, IV, I
II, VII, VI, III, V, IV, I	II, VII, VI, III, V, IV, I
VII, II, VI, III, V, IV, I,	II, IV, V, III, VII, VI, I
VII, III, V, VI, II, IV, I	VII, VI, V, II, IV, III, I
II, VII, III, V, VI, IV, I	I, VII, V, III, VI, IV, I
	II, III, VII, VI, V, IV, I
SERIES. 7, 2, 6, 3, 5, 4, 1	VII, II, VI, III, V, IV, I
Ebola, AIDS, herpes, syphilis	II, VII, III, V, IV, VI, I
cholera, Malaria, headache	VII, II, VI, V, IV, III, I
	II, VI, VII, III, IV, V, I
	2, 7, 6, 3, 5, 4, 1
	AIDS, Ebola, herpes, syphilis, cholera, malaria, headache

REASONS, 1. PERSONAL, 2. COMMUNITY	COMMUNITY'S PERCEPTION 1. 2	REASON
2	1	1. Belief that AIDS is a disaster, or AIDS is witchcraft
2	1	2. Sharing of knives during circumcision
2	1	3. AIDS is a myth
1	1	4. AIDS is a myth
1	No comment	5.No comment
No comment	Undecided	6. No comment
1	2	7. No comment
1	2	8. No comment
1, 2	1	9. Images or scary HIV+ persons as opposed to using healthy persons.
2	1	10. Abstinence is relative, for some communities after circumcision people engage in sex because they are now regarded as adults
12	2	11. Stigma
1	2	12. Stigma
12	1	13. AIDS is a myth
1	1	14. Belittling AIDS, some remain promiscuous
1,2	2	15. No comment
No comment	1	16. Wife inheritance, circumcision
2	1	17. AIDS is witchcraft, AIDS is a myth
2	1	18. AIDS is witchcraft, AIDS is a myth
1	1	19. No comment
1	2	20.Wife inheritance, circumcison
2	1	21. Cultural beliefs
2	1	22. Stigma, fear of knowing one's status
2	1	23. Stigma
2	1	24. Ignorance about AIDS
1	1	25 Tolerating promiscuity
2	2	
2	1	
2	2	
	1	
	2	
	1	
	2	
	2	
	1	
	1	

Appendix 21: The evolution of Kenyan AIDS posters


### 1. Use of pictograms in AIDS posters in the nineties

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### 2. Use of real pictures in AIDS posters 2000

3. Use of icons without naming them overtly in the poster: The case of the former archbishop Of Nairobi diocese and the Kenyan football team together with the former minister of sports Honorable Najib Balala

4. Naming of paragons in the 2003 posters, the case of the US President Barack Obama and the First Lady Michelle Obama, during their visit to Kenya.

5. LOCALIZED ICONS IN AIDS POSTERS?

Appendix 22: Research Permit

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Telegrams: "SCIENCETECH", Nairobi
Telephone: 254-020-241349, 2213102
254-020-310571, 2213123.
Fax: 254-020-2213215, 318245, 318249
When replying please quote

P.O. Box 30623-00100
NAIROBI-KENYA
Website: www.ncst.go.ke

Our Ref:

NCST/SS/02/09

Date:
20th Jan, 2010

Lilian Achieng' Magonya
University of Geneva
Switzerland

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION

Following your application for authority to carry out research on *"A Pragmatic Analysis of Figurative Language in HIV Discourse in Kenya: A Case Study of English and Kiswahili Messages"* I am pleased to inform you that you have been authorized to undertake your research in *Uasin Gishu and Kisumu Districts* for a period ending *31st July 2010*.

You are advised to report to the **District Commissioners and the District Education Officers** of *Uasin Gishu and Kisumu Districts* before embarking on your research project.

Upon completion of your research project, you are expected to submit two copies of your research report/thesis to our office.

PROF. S. A. ABDULRAZAK Ph.D, MBS
SECRETARY

Copy to:

The District Commissioner
Uasin Gishu District
Kisumu District

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